Corruption within a Cooperative Society

Kosfeld, Michael (July 1997) Corruption within a Cooperative Society. Former Series > Working Paper Series > IHS Economics Series 48

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Abstract

Abstract: In this paper we take up a model of Okada (1996) to describe the possibility of collective cooperation in a n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game by means of institutional arrangements. In addition, we introduce the possibility to corrupt the institutional authority by paying him some positive transfer in order not to be punished in case of defection. It is shown that there exists a maximal number of corrupting and defecting agents such that the organization is still formed and the rest ofthe population cooperates.;

Item Type:	IHS Series
Keywords:	'Corruption' 'Cooperation' 'Prisoner's Dilemma' 'Organization'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL):	C72
Date Deposited:	26 Sep 2014 10:36
Last Modified:	26 Sep 2019 16:47
URI:	https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/995

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