Introduction to
THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

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PREFACE

This book is an introductory text, at least on the ground of (1) the kind of material referred to, (2) the method of presenting it, and (3) the low degree of abstractness with which the whole range of the vocabulary of describing and explaining change is used. Introduction to Theories of Social Change is therefore geared toward readers interested in obtaining a fairly comprehensive survey of approaches to the study of social change and those students who look for a systematic introduction into some of the most pertinent analytical considerations and empirical aspects of the sociological study of change.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is two-fold: (1) to present some of the conceptual and analytical considerations involved in the sociological study of change; (2) to present a fairly comprehensive survey and critical evaluation of the most prominent approach to the study of social change, i.e., structural-functionalism, in its entirety by treating it as a single theoretical stance; and (3) to present, within the context of these considerations, three contemporary theories dealing with various aspects of social change to show how they may be used as complementary schemes to produce a more "complete" theory of change.

In Part I, we review the major schools of thought, with special emphasis on functional theory, on the issues of conceptualization and explanation of change. More specifically, we deal with the questions of what social change is, what causes change and how change takes place and examine the answers to these questions proposed by some major theories on the subject.

In Part II, we present summaries of three contemporary theories on change. The first theory to be presented was developed by Barrington Moore in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. It is a societal level analysis of the changes connected with a nation's transformation from a feudal to an industrial society. The second theory, presented by Neil J.Smelser in his Theory of Collective Behavior, deals with group level actions directed toward partial or complete changes in the social order. The third theory, or set of related theories on the intra- and interpersonal level, involves various studies done on the relationship between social status and activities and attitudes related to social change. Most of these

concepts involve individual reactions to certain social conditions although some are generalizable to status group reactions. Although each of the theories deals with various aspects of the problems considered in Part I, they represent three very different approaches to the study of social change. After presenting these theories, some of their major differences will be examined in relation to the issues posed in the first part of this study. Finally, the possibility and utility of bringing these theories together as complementary explanatory schemes will be explored, in spite of, or rather largely because of, their differences.

PART I

GENERAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The study of social change has long been an important focus of sociological inquiry. Much literature has been written and hundreds of theories proposed to explain and describe various types of change. Yet the topic of social change remains one of the most ambiguous and loosely-defined areas in the discipline. Instead of attempting a formal definition of this broad subject, and thus merely adding one more to the existing multitude, we shall begin by reviewing some of the major issues and prominent theoretical positions in the area. The purpose of this review is not an exhaustive summary of all the work in the field but, rather, is meant to provide the reader with an appreciation of some of the problems that arise in the study of social change as well as to present explanations of social change characteristic of major schools of thought on the subject.

CHAPTER 1

ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHANGE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

Theories of social change have exhibited great variation in the ways they define and conceptualize the phenomenon of change. This review will deal with only a few of the most prominent ones and a discussion of some of the problems that have arisen in attempts to define and delimit the area of change.

In trying to clarify the meaning of social change as used in a particular theory, three basic questions may be asked: (1) what are the assumptions made in the theory about the nature of society and the nature of change; (2) what is the scope of the explanandum, i.e., the phenomenon to be explained; which level(s) of human action is (are) being studied and what kinds of things are to be considered as "change;" and (3) what is the focus of determinacy, i.e., the variables used to determine this.

1.1 Assumptions

The first question is of particular importance as the underlying assumptions determine how the phenomenon of change will be conceptualized. Appelbaum, in his Theories of Social Change, distinguishes four basic assumptions concerning society made by various theories of social change and notes the implications that these assumptions have for views on change. These assumptions are categorized according to what he terms the four major types of theories on social change:

> Evolutionary theories, characterized primarily by assumptions of smooth, cumulative change often in a linear fashion, and always in the direction of increasing complexity and adaptability; equilibrium theory, characterized by the concept of homeostasis, and focusing on conditions tending towards stability as a consequence; conflict theory, characterized by the assuption that change is endemic to all social organisms and focusing on conditions that tend towards instability as a consequence; and 'rise and fall' theories, characterized by the assumption that societies, cultures, or civilizations regress as well as grow.[1]

The first two types of theories are similar in their implications for viewing change as both focus on the "working out" of conflicts through adjustments and adaptations in the system. The other two are similar in that both see conflict and change as inherent and continuous properties of social organization.

Knowing which kinds of assumptions are being made is important for understanding how the resolution of conflicts (of whatever kind) will be handled by the theory: (a) through adaptive mechanisms; or (b) through the destruction of opposing interests and the synthesis of a new form of social organization.

1.2 Levels

The second basic question in determining how a theory conceptualizes social change involves the focus of the theory, i.e., what aspect of human behavior is being considered "social" or in what unit of analysis is change presumed to be located. Various theories have focused on the individual and group processes which underlie changes in society while others have focused on changes on the social system level. Most theories dealing with social change have been based on one of these perspectives - the psychological

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[1] Richard P.Appelbaum, Theories of Social Change (Chicago, Ill.: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), p. 9; see also pp.123-127.

(e.g., Freud, Horney), social-psychological (e.g., Simmel, Mead) or sociological (e.g., Durkheim, Marx) perspective, although some biological theories (e.g., social Darwinism) and geographical and climatic theories have also been advanced. The three theories that we have chosen for analysis in Part II are examples of modern theories utilizing aspects of these perspectives. Obviously, the focus of a theory on one level of human action or another will greatly influence its scope, its conceptualization of the source of change, impetus to change, the process of change, the effects of change, etc.

In general, most theories that have focused on the individual personality level have defined the nature of social relations in terms of the fulfillment or repression of various instincts and need-dispositions and with reference to such psychological processes as cognition, emotion, motivation. Changes are seen as responses to externally produced stimuli that is, as interchanges between the human organism and his environment (both the inanimate universe and other humans) in which man, via the learning process, can obtain information from his environment and thus adapt to it or attempt to adjust the environment to his own needs and goals. "Thus, whatever the source of the individual's goals, it is an orientation toward achieving them that shapes the individual's transactions with his environment."[2]

Various psychologists have stressed the power of the environment to alter individual behavior (e.g., the stimulus-response theories of Pavlov, Hull, and Skinner), while others emphasize the individual's influence over his environment and his problem-solving capacities (the psychological field theory).

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[2]Bernard S. Phillips, Sociology - Social Structure and Change (London: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p.28 (also see pp.31-38).

In either case, the individual is seen as a goal-oriented creature (whether these goals are stated in terms of instincts, drives, needs, tension-reduction or whatever) and the "social" is seen to reside in the interchanges between an individual and his environment, particularly in the psychological responses to this interchange.

Social psychology has principally focused on the dynamics of the interactions between individuals. The psychological characteristics and behavior patterns are taken into account as well as the social context within which the interaction occurs. In general, social psychologists have viewed the character of social relationships as determined basically by the personalities, motives, needs, etc. of the individual actors while social psychologists have emphasized the impact of the sociocultural environment on mutual expectations and subsequent interactions.

For example, Homans attempts to explain all social behavior in terms of two psychological assumptions: that "the basic units of social behavior are the actions of individual men" and "that the actions are a function of their [psychological] payoffs [in terms of rewards and costs]."[3] Georg Simmel, who studied society in microscopic terms, located the social in the interaction among individuals, thus defining it as an interhuman reality, while "Meadian psychology not only sees the social level as residing in the relations among men, but sees the human personality as arising virtually entirely from human interaction."[4]

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[3]George C.Homans, "Fundamental Social Processes," Sociology: An Introduction, ed. by Neil J.Smelser (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 31 f.

[4]Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 14 f.; Appelbaum, op. cit., p.3; cf. George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology, ed. by Anselm Strauss (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 199.

Those theorists who have stressed the psychological aspect of interaction have generally emphasized the effect of the individual in changing the "character" of the group while those stressing the social context in which behavior occurs have focused on the effect that changes in the group structure or the social context have on the individual's behavior, attitudes, etc.

The sociologist also studies human interactions but is concerned with the interaction process itself (i.e., what occurs between individuals) rather than the psychological processes within the individuals. However, sociology has mainly emphasized the group as the unit of analysis (with individuals seen only as members of groups) and the relationships between the various groups that comprise the social system. The elements of the social system are seen as interdependent so that changes in one part will produce pressures for change in other parts of the system. Within this perspective, or in combination with the social-psychological perspective, a theory may focus on change in such levels as roles, role occupants, role performances, role content, social relationships, social structures (identifiable patterns of roles organized around the fulfillment of some function or activity), social institutions (sets of related social structures), the social system (comprised of related, interdependent institutions), values and norms, etc.

Sometimes culture and cultural change is treated as a separate level of human action but it is so closely interwoven with the foundation and workings of the social system that the two are often subsumed under the same heading. In addition, there is considerable disagreement as to what elements are "cultural" as opposed to "social." And, for the purposes of this study this distinction is not vital.

1.3 What is Change?

1.3.1 Defining Change

The final question in this category is perhaps the most difficult of any presented in this paper. It involves the greatly neglected query of what type and what degree of change in what is considered to be "social change." Most theorists of change answer this question implicitly somewhere in their theory or in the application of it but abstracting the answer to it from the rest of their work is often difficult. We concur with the statement that most of them make concerning the necessity of clearly defining the area but we also, as the others, are hesitant to say what social change is. Whether or not it would even be more fruitful to define what social change "is" once and for all than for each theorist to state, in no uncertain terms, exactly what he will mean by social change is open to question. However, for the purposes of this work we will examine some of the distinctions that have been commonly used to conceptualize "change" and explore some of the problems and implications of these conceptualizations.

Most theorists of social change, be they of the conflict or consensus, evolutionary or cyclical or whatever school, agree that, in the most concrete sense of the word "change", every social system is changing all the time. The composition of the population changes through the life cycle and thus the occupancy of roles changes; the members of society undergo physiological changes; the continuing interactions among members modify attitudes and expectations; new knowledge is constantly being gained and transmitted, etc. On the other hand, many of the social structures within which these changes occur reflect very little change. Nisbet illustrates with the example of the

family structure in Western society:

> Consider only the number of undoubted role tensions, not to say domestic squabbles and hatreds, in the history of the family in the West during the past 2,000 years. But the number of changes of structure of the family and changes of dominant roles in the family have been few. Most are directly related to events outside the family, in other spheres of society, which proved to have substantial impact upon the family. Deviations from the norm of monogamous marriage have always been present in the form of evasions - some of which have been sanctioned evasions, some not. But the norm of monogamy, like the structure of monogamy with its roles and statuses, goes on century after century.[5]

Nisbet also says that we cannot regard such things as social interactions, changes in the population or in role occupancy, or the conflicts, tensions, and strains of roles, status and norms as "change." Neither can we "...seek to derive change - its sources, mechanisms, continuities or discontinuities, and alleged directions - from the elements of social structure - role, status, norm, and so on..."[6] However, Moore[7] points out the problem of disregarding the aggregate effects of seemingly insignificant, day-to-day alterations. For example, a long-term change in either the birth or death rate of a society can have enormous consequences for the economic system, stratification system, educational, political and military institutions, etc. Even a change in the occupant of a role, especially if the role is that of king, prime minister, dictator, president, military commander, etc., can have very far-reaching effects.

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[5]Robert A.Nisbet, The Social Bond (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970), p. 306 (see also pp. 302-308).

[6]Ibid., pp. 303-304.

[7]Wilbert E.Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), chapter 3.

How then can we distinguish between that which is, in a sense, continuously "changing" (and, in another sense, relatively unchanged) and that which constitutes "change"? Although there is little agreement on the subject, some distinctions have been developed which may be useful if only to illuminate the state of confusion which surrounds the issue at present. Credit must be given to the functionalist school for the development of most of these for, although frequently criticized by conflict theorists for "neglecting" social change, they have done more towards clarifying concepts than their opponents.

Perhaps the most popular distinction that is currently made between kinds of changes is that developed by Parsons in his analysis of change within and change of systems[8], i.e., the orderly processes of ongoing change within the boundaries of a system as opposed to the processes resulting in changes in the structure of the system. Many other proponents of the functionalist view (and some of its opponents) have adopted or modified Parsons' categorization.

Of course the distinction between change within and change of systems is a relative one as Coser points out:

> There is always some sort of continuity between a past and a present, or a present and a future social system; societies do not die the way biological organisms do, for it is difficult to assign precise points of birth or death to societies as we do with biological organisms. One may claim that all that can be observed is a change of the organization of social relations; but from one perspective such change may be considered reestablishment of equilibrium whereas from another it may be seen as the formation of a new system.[9]

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[8]Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 480-482.

[9]Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 27.

And, although this appears to be a useful analytical distinction, conflict theorists point out that it is important to remember that the cumulative effect of changes within the system may result in a change of the system.

> It is precisely Marx's contention that the change from feudalism to a different type of social system can be understood only through an investigation of the stresses and strains within the system...conflict leads not only to ever-changing relations within the existing social structure, but the total social system undergoes transformation through conflict.[10]

So, although we may distinguish between the two types of change, they should not be seen as empirically unrelated. If, as Nisbet[11] and others, we ignore the strains, tensions, and conflicts among elements of the social system as possible sources or mechanisms of change we may develop a very one-sided view of the nature of social change. Johnson recognizes this problem to some extent but says that we still need not count strains and alterations within a structure as "change" because "...if it is sociologically important, [they] will bring about changes in values or in institutional patterns"[12] which can then be counted as changes of a structure.

In those theories that are based on the assumption that a social system (or a group or an individual) is a relatively persistent, stable (or at least changing in a smooth, continuous manner) and well-integrated structure of elements (evolutionary and equilibrium theories), the specification of what constitutes "change" has made some headway. As mentioned above, the distinction is usually made between changes within or changes of a system or structure. Those within are considered part of

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[10] Ibid., pp. 25-27.

[11] Nisbet, op.cit.

[12] Harry M. Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1960), p. 630 (see also pp. 626-631).

the "normal" operations or alterations within the pattern of the social structure and are adjusted or adapted to within the boundaries of that structure. Those changes which alter a structure (commonly defined as a relatively fixed relationship between the elements or parts which make up a whole) are "change". According to Johnson: "Broadly speaking, social change is either change in the structural or quasi-structural aspects of a system or change in the relative importance of coexisting structural patterns."[13] Johnson includes under structural aspects such things as cultural values, regulative norms, subgroups, and roles. Under quasi-structural aspects he lists the number of subgroups of each distinct type, the distribution of members among the subgroups of each type, the number of occupants of the various roles within the subgroups and the systems as a whole, the systems as a whole, the distribution of "facilities" (means) and rewards.[14] Other common (but not as specific) formulations of the components of structural changes include "...those changes of type, or form, or pattern of behavior..."[15] or changes in "...the size of a society, the composition or balance of its parts or the type of its organization."[16] Yet there is still much disagreement as to what degree of alteration in a structure is "significant" and what types of alterations in which structures should be counted as "major" or "minor", etc.

Whereas among those who focus on equilibrium there is at least some consensus as to what is not "change", for those who see conflict and change as inherent in social organization (conflict and "rise and fall" theories) the subject of social change is even more vague and confusing. Dahrendorf enumerates

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[13] Ibid., p. 631.

[14] Ibid., pp. 51 and 61.

[15] Nisbet, op.cit., p. 310.

[16] M.Ginsberg, "Social Change," Readings on Social Evolution and Development, ed.by S.N.Eisenstadt (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970), p. 37.

some of the basic tenets of this view:

(1) Every society is at every point subject to processes of change: change is ubiquitous.
(2) Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict is ubiquitous.
(3) Every element in a society renders a contribution to its desintegration and change.
(4) Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.[17]

Even though, for conflict theorists, change is everywhere and continuous, some types of changes are seen as more important than others. And, at the risk of distorting some conflict theories, we could assign the label of "social change" to those types of changes which they see as most significant. We are here referring to changes in power relations or such changes as set up pressures for an alteration in the existing power relations (e.g., for Marx, the development of new forces of production).[17a]

Of course, which changes will be seen as changes in power relations depends on the theorist's conception of power. For Marx, "power" meant economic power, but power over (i.e., ownership of) the means of production also meant political power. The essential feature of social conflict was the unequal distribution of power between two major classes: the oppressors who have the power by virtue of their ownership of the means of production to rule and oppress the non-owners.

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[17] Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 162.

[17a] Ibid., pp. 231 ff.; Lewis A.Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 8, 37.

For Max Weber power was the ability to influence, or impose one's will on, others.[17b] Although there have been many other definitions of "power" advanced, we may assume that, for conflict theorists, alterations in these power relations are the "significant" changes or "social changes" while other changes within a society are not. Or perhaps we couls impose the distinction, in line with the one made by consensus theorists, of changes within a set of power relations (e.g., a merger between companies) and changes of power relations (e.g., the transfer of power from one class to another).

For "rise and fall" theorists, the most "significant" changes are those that accompany or mark the transition from one stage or phase of the envisioned cycle to another. For example, for Pareto, the closing of ranks by the governing elite to the nonelite "foxes" marks the onset of their decline and thus may be said to represent a "significant" change.[17c]

Along the same line we may designate as "significant" for evolutionary theorists those changes associated with the movement of social forms or a whole society from a "less advanced" state towards a terminal "advanced" state or from one level or epoch to another (e.g., for Marx, from the slavery to feudal epoch and to the capitalist epoch; for Comte, from the Theological and Military epoch to the Metaphysical and Juridical and on to the epoch of Positive Science and Industry; for Durkheim, the transition from societies based on mechanical solidarity towards ever increasing complexity and interdependence - based on organic solidarity.)

[17b] Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Karl Marx's Theory of Social Classes," Class, Status and Power, 2nd ed.; ed. by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1966), p.8; Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 4th ed. (Tübingen, Mohr, 1947), p. 28.

[17c] Cf. Vilfredo Pareto, Sociological Writings, selected and introduced by S.E.Finer (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 265 ff.

Again, which changes could be classed as "significant" would depend on the aspects of society which the particular theorist deemed most important or strategic and what final state he had in mind. But, generally, the "social" changes would be those associated with progress in the desired direction of some "ultimate" social form.

Of course there are other theoretical vantage points from which social change can be and has been viewed which accept portions of both the equilibrium-conflict view or ignore the argument altogether. And even these two seemingly contradictory views on the nature of change are not incompatible, at least according to Gerhard Lenski (Power and Privilege) and to Dahrendorf:

> It is evidently virtually impossible to think of society in terms of either model without positing its opposite number at the same time. There can be no conflict, unless this conflict occurs within a context of meaning, i.e., some kind of coherent 'system.' No conflict is conceivable ... *[if]* groups are not united by, or perhaps 'integrated into,' a common frame of reference. Analogously, the notion of integration makes little sense unless it presupposes the existence of different elements that are integrated..."[18]

1.3.2 Describing Change

With the question of "how does one conceptualize or measure social change" still unanswered in any but the most general and ambiguous manner by the two major schools of thought on the question, we will turn to some further distinctions that have been developed and which may prove useful for both (or any) schools in delimiting or at least categorizing "change."

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[18] Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.164.

Some of the attributes most frequently used in describing change are: magnitude of change, time span involved, direction of change, rate of change, amount of violence. These distinctions should not be seen as "either-or" attributes but rather as varying along a continuum from one "extreme" to another.

The magnitude of change involves the distinction between small-scale vs. large-scale change. This categorization is designed to reflect the "... size and centrality (or strategic character) of the units affected [and] the degree of alteration involved by the change."[19] The types of changes involved here range from those which "are so regular in their recurrence that they are a major component of predictable order, and scarcely to be regarded as change in the sense of altered roles, rules, or conditions of action"[20] to the other extreme in the magnitude of change "... when all major structural relations, basic institutions, and prevailing value systems have been transformed."[21] Generally, the theorists operating out of an equilibrium model do not regard the first types of change mentioned as comprising small scale social change

> ...so long as the process is accompanied by no significant changes in the group - that is, by no alterations in the person's positions and their relations and thus in the performances they are expected to play, in rules of conduct, or the results of the system as it continues to operate.[22]

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[19]Appelbaum, op. cit., p. 8.

[20]Wilbert E.Moore and Robert Cook, eds., Readings on Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 81.

[21]Coser, Continuities ...op.cit., p. 18.

[22]Moore, op. cit., p. 46.

As to where the line is to be drawn between "small" vs. "large" scale change, the criteria that have been offered are somewhat vague. Davis used the terms "social change" vs. "cultural change" in discussing this dimension: "By 'social change' is meant only such alterations as occur in social organization - that is, the structure and functions of society" and "cultural change" "...embraces all changes occurring in any branch of culture, including art, science, technology, philosophy, etc. as well as changes in the forms and rules of social organization."[23] Another distinction offered is that small-scale change "...refers to changes within groups and organizations rather than societies, cultures or civilizations"[24] (large-scale change). And Moore, in his Social Change, says that:

> By small-scale changes we shall mean changes in the characteristics of social structures that, though comprised within the general system identifiable as a society, do not have any immediate and major consequences for the generalized structure (society) as such.[25]

Moore admits that "...the qualifier 'major' is possibly evasive, unless some measure of magnitude is available and some meaningful 'critical minimum' is accepted as constituting a major effect."[26] However he neglects to establish any such measure. Another distinction can be derived from Coser's analysis of social conflict in which small-scale changes may be seen as social conflicts which "...lead to inner adjustments of social systems..." and large-scale ones as those which result in "...the breakup of existing social orders and the emergence of a new set of social relations within a new social structure."[27]

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[23] Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 622.

[24] Moore and Cook, op. cit.

[25] Moore, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

[26] Ibid (emphasis added).

[27] Coser, Continuities... op. cit.

One major problem with all of these conceptualizations of magnitude of change (other than their obvious vagueness) involves the next attribute to be discussed - time span. That is, a change which may be classified as "small-scale" from the "short-term" perspective may turn out to have "large-scale" consequences when viewed over a "long-term." Thus, although these descriptions of magnitude may make it possible to classify the effects of an historically "completed" event, it is difficult to apply them to actual or hypothetical cases of change.

The specification of a time span over which change is to be viewed is especially important but lacking in many theories. Moore suggests that:

> Before propositions about short-term and long-term effects can be objectively tested, the time interval must be specified and the future when 'long-term' effects 'will' display themselves must not be so distant as to be meaningless. For we are reminded of the acerb comment, attributed to the great economist Lord Keynes, 'In the long run we are all dead.'[28]

Still, a specification in terms of months or years of what will from now on constitute short term and long term change in all theories would be unwise for these terms are relative to the subject under consideration. Surely the study of the short and long term effects of an economic depression necessitates the use of a different temporal period than the study of the short and long range effects of the industrial revolution. However, it would be helpful in clearing up the confusion in this area if each theorist would specify what period it is that he is discussing changes in and separate between what he views as short and long terms, depending on the time being covered.

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[28]Moore, op. cit., p. 31.

The third attribute of change to be discussed is the directionality of change. Whether a change is viewed as progress or retrogression depends on the eventual result the theorist has in mind. For example, if one is viewing the change in a religion from three gods to one from the perspective of Christianity, this may be seen as "progress." If however, one could look into the future and see that the ultimate result of the development of religion in that society "... is going to be a belief in six gods, a change from a belief in three to a belief in one is not speed but retrogression."[29] The same conclusion might be reached if the observer had no insight into the future but was a proponent of polytheism rather than of Christianity.

The directions of change usually discerned are cyclical and linear changes, or variations on these two themes. But in order to extrapolate a trend in change we must have a starting point and a terminal point within which to interpret the change as well as some point of reference towards which the change is moving. One of the main criticisms leveled against all theories which argue that social change, taken as a whole, is "ultimately" linear or cyclical is that:

> We cannot know anything about all of social change. At best we have reasonably full data concerning a few thousand years of human history, out of millions of past years and no telling how many future ones. Any claim that a mode of change has always persisted and always will persist clearly goes beyond empirical knowledge. The question of what is the ultimate nature of social change is therefore simply a philosophical puzzle that has no place in social science. When we confine ourselves to what is knowable, we find both trends and fluctuations. Indeed, whether a given change is cyclical or linear depends largely on the span of time under consideration. A decline in business appears as a trend if only a few years are taken, whereas in a larger time context it appears as merely one phase of the business cycle."[30]

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[29] Davis, op. cit., p. 627.

[30] Ibid., p. 629.

Another basis for classifying change is the rate at which a change takes place, on a continuum from gradual to rapid. In order to be useful this distinction must be accompanied by specification of the time span being considered and some point towards which this change is headed, i.e, some end result that such and such a change is approaching at a gradual or rapid pace.

The last major distinction frequently employed is that between peaceful and violent change. At times peaceful change has been considered as practically synonymous with graduality and violent change with rapidity. And, in a sense, rapid change may "violently" affect the emotions, values, expectations, etc., of those involved. However, in describing change, the term "violence" more frequently refers to the threat or use of physical force involved in attaining a given change while "peaceful" refers to changes that take place by consent, acceptance or acquiescence and are enforced by the usual normative restraints of the society. Of course, this distinction ignores the institutional violence often involved in "usual normative restraints." Thus it might be more useful (and more correct) to rephrase this distinction in terms of the degree of violence employed, rather than its presence or absence.

Other categorizations that have been devised involve the division of changes on the basis of such characteristics as continuous vs. spasmodic, orderly vs. erratic, and the number of people (or roles) affected by, or involved in, the change.

Although no hard and fast categories have yet been developed into which we can fit different types of changes, the use of the foregoing distinctions, nebulous as they are, may be helpful in clarifying one's conceptualization of any type of change or, at least, they can help one understand the complexities involved in developing a definition of the subject of social change.

Leaving aside the rather arbitrary problem of definition and the philosophical puzzle of the "true nature of change," we now turn to two issues which are central to a concrete sociological explanation of change: the conditions which create change and the processes by which change takes place. Although, unlike the previous issues discussed, these are subject to empirical inquiry, there has been a great deal of controversy over both causal factors and processes.

In the following sections some of the major theoretical positions on the causes and processes of change will be reviewed and, later, three contemporary theories which deal with aspects of these issues will be presented and examined.

CHAPTER 2

EXPLANATIONS OF CHANGE: SOURCE AND PROCESS

This chapter deals with two questions which form the core of many theories of social change: (1) causal agents - the conditions which produce change; and (2) the processes (agents, mechanisms) through which social change takes place. As with the problem of definition, there is little consensus among the major theoretical positions on the sources or processes underlying change.

Both the terms "source" and "process" are somewhat ambiguous and have been used in many ways. In the context of this study, the source of change will be taken to mean the primary or ultimate "cause" or "driving force" behind an episode of change. ("Cause" will be defined here as a set of related factors which, when taken together, are both sufficient and necessary for the production of a certain effect.) As for "process," "...in its most frequent use the term means a transition or series of transitions between one social condition and another."[31] The process of change will here be used to mean the principal conditions or factors involved in the movement of a society, or some aspect of it, from some specified state to another different, "changed" state.

The two problems of source and process are presented together because, in many theories, they are practically inseparable. Especially in those theories which focus on change as inherent in the socio-cultural system (conflict, rise and

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[31] Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. by Julius Gould and William L.Kolb (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 538.

fall, and evolutionary theories), it is difficult to clearly distinguish between the sources of change they discuss and the processes by which change occurs.

As in the previous chapter, the differences between the psychological, social-psychological and sociological perspectives will be explored, with emphasis on the latter. In determining which perspective is being used in a theory, we may keep in mind the type of questions posed by Ginsberg in his article on "Social Change":

> Is it true that in the last resort changes are to be traced back to desires or purposes or, perhaps, unconscious drives in individual minds? [psychological] If the real agents are always individuals, what significance is to be attached to the phrase 'social forces'? Are these concatenations of individual desires or volitions as modified by interaction? [social psychological] Or is causal agency to be ascribed to changes in social structure conceived as bringing about other changes?[32] [sociological].

Psychological theories of social change have generally focused on the "causal role of desires, volitions or unconscious mental drives in the analysis of social changes."[33] Some psychologists have emphasized the primacy of mental processes and internal psychological conflicts or of certain personality "types" as causal factors in change, but most contemporary psychologists view changes in the situation external to the individual as playing an important role in causation (e.g., Karen Horney's theory of the effect of cultural contradictions on personality conflict[34]). The process by which change takes place is usually seen as the acting out of individual desires, motives, intentions, etc. (e.g., the

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[32] Ginsberg, op. cit., p. 37.

[33] Ibid., p. 43.

[34] Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1937).

"competitive motive," desire to optimize gratifications, the release of "repressed aggressive tendencies"). The individual responds to his physical and social situation with purposive acts designed to achieve certain goals which are determined by his needs, drives, instincts, etc.

Social psychological perspectives on change have frequently focused on the conflicts and tensions between the individual (his personality, needs, drives, desires, motives) and the collectivity. Causal factors in social change are seen as the "...desires and purposive acts of men which are stimulated and shaped in various ways by factors in the physical and social environment."[35] Whether priority is given to the changes that alterations in social factors produce in the individual or vice-versa depends on the orientation of the theorist (social psychological vs. social psychological). But, in either case, both the individual and his social milieu are seen as capable of introducing changes in the other through interaction.

Social psychological theories place more emphasis on the part played by social factors in evoking individual responses and shaping motives than do psychological theories and change is often seen as the result of group, rather than individual, efforts to achieve ends. The emergence of a "common purpose" or "group mind" are often seen as important in the change process. According to one social-psychological theorist of change, history may be seen as

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[35]Ginsberg, op. cit., p. 63.

> ...a series of groping efforts of men slowly becoming aware of their common needs and the possibilities of harmonious cooperation. The results of their efforts are embodied in social structures which, in turn, react upon the individual concerned, creating new situations and generating new wants and strains which in their turn stimulate new efforts. Social forces thus consist of the energies of men in conscious or unconscious interaction. The individual will may be often powerless, largely because it is thwarted or unaided by other wills, though on occasions, when opposing forces are equally balanced, the contribution of one or more determined men may be decisive. Slowly the interrelations enter into consciousness, making a common purpose possible. That conscious purpose plays an increasingly important part in the shaping of events seems to me beyond doubt. But it is limited by the nature of the will and the conditions in which it has to work, including the consequences of its own action.[36]

Studies in "group dynamics", cognitive dissonance, status and role strains, inconsistencies and conflicts, partial and differential socialization, collective behavior, and many others are examples of contemporary theories focusing on the interactive effects of changes on the individual and his social milieu. Hans Toch's, The Social Psychology of Social Movements, and Hadley Cantril's, The Psychology of Social Movements, have been important studies on the interaction between personality and social environment in the genesis of various types of movements aimed at effecting changes in society. And David McClelland's theories on the development of achievement motivation[37] as a causal factor in social change has gained prominence in the area of social psychology.

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[36] Ibid., p. 68.

[37] David C.McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: Free Press, 1961).

Another type of explanation of the source of change that is related to both psychological and social psychological perspectives involves the role played by the "great man" or elites in originating and/or effecting social change.

Max Weber, although primarily a historian rather than a theorist of social change, developed the concept of "charisma" which has been embodied in some subsequent theories of change. Weber noted the important role that charismatic leaders had played in providing the "mainspring" for change throughout history. He used the term "charisma" to designate

> ...a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as they are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.[38]

However, it should be noted that Weber did not attribute the ability of charismatic authority to initiate change as resting purely on personality but also on social circumstances and the leader's ability to perform certain functions valued by the society.

Vilfredo Pareto attributed great importance to the "non-elite foxes" both in initiating and carrying out changes in the stagnant regime of "lions." In fact, they were seen as the main agents by which the old regime was overthrown and the "rise and fall" cycle continued.[38a]

W.I. Thomas was also concerned with the role of the "superior individual:"

> ...the power of the attention to meet a crisis is primarily an individual matter, or at least the

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[38]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 358.

[38a]Pareto, op. cit.

> initiative lies with the individual... The relation of the 'great man' to crisis is indeed one of the most important points in the problem of progress. Such men as Moses, Mohammed, Confucious, Christ, have stamped the whole character of a civilization.[39]

And Robert Nisbet, in his theory of social change, focuses on the part played by "innovation-minded" individuals and elites in the change process.

> If we consider any of the major changes in history - changes which involve whole legal orders, social organizations, religions, and which extend into all areas of a society for centuries following - we almost always find some one individual, or a relatively small elite, at work...Major changes are incomprehensible save in terms of superlatively endowed individuals, or effectively marshalled elites, working within social circumstances...[40]

Although this discussion of the psychological and social-psychological explanations of the causes and processes of change has been cursory, the following review of explanations of change in sociological literature will shed more light on the types of conflicts and changes in the larger social system which have direct and important implications for individuals and their social relationships.

Most of the sociological explanations of the origin or source of change may be categorized according to whether change is seen as (a) inherent in the social organization of society; or (b) the product of external forces. In line with the distinctions advanced by Levy and Dahrendorf[41], the former will be termed endogenous change, the latter exogenous change.

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[39] W.I.Thomas, Source Book of Social Origins (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1909) p. 19.

[40] Nisbet, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

[41] Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 127 and ff.

Processes of change may also be classified in this manner, according to whether the agents/mechanisms which bring about change are seen as internally generated or externally imposed.

2.1 Theories of Endogenous Change

The major types of theories that have attributed change to forces generated by the society itself are: (1) conflict; (2) rise and fall; (3) classical evolutionary; and modern variants on classical evolution, (4) multilineal evolution and modernization theories.

2.1.1 Conflict Theory

Conflict theories have generally viewed change as generated by contradictions inherent in the mechanisms of the social system. The source of conflict and change is located in specific social structures - especially those associated with the control and allocation of scarce resources. These theories focus on processes leading to instability and conflict between parts of the society and/or between actors. The major process of change is usually viewed as dialectical with the dominant structures - thesis - (of values, ideologies, power relations, distribution of resources, etc.) giving rise to new, contradictory ones - antithesis - which results in a struggle between the old and the new and produces a synthesis (which then becomes the new thesis).

Marx was one of the major early exponents of conflict theory and his works still represent the most systematic statement of large scale societal change based on the conflict approach. Marx emphasized two interrelated sources of conflict - class conflict and structural conflict. He saw classes as based on the economic relationships that arise out of a division of labor. Not only does cooperation develop from these economic relationships, but also the potential for disorder - an inherent

conflict of interests between the groups engaged in specific economic activities vis-a-vis other parts of the economic system.

> ...the division of labor implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity - enjoyment and labor, production and consumption - devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labor.[42]

Not only did Marx see conflict as inevitable as long as this division of labor and interests exists, but he saw it as magnified by the other major source of strain - the development of new forces of production (substructure) which make existing relations of production and attendant institutions (superstructure) outmoded. These changes in the forces of production (the source of which is rather obscure - presumably innovation) necessitate the eventual change of the whole social superstructure.

From Marx's writings we may discern two major, related processes involved in social change: class conflict and the development of class consciousness. Throughout history there have been two dominant economic classes in conflict with each other - those who control the means of production and those who do not; the oppressor and the oppressed. This class conflict is the main process underlying social change. As new means of production are developed, pressures for change in the superstructure (modes and relations of production, institutions, ideologies, etc.) accumulate. The struggle between the two major economic classes provided the force for this change. Conflict leads not only to ever-changing relations within the system but, finally,

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[42] Karl Marx, "German Ideology," reprinted in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1969), p. 205.

to a breakdown of all existing structural relationships and the development of new ones, based on the new means of production. The oppressed class organizes, revolts and, finally, "bursts asunder the fetters" of the obsolete mode of production and existing institutional arrangements.

In order for an oppressed class to become a successful revolutionary force, another important process must take place - the development of class consciousness. Marx distinguished between a class "in itself" and a class "for itself." In the first instance a class exists by virtue of a common economic situation (e.g., owners vs. non-owners); in the second case a class becomes united by the awareness of common interests. In order for class consciousness to arise, opportunities for communication and association must exist so that the idea of common plight may be transmitted. But class consciousness itself arises only out of involvement in a common struggle with another class.[42a]

Modern conflict theory, as represented by Dahrendorf, Coser, Mills, Gouldner, Aron and others, has retained many elements of the Marxist approach to conflict while rejecting his utopian idealism.

Dahrendorf has developed a theory of interest group conflict in which change is seen to inhere in differential authority relations which produce conflict and change through the opposition of interests.

> In every imperatively coordinated group, the carriers of positive and negative dominance roles determine two quasigroups with opposite latent interests...The opposition of interests has here quite a formal meaning, namely, the expectation that an interest in the preservation

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[42a] Cf. Henri Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), chs. 4 and 5.

> of the status quo is associated with the positive dominance roles and an interest in the change of the status quo is associated with the negative dominance roles. The bearers of positive and negative dominance roles... organize themselves into groups with manifest interests, unless certain empirically variable conditions (the condition of organization) intervene...Interest groups which originate in this manner are in constant conflict over the preservation or change of the status quo...The conflict among interest groups in this sense of the model leads to changes in the structure of their social relations, through changes in the dominance relations.[43]

For Dahrendorf then, this opposition of interests may be seen as the source of change while the formation of, and conflict between, interest groups are the means by which changes in the dominance relations take place.

Coser sees the source of change as resulting from the strains which arise in competition for the scarce resources of power, wealth and status positions. There is a constant strain between those with a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo and those who seek to increase their share of power, wealth, and honor. However, this strain does not necessarily result in conflict:

> ...if certain groups within a social system compare their share in power, wealth, and status honor with that of other groups and question the legitimacy of this distribution, discontent is likely to ensue. If there exists no institutionalized provisions for the expression of such discontents, departures from what is required by the norms of the social system may occur. These may be limited to 'innovation' or they may consist in the rejection of the institutionalized goals.[44]

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[43] Ralf Dahrendorf, "Towards a Theory of Social Conflict," in Social Change, ed.by Amitai and Eva Etzioni (New York: Basic Books, 1964), o. 107.

[44] Coser, Continuities...op.cit., p. 31.

For Coser, as for Marx and Dahrendorf, conflict not only is the source of change but also the means by which it takes place. If dissatisfactions result in the formation of conflict groups, united by a "...common purpose arising in and through conflict...the emergence of genuine transvaluations is likely to occur.[45] The ensuing struggle between the new conflict groups and the "vested interests" of society may lead to changes in structural relations, i.e., changes in the control of power, wealth and status positions. "Whether the emergence of such new groupings...will lead to a change of or within the system will depend on the degree of cohesion that the system itself has attained."[46]

Aron, in his article, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," discusses the conflicts of interest generated by a pluralistic society but devotes much of the article to a critique of Marx's "classless society." He says: "In one way a classless society resolves the conflicts found in fully mature capitalist societies, but the solution involves the reduction of society to obedience rather than general liberation."[47] The nature of conflict is found in the competition between different groups, which vary in the degree of authority and means of political and economic action they possess, and who vie for a share of the national income. Inequality of means to compete in the distribution of the national income and the problem of economic regression experienced by industrializing societies are seen as the two major sources of conflict in modern society. Again, the formation of interest groups and the ensuing struggle between them is the means by which change occurs.

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[45] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[46] Ibid., p. 35

[47] Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series, Part II, 1962), p. 134 (reprinted from The British Journal of Sociology, 1 [1950]).

In sum, conflict theorists locate the source of strain, conflict and change in the differential distribution of power - whether it be economic, political or status power or the "power to define." Conflict, between those who control the access to the scarce and valued resources of a society and those who are in pursuit of a larger share of the resources, is the basic (if not the only) process through which "significant" changes can take place. Unlike these "cyclical conflict theorists," some authors such as Marx see conflict as leading to ultimate harmony, integration, and stability.

2.1.2 Rise and Fall Theory

Theories of continuous cycles locate the source of change as inherent in the culture or society itself. Like conflict theories, they focus on the conditions leading to instability but, in addition, are concerned with the processes whereby societies, cultures, or civilizations move along a pattern of growth, stagnation and regression. Change is manifested in the recurrent themes or patterns of "cultural types," often viewed as analogous to organismic patterns of birth, growth, maturity, decline and death. The pattern "...is not influenced so much by forces external to the culture as by the implications of the culture itself. The causes of change are built into the basic premises of the culture..."[48] Each society, or each stage in the cycle contains within it the seeds for its own development and destruction: a cultural theme is adopted, developed and elaborated until the theme is exhausted and the opportunities for achievement and growth become limited. Then general dissatisfaction with the present society grows and disorder spreads until the old pattern is destroyed and the society moves on to the next phase of the cycle.

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[48] Smelser, op. cit., p. 712.

One of the best known rise and fall theories is that of Pitirim Sorokin. He described three major cultural themes: Sensate, dominated by reason and realism; Ideational, characterized by mysticism, sentiment and symbolism; and Idealistic, a combination of the Sensate and Ideational extremes.[48a] Sorokin believed that cultural systems fluctuate between domination by sensate and ideational themes (with the idealistic period intervening during the shift between the two extremes). While a cultural theme is developing, the society flurishes. However, when the culture becomes saturated by this theme, innovation and progress are stifled; opportunities for future developments of the theme are exhausted. When this "saturation point" is reached, cultural stagnation and disintegration set in, paving the way for the reversal of cultural values in the direction of the opposite theme. Thus, unlike the linear evolutionists, Sorokin sees the possibilities for development as limited.

> The basic forms of almost all sociocultural phenomena are limited in their number; hence they inevitably recur in time, in rhythmic fashion, and in the course of their changes do not follow a strictly linear trend.[49]

Although Sorokin saw an inevitability to the oscillation of cultural systems between the sensate and ideational themes, he did not mean by this that the implementation or actualization of these themes precludes change in the structure and form of society.

> The dominant form of the direction of sociocultural processes is neither permanently cyclical nor permanently linear, but varyingly recurrent, with incessant modifications of the old themes.[49a]

[48a] Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols. (New York: American Book Co., 1937-41); especially Vol. 1, pp. 66-75, 189; Vol. IV, pp. 775-777.

[49] Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1947, p. 701.

[49a] Ibid., p. 703.

Sorokin also described another cycle of increasing and decreasing societal integration which accompanies the cycle of cultural types and helps to explain how change occurs. As complete saturation by sensate or ideational forms develops, opportunities for creative activity are exhausted and social integration declines with resultant dissatisfaction, disorder and outbreaks of violence.

> We have observed that social organization, differentiation, and stratification grow immanently until they reach their optimum point in a given group; when the optimum point is exceeded, groups generate forces that inhibit further differentiation and stratification. On the other hand, when immobility persists too long, social systems generate forces working for differentiation. If systems do not succeed in regaining their optimum equilibrium, they tend to disintegrate.[50]

Vilfredo Pareto's theory of "The Circulation of the Elites" is a famous political rise and fall theory. Social change takes place because the strength of certain residues (predispositions to certain forms of conduct underlying human behavior) changes over time. However, the social system is never really "changed" because it operates in a state of equilibrium in which change in one residue sets up a compensatory reaction in other areas. "Change for Pareto... maintains the system. The elements whose values alter are the residues and the derivations, but they alter quantitatively."[51] As mentioned, Pareto divides society into two basic groups (both in the economic and political spheres): foxes and lions.

> In the former, the residues of combination predominate - they are innovators, experimenters, risk-takers, mentally mobile...In the latter,

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[50] Ibid., p. 704; for a discussion, see also Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957), pp. 517 f.

[51] G.Duncan Mitchell, A Hundred Years of Sociology (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), p. 122.

> residues of the persistence of aggregates have the upper hand; they are traditionalists, followers of routine, advocates of 'sound methods,' mentally immobile...The most prosperous society is one in which the most important residues are best distributed: the leaders should be strong in residues of combination, thus leading the society to innovate; the followers should be strong in the residues of the persistence of aggregates, thus consolidating all the advantage that may be derived from the new combinations.[52]

At the beginning of a cycle, the elite is strong in the residues of combination. They use cunning, deception, and force to carry out and enforce their new innovations. However, they soon come to stress order, peace, and loyalty within their ranks to preserve the new order. Thus residues of the persistence of aggregates become stronger among the elite. At the same time, they close their ranks to non-elites in order to maintain their positions. By so doing they exclude innovation and the ruling class becomes stagnant. The elite is now composed of those characteristics of the lions and is open to attack by the non-elite foxes who are willing to use new means, such as cunning, deception, and force. Thus revolution (or, perhaps more accurately, a coup d'état) takes place and the new elite of foxes takes over - for a while. The only means by which this cycle can be slowed down is if the elite remains willing to use force and if non-elite foxes are allowed to move into the ruling class (i.e., are co-opted) while elite lions are forced out (at least out of the governing segment of the elite).

Other well-known rise and fall theories have been advanced by Spengler, Toynbee, and Kroeber. However, most classical cyclical theories do not differ greatly from the two discussed here on the issues of the source of change, as inherent in the limitations of cultural patterns, and of the process of change, as resulting from stagnation and becoming manifest in discontent and aggression.

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[52] Howard Becker and Harry E. Barnes, Social Thought from Lore to Science, Vol. III (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1961), p. 1022.

2.1.3 Classical Evolutionary Theory

Classical evolutionary theory was based on the assumption that the history of human societies was the history of their development from a "backward" to an "advanced" state, usually through a series of stages characterized by specific types of institutions, ideas, values, etc. of ever-increasing complexity. The dual themes of the organismic analogy and "progress" from the "primitive" to the "ideal" have pervaded most of these theories.

> Classical evolutionary theory rests on the notion that a cultural item or complex appears when a given society is 'ripe' for it - that is, when it has reached the appropriate stage of evolution. According to this view, causation is internal to society; even if a backward society were exposed to more advanced technology and customs, this society, proceeding on its evolutionary path, would not be prepared to incorporate them.[53]

Although change was seen to inhere in the evolutionary dynamics of each society, the theories failed to fully explain the processes involved as a society moved from one stage to another.

> Most of the classical evolutionary schools tended, rather, to point out general causes of change (economic, technological, spiritual, etc.) or some general trends (e.g., the trend to complexity) inherent in the development of societies. Very often they confused such general tendencies with the causes of change or assumed that these general tendencies explain concrete instances of change.[54]

One of the earliest theories of social evolution to gain prominence was advanced by the "founder of sociology," August Comte. He described three major epochs or stages through which he believed all societies were destined to pass on the road toward human "perfection." The first is

> ...(1) the theological and military epoch in which supernatural preoccupations dominate the

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[53] Smelser, op. cit., p. 704

[54] S.N.Eisenstadt, ed., Readings in Social Evolution and Development (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970), p. 13.

> culture, and military conquest and slavery are the major social goals; (2) the metaphysical and juridical epoch, which is a transitional epoch between the first and third; and (3) the scientific and industrial epoch, in which positivism displaces religious speculation and peaceful economic production displaces war-making as the dominant aim of social organization.[55]

In regard to social change, Comte saw it as practically synonymous with inevitable evolutionary progress following the natural law that "results from the instinctive tendency of the human race to perfect itself."[56]

According to Comte, evolution was primarily the evolution of human intelligence from fetishism to positivism and the corresponding development of social organization from activity oriented towards the war of man against man to the struggle of man against nature. For Comte, "the movement of history...is effected by action and reactions between the various segments of the total social reality."[57] Different systems of thought develop in the direction of positivism at differential rates, creating chaos and crisis. "One of the mechanisms of the movement of history is precisely the incoherence, at each stage of history, of various ways of thinking."[58] However, this seeming chaos would someday be comprehended as the natural, inevitable and "orderly" unfolding of history. As the intellectual movement towards positivism progresses, social institutions change, also at varying rates. Differentiation and specialization of functions increases as man struggles to master nature through the scientific discovery and application of laws governing natural phenomena.

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[55] Smelser, op. cit., p. 699.

[56] Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, Vol.IV (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1877), p. 588.

[57] Raymond, Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. I, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1970), p.99.

[58] Ibid., p. 96.

Differentiation and specialization in one institutional sphere sets up pressures on related areas of activity in the society to move in the direction of "progress," i.e., to increase their control over the environment.

Another prominent theorist in this category is Karl Marx. Although treated as a conflict theorist earlier in this chapter, his theory is also decidedly evolutionary. He differs from other classical evolutionists in that he did not view the progress of societies as smooth, gradual, continuous change but rather "...as broken into discrete units, or epochs, within which the mechanisms [in the system] resulted in slight change but between which there was a complete change of mechanisms themselves."[59]

Marx identified four major historical epochs: the Slave, Feudal, Capitalist, and Socialist (which would culminate in communism as the state "withered away"). Each epoch was characterized by two major, antagonistic classes engaged in a struggle for control over the means of production. What is important for evolutionary theory

> ...is his belief that there is a logic of development operating independently of human will which inevitably results in changes in the structure of society, its origins lying in the relationship of man to the means of production (i.e., factories, mills and machinery), whilst behind this there are the fundamental limitations set by a dominant mode of production (i.e., manual labor or steam power).[60]

Another type of evolutionary theory has focused on the movement of societies from one "ideal type" of social structure to another. The different types are usually defined in terms

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[59]James Beshers, "Mathematical Models of Social Change," Explorations in Social Change, ed. by George K.Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 283.

[60]Mitchell, op. cit., p. 5.

of the basis of social integration and the transition is not necessarily evaluated as one of progress or a move towards "perfection" (indeed, sometimes the opposite, as with Tonnies and Durkheim). In 1861 Sir Henry Maine wrote in his book, Ancient Law, that societies progressed through a series of stages in which the basis for social order changed from patriarchal kinship bonds and "status" to "contract" and freedom. In 1887 Ferdinand Toennies published his famous dichotomization of social structures: Gemeinschaft ("community" - based on common moral sentiments) and Gesellschaft ("association" - based on rational self-interest).[60a]

Durkheim followed this tradition in developing his polar types of social integration - mechanical and organic solidarity. A society based on mechanical solidarity is characterized by a shared, all-encompassing system of beliefs and sentiments, i.e., a strong collective conscience. Such a society is usually small, agricultural and exhibits a high degree of homogeneity among members. "The individuals, the members of the same collectivity, resemble each other because they feel the same emotions, cherish the same values, and hold the same things sacred. The society is coherent because the individuals are not yet differentiated."[61] Social organization is simple, usually based on kinship. On the other hand, modern, populous industrial societies are characterized by organic solidarity, based on the social division of labor among members. The interdependence which results from differentiation provides the basis for social solidarity. A strong collective conscience

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[60a] Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1907); Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society, trans. and ed. by Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

[61] Aron, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 11; Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964), Book I, chapters 2 and 3.

is not necessary because mutual dependence (usually) ensures cooperation. Social organization is based on the social task performed.

As for the cause of change in the form of social organization, it appears to be essentially the same for these theories of evolution between "ideal types." An increase in the volume and density of population leads to increased differentiation and specialization of functions and an increase in social interaction (or what Durkheim calls "moral density"). As a society grows in density, traditional bases for authority start to break down. Larger populations lead to a scarcity of resources and an increase in the division and specialization of labor develops in order to efficiently utilize the resources. The common bonds of values, knowledge, and shared beliefs decrease as anonymity and impersonality increase with the growing population and structural complexity. The cause of social change is thus seen as an internal, "inevitable" condition associated with the growth of a society in its numbers and complexity.[61a]

The two most important processes involved in the transition from "simple" to "complex" social organization are: (1)increasing differentiation and specialization of social functions; and (2) the replacement of ascriptive bases of social organization by achievement criteria.

Differentiation refers to the dissociation of major social functions from one another and their subsequent organization into separate but interdependent institutional spheres. As differentiation progresses, activity becomes increasingly specialized around the fulfillment of some single function. In

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[61a] Ibid., p. 262.

theories of evolution between "ideal types," the

> ...different levels or stages of differentiation denote the degree to which the major social and cultural activities, as well as certain basic resources - man-power, economic resources, motivational - have been disembedded or freed from kinship, territorial, and other ascriptive units...It is this disembedment of resources and activities from such ascriptive frameworks that constitutes the basis for the transformative capacities of societies...The growing autonomy of the different institutional spheres and the extension of their organizational scope...opens up new possibilities for development and creativity - for technological development, expansion of political power or rights, or cultural, religious, philosophical, and personal creativity.[62]

Other important evolutionary theorists include Lewis Henry Morgan,[63] Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner. Spencer believed that "...social or institutional evolution is part and parcel of cosmic evolution as a whole, and hence cannot be successfully controlled by artificial human intervention and guidance."[64] And Sumner, greatly influenced by Spencer, wrote:

> The things that will change it [the world] are the great discoveries and inventions, the new reactions inside the social organism, and the changes in the earth itself on account of changes in the cosmical forces. These causes will make of it just what, in fidelity to them, it ought to be. The men will be carried along with it and be made by it...That is why it is the greatest folly of which a man can be capable, to sit down with a slate and pencil to plan out a new social world.[65]

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[62] Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[63] For a summary and critique of Morgan's theory see Smelser, op. cit., pp. 699-701.

[64] Becker and Barnes, op. cit., p. 799.

[65] William G.Sumner, "The Absurd Attempt to Make the World Over," written in 1894 and reprinted in War and Other Essays (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.Press, 1913), p. 210.

In general then, evolutionary theories see structural change as inevitable, the result of forces endemic to all societies which cannot be stopped or changed by the efforts of men. Invention, innovation, population growth, functional differentiation, etc. are seen as making social change immanent in every society - the iron law of development.

Despite the barrage of criticism leveled against classical evolutionary theory for its single, universal determinants, vague "prime movers" of history, lack of empirical proof for "general laws of history," etc., etc., the evolutionary perspective is still thriving, albeit in a modified manner, in theories of multilineal evolution and modernization.

2.1.4 Neoevolutionary Theory

One neoevolutionary school of thought, called multilinear evolution, has been developed in the works of Julian Steward, Marshall Sahlins, Elman Service and others. This school has basically sought to reconcile the overall parallel patterns of development that they see in many cultures with the great cultural diversities that also exist. Steward's argument

> ...is summarized in the proposition that 'the facts now accumulated indicate that human culture evolved along a number of different lines; we must think of evolution not as unilinear but multilinear.' The task of the anthropologist is to identify culture types within which distinctive lines of evolution emerge. Thus, one type of culture area produces hunters, another an agricultural civilization. 'Human evolution, then, is not merely a matter of biology, but of the interaction of man's physical and cultural characteristics, each influencing the other.'[66]

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[66] Appelbaum, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

And Sahlins and Service attempt to explain both diversity and general stages of development through the ideas of Specific and General Evolution.

> It appears almost obvious upon stating it that in both its biological and cultural spheres evolution moves simultaneously in two directions. On one side, it creates diversity through adaptive modification; new forms differentiate from old. On the other side, evolution generates progress: higher forms arise from, and surpass, lower. The first of these directions is Specific Evolution, and the second, General Evolution.[67]

The process by which societies evolve rests on the development of increasingly greater adaptability - adaptation to environmental conditions, previous cultural heritage and the achievements borrowed from other cultures. Sahlins and Service identify three steps in evolutionary progress to "high" cultural forms. The first two involve (a) the production of greater energy transformation and (b) an increase in societal integration.

> It seems to us that progress is the total transformation of energy involved in the creation and perpetuation of a cultural organization...Cultures that transform more energy have more parts and subsystems, more specialization of parts, and more effective means of integration of the whole.[68]

A highly energized and integrated social organization results in the third aspect of progress - greater adaptability to the exigencies imposed by the physical and social environment.

As with the classical evolutionists, the multilinear evolutionists envision the development of societies in the

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[67] M.D. Sahlins and E.R.Service, eds., Evolution and Culture, (Ann Arbor Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 12-13.

[68] Appelbaum, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

general direction of progress to "higher forms" although, unlike classical theory, societies may develop along different lines as they progress. Also, unlike earlier evolutionary theories, external sources of change are recognized and are seen as accounting for some cultural variations in development.

Modernization theories are concerned with the transformations that societies undergo during industrialization. Although some of the recent modernization literature has dropped the evolutionary emphasis, the heritage of evolutionary thought is apparent in many of these theories which see the patterns of development as essentially the same for all societies undergoing industrialization and the end result of this "progress" - modernized societies - as being quite similar.

Marion J.Levy's view of modernization is that:

> We are confronted - whether for good or for bad - with a universal social solvent. The patterns of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them...The patterns always penetrate; once the penetration has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized societies.[69]

Wilbert Moore defines modernization as "...the 'total' transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the 'advanced', economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World."[70]

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[69]Marion J.Levy, "Social Patterns and Problems of Modernization," in Moore and Cook, op. cit., p. 190.

[70]Moore, op. cit., p. 89.

And Smelser says that the term "modernization" "...refers to the fact that technical, economic, and ecological changes ramify through the whole social and cultural fabric."[71]

The source of technical and economic change is seen as mainly endogenous innovation although societies which begin the process of industrialization later than others may borrow certain inventions and knowledge, enabling them to develop more rapidly than by independent invention alone. Social and cultural institutions presumably change as a direct result of changes in technology and the means of production. Here modernization theory borrows heavily from Durkheim. The increased differentiation and specialization of functions leads to an increasing "moral density" (the number of people engaged in social interaction) and a breakdown in traditional social relationships. Heterogeneity of beliefs and interests results as well as the disorganization and destruction of pre-industrial social life.

The two most important, but interrelated, processes of change involved in modernization are industrialization and structural differentiation. In traditional or "premodern" society, social needs are met by a single or small number of social units. For example, the kinship unit often serves as the center for socialization, religious, educational, and economic activities and, often, political functions. Thus the major social functions are fused into a single institution. Differentiation of these functions takes place during modernization and each function comes to be served by a separate, specialized social structure. The process of industrialization is central to structural differentiation as it necessitates the differentiation of productive processes and the structural independence of production and exchange.

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[71] Neil J.Smelser, "The Modernization of Social Relations," Modernization, ed.by Myron Weiner (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 111.

The process of differentiation and specialization in premodern society produces a disintegration of the traditional social structure and, with it, traditional values, norms, and other integrative mechanisms. Gradually, new mechanisms of integration arise which are themselves differentiated and specialized (e.g., labor unions, interest groups, voluntary associations, etc.).

Another factor in the process of modernization seen as important by some theorists (e.g., Gerschenkron, Shils, Kerr, and others) is the part played by "modernizing elites." "Such approaches assume that the process of modernization is...born or 'pushed' not only by the development within a society of certain general structural characteristics but also by the activities of special 'charismatic' groups or personalities."[72]

Another well-known theory of endogenous change which arose as a response to classical evolutionism was W.F.Ogburn's theory of cultural lag. Although, as a positivist, he criticized the evolutionists' unprovable generalizations about the inevitable stages of development, his theory of cultural lag has also been criticized for over-simplification and discrepancies between theory and data.

Ogburn separated two aspects of culture - material and sociocultural aspects (analogous to Marx's substructure and superstructure). He believed that material culture develops and changes through accumulation, i.e., new discoveries and inventions built on past ones. However, this principle of accumulation does not apply to other aspects of culture - values, religious beliefs, art, law, traditions, etc., which do not develop cumulatively but rather are displaced by new ones.[72a]

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[72]Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

[72a]William F.Ogburn, Social Change (New York: Viking Press, 1933), pp. 73, 196, and passim.

His basic hypothesis of cultural lag "...states that changes in material culture proceed at a faster rate than changes in adaptive culture - customs, beliefs, philosophies, laws and governments - and the result is continuous maladjustment between the two types of culture."[73] The more rapid rate of development in material culture causes social maladjustments and pressures for change in the adaptive structures. Thus he saw material innovation as the most important single cause of change.

Ogburn noted three variables that were important in the invention process: (1) mental ability, (2) demand, and (3) existing knowledge. Mental ability referred to the availability of intellectual ability in a society. Demand referred to needs which build up to such proportions in a society that specific resources are diverted to satisfy these needs (e.g., training and education of scientists and technicians to develop national defense programs). Existing knowledge is important in the development of inventions as it provides the base on which inventions can build. The broader the base of knowledge, the more numerous and varied the inventions in a society, so that modern societies are continually accumulating new material culture with consequent lags in adaptive culture resulting in "social maladjustment." Elements of Ogburn's theory can be seen in the modernization approach discussed above.

In sum, the endogenous sources of change envisioned by these theories all stem from one or another kind of inadequacy of the existing society to cope with the various forces which are engendered by or within the socio-cultural system itself and the processes by which societies change are seen as the "working out" of contradictions between the old and the new.

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[73] Smelser, op. cit., p. 703. For a critical view on this kind of interpretation of Ogburn's theory of social change, see Otis Dudley Duncan's Introduction to William F. Ogburn, On Culture and Social Change (Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), esp. pp. XV f.

2.2 Theories of Exogenous Social Change

Theories concerned with exogenous sources of social change generally view societies as basically stable, well-integrated systems which are disrupted or altered only (or principally) by the impact of forces external to the system (e.g., world situation, wars, famine, natural disasters) or by new factors introduced into the system from other societies (e.g., diffusion of cultural traits).

2.2.1 Classical Diffusion and Culture Contact Theory

The idea of cultural diffusion - the spread of cultural traits from one society to another - as the major source of social change arose largely as a protest against the immanent, self-generating view of change developed by the evolutionists. The diffusionists attempted to demonstrate that few, if any, cultural items developed through independent invention but rather were borrowed from other cultures. The presence of certain cultural traits in a society is not evidence that that society has evolved independently to that stage, but rather that it has come into contact with other, more advanced cultures. Thus one society may "evolve" to a certain stage in a fraction of the time it took for other societies, simply by the process of borrowing.

Davis views the question of whether invention or diffusion is the most important source of change as essentially pointless. History has shown that inventions are not the result of a single event or one man's work, but rather that they arise from the ideas, contributions and products of many men. Furthermore, the same invention often is developed in different places, at different times, by different men, independently of each other.

Thus an invention

> ...'can be treated as a single event and ascribed to one man or another only after its nature has been completely misconceived.' In the same way 'diffusion' turns out to be a complex abstraction, not a separate entity. No idea, no practice, no technique ever passed from one society to another without some modification being added to it. The borrowed culture trait must be somehow modified and adapted so as to fit into the existing cultural context. It follows that diffusion and invention are always inseparably mixed. To oppose them as if they were mutually exclusive is to raise a false issue.[74]

As a source of change culture contact is closely related to diffusion. However, unlike diffusion theory, contact theory focuses primarily on the challenges that extensive and intimate culture contact pose for the existing culture.

> More important than borrowing is the discovery that there is a vantage point from which one's own values no longer appear unquestionable axioms but merely one among alternative systems of values. Thus it is not so much the particular culture with which culture contact takes place as it is the attitude toward one's culture that is induced by any serious culture contact...Culture contact gives rise not only to borrowing but to new ideas concerning the necessity for change in the established order and the directions in which such change should go.[75]

Thus not only are new cultural items introduced which may effect changes in the mode of subsistence, technology, etc., but a "relativizing" of values, norms, roles, and goals takes place, a situation not conducive to a static social order.[76]

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[74] Davis, op. cit., p. 631.

[75] Turner and Killian, op. cit., p. 520.

[76] For a discussion see Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), esp. chs.2 and

The processes by which cultural or social traits are transmitted from one society to another involve, of course, some type of communication or contact. Moore lists the following modes of contact and ranks them according to frequency and the number of people involved:

1. Imperialism
2. Other wars, conquests, and military occupations
3. Missionary religions, which might be called "religious imperialism"
4. Mass migration
5. "Individual" migration
6. Economic trade
7. Tourism
8. Transported labor, e.g., slavery, indenture
9. Transfers of knowledge
10. Diplomacy, indirect contacts, formal communications.[77]

He also summarizes some of the major factors that have been proposed by various writers to be correlated with the acceptance of cultural items:

1. Their simplicity
2. Consistency with existing values
3. Prestige of the bearers of novelty
4. An already changing situation in the receiving culture
5. Lack of close "integration" of the receiving system, as exemplified for example by the importance of disaffected elements
6. The extent and continuity of contact.[78]

Bertrand presents several factors which he sees as affecting the change process in diffusion and contact situations:

1. The form of culture - normally material items are diffused faster than ideas or ideologies.
2. Degree of coercion - a conquered people must submit to the wishes of their masters, and to the extent one cultural group has power over another group it can force the group to accept its ways.
3. Intensity of cultural contact - when communication is facile and continuous, diffusion is usually faster than when contacts are difficult and accomplished only on occasion.

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[77] Moore, op.cit., p. 86.

[78] Ibid., p. 86.

4. Amount of cultural inertia - many individuals and groups resist cultural change for a variety of reasons.
5. The presence of a crisis situation.[79]

And Rogers[80] identifies several factors important in the diffusion process. First there must be an innovation which is perceived as new by the potential adopters, whether or not it is. The second element is communication. The new idea or item must be transmitted throughout the society if adoption is to be successful. The third factor is the reaction of the social system within which the innovation is introduced. The social system may act to discourage or encourage adoption, or may even impose the innovation on its members (e.g., flouridation of drinking water).

2.2.2 The Impact of Crises and Events

The roles of crisis or catastrophes brought about by the non-social evironment (e.g., earthquakes, plagues, floods, etc.) are rarely incorporated into contemporary theories of social change, probably because of their unpredictability and the difficulty of making generalizations or predictions about their consequences. Although some theories have been advanced along this line, like that of Karl Wittfogel who suggested that "...the social and political structures of a number of ancient empires were determined by the necessity to control floods and manage the society's water resources,"[81] most of the geographical and climatic explanations of social organization and change have been disproven or discarded.

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[79] Alvin L. Bertrand, Basic Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), pp. 125-126.

[80] Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 12-20.

[81] Society Today (Del Mar, California: CRM Books, 1971), p. 451; Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1957).

Small-scale studies of natural disasters have generally shown that neither the disaster itself nor the temporary social organizations that arise to deal with the emergency directly change or challenge the social order. However, natural disasters may indirectly provide a background for change. For example, a famine may spark existing discontent with the political order or a widespread disaster may so weaken a country that it is left vulnerable to possible rebellion or invasion.

Crises of a social nature are more often treated as potential sources of social change. However, as Turner and Killian point out, well-institutionalized policies for dealing with crises often reduce the pressures for change that might arise.

> ...Catastrophe may be envisioned within the existing social order so that the populace are prepared to accept its inconveniences without doubting the basic adequacy of the established system. Such is generally the case in modern wars. Each nation prepares its populace to accept and deal with a considerable amount of bombing, and results indicate that intensive bombing over an extended period of time does not necessarily break confidence in the existing order...But when catastrophe is of long duration, widespread, and contradicts the assumptions of the established order, pressures multiply for a change in the system. Thus, when bombing can no longer be accepted as a necessary condition to be tolerated...collective opposition to the established order may develop.[82]

Robert Nisbet makes crisis his central explanatory principle in analyzing the cause of social change. In speaking of what he calls the "crisis-born nature of change," Nisbet says: "The first point to be made about change is that wherever it exists in substantial degree, it is associated with some form of crisis."[83] A crisis arises when control (over one's environment)

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[82] Turner and Killian, op. cit., p. 521.

[83] Nisbet, op. cit., p. 316.

is threatened by the introduction of some new element into the environment or when conventional behavior or thought is found to be inadequate or ineffective. According to Nisbet, crisis never arise from strains or conflicts within a social structure. Rather they are the product of "events."

> An event is not a change, though it may be closely related to change. An event is a happening, an occurrence; it takes place in time and, of course, in setting...A single event may, by virtue of its crucial impact, alter one's whole career or life. A major event can also alter the character of an entire nation or culture...An event is external and does not grow out of the structure...[84]

Events which create crisis conditions (i.e., which threaten control or which make conventional behavior inadequate) are the ultimate source of change. Apart from "...those impacts and intrusions we call events...from which modern economic, political, and social history is formed, no understanding of the structural changes so obvious today in the social organizations of peoples on all continents would be possible."[85]

"Events are by their nature unpredictable, fortuitous, and more or less random."[86] Thus the exact cause of a particular social change cannot be predicted. We cannot generalize about where, when and how changes may occur or what effects they will have. "But, wish as we might, we cannot understand social change apart from consideration of events - even if our consideration must always be retrospective and historical rather than analytical or systematic."[87]

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[84] Ibid., pp. 322, 323.

[85] Ibid., pp. 324-325.

[86] Ibid., p. 323.

[87] Ibid.

Nisbet discusses what he considers to be the four major processes of change. Although he sees them as recurrently involved in change throughout history, they are not gradual, continuous processes. This view of change as intermittent, discontinuous and uneven stems from his views on the critical nature of the occurrence of unpredictable, crisisproducing events as the cause of change.

> The first major process of change is individualization, by which I mean the release of individuals from the constraining ties of long-fixed, traditional social codes or authorities. The second is innovation - the circumstances involved in cultural efflorescence of high or distinctive order. Third is the process of politicization in which the assertion of power, whether individual or collective, succeeds the ordinary processes of custom and tradition. The fourth is secularization - the passage of sacred norms into secular, the replacement of a social order largely governed by religious values by one in which utilitarian or secular values are dominant.[88]

In his discussion of the first three processes, Nisbet draws heavily on classical evolutionary and modernization theory; the fourth is analogous to Weber's concept of rationalization.

2.2.3 Equilibrium Theory

The most prominent contemporary school of sociological thought that views exogenous forces as the source of major change is the functionalist school.[88a] The central concept in the functionalist view of society is that of equilibrium, at least according to one of its leading exponents, Kingsley Davis: "The functional-structural approach to sociological analysis is basically an equilibrium theory."[89]

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[88] Ibid., p. 370. Cf. also Robert A.Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford Univ.Press, 1969).

[88a] Since, as we believe, sociological literature provides ample evidence to justify this statement, we shall examine the functionalist theory of social change in the following chapter at some length. The reader who is interested in such a detailed analysis may skip the next couple of pages in which an attempt is made to briefly sketch the equilibrium position.

[89] Davis, op. cit., p. 634.

According to Davis, equilibrium means "...that in the absence of outside interference a society will manifest a trend in a direction determined by the state of the socio-cultural variables at a given moment. Furthermore this equilibrium is in part self-restoring: it resists deflection."[90] And, in his critique of equilibrium theory, Guessous says:

> In the most general terms, a system is said to be in equilibrium when its component parts are so compatible with each other that, barring an outside disturbance, none of them will change its position or relation to the others in any significant way...A theory of social equilibrium is a theory that seeks to uncover the general condition for the maintenance of a society in stable equilibrium, and to specify the mechanisms by which that stability is preserved or re-established after the occurence of outside disturbances.[91]

Early equilibrium theories have often been criticized for their emphasis on how order is maintained while neglecting how change occurs. Guessous argues that the model of a stable equilibrium leaves only "...one point of view from which the problem of structural change can be analyzed - by relating it to the influence of powerful exogenous forces."[92]

Recently, many functionalists (e.g., Parsons, Moore, Johnson, etc.) have modified the equilibrium model of society to take into account types of changes that may occur within the social system. For example, such factors as normative inconsistency partial and differential socialization, persistent environmental challenges, inequalities generated by the stratification system,

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[90] Ibid.

[91] Mohammed Guessous, "A General Critique of Equilibrium Theory" in Moore and Cook, op. cit., pp. 23, 24.

[92] Ibid., p. 27.

etc. are seen as creating strain and, sometimes, "change."

As for the processes of change, the most prominent proponent of the functionalist position, Talcott Parsons, has this to say:

> The process of structural change may be considered the obverse of equilibrating process; the distinction is made in terms of boundary-maintenance. Boundary implies both that there is a difference of state between phenomena internal and external to the system; and that the type of process tending to maintain that difference of state is different from the type tending to break it down.[93]

Parsons discusses several factors involved in the process of structural change, whether of the exogenous or endogenous variety. The first factor is the existence of strain, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the production of change. "Strain here refers to a condition in the relation between two or more structured units (i.e., subsystems of a system) that constitutes a tendency or pressure toward changing that relation to one incompatible with the equilibrium of the relevant part of the system."[94] However, the presence of strain does not necessarily result in change. Parsons notes three ways in which strain may be relieved: (1) resolution - restoration of full conformity with normative expectations; (2) isolation - some accomodation is made which allows less than normal performance by the deficient units; (3) change in the structures under strain.[95]

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[93] Talcott Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," Theories of Society, Vol.I, ed. by Talcott Parsons et al. (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 70.

[94] Ibid., p. 71.

[95] Ibid., pp.71 f.

The other factors considered by Parsons in the change process are paraphrased below:

1. Adequate mechanisms for overcoming the resistence inherent in institutionalized structural patterns (e.g., "vested interests").

2. Among the positive reactions there must be adequate constructive possibilities:
   a. the alientive component must be strong enough to motivate detachment from older patterns;
   b. but it should not be so closely connected with other negative components that it only motivates destructive behavior.

3. A model, from exogenous sources or endogenously produced, of the pattern to be newly institutionalized is necessary.

4. The pattern of sanction must selectively reward behavior conforming with the new model (but not the old) and must be consistent over a period of time long enough to bring the coinciding of the values of units and their self-interest that is the hallmark of institutionalization.[96]

Parsons illustrates with the process of functional differentiation which he sees as a fundamental type of social change. The example used is the differentiation of occupational roles from the kinship structure. What has been one role becomes differentiated into two roles in two distinct collectivities - the kinship group and the employing organization. The first of the prerequisites which must occur if change is to be realized is separation from the old pattern. In order for this to happen there must be something to motivate the actor to make the change, e.g., new opportunities which cannot be acquired within the older structural framework. Secondly, to insure that negative reactions to the forces of change do not overcome the positive tendencies, there must be an adequate

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[96] Ibid., pp. 75 f.

range of institutionalized permissiveness and negative sanctions for following the old pattern. The third factor involves the development of a positive model to demonstrate the new pattern. He uses the example of availability of jobs which offer advantages, i.e., positive sanctions, like salary. The new model must be legitimized in terms of the relevant values, the fourth condition. The exemplary case is the procession of legitimation of profit-making in England by the Protestant Ethic before the institutionalization of the factory system, thus clearing the way for change.[97]

Although other functionalists have dealt with the processes of change, few have devoted as much writing to the subject as Parsons and his views may be seen as representative of the functionalist school. Parsons' and other so-called "dynamic equilibrium" models have attempted to come to terms with many of the criticisms levelled by conflict theorists and others against the static bias of classical functionalism, but their models of dynamic social systems are still criticized as stopping short of accounting for total transformations or radical reorganizations of an entire system except through external explanations of change-producing forces. Let us now examine more thoroughly some of the analytical issues involved in the structural-functional theory of change.

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[97] Ibid., pp. 76-78.

CHAPTER 3

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND ITS DISCONTENT

As indicated we consider the structural-functional approach to the study of social change the most prominent one with respect to its dissemination among social theorists as well as the empirical and theoretical results that it produced. However, the present chapter does not aim at justifying functionalism as a distinct approach to sociological phenomena, although we do elaborate upon it.[1a] Neither can it be our goal to rigorously examine the idea that all science is structural-functional and hence functionalism only another name for sociological analysis, although we will be interested in functionalism as a method as well as a theory.[1b] Nor are we making an attempt to reconcile structural-functionalism with the conflict approach or to defend the latter as a theoretical alternative, although we will take into consideration their potential of presenting credible interpretations of facts of social change in terms of their respective sets of categories.[1c] Our

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[1a] Talcott Parsons, "The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sociology," Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), pp. 212-237.

[1b] Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," American Sociological Review, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 752-772.

[1c] Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," American Sociological Review, 28 (October, 1963), pp. 695-705: Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, op.cit. As leading spokesmen of the theoretical alternative we like to mention: David Lockwood, "Some Remarks on the 'Social System,' " British Journal of Sociology, 7 (June, 1956), pp. 134-146; Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (September, 1958), pp. 115-127.

main purpose to introduce the reader to theories of social change suggests to be less concerned with the differences between distinctions within structural-functionalism. Rather, the structural-functional study of social change is taken here as a single theoretical stance in that we focus on the theoretical position of its most outstanding representative, Talcott Parsons. Such a working hypothesis permits us to survey and evaluate this approach in its entirety[1d] and the student to familiarize himself with a comprehensive system of describing and explaining social change.

3.1 Preliminary Concepts

In order to render the "case study" of the structural-functional approach to change phenomena a worthwhile learning experience, we suggest to test the following hypothesis: A social theory based on the concept of order is unrealistic. Two facts make it so: conflict and change. This statement seems to imply four distinct, though interrelated, questions: (1) How are social conflict and change defined and how do they occur in society? (2) What are the characteristics of the order model upon which theories of society are based? (3) How does the order theory of society deal with conflict and change? (4) What are the criteria according to which sociological concepts are judged as "realistic" or "unrealistic?"

[1d] Cf. N.J. Demerath III, "Synecdoche and Structural-Functionalism," System, Change, and Conflict, ed. by N.J. Demerath III and Richard A. Peterson (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 501-518, esp. p. 502.

In order to get to the core of the matter, we will first present a rather detailed account of the methodology upon which order model and functional analysis base their assumptions, postulates, and hypotheses. Such a map of the logic of functional analysis will enable us to uncover the principles of the functional approach to the study of social conflict and social change. By demonstrating its merits and possible shortcomings, we may then arrive at conclusions concerning the heuristic import of a social theory based on the concept of order with reference to social conflict and change. And finally, this discussion may also generate propositions that concern the difficulties which inhibit the development of a general theory of social change.

Before we enter any substantive discussion, it is profitable to present a working definition of the variables to be explained by order theory: conflict and change. In this chapter we will not be primarily concerned with particular forms of social conflict and patterns of social change, which had been dealt with in chapters 1 and 2. Thus, there is no need to make the type of conceptual distinctions which would be required in a consideration of such particular forms. What we do need is a definition that serves as an umbrella for a vast variety of conflict phenomena and change processes. However, we are aware of the possible disadvantage of a broader definition that it might convey more similarities between various species of conflict and change than actually exist.

We will adopt the following working definitions:

> That social action in which an actor or actors attempt, in the face of human opposition, to achieve one or more goals, I call conflict. The actors, whether rivals or foes, may be indivi-

duals or groups and the goals may be wealth, power, prestige and other values.[1]

> Social change is the significant alteration of social structures (that is, of patterns of social action and interaction), including consequences and manifestations of such structures embodied in norms (rules of conduct), values, and cultural products and symbols.[2]

Without subscribing to pan-conflict imperialism, almost all social action may be analyzed in terms of conflict. On the other hand, as elaborated upon in previous chapters the definition of change may encompass small-scale change (e.g., development of a leadership role in a small group), cyclical patterns of change (e.g., on a temporal or organizational basis), and revolutionary change (e.g., change of the system through a coup d'état). Of course, the definition may refer to short-term as well as long-term changes (e.g., in the employment structures) and to continuous or discontinuous processes (e.g., bureaucratization vs. inventions). However, most importantly, in the present context conflict and change will be regarded as twin-concepts. In the last analysis, all social conflict involves some change of the organization of social relations which, in the language of the order model, may be regarded as either the reestablishment of equilibrium or the formation of a new system. The same is true for change. Whether we deal with changes of systems or changes within systems, all that can be observed and verified is a change of the organization of social relations. Therefore, whatever the actual case, conflict may be a result just as much as a source

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[1] Charles P. Loomis, "In Praise of Conflict and Its Resolution," American Sociological Review, 32 (December, 1967), p. 875 (emphasis added).

[2] Wilbert E. Moore, Art. "Social Change," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills. Vol. 14 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 366 (emphasis added).

of change. Furthermore, change, regardless of its source, is potentially promotive of strain and conflict. On a general level, a theory of social conflict is a theory of change. In most cases, one notion implicates the other and vice versa.

The concept of order refers to an image of society as a system of action unified by a shared culture and as functionally integrated system which is held in equilibrium by certain recurrent processes. In a most general way, functional analysis is said to focus on society as "a systemic whole with constituent parts in search of a mutually adjusted equilibrium."[2a] In the context of this study, therefore, order or integration theory will be regarded as synonymous with structural-functional analysis in general and with equilibrium theory with respect to conflict and change analysis in particular. Finally, as mentioned, we do not adopt an "either-or" point of view as far as order vs. conflict theory is concerned. By postulating that actual societies are held together by consensus, interdependence, sociability, conflict, and coercion, we are inclined to follow Heinrich Rickert's reply to Georg Simmel's vitalistic philosophy: "Movement is a relational concept and presupposes an unmoved in relation to which something is moving."[3]

[2a] System, Change, and Conflict, ed. by N.J.Demerath III and Richard A.Peterson. New York: Free Press, 1967. p.2.

[3] Quoted in Lewes A.Coser, ed., Georg Simmel, Englewood Cliff, AN.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965, Page 23.

3.2 The Logic of Functionalism

It is the aim of this sub-chapter to arrive at a definition of the concept of order, to discuss its uses as a scientific model, and finally to provide a methodological base for the assessment of its heuristic value in subsequent sub-chapters.

A model is usually considered as consisting of a set of propositions which are logically connected with one another. These propositions are not assumed to be reflecting the facts within an area of inquiry. Rather, they are assumed "because they refer to facts which are considered similar to those studied within an area of discourse."[4] May Brodbeck has termed the similarity between the elements of the model and the elements of that area of knowledge of which it is a model as isomorphism.[5] As the history of sociological theories amply demonstrates, the notion of "model" as isomorphism of laws (e.g., in physiology and sociology) is not at all a symmetrical one. That is, most of the models of society had been taken over from the natural sciences, from areas about which we have already known a good deal. Since grounded knowledge in sociology has always been scarce, not surprisingly therefore it has witnessed an influx of speculative models or guesses about isomorphisms. Of course, these models or analogies did not always work on the same principles as the original. There are only few isomorphisms in sociology which could be called complete. Writers such as Schaeffle, Spencer, and Spengler[6] came probably closest to a

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[4] Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Causation and Functionalism in Sociology (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 115.

[5] May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning, and Theories," Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. by Llewellyn Gross (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1959), p. 374.

[6] Cf. Werner Stark, The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963), pp. 30 ff. and 63 ff.

complete isomorphism while, on the other hand, there is no such one-to-one correspondence between say, the organismic model and the sociological theories of men like Durkheim, Parsons, Levy, and Smelser.

These analogical as well as other "domain assumptions"[7] largely make up scientific models of society, and thus greatly influence what the sociologist "looks for, what he sees, and what he does with his observations by way of fitting them, along with other facts, into a larger scheme of explanation."[8] Such models therefore provide a "general image of the main outline of some major phenomenon, including certain leading ideas about the nature of the units involved and the patterns of their relations."[9] In contrast to a theory, which can ordinarily be verified or falsified, a model can usually only be judged complete or incomplete, misleading or not, productive or unproductive, or for that matter, realistic or unrealistic.[9a]

3.2.1 The Use of The Organismic Model

The concept of order is here referred to assbeing derived from an organic analogy. Its most important manifestation can be seen in the interrelated concepts of "structure" and "function,"

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[7] Alvin W. Gouldner (The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology [New York: Basic Books, 1970], pp. 29 ff.) distinguishes between "background assumptions" - explicit and unlabelled postulations - and "domain assumptions," which are background assumptions applied only to members of a single domain. He states: "Domain assumptions about man and society might include, for example, dispositions to believe that men are rational or irrational; that society is precarious or fundamentally stable; that social problems will correct themselves without planned intervention; that human behavior is unpredictable; that man's true humanity resides in his feelings and sentiments." (p. 31).

[8] Alex Inkeles, What Is Sociology? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 28.

[9] Ibid., p. 28.

[9a] For a more elaborate discussion on the relationship between assumptions, models, and theories, see Hermann Strasser, Order and Conflict: The Normative Structure of Sociology (Ph.D. Dissertation; New York: Fordham University, 1974), chapter 1.

which figure prominently in the works of Spencer, Durkheim, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and Parsons and his followers. With the rapidly growing literature on functionalism, it has become rather difficult to attempt a sophisticated definition of the basic perspectives of the structural-functional school of sociology.[10]

As we shall see, it is the idea of an "organismic" system assumed by functionalism that makes it distinct from other forms of explanations in sociology. Social science literature has come up with two outstanding types of theoretical explanation, that of methodological individualism and that of functionalism.[11] The former places the focus of determinacy, that is the area in which a proper explanans of some explanandum can be found, in the social-psychological realm as theories of social behaviorism and symbolic interactionism do. Functionalism, on the other hand, attempts to place the focus of determinacy in the attributes of collectivities. Not only is the focus of

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[10] E.g., Bernhard Barber, "Structural-Functional Analysis: Some Problems and Misunderstandings," American Sociological Review, 21 (April, 1956), pp. 129-135; Harry C. Bredemeier, "The Methodology of Functionalism," American Sociological Review, 20 (April, 1955), pp. 173-180; Walter Buckley, "Structural-Functional Analysis in Modern Sociology," Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change, ed. by Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (New York: Rinehart, Holt and Winston, 1957), pp. 236-259; Francesca Cancian, "Functional Analysis of Change," American Sociological Review, 25 (December, 1960), pp. 818-827; Davis, "The Myth... op. cit. Ronald Philip Dore, "Function and Cause," American Sociological Review, 26 (December, 1961), pp. 843-853; Harold Fallding, "Functional Analysis in Sociology," American Sociological Review, 28 (February, 1963), pp. 5-13; Dorothy Gregg and Elgin Williams, "The Dismal Science of Functionalism," American Anthropologist, 50 (October/December, 1948), pp. 594-611; Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," Gross op. cit., pp. 271-307; Isajiw, op. cit.; Lockwood, "Some Remarks on the 'Social System,' "op. cit.; Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, enlarged edition (New York: Free Press, 1968); Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Some Further Comments on Chronic Controversies," American Journal of Sociology, 71 (May, 1966), pp. 717-721.

[11] Cf. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), pp. 520 ff.

determinacy placed in the attributes of collective entities rather than individuals, but functional explanation also implies the assumption that systems of relations between human actors, in their own right, are capable of exercising a determining influence upon their behavior.[12] It is this form of holism derived from physiology that became so central to the structural-functional approach.

A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, a sociologically oriented British anthropologist, explicated functional theory's dependence on the organismic analogy:

> To turn from organic life to social life, if we examine such a community as an African or Australian tribe we can recognize the existence of a social structure. Individual human beings, the essential units in this instance are connected by a definite set of social relations into an integrated whole. The continuity of the social structure, like that of an organic structure, is not destroyed by changes in the units. Individuals may leave the society, by death or otherwise; others may enter it. The continuity of structure is maintained by the process of social life, which consists of the activities and interactions of the individual human beings and of the organized groups into which they are united. The social life of the community is here defined as the functioning of the social structure. The function of any recurrent activity, such as the punishment of a crime, or a funeral ceremony, is the part it plays in the social life as a whole and therefore the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the structural continuity.[13]

Accordingly, the analysis of the functions of various behavior patterns or of cultural items in relation to the total social system to which they belong should yield the two central tasks of a science of society, namely, to show how

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[12] Cf. Isajiw, op. cit., p. 6.

[13] A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," American Anthropologist, N.S. 37 (July-September, 1935), p. 396. Cf. also his Structure and Function in Primitive Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952).

social system perpetuate themselves by maintaining their structural form and how social systems change by altering their structure.[14] Radcliffe-Brown holds that any activity or sociocultural item is regarded as explained when it is demonstrated that it has the effect of maintaining the social structure. Moreover, he says, while in animal organism the organic structure can be observed to some extent independent of its operation, "in human society the social structure as a whole can only be observed in its functioning."[15] Thus, the social structure is defined in terms of activities and the effect of these activities on units. At this point it is important to mention another element in biological organisms that is not in a one-to-one correspondence with social organisms. While in healthy biological organisms the activities of the organs and units are practically identical with those which have the effect of maintaining the life of the organism, in social organisms people do things invoking the cooperation or opposition of other people, although these activities do not necessarily maintain the social structure. The organismic model seems to be only useful in explanations of some human actions.

As stated above, the term function is used by Radcliffe-Brown to signify the contributions an item makes toward the maintenance of a certain state of the social system. This meaning of function points to the crucial problem of survival or paramount purpose of the organism which gave rise to an

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[14] A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural Science of Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), Part 2. See also Nagel, op. cit., pp. 520-522.

[15] Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function ... op.cit., p. 180.

elaborate discussion on the "functional prerequisites of a society."[16] Already Radcliffe-Brown himself recognized that the endeavor in sociology to demonstrate that certain processes were necessary for societal survival was doubtful although such demonstration was possible in biology. He made it clear that societies do not cease to exist as physical organisms do; they rather become different societies, i.e., they change their structural type. Thus, the concept of function takes on a problematic significance. If it cannot demonstrate the fact of structural change as clearly as the facts of death or illness, it would be difficult to assign to the concept of function any significance with respect to "survival value" or "vital importance." This not only forecasts a shadow on Parsons' and others' "functional prerequisites," but also questions the concept of change in toto which distinguishes between "normal change" and "structural change."[17]

Moreover, in the light of various community studies this also calls for a reassessment of the concept of dysfunctionality. From studies such as those by Frank and Ruth Young about patterns of community growth, by Edward Spicer on the impact of technology on primitive communities, and Robert Redfield's and Oscar Lewis' study of the Mexican village

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[16] See, e.g., D.E. Aberle, et al., "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," Ethics, 60 (January, 1950), pp. 100-111. Talcott Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op.cit.; Talcott Parsons and Neil J.Smelser, Economy and Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); Merton, op. cit.

[17] Cf. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), pp. 480 ff.; Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., pp. 70 ff.

Tepoztlán,[18] to name a few, we can infer that whenever certain traditional activities have been displaced because of contact with more articulated structures, their displacement has led to a period of rapid change and extensive instability in these and other areas. Assuming that the particular social system was in fact stable in the precontact period, we may even speak of the displaced activities "as having had a function in promoting the survival of the earlier structural type."[19] Obviously, it would not make much sense to regard such a change in the pattern of social actions as necessarily dysfunctional. Dysfunctional for whom? Too often social scientists, anthropologists in particular, have seen change negatively by contrasting the new social pattern with the old one - the traditional pattern representing the "healthy" social organism.

It is in this context that Robert Merton's critique and defense of the functionalist method, in his essay on "Manifest and Latent Functions," unfortunately does not contribute to a clarification of these problems. Although he insists that some concept of the needs of the system is vital to sociological analysis, he is at great pains to establish such needs objectively.[20] As John Rex has remarked, Merton's actual cases of "latent functions" seem "to refer quite definitely not to

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[18] Frank W.Young, and Ruth C.Young, "The Sequence and Direction of Community Growth: A Cross-Cultural Generalization," Rural Sociology, 27 (December, 1962), pp. 374-386; Edward Spicer, Human Problems in Technological Change (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952); Robert Redfield, Tepoztlán: A Mexican Village (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1951); for a critical discussion of Redfield's and Lewis' divergent views of Tepoztlán, see John Paddock, "Oscar Lewis's Mexico," Anthropological Quaterly, 34 (July, 1961), pp. 129-149.

[19] John Rex, Key Problems of Sociological Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 71.

[20] Merton, op. cit., p. 106.

the needs of the system but to the purpose of groups of individuals."[21] We shall return to this point shortly. The point is that functional statements could be regarded as appropriate only in connection with systems possessing self-maintaining mechanisms for certain of their traits. They seem to be pointless or even misleading, particularly in view of a general theory of change, "when used with reference to systems lacking such self-regulatory devices."[22]

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[21] Rex, op. cit., p. 73. Johan Galtung ("An Outline of Structural-Functional Theory Applied to Social Change." Unpublished Manuscript. Quoted in Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology [Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster Press, 1963], p. 18.) points out that the crux of the functionalist position lies in the notions of "adaptation" and "adjustment" as used by Merton (Merton defines function as follows: "Functions are those observed consequences which make for the adaption or adjustment of a given system; and dysfunctions, those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation of the system." Merton, op. cit., p. 105). Galtung goes on to say: "But 'adaption' and 'adjustment' to what? The answer 'to S (the system) as it is, to status quo,' can be discarded at once - this would make all consequences implying social change dysfunctional by definition. The answer 'to a social change in or of S' can be likewise discarded, as we do not believe today that consequences implying social change are necessarily beneficial for the system." (chapter 1, p. 6 in Galtung). It boils down to the question "Functional for whom?", and Galtung proposes to give the answer in terms of some shared values within a social subsystem. Functionality and dysfunctionality thus depends on the values in the social system or subsystem taken as a point of departure.

[22] Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 251 f. For an extended discussion of these questions, see Ernest Nagel "Teleological Explanations and Teleological Systems," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 537-558.

3.2.2 Dynamic Analysis

Although the integration or order theory of society appears in several versions,[23] all agree to treat "the consequences of one phenomenon as the causes of other, subsequent, phenomena, i.e., their 'functionalism.'"[24] The postulate to consider social phenomena as dynamically interdependent variables, to which Talcott Parsons refers in his discussion of the "dynamic interest of theory," resulting in "dynamic knowledge," directs our attention to the central concern of functionalism:

> The essential feature of dynamic analysis in the fullest sense is the treatment of a body of interdependent phenomena simultaneously, in the mathematical sense. The simplest case is the analysis of the effect of variation in one antecedent factor, but this ignores the reciprocal effect of these changes on this factor.[25]

Both Parsons and Merton probably still agree that in the present state of the sociological discipline "dynamic analysis in the fullest sense" cannot be realized and that the theory of structural-functional analysis is the best substitute for dynamic analysis.[26] Merton notes that the ideal, dynamic, conception has been expressed in a more extended but also more imprecise form by such notions as "functional interdependence," "mutually dependent variations," and "functional relations."[27] However, Parsons' major concern in functional theory lies on an analytical level different from that of Merton. Parsons is primarily concerned with the problem of dynamic analysis and its substitutes, viewing all social phenomena as variables of one

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[23] See, e.g., Walter L. Wallace , ed., Sociological Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 24 ff.

[24] Ibid., p. 25.

[25] Parsons, Essays ... op.cit., pp. 215 f.

[26] Cf. Ibid., pp. 216 f.; Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., p. 20; Merton, op. cit., pp. 75 f.

[27] Merton, op. cit., p. 75.

all-inclusive theoretical (and empiric) system. Merton, on the other hand, is preoccupied with specifications of functional analysis in order to apply it in research.[28] Specifically, his central orientation lies "in the practice of interpreting data by establishing their consequences for larger structures in which they are implicated..."[29] Despite Merton's exercised theoretical restraint with respect to a systemic theory, his theoretical position is no less questionable.

By contrast, for Parsons, who stresses the systemic reference and hence the explanatory power of systemically imposed imperatives, it is the most essential condition of successful dynamic analysis to refer continually and systematically "every problem to the state of the system as a whole."[30] Parsons constructs his alternative, that is, structural-functional theory, to the ideal of dynamic analysis by following three methodical steps. First, one treats groups of interrelated variables as structural categories, that is, as constants, in order to reduce the complexity of interdependent factors. In other words, these categories are not defined in terms of other variables, but independently, and thus provide adequate description of the empirical social system.

In a second step, once these structural categories are defined, they must be linked to the variable elements of the system. This is done by establishing the relevance of the structural categories to the total social system through the concept of function. Thus, Parsons' concept of function, closely related to that of Radcliffe-Brown, serves to provide a criterion for determining the importance of dynamic factors and processes

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[28] Ibid., pp. 56 ff.

[29] Ibid., p. 101.

[30] Parsons, Essays ... op. cit., p. 216.

within the system. The functional relevance will be found in the differential consequences for the total social system - maintaining its stability or producing change in it, promoting integration and order or disruption and change of the system in some sense.[31] It is this assessment of relevance from which the notion of functional analysis is derived.

According to Parsons, the structural-functional theory would not be complete, if it did not, in a third step, include a set of "dynamic functional categories." They "must describe processes by which these particular structures are maintained or upset, and the relations of the system to its environment are mediated."[32] On this analytical level the problem of social change is supposedly taken care of.

These procedures of structural-functional theory aim at the formulation of interrelated categories by means of which any social phenomenon within a system as well as total social systems can be analyzed according to the standards of this theoretical scheme. Parsons and many other sociologists consider the analysis

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[31] Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 21 f. In his essay "The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sociology," Parsons states: "Functional significance in this context is inherently teleological. A process or set of conditions either 'contributes' to the maintenance (or development) of the system or it is 'dysfunctional' in that it detracts from the integration, effectiveness, etc., of the system. It is thus the functional reference of all particular conditions and process to the state of the total system as a going concern which provides the logical equivalent of simultaneous equations in a fully developed system of analytical theory. This appears to be the only way in which dynamic interdependence of variable factors in a system can be explicitly analyzed without the technical tools of mathematics and the operational and empirical prerequisites of their employment." (Essays ... op. cit., pp. 217 f.). Compare this statement with Galtung's critique on Merton quoted above.

[32] Parsons, Essays ... op. cit., p. 218.

of social change to be the culmination point if not the core of sociological theory.[33]

3.2.3 System and Functional Autonomy

In a now famous presidential address, Kingsley Davis has gone so far as to deny that functionalism is any special method or theoretical scheme in sociology. In other words, all sociologists use much the same analytical framework.[34] Davis holds that any scientific discipline assumes "a system of reasoning which presumably bears a relation to a corresponding system in nature," and goes on to ask:

> How else can data be interpreted except in relation to the larger structures in which they are implicated? How can data on the earth's orbit, for example, be understood except in relation to a system in which they are involved - in this case, the solar system or the earth's climatic system? Since in science some kind of system is being dealt with, an analysis of the effect of one factor must always be made with the possibility in mind of a

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[33] In the first edition of his Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 11 f., Parsons states: "The final branch of sociological theory according to this conception is the dynamic theory of institutional change ...It is unquestionably the culminating synthetic aspect of the theoretical structure of our science, and high levels of achievement in this aspect must depend on the development of the tools in the other branches with which the theorist of dynamic change must work." See also Parsons, The Social System, op.cit., pp. 480 ff. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict... op. cit.; Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2 (June, 1958), pp. 170-183; Dahrendorf, Die Angewandte Aufklärung (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1968); Dahrendorf, Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1968); Lewis A. Coser , "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," British Journal of Sociology, 8 (September, 1957), pp. 197 - 207.

[34] Davis, op. cit.

> possible return effect ('feedback') on that factor itself. If, for example, the increase of fish (y) in a pond has the effect of increasing the toxicity (x) of the water, the growth of the fish population (y again) will eventually cease unless other factors intervene. This is not explaining things solely by their consequences, but rather by the way their consequences react upon them.[35]

To be sure, all science studies the relation of parts to some systemic whole. However, this does not mean that all science follows the same procedure as functionalism, especially not since there are different types of systems. It will be our task to show that functionalism is not a myth, which will be dispelled with time, as Davis believes, "but an important though fragmentary approach to social reality."[36]

Let us return for a moment to the divergent conceptions of functionalism in Parsons and Merton. Our brief documentation of their respective view showed that Merton's central orientation was to interpret data "by establishing their consequences for larger structures ...," while Parsons considered the "systematic reference of every problem to the state of the system as a whole..." to be of central importance. It should not be ignored that Parsons places great emphasis on the notion of a "system," while Merton directs his attention to "units" or "items" and avoids explicit use of the system concept.[37] Alvin W. Gouldner has noted that Parsons' committment to a system model can be called a total one, while Merton's may be regarded a "strategy of minimal committment."[3]

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[35] Ibid., p. 759.

[36] van den Berghe, op. cit., here quoted from a reprint in Wallace, op. cit., p. 202.

[37] See Merton's "Paradigm for Functional Analysis in Sociology," in Merton, op. cit., pp. 104 ff.

[38] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," Gross, op. cit., p. 243.

Despite these differences, the orientation of the two leading American functionalists in sociology converge substantially, since both of them agree to explain any social pattern only in the context it occurs, that is, to analyze it in its relation to other patterns. In short, Merton postulates implicitly and Parsons explicitly a system model in dealing with social phenomena.

In order to understand the analysis of change that is based upon functional theory, it is important to have in mind Parsons' assumption that "the whole system must be conceptually constituted prior to the investigation and analysis of specific patterns."[39] It is at least questionable whether the problem of selecting elements as parts of a social system can be solved by theoretical postulation alone.[40] As we have seen earlier, the concept of system implies the notion of interdependence referring to parts of the system engaged in mutual exchanges. In turn, the notion of interdependence implies the principle of reciprocity. The concept of functional reciprocity conveys the idea that it is not sufficient to provide an explanation of the persistence of some social phenomenon in terms of its consequences for the larger structures in which it is implicated. For instance, in his analysis of the latent functions of political machines in the U.S., Merton failed to trace explicitly "the manner in which the groups or structures, whose needs have been satisfied, in turn 'reciprocate' and repay the political machine for the gains it provides them."[41] The

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[39] Ibid., pp. 244 f.

[40] See Merton's emphasis on "theories of the middle ranges" in opposition to Parsons' strife for a "grand theory" (Merton, op. cit., pp. 39 ff.; see also Zetterberg, op. cit.).

[41] Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," op. cit., p. 249. See also Merton, op. cit., pp. 126 ff.

possible implications of a functional analysis that ceases before it has attempted to establish empirically the reciprocal functionality seem to be rather obvious, particularly for dealing with group conflict and change.

We may therefore postulate that the notion of interdependence, which is so central to the system concept, must be taken as problematic rather than as given. That this has not been systematically done, is partially attributed to the fact that Parsons distinguishes between a "theoretical" and an "empirical" system.[42] The empirical system which "has to do with the criteria for coherence and harmony to be applied to some specific body of subject matter," remains in the Parsonian scheme largely unexplored and is, in contrast to the theoretical system, analytically unproblematical. It seems to set the terms according to which the theoretical system must develop. Since different elements are involved in the conception of an empirical system and thus interrelated and interpreted differently, it is more likely that they constitute different types of empirical systems. Therefore, formal models of system organization become rallying grounds for competing schools in sociology. It is our task as sociologists to identify those models or vocabularies of social explanation which are best suited to relevant data.[43]

From the principle of reciprocity may be inferred that among the parts of a social system there are varying degrees of interdependence. Consequently, "if there are degrees of interdependence, there must also be degrees of independence or

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[42] Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy ..." op. cit., p. 252.

[43] For example, see Strasser, op. cit. Chapter 1. John Horton, "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as C Competing Ideologies," American Journal of Sociology, 71 (May, 1966), pp. 701-713. See also Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 28 ff. J.Feibleman and J.W.Friend, "The Structure and Function of Organization," Philosophical Review, 54 (January, 1945), pp. 19-44. A.Angyal, "The Structure of Wholes," Philosophy of Science, 6 (January,1939), pp. 25-37.

functional autonomy."[44] In the light of the fact that different system parts contribute differently to any state of the system and hence to both changes in and the stabilization of the system, Parsons' stress on the "web of interdependence" ("everything influences everything else") within the system comes close to substituting postulation for research. The problem of functional autonomy of the parts enters into the analysis of social systems, when functionalism should be capable of coping with the analysis of tension within social systems and hence with the analysis of social change. This is so because "functional autonomy" focuses not primarily on the "whole" or on relations between parts, but rather on the parts themselves in spite of their relations to each other. By attending to the possibility that the mutual needs of the parts need not to be symmetrical and that any part may be more or less dependent on another part, the concept of functional autonomy directs analysis to social structures productive of tensions.[45]

Finally, there is another key element that is involved in the concept of system. For structural-functional theory to have relevance, says Parsons, "it must apply to a boundary-maintaining type of system," that is, to a system in which the co-existence of counteracting forces results in a state of equilibrium.[46] It is precisely these balanced states of the

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[44]Gouldner, The Coming Crisis ... op. cit., p. 226.

[45]See especially ibid., passim and Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy, ..." op. cit., pp. 254 ff.

[46]Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., p. 483.

system(s) that are to be explained. They are explained on the basis of the assumption that a social system not only tends to maintain its boundaries, but also that it is self-regulative to the effect that it is able to generate forces which restore a displaced equilibrium. For Parsons, it is the principle of equilibrium, that is to say, the system containing social and cultural patterns that tend to be maintained, which becomes the principle of determinacy or causality.[47] Many authors have objected to Parsons' "conceptualism"[48] on the grounds that it tends to abstract one variable aspect of concrete social reality to the exclusion of other aspects;[49] that its scope is inadequatly specified and functionalist key terms such as "need," "functional requirement," and "adaptation" are used non-empirically;[50]

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[47] Cf. Siegfried F.Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure (London: Cohen & West, 1957), pp. 144 f.; Isajiw, op. cit., pp. 66 ff.; Gouldner, The Coming Crisis ... op. cit., p. 231. To quote Parsons (The Social System, op. cit., p. 482): "(The) elements of the constancy of pattern must constitute a fundamental point of reference for the analysis of process in the (social) system. From a certain point of view these processes are to be defined as the processes of maintenance of the constant pattern. But of course these are empirical constancies, so we do not assume any inherent reason why they have to be maintained. It is simply a fact that, as described in terms of a given frame of reference, these constancies are often found to exist, and theory can thus be focused on the problems presented by their existence. They may cease to exist, by the dissolution of the distinctive boundary-maintaining system and its assimilation to the environment, or by transformation into other patterns. But the fact that they do exist, at given times and places, still serves as the theoretical focus for analysis."

[48] Nicholas S.Timasheff, "Order, Causality, Conjuncture," Gross, op. cit., p. 148.

[49] Barber, op. cit.; as a point in case, see Tumin's critique on Davis' and Moore's stratification theory (Melvin Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis," American Sociological Review, 18 [August, 1953], pp. 387-394; Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," American Sociological Review, 10 [April, 1945], pp. 242-249).

[50] Hempel, op. cit.

that there is no reason to attribute to functional analysis a character *sui generis* not found in the hypotheses and theories of the natural sciences;[51] and that functionalism reasons tautologically since functional statements are always *ex post facto* statements.[52]

Apart from the critique in terms of reciprocation, asymmetrical interdependence, and functional autonomy, Parsons' multiple causation model, despite its claim that all social and cultural phenomena were produced by many factors rather than one, has clearly assigned a paramount place to one variable: shared moral beliefs or value elements. In this respect, he simply followed the tradition from Comte to Durkheim. Similar to Karl Marx, his attention is fixed on asserting that certain elements within the social system have ultimate control over it.[53] In the light of the foregoing discussion, then, these patterns, or, say, moral codes, which tend to be maintained, could not only be seen as conductors of tensions, but moreover as regularities of conflict and change.

3.2.4 Recapitulation

Before we go on to discuss the question how order theories deal with the problem and facts of social conflict and change, we may summarize the basic principles of the order approach by deriving them from the preceeding logical and partially substantive considerations.

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[51] *Ibid.*; Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, *op. cit.*, chapter 14.

[52] Buckley, *op. cit.*

[53] Parsons' "An Outline of the Social System" is particularly informative with respect to the role of values and norms, of socialization and internalization, in society (In: Parsons et al., *Theories of Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff.). See also Parsons, *The Social System*, *op. cit.*; Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951); Gouldner, The Coming Crisis ... *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff. The passage quoted in footnote 47 seen through the lens of these remarks takes on particular significance.

(1) Societies are seen as systems of interdependent parts;

(2) A system is assumed to be self-persistent and self-regulating, thus fundamentally in a state of equilibrium;

(a) The different social forces are therefore viewed as parts of a more or less integrated whole and thus explained in relation to this integration, that is, as more or less contributing to it;

(b) Accordingly, dysfunctions and conflicts do exist, but they tend to resolve "themselves" or become "institutionalized" in the long run;

(c) Social change is generally conceived of as occurring in a gradual and adjustive manner through differentiation and adaptation to extra-systemic change;

(3) Social integration is most importantly achieved through value consensus, that is, through aims or principles which most members of a given social system agree on.

In the first part of this chapter we have outlined the determinate logical structure of the system of functional (or order) theory. Since, as Parsons says, a "theoretical system does not merely state facts which have been observed and their logically deducible relations to other facts" but also "what empirical facts it should be possible to observe in a given set of circumstances,"[54] we are now ready to examine, under the aspect of conflict and change, some of the social theories based on the order model. This test should ultimately decide whether functionalism and its concept of order is only a myth or rather a fragmentary approach to social reality.

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[54]Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (1937), Vol. 1 (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 8.

3.3 Functionalism and Social Change

It is a common experience that our everyday life which takes place in some form of social organization is characterized by orderly persistence as much as by change. As man's biological life cycle or various forms of social conflict in political, economic, and social life suggest, small-scale changes may be considered an important component of persistence on a larger scale. Thus, changing patterns also seem to provide a predictable continuity to the patterns of social life. Of course, this description illustrates only some segments of those antagonistic social relations and that scope of social change which we have defined at the outset.

Paradoxically, the scientific disciplines that deal with man's action and products have tended to stress "orderly interdependence and static continuity," as the rate of social change has accelerated in social reality.[55] Apparently, difficulties in dealing with social dynamics are at least partially responsible for this state of affairs. In spite of Parsons' claim that the structure of sociology was to culminate in a "dynamic theory of institutional change," he nevertheless once declared pontifically that

> a general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge.[56]

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[55] Moore, Art. "Social Change," op. cit., p. 365; see also Carle C. Zimmermann, "Contemporary Trends in Sociology in America and Abroad,", Readings in Contemporary American Sociology, ed. by Roucek, Joseph S. Paterson, N.J.: Adams Littlefield, 1961), pp. 6 ff.

[56] Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., p. 486.

And added prophetically:

> When such a theory is available the millennium for social science will have arrived. This will not come in our time and most probably never.[57]

Most sociologists will agree that we do not have such a theory of social change. What is more disputed, however, is the question of whether the difficulties which a theory of social change encounters render its formulation impossible.

3.3.1 The Equilibrium Theory of Change

It has been argued that the functional approach "was developed partly in reaction to the preoccupation of much nineteenth-century social inquiry with questions concerning the origins (and evolution, H.S./S.C.R.) of social institutions."[58] On the other hand, there is ample evidence that modern functionalism is in many ways the twentieth-century legacy of early evolutionary theory, nonetheleast in its receptiveness towards the organic analogy - organism being a paradigmatic case of a system.[59] In other words, the difference between contemporary structural-functionalism and the nineteenth century evolutionism is primarily a matter of emphasis. What is the substance of this legacy and who are its heirs?

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[57] Ibid., p. 534. In the two decades that have passed since the publication of The Social System, Parsons did not modify or in any way correct these statements cited on p. 24. In none of his accounts of the state of sociology in the United States which have appeared since then, did he take on the issue of a general theory of change again. Cf. Parsons, Talcott, ed., American Sociology: Perspectives, Problems, Methods (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. IX ff. and 319-355. Talcott Parsons, "General Theory in Sociology," Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects, ed. by R.K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cotrell, Jr., Vol. I, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), pp. 3-38. For a good summary statement of his view on social change, see "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., pp. 70-79.

[58] Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit., p. 520.

[59] Cf. Appelbaum, op. cit., p. 131; Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy ..." op. cit., p. 241.

3.3.1.1 The Evolutionary Legacy

According to Auguste Comte, (Western) civilization develops in an evolutionary way, that is to say, it progresses uniformly toward human perfection and thus changes continuously. He simply considered the laws of social change as a

> form of the great principle, which of the two great constituent elements of Positive Sociology - Order and Progress - makes the second the result and consequence of the first, according to the maxim: - Progress is the development of Order.[60]

In his organismic view of society, its functional interdependence, and analysis of the development and consequences of functional differentiation,[61] he not only paved the way for Spencer and Durkheim, but also for systems theorists like Talcott Parsons and structuralists like Marion Levy.

Because of their emphasis on an ever-increasing societal complexity and interrelatedness, Spencer and Durkheim can be classified as major contributors to the evolutionary legacy. Herbert Spencer's central argument was that both society and living organisms increase during their life cycle in mass or size as well as in structural complexity from a few uniform parts to numerous interrelated unlike parts.[62] In other words, a substantial increase in complexity attends growth. Although Spencer used a different scientific language, Emile Durkheim employed and reformulated many Spencerian concepts,[63]

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[60] Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, Vol. II (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1875), p. 152.

[61] Ibid., pp. 329 ff.

[62] Herbert Spencer, First Principles of a New System of Philosophy (New York: DeWitt Revolving Fund, 1958), p. 394.

[63] See especially Durkheim's early work (1893) The Division of Labor in Society, op. cit.

though with a rather distinctive methodological view. In that he explicitly identified social facts (e.g., the division of labor) and established the efficient cause (e.g., increasing moral density) and its function (i.e., the need it fulfills), we may regard him the father of modern functionalism. For Durkheim, we stated, increasing moral density, that is, an ever-increasing number of people in interaction with each other, determines the nature of social relationships and thus constitutes the dynamic of social change. Durkheim was able to identify points of societal stress and regarded organic solidarity as being not sufficient in itself to integrate a society. According to him, the increasing individuation of man tends to be reflected in a tangle of social pathologies because contemporary man lacks a collectivity with which he can identify. The French sociologist sees the remedy for modern society in occupational decentralization, since the differentiation of society occurs along occupational lines.[65]

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[65] Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 389-391. Without going into great detail, it is interesting to note that the analytical axis of different sociologists such as Durkheim and Dahrendorf originates in the same structural realm. The former sees in the acquisition of a moral individuality by the corporation, the labor union, and professionl association the basis for a resurgence of mechanical solidarity. The latter, on the other hand, locates the structural origin of group conflicts "in the arrangement of social roles endowed with expectation of domination or subjection." (Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict ... op.cit., p. 165). In other words, wherever there are such roles, group conflicts are to be expected. The groups engaged in conflict are formed along the lines of the differentiation of roles that are relevant from the point of view of exercise of authority. While Dahrendorf sees in enforced constraint the overriding principle that makes social organizations cohere and thus, in the formation of conflict groups, the ultimate guaranty for societal integration and individual freedom in industrial societies, Durkheim stresses the establishment of new communal solidarities along occupational lines as a solution to the manifest problem of social integration in urbanized society. Cf. also Rex, op. cit., p. 99. It is interesting to compare Durkheim's ideas on this subject with Louis Wirth's concepts On Cities and Social Life. Selected Papers, ed. by Albert J.Reiss, Jr. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964); especially chapter 4, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," pp. 60 ff.

However, this awareness of, and approach to, the crisis of his age was typical of Durkheim's preoccupation with the problem of order, that is, with the conditions of the French society of his time. His morphology of the total group did not allow a recognition of conflicting subgroups in modern society. That he neglected class phenomena and sought a solution of the threat of normlessness in occupational decentralization through professional organizations was a consequence of this morphology, since classes are always antagonistic groupings whereas the latter are not. Moreover, thinking in terms of the "whole" and ignoring struggles between "parts," Durkheim concluded The Division of Labor in Society by affirming that, in a society characterized by organic solidarity, social inequalities diminish and hence class differentiation is reduced. Not surprisingly therefore, he rejected socialism not so much on economic grounds, but rather on the grounds that it was the program of a conflict group, thus benefiting a part of society and not the whole.[66] To him, class phenomena appeared a priori divisive and disintegrating.

According to Durkheim, then, major social norms express the sentiments of the total collectivity. He therefore never entertained the idea that certain social strata may be subordinated to a moral code.[67]

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[66] Emile Durkheim, Le socialisme (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1928); see Introduction by Marcel Mauss, p. VIII.

[67] His own idea that the division of labor is but a milder, a peaceful solution to the struggle for survival which enables a greater number of people to live and survive, could have made him aware of the fact that the sentiments, or at least a part, of the total society are a genuine expression of the "stronger" moral sentiments of only a superordinate stratum. Cf. Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 23 f.; Lewis A. Coser, "Durkheim's Conservatism and Its Implications for Sociological Theory," Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 164. For a more elaborate discussion of Durkheim's theoretical position, see Strasser, op. cit., chapter VI/

The evolutionary aspects of modern functionalism appear to be best represented by the so-called modernization theories which are concerned with the correlates of industrialization. These theories are said to be diachronic, that is, they tend to infer process from a methodology of comparative statics; the direction of change is believed to be unilinear in that all societies are supposedly undergoing a parallel series of transformations during the course of industrialization.[68] Modernization is defined by most of these modern evolutionists in terms of technology or is said to be conceptually related to economic development.[69] For example, Marion Levy's technological definition could have been formulated by Herbert Spencer as well:

> I would consider any society the more modernized the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate power sources and the greater the extent to which human efforts are multiplied by the use of tools.[70]

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[68] Cf. Appelbaum, op. cit., p. 36.

[69] While Marion J. Levy (see next footnote) defines modernization in technological terms, Neil J. Smelser's definition includes "at least four distinct but interrelated processes," namely in the realm of technology, agriculture, industry, and ecological arrangements: "The term 'modernization' - a conceptual cousing of the term 'economic development,' but more comprehensive in scope - refers to the fact that technical, economic, and ecological changes ramify through the whole social and cultural fabric." (Neil J.Smelser, "The Modernization of Social Relations." In: Myron Weiner (ed.), Modernization. New York: Basic Books, 1966. p. 111). Wilbert E. Moore's definition is more direct and synthetic: "... 'total' transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the 'advanced,' economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World... In fact, we may ... speak of the process as industrialization. Industrialization means the extensive use of inanimate sources of power for economic production, and all that entails by way of organization, transportation, communication, and so on." (Social Change, op. cit., pp. 89 and 91 f.). For a comprehensive synthesis, see ibid., chapter 5.

[70] Levy, "Social Patterns and Problems of Modernization," in Moore and Cook, op. cit., p. 190.

A more elaborate analysis would show that Parsons' associates, Marion Levy and Neil Smelser, view society as a mechanistic system operating in an organic framework. In such a system, new social structures emerge to fulfill the functions of those that are no longer performing adequately. Consequently, an uneven process of structural differentiation creates tensions and strain for the system which, in turn, may give rise to the emergence of new integrative mechanisms.

It is precisely the concept of differentiation, i.e., the development of functionally specialized societal structures, that links evolutionism and functionalism.[71] From an evolutionary perspective, Talcott Parsons conceives of social change as continual, through differentiation, in a process of adaptive upgrading:

> If differentiation is to yield a balanced, more evolved system, each newly differentiated substructure (e.g., the producing organization...) must have increased adaptive capacity for performing its primary function, as compared to the performance of that function in the previous, more diffuse structure. Thus economic production is typically more efficient in factories than in households. We may call this process the adaptive upgrading aspect of the evolutionary change cycle.[72]

The concepts of differentiation and adaptive upgrading must be seen in the context of Parsons' conception of society as a social system functioning within a general action system that is comprised of subsystems. According to Parsons, any system of action performs four essential functions - adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance (AGIL).[73]

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[71] Cf. Appelbaum, op. cit., p. 54.

[72] Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 22.

[73] Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., pp. 38-41.

While the social system takes care of the integrative function (the proper subject matter of sociology) within the larger action system, the societal community performs the same function within the social system. The economy takes on the function of adaptation, the polity that of goal-attainment, and the family, educational, and religious institutions that of tension management and pattern maintenance. As Parsons has aptly shown in one of his recent books.[74] societies, as they evolve, differentiate first along these AGIL lines and then into subsystems of each AGIL function (economic subsystems, etc.)

3.3.1.2 Equilibrium and Change

We have seen that the concept of differentiation links evolutionary and functional theory. Parsons calls the principle of differentiation in relation to functional exigency "the master concept for the analysis of social structure."[75] However, this principle alone, says Parsons, is not sufficient; the principles of "segmentation" and "normative specification" are also needed.[76] The latter refers to the normative culture institutionalized in the social structure in which norms are differentiated on the basis of specification of function of units or subunits. In other words, there is "a hierarchy of generality of the patterns of normative culture institutionalized in a social system, one that corresponds to the general hierarchical relations of its structural components."[77] The

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[74] Parsons, Societies ..., op. cit.

[75] Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., p. 44.

[76] Ibid., pp. 44-47.

[77] Ibid., p. 45.

concept of segmentation, on the other hand, denotes "the development of subcollectivities, within a larger collectivity system, in which some of the members of the larger system participate more intimately than in others."[78] Segmentation, in this respect, is thus independent of the differentiation of function between the subcollectivities; as the example of the thousands of nuclear families in a large-scale society shows, the structure is highly segmented but not highly differentiated. In order to render dynamic these mechanisms operating within a social system, Parsons couples them with "input-output exchanges."[79] Each differentiated substructure is then conceived of as producing goods or services that become resources (inputs) of other substructures and as receiving the products of other units as its own resources. These processes of generation and utilization of resources are mediated and regulated by certain types of mechanisms such as money and power.

These interconnecting exchanges and normative specifications that arise between a social system's parts also prevent the process of differentiation from leading to the total independence of these parts. Undoubtedly, these differentiated and specified interrelationships between subsystems continuously fulfill requirements established in order to preserve the social system as an ongoing concern. The question is then what structures fulfill those system requirements or "functional imperatives" and what is the latters' meaning, what is their function? According to Parsons, functional considerations mediate between the exigency

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[78] Ibid., p. 45.

[79] Cf. ibid., pp. 60 ff. and Parsons, Societies ... op. cit., pp. 22-24.

of the relative constancy of a structure and the exigency of the givenness of the environing situation of the system.

> The functional categories of social systems concern, then, those features in terms of which ordered modes of adjustment operate in the changing relations between a given set of patterns of institutionally established structure in the system and a given set of properties of the relevant environing system.[80]

As far as consummatory interests of a social system are concerned, Parsons and Smelser put forward stability as the criterion of the goal attainment function:

> A goal state, for an individual actor or for a social system, is a relation between the system of reference and one or more situational objects which (given the value system and its institutionalization) maximizes the stability of the system... the system must 'seek' goal states by controlling elements of the situation.[81]

Consequently, Parsons and Smelser argue that the imperative of system integration "is to 'maintain solidarity' in the relations between the units in the interest of effective functioning."[82] Note that the criteria of stability and effective functioning on the basis of an integrated whole can be - analogously - treated as a "uniform state" in which mechanisms, so-called homeostatic mechanisms, reach and maintain uniform states. For structural analysis, we know, Parsons regards the "concept of stability... as a defining characteristic of structure...

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[80] Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., pp. 36 f.

[81] Parsons and Smelser, Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 17.

[82] Ibid., p. 18. We refrain here from discussing the remaining functional prerequisites, that is, the adaptive function and that of latent pattern maintenance. They are considered as being instrumental and not consummatory.

equivalent to the more specific concept of stable equilibrium - which in another reference may be either 'static' or 'moving'."[83] In locating structures in larger systems, he is able to single out the points or boundary positions where social change unfolds:

> A system then is stable or (relatively) in equilibrium when the relation between its structure and the processes which go on within it and between it and its environment are such as to maintain those properties and relations, which for the purposes in hand have been called its structure, relatively unchanged. Very generally, always in 'dynamic' systems, this maintenance is dependent on continuously varying processes, which 'neutralize' either endogenous or exogenous sources of variability which, if they went far enough, would change the structure. A classic example of equilibrium in this sense is the maintenance of nearly constant body temperature by mammals and birds - in the face of continuing variation in environmental temperature and through mechanisms which operate either to produce heat, including slowing up its loss, or to slow down the rate of heat production or accelerate its dissipation.
> Contrasted then with stability or equilibrating processes are those processes which operate to bring about structural change. That such processes exist and that they are of fundamental scientific importance is nowhere in question.[84]

It seems to me that Parsons distinguishes between sub-structural change as part and parcel of the processes productive of structural stability and those processes productive of structural change. For him, "structural change in subsystems is an inevitable part of the equilibrating process in larger systems."[85] It is thus important to note the difference between processes of equilibration and processes of structural change, since it "seems inherent in the conception of a social system as cybernetic system of control over behavior."[86]

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[83] Talcott Parsons, "A Functional Theory of Change," in Etzioni and Etzioni op. cit., p. 84.

[84] Ibid., p. 84.

[85] Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., p. 71.

[86] Ibid., p. 71.

Parsons recognizes two major sources of structural change: exogenous and endogenous. Exogenous sources of change in the social structure can be located in tendencies to change in the environing system: the organism, personalities, and cultural systems. For example, changes in the genetic components within a population may affect social role-performance and the social system's capacity for socialization - thus changing social behavior and its patterns. Quite naturally, another important source of external change is change which originates in other social systems. We mention here only the potential impact of societies with different political organization in addition to exogenous cultural borrowing and diffusion mediated through interrelations among societies.[87]

In Parsonian sociology we stated, the endogenous tendency to change is referred to as "strains,"

> A strain is a tendency to disequilibrium in the input-output balance between two or more units of the system.[88]

Strain is defined as a disturbance of the expectation system, the latter being an essential part of the integration of the need-dispositions of relevant actors with a set of cultural patterns. As the case of institutionalization of roles in the social system shows, some "vested interests" in one form or another will always resist the change inherent in the institutionalization process.[89] Parsons' term "strain" clearly points to a conflict situation produced in the (established) system of role-expectations. These situations constitute sources of change; however, as Parsons remarks, "change is never just 'alteration of pattern' but

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[87] Ibid., p. 71. See also our discussion in chapter 2.2

[88] Ibid., p. 71.

[89] Cf. Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 491 f.

alteration by the overcoming of resistance."[90] Apart from the emphasis in his theoretical system, Parsons seems to opt for a concept of conflict-change analytically interwined and empirically endemic in modern society.

However, Parsons only tells us half the story, in so far as he sees "vested interests" only involved in resisting change by maintaining the gratifications provided in an established system of role-expectations. Especially in cases where this expectation system has been previously disturbed, that is, the equilibrium displaced, interests can be vested in the promotion of change, in institutionalizing a new status-role system (e.g., socialized medicine, welfare programs, unemployment insurance). Is institutionalization "implemented" by an undefined collectivity, like society, in order to restrain individuals as Parsons wants to make us believe? Or is it "carried out" by organized groups against some individuals and groups and for other individuals and groups. As Lewis A. Coser, following Georg Simmel, has demonstrated, social conflict is capable of creating new norms and promoting change of common norms which is necessary for the readjustment of the relationship between contenders.[91]

In this context we should note that Parsons' concepts of structure and process and of stability and change are of an analytical nature and we should be aware of the distinction between them on the level of system reference. Parsons' concern with the complexity of the social system and its cybernetic nature, on the one hand, and the social system's consummatory interests defined in terms of stability and effective functioning,

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[90] Ibid., p. 491.

[91] Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, op. cit., pp. 121-137.

on the other hand, may explain to the most part that his focal concern is directed toward those aspects of the social system, and hence empirical society, which are functional, productive in nature. This focus is, as previously mentioned, supposedly refined by assigning a dynamic role to the concept of function.

> Its crucial role is to provide criteria of the importance of dynamic factors and processes within the system. They are important in so far as they have functional significance to the system, and their specific importance is understood in terms of the analysis of specific functional relations between the parts of the system and between it and its environment.
>
> The significance of the concept of function implies the conception of the empirical system as a 'going concern.' Its structure is that system of determinate patterns which empirical observation shows, within certain limits, 'tend to be maintained' or on a somewhat more dynamic version 'tend to develop' according to an empirically constant pattern (e.g., the pattern of growth of a young organism).
>
> Functional significance in this context is inherently teleological. A process or set of conditions either 'contributes' to the maintenance (or development) of the system or it is 'dysfunctional' in that it detracts from the integration, effectiveness, etc., of the system.[92]

In dealing with problems usually productive of conflict and change such as those of social inequality and deviant behavior,[93] the functional principles outlined above actualize

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[92] Parsons, Essays ... op. cit., pp. 217 f.

[93] We shall not enter a discussion on deviant behavior from the order point of view. However, for a detailed account of the problem we would like to refer to Kai T. Erikson, "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance," The Sociological Perspective, ed. by Scott G.McNall (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 273-282; Horton, op. cit.; Robert W. Winslow, Society in Transition: A Social Approach to Deviancy (New York: Free Press, 1970).

themselves. All problems and their proposed solutions become ultimately related to what Parsons has called the "Hobbesian problem of order." Functionalists account for social inequality in terms of the needs of social systems for differentiated positions of varying functional importance.[94] Accordingly, Parsons views the system of stratification in society as essentially an expression of the value system of society. The rewards which men and positions enjoy are a function of the degree to which their qualities, performances, and possessions measure up to the standards set by their society.[95] Since men differ in these respects, inequality is consequently thought of as being inevitable and a necessary feature of any properly functioning human society. In reviewing C.Wright Mills' book, The Power Elite, Parsons thus inferred:

> The essential point is that, to Mills, power is not a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system, but is interpreted exclusively as a facility for getting what one group, the holders of power, wants by preventing another group, the 'outs' from getting what it wants.[96]

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[94]Cf. Davis and Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," op. cit.; Davis, Human Society, op. cit.; Walter Buckley, "Social Stratification and the Functional Theory of Differentiation," American Sociological Review, 23 (August, 1958), pp. 369-375; see especially the Davis/Moore-Tumin controversy on the functional theory of stratification as reprinted in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Class, Status, and Power, 2nd ed., (New York: Free Press, 1966).

[95]Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," Class, Status, and Power, 1st ed., ed. by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), p. 94.

[96]Talcott Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society," World Politics, 10 (October, 1957), p. 139.

In contrast to conflict theorists who explain inequality and class conflict in terms of interests of those in power and draw the analysis of inequality into the theory of conflict and change,[97] Parsons believes that class conflict is merely endemic in our modern industrial type of society.[98] Of course, Parsons, in his rebuttal, entitled "The Distribution of Power in American Society," objects to Mills' attempt to weave partial truth and scattered bits of evidence into one grand indictment. However, he does not present a general analysis of the conditions under which certain norms and values develop or the function they perform beyond that of harmonizing Ego's and Alter's actions. Like Mills, Gouldner poses the question why any kind of moral code should be necessary "except that one party wants something from another whom he sees as unwilling to provide it."[99] This confirms the contention that power is always taken never given and that people will always try to legitimize their power. It is quite obvious that Comte, Durkheim, and Parsons are particularly concerned with a shared moral code or a value system commonly agreed upon, because it increases the motivation of social actors to conform with their mutual expectations and thus stabilizes and equilibrates the social system. What they generally ignore, as pointed out earlier, is that to the ex-

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[97] Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," op. cit.; Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict ... op. cit.; Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, op. cit.; Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, op. cit.; Gouldner, The Coming Crisis ... op. cit.

[98] Talcott Parsons, "Social Classes and Class Conflict," American Economic Review, 39 (1949), pp. 16-26; see also Talcott Parsons, "Social Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory," in Essays ... op. cit., pp. 323-335.

[99] Gouldner, The Coming Crisis ... op. cit., p. 235.

tent conformity is imposed upon an Alter by this moral code, Ego will tend to reward such conformity less than he will under voluntary circumstances. Because of the fundamental "double contingency" of conformity with a moral norm, it is possible, therefore, to say that a moral code not only harmonizes a society but also brings it into conflict.

On several occasions, Parsons has employed a medical analogy in analyzing social conflict. Class conflicts are "endemic" like a disease; important factors in group antagonism, specifically he refers to racial and religious conflicts, can be dealt with therapeutically as in the control of sickness;[100] no wonder, then, that he also parallels a medical man who treats a sick patient with a propaganda specialist who treats a sick society.[101] The author tends to equate conflicting with deviant behavior "which is seen as a disease in need of treatment."[102] Social changes that might be generated by these conflicts are then likely be labelled "contagious" and have to be confined and localized.

3.3.1.3 Recapitulation

At this point we will briefly recapitulate the position of structural-functionalism on the theory of social change, as represented by Talcott Parsons' work, and then conclude with a general critique.

The structural-functional theory consists of a system of structural categories which is said to be logically adequate to describe all essential elements and relations of a social system.

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[100] Talcott Parsons, "Radical and Religious Differences as Factors in Group Tensions," Approaches to National Unity, ed. by Louis Finkelstein et al. New York: Harper Bros., 1945. pp. 182-199.

[101] Talcott Parsons, "Propaganda and Social Control," in Essays ... op. cit., pp. 142-176.

[102] Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, op. cit., p. 23.

It also includes a set of dynamic functional categories, which supposedly articulate directly with the structural categories. The functional categories have the task to describe the processes by which particular structures are maintained or disrupted as well as the relations of the system to its environment. However, the system perspective so strongly advocated by Parsons and others directs the functional categories toward an analysis which seeks to uncover the conditions for the maintenance of a society in a stable or moving equilibrium; that is, in effect, to specify the mechanisms by which stability is preserved or re-established after social disturbances have occurred. Conflict situations are either ignored or generally de-emphasized by acknowledging their endemic nature and/or that they are pathological to the functioning of the social system and usually contained by extending social control. In correspondence to Parsons' conception of social systems and their subsystems as being located in a cybernetic condition-control hierarchy, change is to occur within the given conditions, on the one hand, and is to be governed by the control systems, on the other. The hypothesis is suggested that the more generalized the value or cultural pattern, or the higher a phenomenon lies on the hierarchy of control, the less likely it is to change. Change on the cultural level is change <u>of</u> the system. The lower structures are located on the control hierarchy, the more readily they will adjust to changing conditions and their environments. However, these changes tend to lose force as they ramify upward through the system. For instance, changes in the economic sphere, which is highest in the hierarchy of conditions but lowest on controls, are relatively common. Some of these changes will affect the polity, still fewer the societal community, and practically none

the institutionalized cultural patterns. Parsons confirms this illustration in one of his essays by concluding that those values which integrate American society, i.e., instrumental activism, etc., have not changed in any fundamental way in American history.[103] Finally, to finish where we began this discussion on Parsons, to him a general theory of the processes of change of social systems would imply complete knowledge of the laws of processes of the system which we do not possess.

> The theory of change in the structure of social systems must, therefore, be a thory of particular sub-processes of change within such systems, not of the over-all processes of change of the systems as systems.[104]

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[103] Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 295 ff.

[104] Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., p. 486. For a critical assessment of Parsonian social theorizing, see Hermann Strasser, The Sociology of Talcott Parsons: From Action Frame of Reference to Social Systems Theory (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies Press, 1974).

3.3.2 A General Critique of the Equilibrium Theory

3.3.2.1 Its Merits: What It Does

If we were to believe Kingsley Davis and George C.Homans, the pervasive use of equilibrium models, not only in sociology, but in practically all social sciences, spoke for itself, especially for their explanatory value. Davis states:

> It is only in terms of equilibrium that most sociological concepts make sense. Either tacitly or explicitly anyone who thinks about society tends to use the notion. The functional-structural approach to sociological analysis is basically an equilibrium theory.[105]

Homans, on the other hand, including the possibility of a moving equilibrium declares

> in studying social change, as in studying social control, we discovered nothing new in the relationships between the elements of behavior... What we did was watch how a change in the value of one of the elements effected changes in the values of the others.[106]

We have stated already that the equilibrium theory essentially attempts to reveal the general conditions for the maintenance of a society in a stable equilibrium. In order to be able to do so, we said that it has to determine and specify the mechanisms by means of which stability is preserved or restored. In other words, functional explanations are exclusively related to systems which

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[105] Davis, Human Society, op. cit., p. 634.

[106] George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1950), p. 450. Homans defined the concept of equilibrium, which is central to that of homeostasis, as a condition of a system whereby "the state of the elements that enter the system and of the mutual relationships between them is such that any small change in one of the elements will be followed by changes in the other elements tending to reduce the amount of that change." (pp. 303.f.).

maintain their equilibrium vis-a-vis their environment. This idea is based on the assumption of a latent causality:[106a] Within the system there are causes which become effective in the case of disturbances in order to bring back the system into a stable state. Thus, such a theory does not describe what actually happens in most societies, but rather outlines "what society would be like if it were to function as an equilibrium system."[107] Because of its system-maintenance point of reference, Durkheim's, Radcliffe-Brown's, Malinowski's, and Parsons' and others' functionalism of "the demonstration of interdependence between different elements of social structure came to mean the search for self-equilibrating mechanisms in society."[108]

The principles of a functional theory of change discussed here also suggest that this theory is, at least logically, capable of explaining three types of changes in social life:

(1) necessary changes; that is to say, the meeting of the functional imperatives makes certain changes, adaptations or adjustments, necessary in order to maintain social stability;
(2) compatible changes; that is to say, in order to achieve optimally and most effectively the diverse goals set by the polity, changes that are compatible with the maintenance of social stability might be effected;

[106a] Niklas Luhmann, "Funktion und Kausalität," in Soziologische Aufklärung, 2nd ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), pp. 9 - 30, esp. p. 11.

[107] Guessous, op. cit., p. 24.

[108] Moore, Art. "Social Change," op. cit., p. 367. For further references, see Homans, The Human Group, op. cit., pp. 307 f. Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 383 f. Hempel, op. cit., pp. 293-297. Part of the following discussion draws heavily on Guessous, op. cit.

(3) oscillatory changes; that is to say, because of the inherent frictions and strains in the processes of equilibration involving substructural changes, social stability will temporarily and to a limited extent oscillate around the state of equilibrium of the social system.

With the foregoing discussion in mind, we hypothesize that according to the equilibrium theory of change a society will maintain its stability over a long period of time only when it is able to undergo necessary changes. These changes in societal components usually reveal two kinds of change patterns. The first involves periodic sequences of structural differentiation, through which new, specialized social sub-units are built up enabling the social system to cope with particular problem areas. We will not discuss this point any further, since we have already dealt with it extensively. The second major change pattern refers to the occurrence of periodic "phase-movements" involving the shifting concern of the collectivity with one set of functional problems to another. The main point to remember is that Robert F. Bales' influence led Parsons to a reformulation of equilibrium laws and problems in terms of phases.[109] In Interaction Process Analysis, where small, face-to-face groups were studied, Bales found that their interaction processes were shifting and not in equilibrium. Thus, Parsons saw the chance for introducing "process" into his line of thinking. He began to point out that no single stage in time and space gives optimal satisfaction to all functional imperatives. In other words, each stage satisfies one imperative more than others, and there is a cycle in which at each problem point one imperative enjoys its

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[109] Cf. Robert Freed Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1950).

moment.[110]

These processes of differentiation and phase-movement suggest the importance of conceiving of the maintenance of social stability as continuous and dynamic and of society as being in a dynamic, rather than a static, equilibrium.

3.3.2.2 Its Shortcomings: What It Does Not Do

The discussion of the equilibrium theory of social change has led us to conclude that on the basis of its premises it is capable to account for only some of the changes which occur regularly in social life. It is apparently not capable to give an adequate account of other changes taking place in society. If this assertion is correct, then an equilibrium theory in the Parsonian style does not provide an adequate framework for a general theory of social systems, notwithstanding for an analysis of conflict and change.

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[110] For instance, from 8 to 12 a.m. a man works and serves goal attainment and adaptation, neglecting tension management; from 12 to 2 p.m. he suspends the former and concentrates on tension management; from 2 to 5 p.m. he returns to goal attainment at the expense of tension management; after 5 p.m. he manages tension to the exclusion of goal attainment. However, as Professor Werner Stark has noted in his lectures on Parsons, Parsons seems to fall victim to scheme. At no time can we completely forget one need, or prolong any one over a period of time while jeopardizing the others. There seems to be no neat distinction, though it might be justified to insist that phases are institutionalized (e.g., daily phase with work from 9 to 5 and then relaxation, or weekly phase with work from Monday through Friday and then rest period). From a system perspective one can easily arrive at a classification o social structures in terms of their problem-concerns and phase-movements. For example, the economy, defense, and education (as an agency preparing for future role performance) deal with adaptive problems; the state and certain legal institutions concentrate on integrative problems; the family, informal groups, and education (as an agency transmitting culture) are primarily involved in problems of pattern maintenance and tension management. In their work, Economy and Society (op. cit.), Parsons and Smelser make a bid for bringing all their ideas and concepts together in one closed system. They suggest that the procedure of the sociologist should be to go from the wider to the more narrow social system. Later he should descend to the less inclusive system and continue doing this all the way down the structural scale, until he reaches the study of the functions of personality and organism.

The point is not that the results make the functional theory of change questionable, but rather its underlying premises. As we have demonstrated here, the representation of society as a social system, the ultimate point of reference, follows from the basic question with which this approach is concerned, namely, how the elements of a society are combined into a functioning whole?[111] Most sociologists agree that the equilibrium model of society is based upon implicit postulates such as stability (in the sense of coordinated processes within the system), "functional teleology,"[112] and that society rests on the consensus of its members.[113] There is some empirical as well as theoretical evidence that this societal model does not, i.e., cannot, lend itself to an explanation of social changes and social conflicts beyond functional (or dysfunctional) considerations. This is precisely the point that Ralf Dahrendorf attempted to get across to the different factions in theoretical sociology. He states

> that the criticism of the structural-functional theory for the analysis of conflict is directed only against a claim of generality of this theory, but it leaves untouched its competence with respect to the problem of integration.[114]

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[111] This point has been elaborated upon especially by Lockwood ("Some Remarks on the 'Social System,'" op. cit.) and his pupil, Dahrendorf ("Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," op. cit.).

[112] For reference to Sorokin's criticism, see Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 52 f.; see also Buckley, "Structural-Functional Analysis in Modern Sociology," op. cit., pp. 246 ff.

[113] Cf. Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," op. cit.; Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict ... op. cit.; Moore, Social Change, op. cit., pp. 5-11; Merton, op. cit., chapter 3 ("Manifest and Latent Functions").

[114] Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," op. cit. p. 104 (here quoted from a reprint in Etzioni and Etzioni, op. cit.).

What are those other "facts" of which the equilibrium theory like that of Parsons does not give a reasonably adequate account? Let us consider the class of changes he labels "structural," that is to say, changes involving a transformation of the fundamental structure of society. Parsons presented his own reasons why his theoretical scheme is not capable of yielding explanations of the over-all processes of change *of* the systems as systems.

> The reason is very simply that such a theory would imply complete knowledge of the laws of process of the system and this knowledge we do not possess.[115]

It seems as if Professor Parsons has fallen victim to scheme again. He seems to imply that explanations of changes *of* the system, or social revolutions, can only be inferred from all the processes, or more accurately, a complete knowledge of their laws, operating in a social system and mediating two system states. In the meantime, we had to concentrate on changes *within* the system which would allow us to formulate a theory of the social system's responses to given disturbances.[116] However, the pattern of systemic reaction to social disturbances is obvious - that of movement to a new position of equilibrium. Apart from the fact that the notion of equilibrium represents only a partial and possibly a speculative reflection of actual social life, how does this theory account for a system state in which the equilibrium point has been displaced? As numerous examples in the political, technological, or economic spheres have demonstrated, the new state of equilibrium cannot always be reached from the old one by an infinitesimal number of steps.[117] Since, as Parsons

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[115] Parsons, *The Social System*, *op. cit.*, p. 486.

[116] Guessous, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[117] Cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951); Arthur C. Pigou, *The Economics of Stationary States* (London: Macmillan, 1935); Spicer, *op. cit.*; Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, revised and explanded edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

would reason, processes within a social system generating, affecting, and affected by conflict and change are neither practically nor theoretically transparent, the occurrence of structural change or revolutions might still be analyzed in terms of powerful exogenous forces. There is a wide range of external sources conceived of being the transformation agency of social systems - from biological factors, demographic variables such as immigration or population growth, psychological variables such as motivation or aggressiveness, to cultural ones such as diffusion, acculturation, subversive elements, and charismatic leadership, etc.[118]

This is not to say that descriptive-historical, psychological, or chance variables are not important. However, if it could be shown that certain types of social conflicts and subsequent changes stem from given structural arrangements within the social system, then to relegate these conflicts, "strains," to external variables means not only to distort social reality, but also to abdicate analytical responsibility. Or as Guessous has put it:

> To interpret structural change in this manner is an abdication of analytical responsibility, because the behavior of exogenous forces is assumed to be indeterminate from the point of view of the theory of social systems.[119]

On the other hand, who says that if we had a complete knowledge of the laws of processes operating within a social system in equilibrium, this would provide a basis for predicting (and explaining) the occurence and intensity of external disturbances? Is it sufficient and reasonable to explain events and changes

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[118] See our previous discussion on endogenous and exogenous sources of change. Cf. Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," op. cit., pp. 71 ff. For an early statement on this topic, see Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 486-496. In the meantime, an immense literature has been produced on this subject; for a sample, see Guessous, op. cit., p. 28.

[119] Ibid., p. 28.

like the French Revolution, the ascent of capitalism, the occurrence of a general strike, or the formation of a revolutionary movement by referring to the motivational states of individuals, historical developments, the dictates of a "prime mover," or other (historical) dei ex machina? Doesn't this idea come close to the notion that social conflicts and sequences of structural changes are only abnormal phenomena and thus merely "exceptions to the smooth course of events postulated by the equilibrium model - exceptions which are brought about by single, individual, nonrepetitive events that may be amenable to historical analysis but not to theoretical generalization?"[120]

Parsons, for instance, spent a lot of effort analyzing the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany and in doing so he singled out "four major broad sets of conditions which must be present if such a movement is to spread widely and gain ascendancy in the social system."[121] In the last analysis, the seizing of power by the Nazi party is accounted for by "the existence of a widespread alienative motivation" as a concequence of a "rapid process of industrialization," which quasi accidentally met a "highly unstable... power structure in post-war Germany."[122] Would it not be of greater explanatory value to contend that the social conflict persisting in the Weimar Republic originated in the antagonistic authority relations prevailing in the wake of the fall of the German monarchy and ultimately resulted in a massive absorption and redistribution

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[120] Ibid., p. 31. See also Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," op. cit., pp. 100 f.

[121] Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., p. 521; cf. pp. 520-534. For further empirical detail, see Talcott Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 1 (1942), pp. 96-114. (This article is reprinted in T.P., Essays ... op. cit., pp. 104-123.)

[122] Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 523 f.

some of which we have covered here, do not stress either aspect.[124] Since all theories necessarily imply change and stability, the crucial question is not which theoretical scheme deals with and handles the change dimension, but rather which one best explains social change, its origin, forms, and direction.

The outline of structural-functionalism and our general critique has demonstrated that Parsons' system perspective includes an elaborate vocabulary of social explanation such as equilibrium (stable or moving), stability, integration, structure, function, strains, etc., which supposedly represents a heuristic key to the organization of knowledge about societal structures and processes. These concepts proved to be capable of providing explanatory devices for a rather limited range of determinate social changes, but stopped short in their capacity to explain the occurrence of radical changes in society and to locate structural origins of persisting social conflicts that generate small-scale or large-scale changes or both. The equilibrium model, already of limited explanatory capacity with respect to necessary and compatible changes, loses all explanatory value beyond homeostatic boundaries and becomes not only unproductive and "unrealistic", but also misleading. It is unrealistic and misleading simply because it ignores essential characteristics of social life and thus distorts social reality through the medium of an alleged social theory.

Perhaps the most serious reproach against, and in the long run the most promising challenge of, the - at least partially circular, nevertheless dominating - functional analysis of social change comes from Europe. American sociologists have always

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[124] Cf. Walter L. Wallace, ed., Sociological Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 55.

been closer to biology, physiology, and ethnology than to economics, politics, and history. Tocqueville and Spencer have been more important than Marx and Pareto. American sociologists like all Americans always showed aversion to notions and ideas such as class, conflict, coercion, revolution, dominance, and elite.[125] Disciplines, theorists, and concepts seemed to have cooperated in creating a conservative syndrom of American sociology. It conceives of society not only as being this functional system itself. As David Lockwood has noted in his critique of Parsons' The Social System, there is no place for the "factual substratum" of social structures in such a societal image. Where do you find the real authority relations in such a conception?[126] The cultural system may provide norms that limit the exercise of power; in social physiology the exercise of power appears as a restraining mechanism of functional harmony.[127] The only question is whether or not Nixon and Breshnev stick to such theories.

The trouble with the order theory is that it makes promises that it cannot possibly keep under given premises. This is so, as we have shown, because, first of all, to assume a value consensus as a prerequisite to the existence of a social system is not only unrealistic, but also misleading. The consensus assumption is untenable because empiric societies not only show considerable dissension and conflict, but also that consensus can lead to disintegration. Furthermore, the assumption of a value consensus is deceptive, theoretically as well as practically, because it tries to convey unity where there is also multiplicity.

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[125] Cf. Dahrendorf, Die angewandte Aufklärung, op. cit., p. 163. Edward A. Shils, The Present State of American Sociology (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948), pp. 52 f.

[126] Lockwood, "Some Remarks on the 'Social System,'" op. cit.

[127] For illustration, see Parsons, "An Outline ..." op. cit., pp. 60 ff.

This basically means that a society can produce alternative means of integration such as political coercion, nationalism, etc. The postulation of consensus does not leave any alternative integration except (self-regulative) social control through internalization and socialization.[127a]

This links consensus with the second basic postulate of order theory, that of equilibrium, the self-regulative, integration mechanism. Consensus linked with equilibrium in the order frame of reference, then, does not represent social structures and processes as they actually operate, but rather what they would be like if functioning within a system in equilibrium on a consensual basis. By contrast, we presented ample evidence that there is no necessary direct relation between consensus and equilibrium or between conformity with a moral code and integration. We have seen that the model of dynamic equilibrium can deal with adjustive changes of the social system. Adjustment to external or internal changes constitutes a condition in maintaining the equilibrium. Here, malintegration or even disruption may result from stability in certain parts of a society (e.g., the political system), when such parts fail to adjust to those changes.

Our methodical as well as substantive considerations suggest that functional analysis should drop the postulate of consensus, on the one hand, and integrate other key concepts such as functional autonomy, functional equivalences and degree of functional reciprocity, on the other hand. Functionalism has to reformulate its vocabulary, especially in relation to the fact that different elements of a society can coexist whether or not they are significantly complementary, more or less inter-

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[127a] Cf. Niklas Luhmann, "Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Systeme," in Soziologische Aufklärung, op. cit., pp. 113-136.

dependent or in opposition to one another. In other words, the concepts of interdependence and equilibrium which are independently variable will have to be "dialectisized."[128] By comparing the dialectic content of order principles such as interdependence, consensus, and equilibrium, with principles of conflict theory such as interdependence conceived of as conflictual relation(s), conflict, power, and coercion, we contend that one definitely finds important points of overlap and convergence.

We all know, although it is often forgotten under theoretical auspicies, that human societies are principally historical. In so far as this is so, social change is universal. But it would be a grave mistake to hope to find the basic principles for constructing a general theory of social change in an assumed pre-estabilized harmony or antagonism. Under such an assumption every sociological problem would then be reducible to a logical one. Equilibrium theorists may try to save their analysis of change by arguing that it is applicable in the long run, during which undefined time period the system will have adjusted to given disturbances. But then the equilibrium theory would say next to nothing about changes in an empirical and historical society, about small-scale changes, and continuous or discontinuous structural origins of social change. In the long run we will always arrive at theories of the same things: stability and change.

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[128] Cf. van den Berghe, op. cit., esp. pp. 208 ff.

CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Briefly, this review has provided us with an examination of three issues which have been central to the development of the sociology of change: (1) what is social change?; (2) out of what structural conditions does change arise; (3) how does change take place. Certainly there are many other important issues which attract the attention of those seeking to explain this phenomenon, but these are three questions which must be dealt with in the development of any social theory of change.

Although it may seem presumptuous to state that the treatment of these issues is "necessary" in order to explain change, a discussion of some of the assumptions that we make about the purpose of a theory may serve to clarify why we deem them so.

4.1 What Is Change - The Problem of Definition

First, a theory, by definition, is supposed to "explain something." And, unless that "something" is clearly and unambiguously defined, we have no way of evaluating the explanation. If the theory is to be tested, it must be conceptualized in such a way that specific hypotheses or statements can be measured against empirical data. Also, if the theory is to be of use to anyone other than its originator, and if it is to supplement the field of inquiry, the concepts must be defined in a communicable manner. The vagueness which characterizes many theories of social change leaves them open to conflicting interpretations and leads

to considerable dissensus as to what has or has not been accomplished in the field. As should be apparent from the earlier discussion of this issue, the answers proffered by various theorists are, to say the least, ambiguous. For example, the answer that change refers to "alterations in structural relations" really tells us no more than the answer that everything is constantly changing, unless what is meant by "alterations" and "structural relations" is clearly defined. However, most theorists seem to assume a general knowledge of, and consensus on, the meaning of these terms; or, perhaps, they themselves are not certain of what is meant by the terms they employ.

We are not trying to argue that we should give up the generalizing ability of social-scientific concepts in favor of a purely descriptive approach. Specification of the meaning of concepts does not necessarily rob them of their generalizing and predictive capacities but it does help to eliminate the problem of being too broad to be tested. Neither are we trying to argue for a definitive statement on what will, from this point on, constitute the subject matter appropriate to the study of change. Rather, we believe that in the interest of providing a clear, precise conceptualization, capable of empirical application, each theorist should specify exactly what he means by "social change" and by the terms he uses to describe it (e.g., short-term, large-scale, etc.). In this way the field will not be limited by any one philosophy on the "true nature of change" but new work in the area will have a more concrete foundation on which to build.

4.2 The Conditions Which Produce Change - The Problem of Causation

As the review of theories on change has shown, there is little consensus on the social conditions which produce change, except among those who share certain basic assumptions about the nature of society and change. However, despite the many difficulties of attributing causal significance to specific factors, it does present a significant problem which must be dealt with by any scientific theory. The necessity of ascertaining a "cause" lies not in the nature of the phenomenon of change, but in the nature of scientific inquiry itself. As Berger points out:

> An empirical science must operate within certain assumptions, one of which is that of universal causality. Every object of scientific scrutiny is presumed to have an anterior cause. An object, or an event, that *is* its own cause lies outside the scientific universe of discourse.[129]

Thus, assuming that the meaning of "change" has been defined and that the change(s) which is to be the subject of examination has been specified, the next question to be dealt with involves the stimuli that induced the change. Whether causal agency is to be assigned to ideas, elites, material forces, etc., will have important implications for how the theorist views the processes and consequences of the change and how his theory can be applied and evaluated.

In saying that a theory should deal with the source of the change being considered, we are not recommending the specification of some single, ultimate source from which all change is presumed to flow. As should be clear from the positions of theorists discussed in this Part I, such uni-causal schemes fail empirically because they attempt to explain too much with too little.

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[129] Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

Probably all of the sources discussed in these theories have played a causal role in some changes, but the numerous critiques written of these theories have also shown that they by no means explain the source of all change.

4.3 How Does Change Occur - Processes and Mechanisms

Theoretical positions on the processes of change are even more varied than on the sources of change. Although most theories of social change refer, at least implicitly, to certain conditions or factors involved in the movement of societies, or their constituent elements, from one state to another, few have fully specified any systematic relationship between the variables supposedly involved in the transition. As Smelser points out:

> Simply to list the variables influencing the course of social change is not sufficient to create a theory of change...The variables must also be organized into some sort of explanatory model. A model, simply defined, is a conceptual apparatus that states that if a given number of determinants are combined in a certain way, a definite outcome (type of change) is to be expected.[130]

One such model developed by Smelser to explain the processes of change will be presented in the next section.

The problem of defining change we leave to each theorist concerned with the subject; the question of the "true nature of change," to philosophers. In the remainder of this paper we will be primarily concerned with the two substantive issues posed (i.e., the structural conditions which produce change and the processes by which change occurs) and

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[130] Neil J. Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 20

with the ways in which three contemporary theories deal with these problems.

4.4 Prospects

Most of the major sociological theories on change (including works reviewed earlier) have, in the past, focused on ascertaining the sources of broad societal changes and describing the major processes involved in the transition of societies from one "state" to another. In more recent years, many theorists of change have moved away from these general theories and have directed their efforts towards describing more concrete processes by which changes, both "large and small scale," occur. Attendant with this change in emphasis has been a change in focus to include other than societal level analyses. The effects of social conditions on groups and individuals and their role in initiating, and participating in, social change has received widespread attention by contemporary theorists. (Although the role of the individual and group in relation to change had been studied, it was usually explained in psychological rather than social terms, e.g., Wilfred Trotter's, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, Le Bon's theory of crowd psychology, etc.) However, in an attempt to stick to more specific and testable hypotheses than their forerunners, some of the broader and more nebulous problems such as causation have largely been shunned. In short, the field of social change is currently characterized by an abundance of theories which deal with either broad, general aspects of change or with more specific details, but rarely with both.

Nevertheless, the absence of grand theories in the field need not necessarily represent a significant deficiency in our knowledge of the subject. The specialization characteristic of

many new theories has added greatly to our understanding of social change. Indeed it might prove more fruitful to draw together various theories which deal with different but complementary aspects of change or with change at different levels of analysis in order to gain a more "complete" understanding of change rather than to attempt a "grand theory of change," especially given the problems and inadequacies of past attempts to produce such theories, on any topic.

The balance of this study is devoted to presenting three contemporary theories which focus on different aspects of change at different levels of analysis and to exploring the possibility of using these theories as independent but complementary explanatory schemes. The result is not meant to be a synthesized grand theory explaining all of social change; each of these theories is limited in its applicability to specific types of change. Rather, we will try to show, within the limitations set by the broadest theory, how the two more specific ones may serve to fill in gaps in the explanation of change proposed by the first.

PART II

TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-FOCAL ANALYSIS OF CHANGE

In the following section we will examine the approaches of three authors of contemporary theories on change, each of which deals with different aspects of the issues of cause and process.

The first theory to be presented, Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, deals principally with factors which necessitate change in a social order. His is primarily an historical account of the changes produced in several societies by the introduction of commercialization. Although his perspective might be translated into a more general framework for analyzing what occurs when the power relations of an existing social order are challenged by pressures for change, his theory basically provides us with an analysis of structural conditions which produce societal change and a formula for predicting the type of change which is likely to occur.

The second theory to be presented, Neil J.Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior, differs from Moore's in several respects. Whereas Moore's theoretical statements are drawn from extensive historical reviews of specific episodes of change, Smelser has developed an abstract analytic model of universal determinants which he superimposes on concrete cases. Smelser, as opposed to Moore, focuses more on the concrete mechanisms by which change takes place than on causes. And Moore's theory

is aimed at explaining societal-wide changes while Smelser's encompasses both small-scale changes within a society as well as those of broader impact.

Most sociological explanations of change, including those of Moore and Smelser, stress the social forces which give rise to change but relegate the question of why people participate in movements designed to effect changes in society to the realm of implicit assumptions. For example, broad laws of social development or social conditions such as economic hardship, social disorganization, etc. are cited as reasons for the rise of social movements, but little explanation is given for why specific groups or individuals participate in these movements. The third theory, or set of related theories, to be presented deals with this aspect of the change process. These Theories of Status Discrepancy represent a social-psychological view of the relationship between the social status of individuals and groups and their attitudes and activities relative to social change.

The theories of Moore, Smelser and Status Discrepancies were chosen primarily because they represent different approaches to the study of change. We neither claim that they cover all important aspects in dealing with social change nor that they are necessarily representative of the theoretical approaches to this area of discourse. After presenting summaries of each of these theories, some of their major differences will be discussed and, on the basis of these differences, the possibility of combing them as independent but complementary schemes will be explored.

CHAPTER 5

PRESENTATION OF THREE CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ON SOCIAL CHANGE

5.1 Summary of Barrington Moore's Theory of Social Change

The theory of social change presented by Barrington Moore is an attempt to explain the important structural factors behind the main historical routes that the major nations of the East and West have taken in their transformation from agrarian to modern industrial societies. The three routes to the modern world which he examines are: (1) Democracy, via a bourgeois revolution (e.g., England, France, United States); (2) Fascism, via a conservative revolution from above (e.g., Japan, Germany); (3) Communism, via a peasant revolution (e.g., China, Russia). The key to understanding why a country followed a particular historical route to modernization lies, according to Moore, in the ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture.[1]

The dominant features of the three basic political configurations which emerged as these nations started on the road to modernization are briefly summarized below:

Democratic Capitalism: the development of an economically independent bourgeoisie which the landed upper classes and

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[1] Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1967), p. xvii.

peasantry either supported or were destroyed by, via revolution or civil war.

Reactionary Capitalism: a coalition between the older landed elites and the relatively weak rising commercial and industrial class, directed against the lower urban and rural classes. Bourgeois revolution was either non-existent or weak and easily defeated.

Communism: the maintenance of power by the agrarian bureaucracy and landed nobility which stifled all but the most feeble attempts at commercialization and industrialization, leaving behind a huge peasant population which ultimately revolted against the ruling classes.

For the purpose of analyzing how and why particular political outcomes resulted from certain structural conditions and responses of the landed aristocracy and the peasantry to the pressures of economic modernization, we have isolated several variables which seem to be of major significance in Moore's treatment of the subject. They represent only a broad outline of the important determinants and certainly do not do justice to the complex interplay of factors responsible for each individual nation's outcome. Moore does present an abundance of historical facts about each nation's progress on the road to modernization which serve to tie these variables into specific cases and "fill the gaps" of explanation. However, since we are concerned with the broad theoretical implications of his book than with summarizing his detailed historical accounts, we will discuss only those variables of importance in formulating a general theory of the social origins of democracy, fascism and communism.

The variables which seem to be of major significance in Moore's analysis are:

1) the "starting point" (or social setting prior to modernization)

2) persistence or non-persistence of a strong central authority and its relationship with the landed aristocracy

3) response of landed aristocracy to commercialization and the form which this commercialization takes

4) condition of the peasantry resulting from the landed elite's response to the pressures of modernization

5) strength or weakness of bourgeoisie relative to landed aristocracy

6) nature of coalitions between classes

7) presence or absence and type of revolution.

It is important to point out that we have isolated these variables only for means of analysis and that in specific historical situations they are intimately interrelated.

The plan of this summary will be to describe Moore's major theoretical propositions by sketching the basic configuration of these variables as they relate to democracy, fascism, and communism and examining how they operated in the specific historical instances that Moore discusses (England, France, United States, Japan, and China) to produce certain political forms.

Moore's point of departure is England which he sees as the ideal-typical example of a bourgeoise revolution culminating in parliamentary democracy. France and the United States are aberrant variations on the same theme. Rather than positing separate ideal types of fascism and communism, he analyzes them basically in terms of the ways in which they deviate from the model of parliamentary democracy, i.e., he looks at the conditions necessary for parliamentary democracy

which were lacking in the countries which terminated their route to the modern era in fascism or communism.[1a]

Variables

1. Social Setting Prior to Modernization

Although Moore does not examine in detail the history of premodern societies, he does point out that certain structural differences in agrarian societies may have influenced their subsequent development. Certainly the social structure of a premodern society does not completely determine the form it will take during and after modernization, "Yet even if the starting point is not decisive in itself, some may be much more favorable to democratic developments than others."[2]

Moore believes that the character of feudalism in Western Europe favored subsequent democratic developments whereas social arrangements in other parts of Europe and in Asia lacked certain of the ingredients favorable to democratic ideas and institutions. The most important of these elements of Western feudalism were:

a. growth of the notion of the immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler.

b. the concept of the right to resist unjust authority.

c. the concept of contract as a mutual engagement freely undertaken by free persons (derived from the feudal relation of vassalage).

According to Moore, these ideas led to the delicate balance between too much and too little royal authority which

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[1a] It seems to us that this approach makes it somewhat difficult to differentiate between the variables which prevented certain countries from following the democratic route and those variables which "determined" that they adopt a fascistic or communistic route.

[2] Ibid., p. 415.

was an essential ingredient for parliamentary democracy. In Russia no such balance was struck, for there was little reciprocal sharing of obligations and power between the ruler and independent nobility. Bureaucratic China lacked a strong conception of corporate immunity from central authority. Japanese feudalism stressed loyalty to superiors and a divine ruler and lacked the concept of free contract.

Moore emphasizes that, although he sees the role of ideas or cultural themes as important, he does not consider them to be the sole key to historical explanation. (Note that early Prussian society had features similar to those that became the ancestors of parliamentary democracy in other parts of Western Europe.) Rather, he sees them as intervening variables between people and "objective" situations which greatly influence the response to a situation.

> The residue of truth in the cultural explanation is that what looks like an opportunity or a temptation to one group of people will not necessarily seem so to another group with a different historical experience and living in a different form of society.[3]

Moore does not attempt to explain the historical developments of these countries in terms of their cultural values, but rather seeks to determine out of what conditions and experiences those values and institutions, which lent themselves to the development of democracy, fascism or communism, arose. The following variables which are concerned with the social, political, and economic conditions of the major classes in the societies may serve to clarify the bases of the various cultural themes.

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[3] Ibid., p. 485.

2. Presence or Absence of a Strong Central Authority and Its Relationship with the Landed Aristocracy

Moore designates the 16th and 17th centuries, during which time powerful central governments were established in all the countries which he examines (except the U.S.), as the beginning of modernization. In general, the development of strong central governments served two main functions which were very important to modernization. First, they checked the power and arbitrary rule of the nobility and, second, they "rationalized" the political order, i.e., they established more or less uniform administrative and legal systems and created an organized military machine. These two important tasks were carried out early by the royal absolutist regimes but not until the nineteenth century, after modernization had begun, in the agrarian bureaucracies.

Although strong central authorities developed in all of these countries, the important variable is whether or not this preindustrial royal absolutism or agrarian bureaucracy persisted into modern times and whether or not it joined forces with the landed aristocracy to form a conservative regime.

In general, the persistence of a nobility economically dependent on the land in alliance with a strong central authority which protects the privileges of the nobility is unfavorable to democratic capitalist developments as it tends to resist the formation of an independent bourgeoisie. Instead of allowing an independent commercial class to arise, the nobility, aided and protected by the central government, may continue to make its living from what it can extract from the peasants.

In England there was no strong alliance between central authority and landed aristocracy during modernization. Instead

a rough balance of power between crown and nobility emerged. The English Civil War had checked royal absolutism and the landed aristocracy early established a firm, independent economic base by their own acquisition of commercial traits.

French social structure lacked this important balance of power between monarch and landed elite. Instead of gaining independence, the leading sector of French nobility "...became a decorative appanage of the king,"[4] dependent on him for feudal protection. And, instead of turning to commercialization for income, the nobles continued to extract dues from their peasants. Those independent commercials who did arise were "co-opted" into the nobility and its conservatizing system of privileges. This fusion of ruler, aristocracy, and enterprising bourgeoisie into a conservative ancien régime, dominated by the monarchy, would have been a strong obstacle to the development of parliamentary democracy had the French Revolution not destroyed it.

The United States (after the Revolution) did not face the problem of destroying a well-established absolutist regime and the Southern aristocracy were involved from the very beginning in commercial agriculture. However, the Southern landed elites did not extend their commercial activities past agriculture and their interests were opposed to Northern industrial development. They constituted an inhibiting force to modernization which was finally destroyed by the Civil War.

The fascist configuration of this variable involves the persistence of a strong royal bureaucracy closely allied with the landed aristocracy, both of which rely mainly on the extraction of a surplus from the peasants for use and marketing.

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[4] Ibid., p. 40.

Commercial and manufacturing interests are allowed to develop but are controlled to a great extent by the central government and landed elite.

The communist configuration displays the same relationship between royal bureaucracy and landed aristocracy as fascism, the main difference being that almost all commercial impulses within the elite and peasantry are stifled.

3. Response of Landed Aristocracy to Commercialization and the Form Which This Commercialization Takes

One of the greatest impacts of commerce, both locally and internationally, was on the traditional exchange economy. As markets increased, cash economies developed, placing demands for more and more cash on rulers and lords. Rulers responded by levying heavier taxes on the lords who responded either by turning to commercial farming themselves or by extracting increased surpluses from the peasants. In general, the former response occurs where there is a fairly independent nobility and the latter is found where the landed elite remain closely tied to a strong central authority which is able to carry out the repressive measures necessary to hold down a labor force on the land.

The English response to commercialization was most favorable to democratic capitalist development. The English aristocracy turned to a form of commercial farming, removing most of its remaining dependence on the crown. They set their peasants free to shift for themselves, thus creating a large potential urban labor force.

The commercial impulse was much weaker in France where the aristocracy generally left the peasants in control

of the soil. Where the French nobles did turn toward commerce, they compelled the peasants to turn over a large part of their produce which the nobles then marketed. Thus, in France, peasant society was left largely intact but often economically drained, a situation which might have led to a peasant revolution had the French Revolution not crippled the monarchy and landed elite and, with them, the major resistence to democratic bourgeois development.

The response of the landed elite in the United States to commercialization was plantation slavery, a politically and socially repressive system unfavorable to democracy basically because it impedes the development of an independent bourgeoisie and requires a strong, authoritarian political apparatus. Democratic developments were made possible mainly because (a) the landed aristocracy did not control the emerging bourgeoise in the North and West and; (b) because the Civil War destroyed some of the landed elite's repressive hold over the South.

In contrast to the democratic route in which an independent bourgeoisie develops and the transition to commercialization is made with either the help or destruction of the landed elite, the fascist response to pressures to commercialize is carried out through a labor-repressive system. In this case the landed upper class, in conjunction with the central political authority, uses various political and social levers (as opposed to reliance on a free labor market) to ensure an adequate labor force to work the soil and provide surplus for marketing and consumption. A bourgeois class is allowed to develop, but is kept under control by the landed aristocracy. A dependent bourgeoisie, coupled with this reliance on serfdom or slavery for agricultural surplus leaves

the conservative alliance of central authority and landed elite in full control and is likely to result in fascism (unless the ancient régime is destroyed by revolution, e.g., in the U.S.A.). Such was the case in Japan and Germany.

One of the major differences between the democratic and fascist routes on the one hand and the communist route on the other has to do with this variable of the response of the upper class to commercial agriculture. "Where the landed upper class has turned to production for the market in a way that enables commercial influence to permeate rural life, peasant revolutions have been weak affairs."[5] There are several very different ways in which this development has taken place. For example, (a) the landed upper class can preserve peasant society in order to extract a surplus (e.g., early Meiji Japan); (b) traditional peasant society can be destroyed, either by breaking its connection with the land (e.g., England) or by intensifying the connection by (re-) introducing serfdom or slavery (e.g., Prussia). However, it is where the commercial impulse within the landed aristocracy is very weak that there is the greatest possibility of a peasant revolution leading to a communist regime. Moore basically attributes this to the failure of the landed upper class to establish reciprocal social and economic ties between itself and the peasantry. Peasant society is left intact but economically drained as nobles extract increasingly larger surpluses from the peasantry without giving them the means for increasing their productivity. Such was the case in 18th century France and in China and Russia during the 19th and 20th centuries.

4. Condition of the Peasantry Resulting From Landed Elite's Response to Pressures of Modernization

This variable is very closely related to the

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[5] Ibid., p. 459.

preceeding one and has been discussed to some extent in the previous section. In general, a massive reservoir of peasants persisting into the modern era of industrialization has been unfavorable to democratic development. The channelling of peasants off the land and into an open labor market seems to be most conducive to the development of democratic capitalism. If, instead, they are held on the land by a labor-repressive system, the socio-political climate is apt to be unfavorable to the development of democratic institutions as a powerful, repressive government will be necessary to keep them on the land.

Through the enclosures, England was able to eliminate the peasant question, driving them off the land to the cities and the "new world." The United States also largely avoided the problem of a peasantry because of their relative absence from the country's origin. (Although the slaves may be considered as peasants, they were too weak as a class to present a revolutionary problem.)

France did not escape the problem of a large peasant mass persisting into the modern era and Moore attributes the present instability of French democracy partly to this factor. However, the French Revolution, in which the peasants and bourgeoisie were allied against the French aristocracy and monarchy, served as an alternative way of getting the peasants off the land and allowed the creation of institutions favorable to democratic development.[6]

A large peasant population surviving into the modern era is characteristic of both the fascist and communist routes. The main difference between the two on this point stems from the different responses of the landed elites to modernization and the resultant differences in the condition of the peasant

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[6] Ibid., p. 426.

population. As pointed out earlier, in the fascist route, the landed elite, in alliance with the central authority, turns to commercial agriculture by keeping the peasants on the land and forcing them to produce a surplus for consumption and marketing. In the communist route the landed elite does not turn to commercialization and does not introduce commercial agricultural techniques into peasant society but continues to squeeze more produce out of them. The former course forces the peasants into modernization by introducing just enough changes in rural society to insure that the peasants generate a sufficient surplus to allow the landed elite to appropriate and market the goods at a profit. The latter course resists techniques that would increase productivity but continues to demand increased surpluses.

Very briefly, modernization entails the development of markets and the establishment of peace and order over a large territory for purposes of transporting goods. In countries such as Japan, Germany, and the United States, the processes of modernization and labor-repression served to strengthen the ties between lord and serf and the control that the lord had over the peasants. The development and maintenance of strong ties between the peasants and local nobles Moore sees as essential to the development of a reactionary reservoir of sentiment among the peasants and prevention of a peasant revolution. Strong ties between the two groups are basically maintained through a division of functions (mainly protection in return for production) and the creation of what Moore calls conservative solidarity (i.e., cohesion between the two groups is established by tying those with actual and potential grievances into the prevailing social structure by giving even the most impoverished

a stake in the system).

In countries that did not turn to commercial agriculture, links between the lord and peasant were weakened. The central authorities increased the burden on the peasants in order to militarize, meet the costs of a growing bureaucracy, etc., pushing many peasants below the subsistence level. And, where the protective function was also taken over by the central authority rather than by local landed elites (e.g., China), a crucial tie between the upper class and peasantry was dissolved. As opposed to the conservative solidarity characteristic of the peasants tied to the lords, a condition which Moore terms radical solidarity may arise. In radical solidarity the institutional arrangement is such as to spread grievances throughout the peasant community and turn it into a solidarity group hostile to the landlord, rather than providing an institutionalized means for redress of grievances. Radical solidarity arose in Russia, in response to the generalized land hunger, aligning the richer peasants with the poorer against the landlord. In China, where a certain minimum of property was necessary to be a "part" of the recognized religious and social system, the Chinese communists were able to create this type of solidarity among those who had been pushed below the minimum property level and no longer had a vested interest in the existing social structure.

5. Strength or Weakness of Bourgeoisie Relative to Landed Aristocracy

According to Moore, the development of a strong bourgeois class which can effectively compete for political power with the landed aristocracy is essential for democratic capitalist development.

In England the commercial class was strong, mainly because a large portion of the aristocracy had turned to

bourgeois capitalism in response to pressures for commercialization. That is, the landed elite became "bourgeoisified," thus strengthening and leading the new commercial interests while simultaneously weakening the hold of the traditional landed nobility.

In the United States, the Northern industrialists broke the hold of the Southern aristocracy in the Civil War and this asserted their dominance as the nation's primary economic class.

In France the bourgeoisie was weak. The nobility absorbed the more powerful peasants who had turned to commercial agriculture by granting them titles and privileges. However, the developing bourgeoisie who had not been thus co-opted aligned themselves with the peasants to destroy the inhibiting elite in the revolution.

Thus, in the development of bourgeois capitalism, the landed elites either became an important part of the capitalistic and democratic trend, as in England, or, if they opposed it, they were destroyed as primary political powers via civil war or revolution.

In the nations which eventuated in fascist regimes we find a developing capitalist class in alliance with (rather than in competition with or dominance over) the landed upper class. In this situation, the powerful bourgeoisie are not allowed to develop independently but rather are controlled by the landed elite. Commercialization and industrialization are fostered, but the landed elite retains the dominant hand politically. In the cases of Germany and Japan, "... the industrial class is too weak to take power itself and therefore throws itself into the arms of the royal bureaucracy and the landed aristocracy, exchanging the

right to rule for the right to make money."[7] For reasons pointed out in the preceeding section, the peasantry does not align itself with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the elites, as happened in France.

In China and Russia the bourgeois class was small and politically dependent. In China the Imperial bureaucracy stifled the development of a strong commercial class. It absorbed ambitious individuals into the Imperial service in an attempt to prevent the development of an alternative, commercial ladder to legitimacy and social status from arising. In both Russia and China, what commerce that did arise was heavily taxed and controlled by the rulers for their own profit. After the decay of the Chinese Imperial apparatus in the late 18th century, commercial and industrial elements turned to the provincial gentry for protection. However, these local officials were able to stifle commercial independence even more effectively than had the Imperial bureaucracy. "Not until 1910 did the Chinese business class begin to show some definite signs of emerging from official influence and domination."[8]

The commercial and industrial classes of Russia were also kept weak under the control of the Tsarist regime as late as 1917. In neither country did they have enough power or wealth to constitute a worthwile ally either for the peasants (as had been the case in France) or for the nobility (as in Germany and Japan).

6. Nature of Coalitions Between Classes

Moore believes that the nature of the relationship between the landed upper classes and the upper stratum of the town dwellers (which he terms the bourgeoisie) is one of the most important variables in determining the political outcome

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 177.

of modernization.

> The coalitions and countercoalitions that have arisen among and across these two groups have constituted ...the basic framework and environment of political action, forming the series of opportunities, temptations, and impossibilities within which political leaders have had to act.[9]

The type of coalition most favorable to democratic development is an alliance of the aristocracy with a strong bourgeoisie against the crown. This type of coalition occurred in England, further weakening the royal authority and allowing the industrial leaders to gain a firm political and economic hold. It is essential for democratic capitalism's development that the bourgeoisie be the dominant partner in the coalition - that the urban interests prevail over the rural.

In France and the United States the landed aristocracies did not align themselves with the new industrial leaders but rather were destroyed by the bourgeoisie which formed temporary coalitions with the peasants (France) and the central government (United States). In both cases, the hold of the conservative ancien régime was broken, allowing capitalist interests to dominate.

In contrast with the English case, the bourgeois-elite alliance that took place in Japan and Germany was of a reactionary nature. The landed aristocracy was the dominant partner and the coalition was directed against the peasants and workers. Thus the old politically and economically powerful aristocracy retained its hold and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie became part of the elite - the opposite of what occurred in England. Although, in the case of a reactionary

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[9] Ibid., p. 423.

coalition, the commercial and industrial elements are too weak and dependent to take power and rule themselves, they are strong enough to make a worthwhile political ally for the aristocracy and bureaucracy. Thus industrialization may proceed fairly rapidly although under the protective wing of the landed upper class. Even under this type of coalition democratic political features have developed (e.g., the Weimar Republic, Japan in the 1920's and Italy under Giolitti). However, these developments have been unstable and shortlived, basically because the landed elite, in the absence of a revolutionary upheaval, retained a large share of the political power. And, with the rural interests holding the balance of power, the fundamental structural changes necessary to modernization were resisted - until a revolution from above imposed such changes upon the society.

Where the commercial and industrial elements are quite weak (e.g., Russian and China), another type of coalition occurs, with quite different results. If the bourgeoisie is perceived as too weak to provide a worthwhile ally for the royal bureaucracy or the landed elite and thus is not "bought off" with a piece of the political and economic power of the regime, the urban leaders may join forces with the peasants, providing direction and leadership for peasant grievances in return for massive support necessary to seize power. However, even after the peasant-powered revolution has crippled the regime, neither liberal nor reactionary capitalist development is likely due to the weakness and underdevelopment of the trading and manufacturing classes.

7. Presence or Absence of a Revolutionary Upheaval or Revolution from Above and Time in the Era of Modernization in Which the Revolution Takes Place

Moore sees a revolutionary break with the past as a necessary condition for successful modernization. In general,

the earlier in the era of modernization this break takes place, the more favorable it is for the development of democratic institutions; the later this break occurs, the more firmly entrenched the power of the landed aristocracy and central government becomes, presenting a solid front of conservative upper-class opposition to bourgeois development and the social reforms necessitated by modernization.

The major import of a revolutionary break with the past is to destroy the alliance of big landlords with the central political machinery which inhibits the institution of the fundamental structural changes necessary for the adoption of commercial and industrial enterprises.

The English Civil War checked royal absolutism and gave the landed aristocracy a free hand in developing commercial enterprises early in the modern era. The French Revolution broke the power of the precommercial landed elite and royal authority, making it possible for independent commercial groups to develop and gain power. "In this sense...the French Revolution constituted an alternative way of creating institutions eventually favorable to democracy."[10] The American Civil War was the last of the three major bourgeois revolutions, likewise destroying the power of a landed elite which stood in the way of modernization via capitalism.

The next stage in modernization was characterized by revolution from above, eventuation in fascism. This occurred in those countries in which the power of the landed elite had not been diminished and where commerce and industry had grown up under the protective wing of the conservative regime. In such countries a minimum of social adjustments to modernization had been allowed by the nobility and the necessary structural

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[10] Ibid., p. 426.

changes had to be initiated from above as the peasants and workers were unable to make them themselves. (Recall the reactionary coalition spoken of earlier in which the nobles are allied with leaders in commerce and industry against workers and peasants.) Moore's position is that where industrialization and commercialization are accomplished through labor-repressive systems and without revolutionary upheaval, structural modernization will be imposed from above and fascism will be the end result.

Fascism may be seen as an attempt to make conservatism popular and plebeian; as a reaction against the upper-class coalition against peasants and workers. According to Moore, fascism is the product of the forced entrance of capitalism into the rural economy and of the structural strains arising in the post-competitive phase of capitalist industry. The small peasant suffering under the advance of economic modernization became the key figure in the ideology of the reactionaries. They emphasized a return to the "simple, uncomplicated, romantic life of the peasant" which the strains of modernization had disrupted. The lack of revolutionary upheaval in response to the strains is partially explained by the appeal of this conservative ideology and further by the ties the peasant had with the lord (conservative solidarity).

The third major type of revolution - peasant upheavals - takes place late in the era of modernization. This type is most likely to occur in countries where the commercial and industrial impulses have been stifled and where a large peasant class has survived into the modern era, subject to the strains of a severe labor-repressive system. Also, as under the great agrarian bureaucracies, the close social bonds between the landed upper class and the peasantry are destroyed if the central

authority takes over the judicial and protective functions of the lord. "An agrarian bureaucracy, or a society that depends on a central authority for extracting the surplus, is a type most vulnerable to such outbreaks [i.e., peasant rebellion, H.S./S.C.R.]."[11]

The breakdown in the ties between lord and serf can lead to the development of what Moore calls "radical solidarity," i.e., institutional arrangements which allow grievances to spread throughout the peasant community (rather than upwards to the lord) and turn it into a solidarity group hostile to the landlord. Such a situation may turn into open rebellion if leadership is provided by the wealthy peasants, local town elites, etc., who have become disenchanted with the existing regime. (Moore agrees with Marx here - peasants cannot make a revolution alone.)

In Russia, radical solidarity arose in response to the generalized land hunger, turning both rich and poor peasants against the Tsar. In China, the communists were able to mobilize the support of huge numbers of peasants that had been pushed below the minimum subsistence level. In neither case were the peasants tied into the dominant social structure nor were acceptable channels for expressing grievances provided. In both cases direction and support from disenchanted urban leaders was necessary for the discontent to be channelled into revolution.

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[11] Ibid., p. 459.

Summary of the Features Characteristic of the Democratic, Fascist, and Communist Routes of the Modern World

A. Persistence or non-persistence of a strong central authority and its relationship with the landed aristocracy:

Democratic: Development of a balance of power to avoid (a) too strong a crown (thus avoiding repressive social control apparatus) or (b) too independent a landed aristocracy (thus avoiding dominance of rural over urban) or (c) a monolithic alliance between crown and nobility (which could prevent development of an independent bourgeoisie).

Fascist: Persistence of a strong royal government in close alliance with the landed aristocracy (able to control emerging commercial interests).

Communist: Same as above except that the landed aristocracy is quite dependent on and controlled by the strong agrarian bureaucracy.

B. Response of the landed aristocracy to commercialization:

Democratic: Large segment of the landed aristocracy leads the way in commercial agriculture, becoming economically independent and politically powerful, promoting urban over rural interests.

Fascist: Landed aristocracy responds to pressures to commercialize by establishing a labor-repressive system with the help of the central political authority. Just enough commercial innovations are instituted to insure adequate agricultural surplus. Developing bourgeois class is kept under the control of the aristocracy and central government.

Communist: Nobles respond by extracting increasingly larger surplus from peasants without giving them the means to increase their productivity. Commercial and industrial impulse among nobility is very weak and is all but stifled among the peasants.

C. Condition of the peasantry resulting from landed elite's response to pressures of modernization:

Democratic: "Peasant problem" is solved by channelling peasants off the land and into an open urban-rural labor market.

Fascist: Peasants kept on the land but supplied with modern agricultural techniques to meet demands for increased productivity. Commercial impulse permeates rural society.

Communist: Burden on peasants is increased by pressure to produce more but they are not given technological means to do so.

D. Strength or weakness of bourgeoisie relative to landed aristocracy:

Democratic: Bourgeoisie becomes stronger than traditional landed aristocracy; urban interests predominate over rural. Large part of nobility becomes "bourgeoisified."

Fascist: Landed aristocracy remains stronger than bourgeoisie. Bourgeois development is controlled by the nobility.

Communist: Bourgeois development is stifled.

E. Nature of coalitions between classes:

Democratic: Coalition with bourgeoisie as dominant partner in alliance with (a) the landed aristocracy and directed against the crown, e.g., England; (b) the peasantry and directed against the aristocracy and crown, e.g., France; (c) the central government and directed against landed aristocracy, e.g., United States.

Fascist: Coalition between landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie (with landed aristocracy as dominant partner) directed against peasants and workers.

Communist: Coalition between urban leaders and peasants against bureaucracy and local nobility.

F. Type of revolution and time in the era of modernization in which the revolution took place:

Democratic: Revolutionary break with the past early in era of modernization which destroys alliance of landed aristocracy with the central government.

Fascist: No revolution prior to industrialization and commercialization. Labor-repressive system is used to impose commercial techniques without modifying the social structure. Modernization of structure is imposed from above.

Communist: Absence of a commercial revolution in agriculture led by landed elite and absence of a bourgeois revolution. Massive peasant class survives into the modern era but with few bonds between it and the rest of the system.

5.2 Summary of Neil J. Smelser's Theory of Collective Change

Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior is an attempt to systematically explain why episodes of collective behavior occur where they do, when they do, and in the ways they do.[11a] He uses, as the defining characteristic of "group" behavior in general, the kind of belief under which behavior is mobilized. Collective behavior is action based on a generalized belief. These generalized beliefs differ from those that guide other types of behavior in that they involve a belief in the existence of extraordinary forces - threats, conspiracies, etc. - which are at work in the universe. They also involve an assessment of the extraordinary consequences which will follow if the collective attempt to reconstitute social action is successful (or unsuccessful).

In forming his definition of collective behavior, Smelser lists three characteristics, the combination of which separate it from other types of group phenomena:

(a) Collective behavior is uninstitutionalized - it is formed as a response to an unstructured situation.
(b) Collective behavior is an attempt to reconstitute all or a part of the social order - it redefines social action when the conventional modes of dealing with a situation are inadequate.
(c) It is guided by a generalized belief (as defined above).

So, his definition of collective behavior is - (a) an uninstitutionalized mobilization (b) to reconstitute a component of social action on the basis of a (c) generalized belief.

His definition then excludes, as necessary defining

[11a] Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1963).

characteristics, distinctive psychological states and patterns of mobilization, for, although they are important, they form no observable unique patterns which are necessary for episodes of collective behavior to occur.

As types of collective behavior he excludes crime, audiences, ceremonial behavior, and other group phenomena (often listed under the heading) on the basis of his definition; that is, they are either institutionalized or do not seek to reconstitute social action.

Having set the outer boundaries of the field, Smelser identifies the major types of collective behavior: the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-oriented movement, and the value-oriented movement.

Smelser then introduces his two major foci of determinacy - the determinants of collective behavior:

(1) The general determinants - to explain why collective behavior occurs at all.
(2) The unique combination of determinants for any collective episode - to explain why one form of collective behavior occurs rather than another.

His concept of the organization of these determinants is an "economic" one - that of the value-added process. An example of this process is the conversion of iron ore into a finished automobile by a number of stages of processing like mining, melting, tempering, shaping, and combining the steel with other parts, painting, delivery to a retailer, and selling. Each stage "adds its value" to the final cost of the product. The main point is that each stage must combine according to a certain pattern before the next stage can contribute its particular value to the finished product. Every stage is therefore a necessary condition for the appropriate and effective addition of value in the next stage. The sufficient condition

is the combination of every necessary condition according to a definite pattern. Moreover, each additional stage limits the possible type of outcome. Smelser applies this logic to outbursts of collective behavior, which he considers to be produced by an elaborate sequence of determinants. These determinants must not only be present if collective behavior is to occur, but they must also combine in a definite pattern. He lists six general determinants, each of which is a necessary condition, and all six, when properly combined, constitute a sufficient condition, which must exist for the production of every sort of collective behavior. Furthermore, each determinant occurs in many varieties, the unique combinations of which determine the type of collective behavior. As the various forms combine, the determination of the kind of episode which will result becomes increasingly specific, ruling out alternative behavioral possibilities.

Smelser's determinants of collective behavior are: (1) structural conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) growth and spread of a generalized belief, (4) precipitating factors, (5) mobilization of participants for action, and (6) operation of social controls.[11b] The value-added logic implies a temporal sequence of the activation of an event or situation as a determinant, but only an analytic sequence of occurrence. In other words, any or all of these determinants may have existed for any length of time, but only when they become activated in a definite pattern do they contribute to the formation of collective behavior.

(1) Structural conduciveness is the most general determinant and is a necessary condition for the activation of the other

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[11b] Ibid., pp. 12 ff.

five. Structural conduciveness refers to social conditions that are permissive of a given sort of collective behavior (e.g., regarding a race riot - a large compact, residentially segregated minority population - a structural feature permissive of race riots).

(2) Structural strain refers to a conflict between components of social action (e.g., the value, equality, versus Jim Crow laws). The major types of strain (which will later be applied to the major types of collective behavior) are ambiguity, deprivations, conflicts, and discrepancies. In order for the strain to be a determinant, it must fall within the scope established by the condition of conduciveness. The two must combine, thereby narrowing the range of possible final outcomes.

(3) Growth and spread of a generalized belief - before collective action can be taken to reconstitute the situation permitted by structural conduciveness and brought on by strain, this situation must be made meaningful to potential participants. A generalized belief supplies the meaning by (a) identifying the source of strain, (b) attributing certain characteristics to this source, and (c) recommending that certain actions be taken to relieve the strain; e.g., (a) the Communists (b) are conspiring to undermine the moral fiber of our youth, and (c) we ought to get rid of them.

(4) Precipitating factors - when they occur in the context of, or are interpreted in the light of, the other determinants - give the generalized beliefs concrete, immediate substance, thereby providing a setting toward which collective action can be directed.

(5) Mobilization of participants for action - once the preceeding determinants have been activated, the only remaining necessary condition is to bring the affected group into action.

This point marks the onset of a collective action be it a panic, a hostility, an agitation for reform, or a revolution. In the mobilization process leadership and communications are very important.

(6) The operation of social controls - this is really a counter-determinant and it is its relative weakness or effectiveness that makes collective behavior possible, or impossible. There are two kinds: (a) those social controls which minimize conduciveness and strain, thereby preventing collective behavior and (b) those which are mobilized after a collective episode has begun. They determine how fast, how far, and in what direction the episode will develop.

The value-added logic of these determinants assumes a continuity of substance; i.e., the six determinants of collective behavior are parts of one process - they are multiple determinanats of some single outcome. There is also a continuity of locus implied, for the determinants must be communicated to persons of similar enough experience that these conditions will be interpreted in a like manner.

Now we shall examine the ways in which the value-added explanation of the various determinants may be analyzed in relation to the components of social action which they are activated to reconstitute. Through this analytical framework of social action we may trace the course and type of collective behavior which will result as the determinants accumulate.

Components

One of Smelser's main theses is that collective behavior can be classified and analyzed under the same conceptual framework as all social behavior. That is, even though the

extremes of social behavior differ like collective behavior and conventional behavior, they have essential similarities - i.e., both face situations imposed by social life (e.g., both must be legitimized by values, both involve an assessment of the situation in which they occur, etc.). Because of these characteristics common to all social behavior, Smelser introduces an analytical framework to describe the components of action at the social level. It is a "flow chart" of the paths along which social action moves. He uses this chart to investigate what happens to these components of social action when institutionalized ways of reacting fail in the face of unstructured situations. One major set of reactions to this failure constitutes the major types of collective behavior. Such behavior is an attempt to reconstruct a disturbed social order or parts of it.

Smelser has designed his theoretical construct of the components of social action to operate at the social-system level. That is - it analyzes the relations among actors rather than individual personalities. The units of analysis are roles (husband, citizen) and organizations (political parties, families, etc.). He uses the term "social system" to refer to interaction not only at the societal level, but on down to even informal interaction among two persons.

Smelser's four basic components of social action are: (1) values, (2) norms, (3) mobilization of motivation into organized action, and (4) situational facilities.[11c]

(1) Values - this component refers to the generalized ends which provide the broadest guide to purposive social behavior. Values are the most general component - they do not specify kinds of norms, organizations, or facilities which are required to realize these ends (e.g., democracy - the countries in which this value

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[11c] Ibid., chapter 2.

forms the core of legitimacy for their political systems do not necessarily have the same principles of representation, the same elective systems, etc.). These differences do not lie at the value level, but rather involve various ways of implementing the political value of democracy. Values, then, are the most general statements of legitimate ends which guide social action.

(2) Norms - are more specific than general values, for they specify certain regulatory principles which are necessary if these values are to be realized. For example, the value of democracy provides only criteria for judging the legitimacy or illegitimacy of whole classes of behavior. Norms must be established to indicate how democracy may be realized (e.g., rules of election, etc.). Norms range from formal, explicit regulations to informal, even unconscious, understandings.

(3) Mobilization of motivation into organized action - this component determines the form of organization of human actions. It specifies who the agents in pursuit of the valued ends will be, how the actions of these agents will be structured into concrete roles and organizations, and what the system of rewards will be. This component includes what is commonly called social organization or social structure (e.g., families, churches, government agencies, business firms, etc.).

(4) Situational facilities - the final component - involves the means and obstacles which facilitate or hinder the attainment of concrete goals in the role or organizational context. Situational facilities refer to the actor's knowledge of the environment, his ability to predict consequences, his tools and skills. This knowledge is relative to the possibility of realizing a goal which is part of his role or organized membership (e.g., a businessman employing various facilities for making a decision in the market - information about market

conditions, knowledge of investment, ability to finance the enterprise). In other words, facilities are the means used in the agent's assessment of the situation.

Hierarchy of Components - The Relations Among Them[11d]

(1) The four components of social action stand in a hierarchy in relation to one another -

Values
Norms
Mobilization
Situational Facilities

(2) Dimensions of hierarchy

(a) As we move from top to bottom, the concrete details of involved action receive increasingly more specific definition.

(b) Any redefinition of a component of social action necessarily makes for a readjustment in those components below it, but not necessarily in those above it.

These are the systematic relations among the components.

Internal Organization of Each Component

(1) (a) Each component possesses an internal organization which involves seven levels of specification

(b) These divisions within a component successively restrict the meaning and applicability of it to concrete social action.

(c) The internal levels of specification progressively narrow the definition of the component - from broad generalizations to everyday occurrences.

(2) To illustrate, we'll trace the seven levels of specificity

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[11d] For the following discussion, see Table 1, page 155.

TABLE 1:

LEVELS OF SPECIFICITY OF THE COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL ACTION

Level	Values	Norms	Mobilization of motivation for organized action	Situational facilities
1.	Societal values	General conformity	Socialized motivation	Preconceptions concerning causality
2.	Legitimization of values for institutionalized sectors	specification of norms according to institutional sectors	Generalized performance capacity	Codification knowledge
3.	Legitimation of rewards	specification of norms according to types of roles and organizations	trained capacity	Technology or specification of knowledge in situational terms
4.	Legitimation of individual commitment	Specification of requirements for individual observation of norms	Transition to adult role assumption	Procurement of wealth, power or prestige to activate Level 3
5.	Legitimation of competing values	Specification of norms of competing institutional sectors	Allocation to sector of society	Allocation of effective technology to sector of society
6.	Legitimation of values for realizing organizational goals	Specification of rules of cooperation and coordination within organization	Allocation to specific roles or organizations	Allocation of effective technology to roles or organizations
7.	Legitimization of values for expenditure of effort	Specification of schedules and programs to regulate activity	Allocation to roles and tasks within organization	Allocation of facilities within organization to attain concrete goals

More Specific ↓

More Specific →

Source: Ibid., p. 68.

of values that are shown on the chart. For example, freedom is considered to be a basic American value. In order to give the value social meaning we must place restrictions on it. In the economic area, freedom means free enterprise or laissez-faire; in the political sector, it concerns civil and political liberties; in the religious sphere, it means the separation of church and state, and so on. Freedom is still the general value (first level); we have merely qualified it in reference to various institutional sectors of society (second level). The third level specifies what kinds of activities and rewards are legitimately to be pursued. The fourth level specifies the appropriate type of committment for the individual actor at the role level (e.g., in business, personal success). At these four levels, committment to values is very general. The last three restrict the values to an operative level. Level 5 limits the scope of activity involved by recognizing as legitimate other competing values (e.g., business vs. religion - in some communities business must close on Sunday though that is unprofitable). Level 6 introduces values which specify the types of committments that are necessary at the operative organizational level if the higher-level values are to be realized (e.g., efficiency means profit-making). Level 7 involves the committment to implement, by personal effort, the higher-level values of the organization.

The higher levels define the general nature of values; the lower levels define the committments necessary at operative levels if these general values are to be realized. The other components of social action operate on the same basis.

The Structure of the Components of Social Action

(1) This table of levels of specificity is conceived by Smelser to be a map of social action - it indicates the principal transition points as human resources move from general undefined states to their more specific operative states.

(2) There are several principles which govern this chart:

(a) Reading <u>across</u> each row - each transition adds a qualitatively new component of action to values - first norms, then mobilization, then facilities.

(b) Reading <u>down</u> each column - at each transition a single component is prepared for implementation by the addition of some new restricting condition.

(c) Each transition across a row to the right and each transition down a column, then, adds more specific meaning to the process of producing concrete social action.

(d) From any given point in the table, any <u>redefinition</u> of the component at this point <u>necessarily</u> requires a corresponding redefinition of all points below and to the right. The converse does <u>not necessarily</u> follow.

This chart will provide us with a theoretical framework within which we can trace and define episodes of collective behavior.

<u>Structural Strain</u>

Earlier we identified structural strain as one of the major determinants of collective behavior. We will now analyze it in reference to the components of social action.[11e]

[11e] <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 47 ff.

Smelser defines strain as an impairment of the relations among, and consequently inadequate functioning of, the component of action. He makes two propositions: (a) any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior; and (b) strain at any level of any component will show up first at the lower, more operative levels where the immediate impact of events is most evident and where dissatisfactions accumulate first. Only as dissatisfaction spreads and attention turns to a search for the source of operative failures are the higher level components activated.

(1) Application of strain to lower levels of components of social action:

(a) Ambiguity as to adequacy of means for a given goal is the principal strain on situational facilities (it concerns the adequacy of knowledge and skills); e.g., are there unforeseeable financial risks? Examples of ambiguity at the lower levels of situational facilities are shown on the chart.

(b) Mobilization of motivation includes rewards for fulfillment of role behavior. The strain therefore is actual or potential deprivation of the rewards due (it concerns the balance between motivated activity and its rewards).

(c) In regard to norms the relevant strain involves conflicting roles, regulations, etc. (it concerns the integration of human actions).

(d) Strain on values involves the discrepancies which may exist between competing values - e.g., personal values vs. organizational goals (it poses the issue of commitment).

(2) The foci of strain also follow hierarchical principles; i.e., (a) strain at any point in the table is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for strain at all points downward

and to the right, but (b) it is neither necessary nor sufficient for strain at points upward and to the left.

When strain is exerted on one or more of these components and when established ways of relieving strain aren't available, various kinds of collective behavior tend to arise. Such episodes Smelser interprets as attempts to reconstitute one or more of the above components on which strain has been placed.

(3) Strain manifests itself in the lower operative levels:

(a) General principle for reconstituting social action: when strain exists, attention shifts to the higher levels of the components to seek resources to overcome this strain, or in the language of the table, we can define this process by saying that, in the search for solutions to conditions of strain, people turn their attention either upward or to the left, or both. That is, they move towards the more general levels and/or components in search of a solution. They generalize to overcome the strain, and thereby reconstitute that level, to reduce strain.

(b) If the process of generalization is successful, i.e., if a level was found which was causing strain and was therefore reconstituted to eliminate strain, attempts are made to work back down the levels - to reapply the new level to those below. Attempts are made to generalize, then respecify; the components are first destructured, then restructured. This is the process by which conventional behavior eliminates strain.

(c) Collective behavior also involves a generalization to a high-level component in search for solutions to strain. The critical feature of collective behavior occurs here - once the generalization has taken place, people do not proceed

to respecify, step by step, down the line to reconstitute social action.

(d) Instead, they develop a belief which short-circuits from a very generalized component directly to the focus of strain. The accompanying belief is that the strain can be relieved by a direct application of a generalized component. This is why collective behavior is irrational, abnormal, and radical. It compresses several levels of the components of action into a single generalized belief, from which specific operative solutions are expected to flow.

(e) An episode of collective behavior itself occurs when people are mobilized for action on the basis of such a belief.

(f) All collective behavior involves a belief which (a) arises from strain and (b) redefines the situation of strain at which time it selects some aspect of the strained situation and attributes a power or force to it - a force which is sufficiently generalized to guarantee the outcome of the situation.

Collective behavior then is differentiated from conventional behavioral reactions to strain because, by short-circuiting from high to low level components, it bypasses the specifications and controls that are required for society to normally adjust to the redefined component.

Generalized Beliefs[11f]

The three major functions of a generalized belief as a determinant in an episode of collective behavior are:

(1) The reduction of ambiguity in a situation by restructuring explaining and predicting.

(2) Reduction of ambiguity by restructuring the situation in a fast, short-circuited manner.

[11f] Ibid., pp. 79 ff.

(3) Preparation of individuals for collective action by creating a common culture within which leadership, mobilization, and concerted action can take place.

Each of the major types of generalized beliefs may restructure a specific one of the components of social action under strain and may also produce a certain kind of collective behavior if the other determinants permit action to flow.

(1) The first major type is hysteria. It transforms an ambiguous situation into an absolutely potent, generalized threat. Hysterical beliefs restructure the Facilities Series, and, if they give rise to action, lead to panic.
(2) Wish-fulfillment - reduces ambiguity by positing absolutely efficacious generalized facilities. Wish-fulfillment beliefs also restructure the Facilities Series and can give rise to the craze.
(3) Hostility - involves removing some agent or object perceived as a generalized threat or obstacle. Hostile beliefs restructure the mobilization component and may give rise to such hostile outbursts as scapegoating, even mob violence.
(4) Norm-oriented beliefs - envision the reconstitution of a threatened normative structure - reconstitute the Normative Series - give rise to reform movements and counter-movements.
(5) Value-oriented beliefs - envision the reconstitution of a threatened value system - Values Series - political and religious revolution, nationalistic movements, secessions, and formation of cults.

We must examine the ways in which the six determinants of collective behavior combine in a value-added order within this framework of the components of social action in order to determine what kind of collective behavior will occur. Of the major types of collective behavior, we'll use the panic - the simplest type, to illustrate. The basis for choosing the panic is that the major types of collective behavior are related to one another in a hierarchy - value-oriented

mobilization > norm-oriented mobilization > hostile outburst > craze > panic. Each of the higher types contains the main elements, in addition to elements characteristic of the particular type. Structural conduciveness is related to the four components in that they indicate the four major types of structural conduciveness.[11g]

The Panic - This type of collective behavior involves the restructuring of the Facilities Series. This is because the unstructured situation which panic is a reaction to involves only lack of knowledge of, or information about, the environmental conditions. It does not directly involve agents, norms, or values.

Structural conduciveness is the first condition which must exist if a panic is to result. In relation to panic, it refers to the (a) degree to which danger, (b) communication of danger, (c) and restricted opportunity to escape can arise at all; e.g., in financial panic (a) to what degree do the dangers of economic fluctuation exist - how effective are the institutional controls (i.e., unemployment insurance, government regulations of business, etc.), (b) can news of economic disaster be rapidly communicated, (c) do people - in the event of a financial panic - have only restricted means of disposing of their assets?

The next necessary condition is strain - the relevant type of strain here is ambiguity which refers to the perceived presence of some immediate danger of unknown and uncontrollable proportions. Such strain must appear in the context of the structurally conducive features in order to take on meaning as a determinant.

[11g] For the following discussion, see ibid., chs. 6 - 10.

Before the third determinant can appear, anxiety, caused by perception of the ambiguous threatening danger, must develop. This anxiety is converted by the precipitating factor into the next condition, generalized belief.

The generalized belief relevant to panic is the hysterical belief - or fear. This results when a precipitating factor "confirms" the generalized anxiety of the group and transforms this vague threat into fear of a specific, threatening agent.

Mobilization for flight (fifth determinant), may now occur (usually under a primitive form of leadership) for the identified destructive agent provides something from which to flee.

In regard to the sixth determinant - social control - we can regard the stages leading to panic as a series of equilibrium states. At each stage we can assess the balance between forces making for panic and those making for panic control. We may define types of control in terms of the components of social action - i.e., values such as faith can act as preventives or as controls in the early stages of panic. Norms may act as preventives (e.g., fire drills tell us how to act in such a situation) or as controls, directing behavior towards some other kind of activity than panic (e.g., saving loved ones). Organization (mobilization series) - or the structure of roles - can control panic (e.g., a "soldier" does not panic, a leader controls). Facilities, especially information which attempts to explain or dispel the fear, may act as controls.

In sum, we may define panic as a collective flight based on a hysterical belief and postulate that panic will occur if the appropriate conditions of conduciveness are present and

if a hysterical belief develops and if mobilization occurs, and if social controls fail to operate.

The other major types of collective behavior are all related to panic and the determinants operate in much the same way. However, as we move on to the more complex types, the main difference between each is the introduction of some new elements which makes that type distinct from the others. We will briefly summarize the new elements which are added to the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-oriented movement, and the value-oriented movement.

The Craze is the second type of collective behavior - in order of increasing complexity. Like panic, it also is related to the facilities series and its relevant strain is also ambiguity. It involves all of the basic elements of the panic but adds, as its defining characteristic, a positive generalized belief which counters the negative, hysterical fear. This is the wish-fulfillment belief - it guarantees a positive outcome in an uncertain situation by empowering some force with generalized potency to overcome the possibly frustrating, harmful, or destructive possibilities.

The Hostile Outburst may take the form of scapegoating, or, in extreme cases, mob violence. It is more complex than the panic or the craze and contains the major elements of both of these.

The hostile outburst differs in that it not only involves a redefinition of the facilities series, but also of the mobilization component. The relevant strain is deprivation, i.e., the anxiety here arises because of the actual or potential threat of deprivation of the rewards which are involved in the mobilization level. Therefore, this anxiety is identified with some responsible agent and a hostile belief develops with

the desire to mobilize to attack this agent. This identification of and attack on a specific agent constitutes the episodes' attempt to redefine the mobilization component which is the major difference between it and the panic and craze.

Norm-Oriented Movements differ from the previous ones in that they involve an attempt to reconstitute one or more norms. Because of the hierarchy governing the components of action, they necessarily also affect the mobilization and facilities series. The strain here is conflict concerning the integration of human action.

The generalized belief here is the norm-oriented belief. This goes one step farther than the hostile belief. After it has identified the agent responsible for the anxiety, it assumes that regulation of the agents is inadequate and that a normative reorganization is necessary to deal with them. It is, therefore, a movement oriented towards a change in the normative structure.

The Value-Oriented Movement involves the redefinition of the value series on the basis of a value-oriented belief which was created to explain the relevant strain - discrepancy. The discrepancy is between competing values. The main difference between the value-oriented movement and the others is that its generalized belief ascribes the anxiety and general social disharmony to a degeneration of values. It also envisions a regeneration of values which will cure all social ills.

In summary, all types of collective behavior are related to one another in that:

(1) All must have the six general determinants combined in a definite value-added pattern.

(2) All involve the reconstitution of a component of social action and their major differences stem from the particular components which each attempts to reconstitute.

(3) The four types of collective behavior stand in a hierarchy of increasing complexity and inclusiveness.

5.3 Status Discrepancy: Theories on Social Status and System Change

In recent years there has been a proliferation of theories dealing with the relationship between the status of various groups and individuals in a society and attitudes towards social change. The concept of status, as used here, refers to position in a social system (a) with respect to the distribution of prestige, rights, obligations, power, and authority; and (b) involving reciprocal expectations of action with respect to the occupants of other positions in the same system.[11h]

Some of the most prominent concepts in this area will be presented in summary form here in an attempt to develop a partial explanation of the reasons why various groups and individuals tend to advocate or resist certain types of social change. The concepts that we'll be dealing with, although closely related, will be presented under the separate headings of Status Consistency, Role Status Congruence, and Status Politics.

Status Consistency

The theory of status consistency is based on the proposition that an individual's position in a social system - with respect to the distribution of social rewards and responsibilities - is dependent on a multi-dimensional system of social ranking. That is, one's social status is determined by one's position on a number of status hierarchies, not on a single vertical dimension from high to low.

The measurement of this social status variable includes position on both ascriptive and achieved status hierarchies.

[11h] Dictionary of the Social Sciences, op. cit., pp. 692-693.

Ascriptive status refers to those status characteristics of an individual which are not subject to change through efforts of the individual. Only a change in the social evaluation of an ascribed characteristic can effect a change in its ranking on a continuum from high to low. The ascribed status characteristics most commonly used in measuring social status are: (a) racial-ethnic; (b) religious affiliation; (c) age; (d) sex. Achieved status positions are those which the individual may attain through personal efforts. An individual's position on these status hierarchies is subject to change according (at least theoretically) to individual efforts, although ranking is a matter of social evaluation. Achieved status variables frequently used in the measurement of social status are: (a) income; (b) occupation; (c) education. However, this type of classification of status variables into achieved-ascribed criteria does not always reflect the nature of these variables in concrete instances. As Rush[12] points out, education may take on the characteristics of an ascribed status for, once attained, it cannot be reversed. And, in some cases, education, income, and occupational status may be practically ascriptive according to the socio-economic class one is born into (e.g., for the black child born in Harlem, a low ranking on traditionally used measures of "achievement" is virtually insured.)

Status consistency is an individual condition resulting from similar rankings on all status hierarchies measured. Conversely, status inconsistency is the condition resulting from an imbalance among an individual's position on various status hierarchies which are associated with his social rank.

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[12] Gary Rush, "Status Consistency and Right Wing Extremism", American Sociological Review, 32 (February, 1967), p. 87; also see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," Conflict Resolution, ed. by. Clagett Smith (Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 277.

We may conceptualize this phenomenon on a continuum from perfect status consistency (e.g., a WASP, Episcopalian, Male, Middleaged M.D. earning $70,000 per year or a Mexican-American Catholic, Young, Female clerk earning $4,000 per year) to completely inconsistent social status characteristics.

The degree of status (in)consistency and the type of inconsistency (i.e., which status variables are inconsistent) may be considered the two most important factors in determining attitudes toward social change. The relationship presumed to exist between social status and attitudes towards social change is based on the psychological effect that social evaluation has on the individual's self-evaluation. If an individual's positions on all status hierarchies relevant to his overall social status are consistent, he will be evaluated and ranked in a similar manner in all social spheres and his self-image (seen here as a reflection of the evaluation of significant others) will be consistent. If, however, an individual's positions on various status hierarchies are inconsistent, he will likely be subject to conflicting evaluations by others and perhaps have inconsistent views of himself, depending on which status variable is made salient at the time.[12a] The literature on status inconsistency suggests that such a condition is disturbing to the individual and often produces frustration

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[12a] Several studies suggest that in order to establish status inconsistency or disequilibrium it is not sufficient that some status factors rank higher than others unless those differences are inconsistent with the normative expectations of the actor's social milieu. In short, differential ranking on different status dimensions does not in itself produce status disequilibrium. As Edward Sampson ("Status Congruence and Status Consistency," Problems in Social Psychology, ed. by Carl W. Backman and Paul F. Secord New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 220); similarly A. Malewski, "The Degree of Status Incongruence and Its Effects," Class, Status, and Power, 2nd ed., ed. by Reinhard Bendix and S.M. Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 303-308.

and insecurity. According to Lenski and others, status inconsistency is stressful because it is more rewarding to the individual to consider himself in view of his highest status or statuses while it is more rewarding to others to view him in terms of his lowest status.[12b] Thus a conflict results between expectations and experiences which may be disturbing to the individual. The literature also suggests that, given this condition, the individual will act to alleviate the condition. The assumed responses of the individual to the stressful condition of status inconsistency is the basis for relating this condition to attitudes and activities involving social change.

The theory of status equilibration assumes three types of pressures to be operating on the status inconsistent: (1) status aspiration, the pressure to maximize one's status position; (2) relative deprivation, resulting from a feeling of unfairness about one's position in relation to others; and (3) status equilibration, the pressure to equalize one's status ranks. Although the first two types of pressures are not limited to status inconsistents, they are related to his attempts to equalize his status ranks. Status aspiration pressures will make him seek to raise his lower status ranks rather than lower his high ones and relative deprivation makes him feel unjustly deprived of the rewards (e.g., rank on other

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[12b] Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Inconsistency and the Vote: A Four Nation Study," American Sociological Review, 32 (April, 1967), pp. 298-301. For a different view, see Elton F. Jackson and Richard F. Curtis, "Effects of Vertical Mobility and Status Inconsistency: A Body of Negative Evidence," American Sociological Review, 37 (December, 1972), pp. 701-713.

status dimensions) which he expects to be associated with his high rank because (he perceives that) such rewards are positively associated with the rank for other actors.

In addition to these three pressures, two 'needs' are postulated: to achieve and maintain (1) a favorable self-image and (2) expectancy congruence. Because of these needs, status disequilibrium may be a frustrating condition for the individual when it subjects him to contradictory evaluations (affecting his self-image) and thwarts his expectations with respect to treatment by others. These frustrating conditions may obtain when the individual is placed in a milieu where others are not characterized by the same status configuration (i.e., the individual is not insulated from differential evaluation and treatment).

In general, the more people there are in his reference group who have higher rank than him on his low status dimensions, the greater the relative deprivation he will feel. The salience of his status disequilibrium may also be affected by his commitment to the system of evaluation, the perceived permanence of his low rank and the degree of commitment or investment involved in the attainment of his high rank(s).

Next we will discuss the avenues available to the individual in his attempts to relieve the effects of status disequilibrium.

If an individual is characterized by status inconsistency, and if this inconsistency is made salient in such a way as to be disturbing to him, he may seek to remedy the condition. If so, there are several avenues of

behavior available which may alleviate the effects of his inconsistent status:

(1) He may seek to raise his lower status characteristic(s) to the level of his highest one, i.e., he may seek to equilibrate his status characteristics. (However, he would not be expected to lower his highest status to correspond to his lowest.)[13]

(a) If his lowest status is an achieved variable, he may attempt to raise it by:
(1) personal effort (e.g., go back to school, train for a "better" job, etc.)
(2) attempting to effect a change in the social evaluation of the position of his lowest status characteristic[14] (e.g., advocate a system in which all occupations are seen as equally necessary and important to society).
(3) attempting to (re)institute a system of evaluation in which his lowest characteristic is not a salient feature of social ranking (e.g., when high ethnic status overshadowed high achievement status).

If he chooses the first alternative, his actions will be system supportive. If he opts for number two or three, he may advocate changes in the social order which he believes to be responsible for his frustration by supporting a political party which promises such changes.[15] The choice of alternative number two would most likely lead to support of a leftist political party; number three of a reactionary platform.

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[13]Emile Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, Status Types, and Status Interrelations," American Sociological Review, 9 (1944), p. 151.

[14]Malewski, op. cit., p. 304.

[15]Erving Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," American Sociological Review, 22 (June, 1957), p. 275.

(b) If an individual's lowest status characteristic is ascribed, the only way that he can "raise" it to the level of his higher ones is to effect a change in the system of evaluation. Such an attempt would most likely lead to affiliation with liberal groups advocating policies of system change. (e.g., Black Power, Red Power, Women's Liberation, etc.).[16]

Note: The phenomenon of "ageism" (i.e., discrimination against the aged) may provide an interesting exception to the prediction that low ascribed status, when translated into political attitudes and activities, will lead to liberalism. Traditionally one's status has increased with one's age. However, at least in the U.S., there seems to be a trend toward the reversal of this, at least at some point in the ageing process. Therefore, we might expect, among the "elderly", the development of a reactionary attitude, desiring a return to "the good old days" when age commanded respect, privilege, honor, etc.

(2) If an individual perceives the possibilities of equilibrating his status or of changing the system of evaluation as negligible, he may react by turning his frustration inward.

This reaction is a possibility for both those whose lowest status is achieved or ascribed. However, it is a much more common reaction among those characterized by high ascribed-low achieved status than those with the opposite configuration of status variables.[17] Presumably this is the case because the person who fails to attain high status in areas that involve personal effort has only himself to blame for his low position whereas a person with low ascribed status cannot raise this status through any amount of individual effort - it is a system-imposed evaluation. However, according to Goffman,[18]

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[16] Elton K. Jackson, "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," American Sociological Review, 27(August, 1962), p. 479.

[17] Ibid. and Lenski, op. cit. p. 298.

[18] Goffman, op. cit.

even those whose lowest status is in the achievement category may advocate system change rather than reacting with self-blame if the perceived possibility for upward mobility is low.

(3) If an individual perceives the possibilities of raising his lower status factors to the level of his higher ones either through personal effort or system change as negligible, he may try to avoid those who react to him in terms of his lowest status characteristics or may withdraw from all but essential social contacts.[19]

One possibility for predicting which alternative a status inconsistent person may choose, involves availability and perception of alternatives. For example, does a movement exist which offers a program relevant to an individual's frustrations and, if so, would joining it be feasible given the individual's social situation (e.g., would he be likely to lose his job, wife, friends, etc., if he were to join a particular movement or party)? Or, does an education or job training program exist which the individual would have the time and money to participate in? If not, then self-blame and/or withdrawal may be the only feasible alternatives open to him.

In sum, we have posited that status inconsistency is a disturbing and frustrating condition and that those characterized by such a condition will seek to alleviate their frustration by (a) bringing the lower status factors in line with the higher ones through personal effort, if possible, or by attempting to change the system of evaluation through reactionary or progressive changes in the social system; (b) by withdrawal or avoidance of situations in which one's lower status characteristics are made salient.

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[19] Lenski, op. cit.; Malewski, op. cit.; and Gerhard Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review, 21 (August, 1956), p. 460.

In general, those status inconsistents characterized by high ascribed-low achieved status may be expected to react by (a) attempting to raise the low achievement variable through personal effort or (b) turning their frustrations inward or (c) advocating a reactionary program involving a desire to return to past systems of evaluation in which ascriptive criteria were the most important. Also, generally speaking, those characterized by high achieved-low ascribed status inconsistency may (a) advocate programs of social change designed to change the system of evaluation so that either achievement criteria become much more salient than ascriptive or so that the evaluation of their ascribed status as "low" will be changed or (b) withdraw from associations in which their ascribed status is salient.

Most studies of status inconsistency have found that the most noticeable and potent effects of this condition result when the discrepancies are between achievable and ascriptive status variables.[20] However, some studies have been done using the variables of only one category of status characteristics. Notable among these is a study done by Gary Rush on "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism" in which he relates certain configurations of achieved status criteria of both right and left-wing extremist attitudes. Using the variables of education, income and occupation, he is able to indicate tentatively the type of combinations of inconsistent achieved status variables which lead to the alternative extremist responses. He found that educational status (high or low) was the most important among the variables he used when it exists in an inconsistent relationship to other variables. Table 2 illustrates the tentative findings of his study:

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[20] Especially see Lenski's review of Robert Alford's Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1963) in ibid., pp. 298 f.

Table 2: Right-Wing Extremism by Low and High Status Consistency, Controlled for Status Differences in Occupation, Income & Education

	Occupation	Income	Education
High	a	b	c
Low	d	e	f

Implications

(1) a + b + c = Status consistency

(2) a + b + f = Status inconsistency which is more likely to lead to right-wing extremism than left-wing.

(3) a + c + c = Status inconsistency more likely to lead to left-wing extremism.

(4) a + e + f = Status inconsistency more likely to lead to right-wing extremism.

(5) d + b + c = Status inconsistency more likely to lead to left-wing extremism.

(6) d + b + f = Status inconsistency more likely to lead to right-wing extremism.

(7) d + e + c = Status inconsistency more likely to lead to left-wing extremism.

(8) d + e + f = Status consistency.

Education seems to be the most important variable of the three.

Source: Rush, "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism," op. cit.

Another study, conducted by K. D. Kelly and W. J. Chambliss,[21] also showed education to be the most important of the achieved status variables. However, their study also concluded that social class (as measured by occupation, income, and education) and racial-ethnic status were much better predictors of political attitudes than was status (in)consistency. In accordance with S. M. Lipset, they conceptualized and tested liberalism and conservatism as multi-faceted attitudes and found that, the higher one's social class, the more liberal one's views on civil rights and civil liberties but the more conservative one's attitudes towards economic affairs, regardless of status (in)consistency. They also found the converse to be true. However, as they did not measure ascriptive status factors, their findings do not invalidate our previous statements about ascriptive-achievement status inconsistency.

The most important element of their study, in terms of developing out theory, is the use of Lipset's multi-dimensional approach to liberalism-conservatism.[21a] Lipset's theory is that the status inconsistent person tends to extremist political attitudes (either right or left of center, or both, depending on the issue involved) more than the person whose status is consistent. The study done by Kelly and Chambliss is fairly supportive of this view although they argue that class and ethnicity still overshadow (in) consistency.

The significance of the theory of status (in)consistency for social change lies in the possibility of whole sectors of society suffering from inconsistent status (e.g., the relatively

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[21]K. Dennis Kelly and William J.Chambliss, "Status Consistency and Political Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 31(June 1966), pp. 375-382.

[21a]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960).

large numbers of American blacks attending colleges today may suffer from low ascribed-high achieved status inconsistency and the poor whites may feel the discrepancy between their high ascribed status and low achievement becoming more salient in the modern achievement-oriented system of evaluation.) Lenski and others have hypothesized that the more status inconsistents there are in a society, the less stable the society will be. However, the society-wide effects of status inconsistency have yet to be studied.

Congruity and Incongruity of Status Attributes Attached to Roles

Another aspect of status discrepancies which is relevant to this study is that which may exist between the status attributes of roles. Under this concept (in)consistency is not measured in terms of an individual's status variables, but in relation to the various status characteristics assigned to a specific social role.

Every social role carries with it certain status attributes[22] - a known level of rewards (privileges or economic rewards), prestige, authority, responsibility, and a perceived and actual functional importance. Congruence exists within a role if the various characteristics are in balance with one another, i.e., if the rewards, authority, and prestige are considered by the occupant of the role to be consistent with the responsibilities and functional importance of the role. Incongruity of role attributes is the converse of this situation.

As in the case of status inconsistency, an incongruent condition between the attributes of a role may be stressful to the role occupant and he may be expected to act to bring these factors into equilibrium (e.g., if a college professor

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[22] F. L. Bates and R. J. Pellegrin, "Congruity and Incongruity of Status Attributes," Social Forces, 38(1959), pp. 23-28.

feels his contribution is greater than his reward, or that his responsibilities outweigh the prestige which the role carries, he may seek to bring the prestige and reward into line with his perceived responsibility and contribution.) Such action may, if translated into political activity, tend towards: (a) the right, if it is believed that the role status was once congruent but, due to changing social values, the status values have become "distorted"; (b) the left, if it is believed that the role status has never been congruent and will only become so through progressive, liberal changes in societal values.

This concept may be useful not only in studying individuals but whole occupational or status groups within a society.

Status Politics

The concept of status politics involves the politically-oriented attitudes and activities which may result from feelings of status insecurity. This concept was developed by Richard Hofstadter and has been elaborated on by S. M. Lipset, Reinhard Bendix and others. Although originally developed to explain the American strain of status-striving and status insecurity, it may well be applicable to the conditions arising in any country undergoing changes in their criteria for according status and other rewards (e.g., societies changing from a feudal to an industrial economy, from a caste to a class system, etc.).

Status politics

> ...refers to political movements whose appeal is to the ...resentments of individuals or groups who desire to maintain or improve their social status...The groups which are receptive to status-oriented appeals are not only those which have risen in their economic structure and who may be frustrated in their desire to be accepted socially

> by those who already hold status, but also those groups already possessing status who feel that the rapid social change threatens their own claims to high social position, or enables previously lower status groups to claim equal status with their own.[23]

In contrast to status politics exists the phenomenon of class or interest politics. Interest politics refers to political division on material, economic matters - usually to the clash between those who favor redistribution of income and those who favor maintenance of the status quo. According to both Hofstadter and Lipset, interest politics predominate during times of depression and economic discontent and during national emergencies while status politics become salient during times of economic prosperity when many individuals can improve their economic position.

> During depressions, the dominant motif in dissent takes expression in proposals for reform or in panaceas. Dissent then tends to be highly programmatic - that is, it gets itself embodied in many kinds of concrete legislative proposals. It is also future-oriented and forward-looking, in the sense that it looks to a time when the adoption of this or that program will materially alleviate or eliminate certain discontents.[24]

On the other hand, status anxieties are seldom expressed in a clear-cut political program for there are no simple policy

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[23] S. M. Lipset, "The Sources of the 'Radical Right'", The Radical Right, ed.by Daniel Bell (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), p. 309. The recently heralded green revolution undertaken by the newly greened sons of the affluent who alleged by deny the power of work will, according to some commentators, only accelerate social mobility in America and thus launch a new era of status politics. Cf. Peter L. Berger and Brigitte Berger, "The Blueing of America," Intellectual Digest, September 1971, pp. 25-27; Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Bantam Book, 1971).

[24] Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt", The Radical Right, ed.by Daniel Bell (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), p. 85.

solutions - the difficulty involves the whole structure of the society.

> Where there are status anxieties, there is little or nothing which a government can do. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political movements which have successfully appealed to status resentments have been irrational in character, and have sought scapegoats which conveniently serve to symbolize the status threat.[25]

Neither Hofstadter nor Lipset go into the specific status attributes of the individual who might participate on either side in times of interest politics, except to say that those who are economically well off will oppose the jobless who are seeking reforms. However, Lipset does imply that a high level of education tends to offset one's high economic position, making him more apt to adopt liberal economic views.

Both Hofstadter and Lipset agree that the two groups most likely to suffer status insecurity and support right-wing programs are the old-family WASPs and the minority ethnics who have risen to middle or upper class positions in the economic structure.

The old-family WASPs suffer from status anxiety because they see their old claims to status slipping. Lipset says that this group often has little other claim to status than its high ethnic rating (high ascribed-low achieved). "They may be members of families which once were important but whose present position is such that on the basis of personal achievement alone they would have little right to social prestige."[26]

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[25] Lipset, op. cit.

[26] Ibid., p. 338.

Regarding the upward-mobile ethnic minority member's interest in right-wing programs, Lipset says:

> While the old American desires to maintain his status, the new American wishes to obtain it, to become accepted... they believe that one need only move up the economic scale to obtain the good things of the society. But, as they move up economically, they encounter social resistance... One of the major reactions to such discrimination...is to become overconformist to an assumed American tradition.[27]

Although Hofstadter and Lipset were writing about the American scene, we may hypothesize that their concept of status politics may apply in any social system which is undergoing extensive structural changes. Where the foundations and rationales for making out rewards, prestige, power, etc. are being changed, status insecurity may well arise among those who were the recipients under the old system and among those who are seeking to establish their positions on the basis of the new evaluations.

If we look at the concept of status politics with regard to status (in)consistency we may see that they are not antithetical. Indeed the description of the old elite (high ascribed-low achieved) whose status base is slipping fits our earlier prediction for reactionary attitudes quite well.

However, if we are to incorporate the phenomenon of low ascriptive-high achievement leading to right-wing attitudes into our previous scheme, we would need to propose

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[27] Ibid., p. 339. Cf. also Peter M.Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations," American Sociological Review, 21(June, 1956), pp. 290-295.

another possible reaction for those seeking to alleviate low ascribed-high achieved inconsistencies. It may be that an alternative response to those proposed earlier involves an attempt to make one's low ascriptive status as least salient or visible as possible by withdrawing from association with others having the same ascriptive status and overconforming to the standards of the high ascriptive group. For example, the economically successful Italian Catholic may avoid association with other ethnic group members, may repudiate ethnic traditions and habits, may terminate open affiliation with his religion, and may even attempt to join the voluntary associations and denomination associated with the majority group. "Conformity is a way of guaranteeing and manifesting respectability among those who are not sure that they are respectable enough."[28]

Thus a person characterized by low ascribed-high achieved status inconsistency may attempt to alleviate the frustration of his low status variable by making it as "invisible" as possible through overconformity to high ascriptive group standards. Or, perhaps, we could interpret his overconformity as an attempt to effect a change in the social evaluation of his ascriptive status characteristic (i.e., a "see how 'white' we can be?" reaction). To put it another way: In performing functions in society, man is definitely constrained by the norms associated with these social roles. Nevertheless, as Dahrendorf has pointed out, there remains an element of choice in role-playing in that role components include varying levels of perceived compulsion, supported by different kinds of sanction and reward, and, as Goffman has shown, permitting the "arts of

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[28]Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 93.

impression-management" to be used by an individual as he presents an image of himself to others.[28a]

> Failing to meet a 'must' expectation usually involves breaking the law; social exclusion usually results from breaking a 'should' expectation; one merely loses popularity by failing to comply with a 'can' expectation. This allows an element of choice in role-playing and implies the possibility of change through interaction... Only when we question the notion that learning a norm necessarily implies a valued attachment to it, can we fully explain social change.[28b]

This points to a similar conclusion we reached in our discussion of the logic of functionalism (chapter 3.2), namely, that Parsons has exaggerated the extent to which conformity results from the shared values which men are socialized into.

There is a whole range of motives underlying conformity to the expectations of others, thus rendering social order problematic and social change its corollary. In the preceeding pages we witnessed that one ought not necessarily expect social norms that are internalized to be expressed in actual behavior; that the values men learn in society may be in conflict with each other; and that, "while men may generally seek approval, they may also be more concerned with the approval of certain types of men than of others and be prepared to offend the latter in the hope of satisfying the former."[28c] The theory of status

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[28a] Ralf Dahrendorf, Pfade aus Utopia: Arbeiten zur Theorie und Methode der Soziologie (Munich: Piper, 1967), pp. 144, 146 ff.; Erving Goffman, Asylums (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959).

[28b] David Silverman, The Theory of Organisations (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 136.

[28c] Ibid., p. 137; cf. Dennis H.Wrong, "The Over-Socialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," American Sociological Review, 26 (April, 1961), pp. 183-193.

inconsistency and status politics not only teaches us the lesson that men continually redefine and thus reshape social reality as experienced by themselves and others by seeking differential approval, but also we should pay attention to the role of the various forms of coercion in imposing a normative definition of the situation on others.

In conclusion, we are convinced by the research that has been done on the relationships between social status and attitudes toward system change that these kinds of concepts may prove useful as partial explanatory tools in analyzing why certain groups and individuals participate in activities directed at changing aspects of the social order.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS AND UNIFICATION: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO CHANGE

The theories of Moore, Smelser, and Status Discrepancies were dealt with extensively because of the different approaches to change which they represent. In line with our earlier contention that it may prove fruitful to combine various existing theories on change, the possibility of doing so with these three will now be explored. However, first, some of the major differences between them will be discussed in order to illustrate that, although all three deal with social change, they are not merely explaining the same things in different ways.

There are many bases on which these theories could be compared. However, for the purpose of this final chapter, we will use essentially the same organization as in the review of literature on social change. That is, they will be examined in terms of the type of theory which they represent and the variables they seek to explain change in, the level of analysis they are operating on and their primary focus. We will then try to show how, because of certain differences between them, they may be used together to analyze different aspects of change, each serving to fill in "gaps" in explanation left by the others.

It should be mentioned that none of these theories claims to provide an all-encompassing explanation of change, on the contrary, all three explicitly limit themselves to

specific types of change. Thus, discussion of their limitations is not meant as a critique, only as a means for pointing out possibilities for combining them.

6.1 Applicability

Barrington Moore's theory of social change is drawn from an extensive analysis of concrete historical cases. The theoretical propositions which he develops are not held to be universally applicable; in fact, he does little towards generalizing his hypotheses to other situations. The dependent variables which he is interested in explaining are the three major politico-economic outcomes of the transition from agrarian to industrial society: democratic capitalism, right-wing capitalism (fascism), and communism. He uses seven structural relationships as independent variables to explain these outcomes (e.g., relationship of central authority to landed aristocracy, etc.).

In terms of the types of theories of change reviewed earlier, Moore seems to fit best in the neo-evolutionary category and, to some extent, in the conflict category as well. The "driving force" behind the transition form agrarian to industrial society is the "pressure to commercialize." Although the evolution is seen as inevitable, it may proceed in several directions (democracy, fascism, communism) depending on the cultural background of the country, the existing power relations, the reaction of its power elite to the pressures of economic modernization, etc.

In direct contrast to Moore, Smelser developed an a-historical theoretical model of social action and organized his determinants of collective behavior into an explanatory

scheme of universal applicability. Smelser's theory is built on an equilibrium model of society (not incompatable with Moore's rather static view of traditional society, pressured into change by the exogenous force of commercialization). His "flow chart" of social action is based on identifiable patterns of relations among the components of social action so that change in one initiates predictable changes in others. Collective behavior is seen as a reaction to, and an attempt to reconstitute, a disequilibrated social order.

Smelser seeks to explain how and why episodes of collective behavior occur and the types of changes such behavior may bring about. More specifically, he explains why particular types of collective behavior (panic, craze, etc.) occur, according to unique combinations of six independent variables (structural conduciveness, strain, generalized belief, etc.) and how each type affects specific aspects of the social order.

The theories dealing with status discrepancies were, for the most part, formulated to explain extremist responses within United States society. However, there seems to be no reason that they could not be applied to other societies, with some modification according to the type of stratification, value, and norm system. These theories were also designed to explain only a single type of extremism - political.

All of the status theories presented appear to be operating from an equilibrium model. That is, the motivation attributed to individuals by these theories is to bring one's lowest status into line with the higher one(s). Discrepancies between status attributes are seen as creating frustration (or disequilibrium at the personality level) and a desire to ameliorate this condition. The dependent variable is political extremism; the independent variables are the various status attributes (education, racial-ethnic status, etc.).

6.2 Level and Focus

Another major difference between these theories involves the level of analysis used. Broadly speaking, all three of these theories are dealing a similar problem - the production of stressful situations and various reactions to stress - but on different levels. More specifically, Moore's theory deals with strain on the societal level - strain placed on existing power relations by economic pressures. The effects of this strain on existing social relationships, and possible structural responses to it, form the core of his theory. Smelser's focus is primarily on the subsocietal, or group level. He is concerned with collective reactions to the strains which arise when actors are confronted with unstructured situations which cannot be adequately dealt with by conventional means. The theories of Status Discrepancy focus primarily on the individual or interpersonal level. They are interested in explaining the effects of strain on an individual's self-concept which result from discrepancies in, or threats to, his social status.

Perhaps the major difference between these three theories lies in their primary focus, i.e., what aspect of change they are most concerned with. In one sense, it can be said that all three explain the source, process, and motivation to engage in the change process, although on different levels. For Moore, the cause is the pressure to commercialize; the process is the type of reaction to these pressures engaged in by the various factions and classes, and the motivation implied is desire for economic and political power. In Smelser's theory, unstructured situations

are the cause, the proper combination of his six determinants constitutes the process by which change takes place and the desire to restructure, or reduce the strain of, an unstructured situation is the motivation implicit in his theory. For the status theories, discrepancies in social status create frustration, a desire to alleviate the frustrating condition is the motivation and attempts to do so may lead to change. From this perspective, all three theories are merely explaining different kinds of change.

Although, on a very general level, each of these theories deals with the same broad categories of problems, the main emphasis of each theory is placed primarily (although not exclusively) on a single, distinctive aspect of change: Moore - cause or source; Smelser - concrete processes; Status Discrepancy - motivation to participate. That is, Moore's chief concern is with the question of <u>why</u> social change occurs and the direction it takes. He designates (1) the pressures that economic modernization places on traditional social structures as the broad structural source of change; and (2) the reactions of various social classes to modernization as more specific sources of change and as determinants of the direction change will take, but he does not offer a theoretical framework for explaining the processes by which change takes place.

Smelser is mainly interested in the question of <u>how</u> change occurs. Although he posits the existence of some cause of change ("unstructured situations"), he is principally concerned with group responses to a situation, not its source. Smelser's theory is also narrower in scope than Moore's.

For example, he can explain the reaction of a group to certain stressful conditions or how a particular revolution took place, but not the structural conditions which created the stress or which made a revolution possible. In short, Smelser's theory is geared to examining the development of a particular movement and its outcome but not to interpreting it in a larger context; Moore's provides us with an overview of the societal-wide preconditions for, and results of, a general upheaval of institutional arrangements, but not the mechanics involved. However, neither Smelser nor Moore explains how strains impinge directly on individuals.

The status theories are mainly concerned with the question of why particular individuals and groups are motivated to engage in actions directed towards achieving certain types of social change. These theories describe a type of system-produced stress which manifests itself as strain on one's self-concept and predict types of behavior which individuals may be motivated to engage in in order to reduce or alleviate the strain. Discrepancy between status attributes is given as the immediate source of motivation to seek change, but the theories (with the exception of Hofstadter's Status Politics) generally do not explore the broader sources of strain (e.g., changes in the stratification system) nor do they outline the means by which change may take place. A few theories mention that availability, and perception of availability, of means for enacting change are important in determining which type of behavior may be engaged in to alleviate the status problem, but none specify how changes (e.g., in social evaluation of a status characteristic) are actually brought about. The main contribution of these theories to the study of social change lies in their

explanation of the effects of a certain type of stress on individuals and how this stress may motivate them to initiate, or participate in, a change process.

Thus each of these three theories may be seen as focusing not only on different levels of analysis but also on distinctive problems in the explanation of change. And it is from this perspective that it seems to us most fruitful to explore their complementarity as explanatory schemes. To illustrate, let us look at the most general theory, Barrington Moore's, and see how the other two may be used to supplement its explanatory power.

6.3 Complementarity

Moore's theory basically tells us the source of change, i.e., what forces introduced pressures for change. The pressure to commercialize, to modernize the economic system and enter the world market, introduced pressures for change, not only in the economic sphere but in the whole, to use Marx's term, superstructure of traditional society. Moore also explains the probable direction of change, depending on existing structural relationships (e.g., how independent the landed aristocracy is in relation to the central authority). That is, depending on the configuration of his major structural variables, we can predict whether change will take place via a bourgeois revolution, leading to capitalist democracy; an abortive bourgeois revolution, followed by a revolution from above and culminating in reactionary capitalism (fascism); or a peasant revolution, leading to communism.

Thus Moore's theory explains a source of change (economic pressure) and three major directions in which change may take place (democracy, fascism, communism). What Moore's theory lacks is the specification of any clear-cut mechanism by

which change takes place. That is, given the pressures set up by an agrarian social structure faced with the problem of commercialization and industrialization, and given the relationships of the major social classes, what is it that transforms the pressure to change into the actual process of change? What sets the revolution, of whichever type, in motion? This question Moore's theory simply does not answer, except through historical descriptions of specific cases. And this is where Smelser's theory may prove a fruitful addition.

Smelser's scheme does not overlap Moore's. He is not concerned with the cause of change (except insofar is it represents an "unstructured situation" to be dealt with by social actors) nor can he explain the direction of change, i.e., his theory doesn't tell us why a peasant revolution occurred rather than a bourgeois or fascist revolution. The macro-structural relationships which are the focus of Moore's theory, Smelser treats as given or non-problematic. However, Smelser can explain, within the limits of structural conduciveness set by Moore (i.e., the configuration of his structural variables), how the pressures which created strains in the existing social order led to revolution (or failed to, as in the case of abortive bourgeois revolutions preceeding fascism). But Smelser fails to explain one important aspect of the change process, namely, how these strains affect concrete individuals and groups, motivating them to seek change.[29]

The theories of Status Discrepancy are especially suited to explaining how the type of social change which

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[29] Smelser notes this as a deficiency himself in a later work (Essays in Sociological Explanation, op. cit., pp. 92-121) and explores the possibility of combining his approach with a Freudian approach to collective behavior.

Moore deals with affects individuals and status groups. A society undergoing the transformation from agrarian to modern renders the social status of many insecure. The shift in criteria for evaluation (from ascriptive to achievement) which accompanies economic rationalization is quite uneven, giving rise to frustrations within the old elite, who find their basis for status slipping and within the new elite who find acceptance on achievement alone difficult. The evaluation of the functional importance of different roles also changes radically with the goals of the society, giving rise to "role incongruence."

The various status theories presented provide us with an explanation of the effect that the changes Moore discusses have on individuals and status groups and why those so affected are motivated to engage in change-related activities. They tell us, in Smelser's terms, who the participants are who will be mobilized for action.

For example, if we look at the rise of German National Socialism in relation to these three theories, Moore explains why the structural arrangements were conducive to fascism and why attempts to modernize the economy without changing the social structure created enormous strains. Smelser explains how these strains were translated by Hitler and his Party into an ideology with massive appeal and how the Nazi movement grew into a revolution, sweeping Hitler to power. The status theories explain why certain individuals and groups were particularly affected by the strains placed on German society and why they were most susceptible to the appeals of National Socialism.

The wider utility of using these three theories in combination is limited, principally by Moore's scheme. However,

they could prove useful in predicting the social-structural outcomes of the many countries now undergoing modernization. But such a task would require an entirely other study. In sum, it is hoped that this exploration of the possibility of combining three different but complementary schemes may serve to point up the possibility of using this method to more fully explain other sociological problems as well.

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