Shubik, Martin; Riese, Martin and Preyer, Marianne (March 1971) an experiment with ten duopoly games and beat-the-average behavior. Former Series > Forschungsberichte / Research Memoranda 52
|
Text
fo52.pdf Download (1MB) | Preview |
Abstract
abstract (concluding remarks): compared with a matrix game, this business game is quite rich, complicated and has a complex environment. by the device of briefing the players to try to maximize the difference in their scores, the game is turned intoa two-person zero-sum game with a saddle point. the strategy space is multidimensional. an extremely strong prisoner's dilemma game is built in on advertising and the evidence obtained was that this was reflected in the actual play. in previous experiments where the players were trying to maximize individual payoffs and the game was truly non-constant sum this effect was also observed. the economic solution predictions were quite good in predicting the range to which price and advertising proceeded. profits were lower than the steady state prediction. this could be explained by the dydnamic aspects of the game which were manifested in the learning and control problems of the players. inventories were in general too high. it took time to work out the implications of advertising. the value of production scheduling and its relationship to management of prices was probably not appreciated by many of the players.;
Item Type: | IHS Series |
---|---|
Date Deposited: | 26 Sep 2014 10:34 |
Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2016 14:07 |
URI: | https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/52 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
View Item |