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Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members

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Angelova, Vera; Güth, Werner and Kocher, Martin G.ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6792-1192 (November 2019) Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members. IHS Working Paper Series 10, 14 p.

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Abstract

We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: Cooperation; leadership; social dilemma; public goods provision; experiment
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C91, D03, D64
Research Units: Insight Austria
Date Deposited: 16 Dec 2019 14:17
Last Modified: 27 Nov 2024 13:17
URI: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/5209

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