Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism

Stark, Oded (June 1999) Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism. Former Series > Working Paper Series > IHS Economics Series 67


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Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Evolution of altruism' 'One-shot prisoner's dilemma game' 'Siblings and strangers'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): A13, D64
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:36
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2019 16:50

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