Archetypal games generate diverse models of power, conflict, and cooperation

Bruns, Bryan and Kimmich, ChristianORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8638-8808 (2021) Archetypal games generate diverse models of power, conflict, and cooperation. Ecology and Society, 26 (4), -2.

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Abstract

Interdependence takes many forms. We show how three patterns of power generate diverse models for understanding dynamics and transformations in social-ecological systems. Archetypal games trace pathways that go beyond a focus on a few social dilemmas to recognize and understand diversity and complexity in a landscape of social situations, including families of coordination and defection problems. We apply the extended topology of two-person two-choice (2 × 2) games to derive simple archetypes of interdependence that generate models with overlapping opportunities and challenges for collective action. Simplifying payoff matrices by equalizing outcome ranks (making ties to show indifference among outcomes) yields three archetypal games that are ordinally equivalent to payoff structures for independence, coordination, and exchange, as identified by interdependence theory in social psychology. These three symmetric patterns of power combine to make an asymmetric archetype for zero-sum conflict and further structures of power and dependence. Differentiating the ranking of outcomes (breaking ties) transforms these primal archetypes into more complex configurations, including intermediate archetypes for synergy, compromise, convention, rivalry, and advantage. Archetypal models of interdependence, and the pathways through which they generate diverse situations, could help to understand institutional diversity and potential transformations in social-ecological systems, to distinguish between convergent and divergent collective action problems for organizations, and to clarify elementary patterns of power in governance.

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Keywords: asymmetric social situations; coordination games; ecology of games; equilibrium selection; interdependence theory; social dilemmas; system dynamics archetypes
Funders: IHS Open Access Fund
Research Units: Former Research Groups (until 2022) > Regional Science and Environmental Research
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2021 07:35
Last Modified: 19 Oct 2021 07:35
ISSN: 1195-5449; 1708-3087
URI: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/5852

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