Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines

Karagözoğlu, Emin and Kocher, Martin G.ORCID: (2019) Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines. Experimental Economics, 22 (2), pp. 419-440.

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We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Keywords: Bargaining, Deadline effect, Disagreements, Reference points, Time pressure
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): JEL Classification C71 C91 D74
Research Units: Former Research Units (until 2020) > Insight Austria
Date Deposited: 18 Sep 2018 08:59
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2019 08:16
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9579-y
ISSN: 1386-4157, online 1573-6938

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