The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games

Demichelis, Stefano; Ritzberger, Klaus and Swinkels, Jeroen M. (June 2002) The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games. Former Series > Working Paper Series > IHS Economics Series 115


Download (361kB) | Preview


Abstract: Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensiveform games.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Perfect information' 'Subgame perfection' 'Equilibrium correspondence'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C72
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:37
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2024 06:00
ISBN: 1605-7996

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item