The simple geometry of perfect information games

Demichelis, Stefano; Ritzberger, Klaus and Swinkels, Jeroen M. (2004) The simple geometry of perfect information games. International Journal of Game Theory, 32 (3), pp. 315-338. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400169

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Abstract

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games. (authors' abstract)

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Former Research Units: Divisions > All Research Groups > Old Former Research Groups > Former Departments (until 2015) > Department of Economics and Finance > Academic Research
Date Deposited: 26 Jan 2015 13:55
Last Modified: 11 Feb 2025 03:45
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400169
ISSN: 0020-7276
URI: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2653

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