Bureaucracy Norms and Market Size

Koziashvili, Arkadi; Nitzan, Shmuel and Tobol, Yossef (October 2010) Bureaucracy Norms and Market Size. Former Series > Working Paper Series > IHS Economics Series 259


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Abstract: This paper proposes a new model of market structure determination. It demonstrates that market structure need not be the result of ideology, political power, collusion among producers or the nature of the technology. In our setting, it is determined by bureaucrats who maximize their share of the industry profits. The approach is illustrated by studying the relationship between industry size and the existing institutional norm and by identifying the bureaucrats' most preferred norm. Inthe latter context, we establish the fundamental inverse relationship between the costs of interaction with government officials and industry size.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Institutional norms' 'Bureaucracy costs' 'Norm viability' 'Industry size'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): D72, D73
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:39
Last Modified: 27 Sep 2019 06:04
ISBN: 1605-7996
URI: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2024

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