Information defaults in repeated public good provision

Liu, Jia; Sonntag, AxelORCID: and Zizzo, Daniel John (2022) Information defaults in repeated public good provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 197, pp. 356-369. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.001

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We study an unexplored type of defaults - information defaults - in a repeated public good provision setting. In our treatments, we vary the default of having or not having contribution information as well as whether the information comes with a positive, zero or negative financial incentive. We find that almost all subjects have the information when this is cost-free or financially beneficial, but around a third have the information even when this is costly. Moreover, a default of not having information leads to a slower unraveling of cooperation which is matched by the beliefs about others’ contributions in these treatments. We also find a secondary informational default effect, challenging previous findings on how defaults work: when the default is no information, subjects do not seek information more often, but they tend to believe that more other subjects seek information.

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Keywords: Information defaults, Public good, Value of information, Lab experiments
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C91, D83, H41
Research Units: Current Research Groups > Behavioral Economics
Date Deposited: 31 Mar 2022 07:00
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2023 08:03
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.001
ISSN: 0167-2681

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