Chapter 2

Social Progress and Environmental Care: Lessons Learnt From the IPSP

Lorenz Lassnigg

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview and a reflection on how the work of the IPSP (International Panel on Social Progress) relates to the topics of our book, covering various aspects of environmental care, societal development and education. First, a general description and explanation of the work and products of the IPSP are provided, outlining the main lines of understanding and conceptual approaches to social progress. Second, a more specific analysis of the approach towards progress and environmental care, interdisciplinarity, Global North–South gaps and relations to other (global) political initiatives (e.g. the International Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], or the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs]) is explained. Third, the main topics of the workshops about environmental care and progress are reflected from the perspective of the IPSP, exploring what the IPSP material says and what insights might be gleaned from it.

Explanation of the Main Lines of Work and Products of the IPSP

The primary focus of the work of the IPSP was the conceptual structuring and analysis of societal, cultural, economic and political development on a global scale, aiming to provide recommendations for action. The blueprint for this endeavour drew inspiration from the IPCC,[10] the United Nations' body for assessing the science related to climate change, applied to the issues of societal development. The term 'social progress' was deliberately selected to convey the main mission of the work: to find research-based ways to address multiple problems, crises and conflicts towards a better society, with addressees at various levels including regional, national, international and global scales. 'The message of this panel is a message of hope. We can do better, this is not the end of history'.[11] In the research direction of the panel, both contradicting basic

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[10] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (n.d.). https://www.ipcc.ch/

[11] International Panel on Social Progress (IPSP 2018). Rethinking Society for the 21st Century. Report of the International Panel on Social Progress. Vol.I-III. Cambridge:

strands of development were thoroughly considered across various analysed topics. On the one hand, there were 'positive' trends towards improvement at several levels (practices, knowledge, institutions, resources, etc.). On the other hand, there were catastrophic trends emerging in parallel, involving degradation, exclusion, conflict, violence and the like. 'Social innovation is not a prerogative of the developed world, quite the contrary. The Global South has been widely influential on many occasions in the far or more recent past and today it still generates many ideas and initiatives that can inspire the world'.[12]

The writers of the introduction state at the outset: 'If a main message emerges from this three-volume Report, it is indeed that: (1) considerable progress has been made in the past centuries and humanity is at a peak of possibilities, but it now faces challenges that jeopardise its achievements and even its survival; (2) addressing these challenges and mobilising our current collective capacities to the benefit of a wider population require reforms that will hurt certain vested interests but rely on general principles that are readily available, involving an expansion of participatory governance and the promotion of equal dignity across persons, groups, and cultures; (3) there is not a unique direction of progress but multiple possibilities and many ideas that can be experimented, with variable adaptability to different economic, political, and cultural contexts'.[13]

The intended audience of the report is diverse, encompassing researchers and academics seeking an understanding of significant challenges, practitioners and policymakers, as well as a wide range of engaged activists at different levels and in various sectors and fields of society. Indeed, these activists at the practice level (change-makers of society) are considered key actors. Realistic hopes for progress cannot be solely addressed to governments and policymakers; progress is an inclusive topic that requires overarching participation and engagement. The authors of the report deliberately make their position to value judgements clear. 'Social change is not a neutral matter, and […] this Panel takes the view that a compass is needed to parse the options that actors and decision-makers face'.[14] Dealing with value judgements is part

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Cambridge University Press. v1 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399623; v2 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647; v3https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399661. For simplification, the references are provided by indicating the report's volumes by v1, v2, v3, followed by the page number when necessary.

[12]IPSP (2018, v1, 2).

[13]IPSP (2018, v1, 2).

[14]IPSP (2018, v1, 2).

of the work of social scientists; however, the factual analysis should be separated from (political) recommendations. 'While value judgments should be resisted when they can pollute positive analysis of facts, they should be recognized as necessary and made transparent when recommendations are proposed. This is why the IPSP has a full chapter[15] on values and principles, and many recommendations about how to promote social progress understood in a certain way'.[16]

The panel describes itself as a purely bottom-up initiative started by a group of researchers who have developed the agenda by including further contributors through a snowball-like process of stepwise building the panel through conferences[17] and subsequent group work on the selected topics in the various thematic chapters. The 'bottom-up' denotes completely independent voluntary work, without any commissioning institution and possibly related vested interests. However, it is a bottom-up initiative by a renowned academic elite situated in various academic elite institutions of the Western world. Some informal searches by the author on the lists of contributors have shown that almost all named contributors belong to the older generation of well-established academics with their specific agendas and competencies (the agendas and places of younger generations of researchers are not really visible in the work of the panel).

It is not easy to grasp an informative and content-loaden overview of the products of the work of the IPSP. The following items might provide some orientation for access to the various analyses and recommendations.

The main product of the work is the three volumes about 'rethinking society for the 21st century'.[18] The broad topic of social progress is dissected into 22 more specific topics presented in the three volumes by the broad themes or dimensions of 'socio-economic transformations' (Vol. 1), 'political issues' (Vol. 2) and 'transformations in culture and values' (Vol. 3); all the three dimensions are deliberately classified as equally

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[15]IPSP (2018, v1, 41–80).

[16] IPSP (2028, v2, 369).

[17] e.g., Istanbul 2015: IPSP (2015) First meeting of lead authors. Istanbul Conference, August 27-29, İstanbul Bilgi University. Retrieved from https://www.ipsp.org/events/ipsp-conference-first-meeting-of-the-lead-authors; see also Robeyns, I. (2015) Impressions from the first IPSP authors meeting. Blog August 29. Retrieved from https://crookedtimber.org/2015/08/29/impressions-from-the-first-ipsp-authors-meeting/.

[18] IPSP (2018).

important, whereby a special emphasis is devoted to the cultural topics. The old ideas about the economic basis and the ideational superstructure are strongly rejected, and the authors state in the third volume about culture and values that 'every chapter in this volume gives the strong impression that neglecting the cultural dimension is a recipe for catastrophe'.[19]

Figure 1 gives an overview of the elements of progress addressed in the chapters of the report. Each chapter was written in a stepwise process by a group of (mostly) leading researchers who produced extensive analyses about the key topics concerning transformations of society.[20] The overview easily shows that the topics of inequality (Chapters 3 and 14), institutions of democracy and human rights (Chapters 9, 10, 13 and 14), institutions of capitalism (Chapters 5–8), globalisation (Chapters 11, 12 and 15) and social norms and services (Chapters 15–20) are emphasised; one chapter (Chapter 4) also separately addresses the topics of nature and the environment in relation to economic and societal development. When we consider that a core group of initiators were (liberal) economists, we see an impressive wide understanding of progress and can be sure that the 'economic case' is tackled seriously. The authors of chapters are multidisciplinary, featuring strong representations of economics, sociology and political science, with some representation from the humanities as well. A particular strength of these chapters is an elaborate presentation and discussion of the state of the art of research on the respective topic. In this way, the report is meant as a 'resource, a mine for ideas and arguments'. 'This Report provides the reader with a unique overview of the state of society and possible futures, with a wealth of ideas and suggestions for possible reforms and actions. For scholars and students, it also offers an exceptional guide to the literature in the relevant academic disciplines of social sciences and the humanities'.[21] When someone seeks an easily accessible overview of the various topics and the main directions of arguments in the individual chapter, the introductions to the three volumes are an excellent source.[22]Five more comprehensive

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[19]IPSP (2018, v3, 606).

[20] The individual chapters were grossly written in three stages, a first draft provided the main platform, a revised second draft was finally manufactured into the published chapters of the book (first and second drafts and comments to them are published at the IPSP webpage, https://www.ipsp.org/resources, and more easily accessible than the published books.

[21] IPSP (2018, v3, 606).

[22] IPSP (2018, v1, v2, v3).

chapters relate specifically to the topics of our book: values (Chapter 2), governance (Chapter 12), progress (Chapter 15), growth and environment (Chapter 4) and social science-technocracy (Chapter 22); three chapters tackle in a more comprehensive and summarising way the themes of the three volumes.[23]

Figure 1: Overview of the topics analysed for rethinking society.

On top of the big analytic endeavour of rethinking society, some selected volunteering authors have written a more political concluding/summarising 'Manifesto for Social Progress',[24] outlining the developed concept of social progress and discussing how it might be approached against obstacles and false ideas. The first false idea concerns the powerful belief that 'there is no alternative (TINA)' to a free market society at 'the end of history'. 'There are many variants of capitalism already in place, and some are much better than others at promoting human flourishing'.[25] The second false idea is 'that the market economy and capitalism are the same thing and that endorsing the former implies accepting the latter – in fact the market is needed but capitalism can be transcended'.[26] The third false idea is that the traditional social causes of liberating women, workers, and ethnic groups, the inclusion of disabled

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[23] v1: ch. 8 about economic organisation, well-being, and social justice; v2: ch. 14 about challenges by inequalities to democracy and democracy rejuvenation; v3: ch. 20 about solidarity and belonging.

[24]Fleurbaey, M., Bouin, O., Salles-Djelic, M.-L., Kanbur, R., Nowotny, H. & Reis, E. Foreword by Amartya Sen (2018). A Manifesto for Social Progress. Ideas for a Better Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108344128.

[25]Fleurbaey et al. (2018, 3).

[26]Fleurbaey et al. (2018, 4).

people and the integration of migrants would have been replaced by cultural and identity issues and environmental problems. 'These traditional causes remain essential and as urgent as ever', notwithstanding 'that the devastation of ecosystems and other species has reached a scale that calls for urgent action'.[27] A final key false idea is 'that salvation comes from politics and from changing government policy' and from fighting about more or less government intervention. Against these beliefs, 'societal changes are initiated by much deeper layers of society, through transformations of methods and conventions, norms and habits, and governmental policy often comes later to stabilise and coordinate the new normal'. However, the political game remains important.[28] In addition, three more significant false ideas concern deterministic technological progress, the convergence of economies and clash of civilisations through globalisation, and 'that social progress requires economic growth accompanied by environmental destruction'.[29]

Some more Specific Understandings of Progress

The IPSP report argues 'for the usefulness of the notion of progress in an era which needs to recover a notion of the direction the world should be going'. As an essential point in the understanding of IPSP contributions, 'progress can be explored in multiple directions […] strongly rejecting the old view that progress follows only one line'.[30] Similarly, the traditional Western views of modernisation and individualisation must be transformed into a 'a multiplicity of modernities emerging across the world'.[31] The philosophical analysis and construction of a compass for approaching progress underlines the multiple directions for action and the relative position of humans. 'Chapter 2 shows the list of relevant values and principles at the core of the ideal of social progress is long and deserves to be better known and debated, including in view of cultural variations that put different weights on them. It also puts human issues in perspective and argues for a broader view encompassing other forms of life in a comprehensive understanding of our stewardship of the planet'.[32] Thus, the path towards progress does not follow a single (linear) line anymore but must shift an uneven broad multifaceted front forward with

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[27]Fleurbaey et al. (2018, 4–5).

[28]Fleurbaey et al. (2018, 5).

[29]Fleurbaey et al. (2018, 5).

[30] IPSP (2018, v3, 607); see also ch. 21.

[31] IPSP (2018, v3, 607); see also ch. 15.

[32] IPSP (2018, v1, 3).

diverse priorities and tempo, using the compass in careful and sophisticated ways.

The basic understanding and criteria of progress is equal dignity of (human) beings, meaning inclusive participation in social life and control over one's important life matters; inequalities in social relations (denoted by status, resources and power) endanger dignity and must be fought.[33] The Anthropocene has put 'humanity in the driving seat of the planet' and poses two main catastrophic dangers: first, the huge inequalities and lack of social cohesion; and second, the environmental degradation. The strategy proposed to support progress is searching for 'possibilities' beneath all problems and dangers, with innovations being crucial in three key aspects:

> Popular participation

> Harmony with nature

> Management of conflicts

Figure 2: Overview of principles and values that constitute the IPSP compass for social progress.

The detailed principles and values that constitute the compass for social progress are illustrated in Figure 2; each of them is more deeply discussed in Chapter 2 of the report.[34] Here is not the place for a thorough discussion;

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[33]Fleurbaey et al. (2018, 2).

[34] IPSP (2018, v1, 41–80).

however, the importance of values for education can be underlined. In one sense, the provision of education is established as one of the principles of social progress; in another sense, a deeper understanding of the meaning and purpose of these principles and values is an important precondition for the conception and delivery of education. In other words, it gives a philosophical underpinning of what education can mean for the development of a better society – so one conclusion is that among educators, 'the list of relevant values and principles at the core of the ideal of social progress […] deserves to be better known and debated'.[35] In fact, the understanding of these principles and values contributes to the understanding of the fundamentals of society, politics and social life.

In order to reduce scope and complexity, the authors discuss the possibilities of a 'division of moral labour', according to (contested) proposals by John Rawls that make distinctions and relationships between basic structures and transactions in society and point to the construction and definitions of the constitution and basic rights.[36] Interestingly, a group around the originally appointed coordinating lead author Harry Brighouse, who withdrew, worked in parallel to the IPSP without any exchange on a philosophically and social science-underpinned theory of educational goods and values[37] that very much resembles the ideas of the compass for social progress – the education chapter has unfortunately taken another direction. In depicting basic principles of social progress, education is in tandem with supporting citizens, seen as a principle applicable to civil society (not government), with strong reference to Amy Gutmann's (1987) Democratic Education. 'A society's educational institutions play a central role in creating citizens, especially in a democracy'.[38] In this way, a strong link is established between education and the movements and organisations of civil society that are perceived as complementary (and possibly critical) to formal democratic institutions.

Fleurbaey et al., referring to the compass chapter, emphasise a broad mixture of values and principles as indispensable for the fight for social progress.[39] 'The key values and principles underlying this book include

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[35] IPSP (2018, v1, 3).

[36] IPSP (2018, v1, 66).

[37] Brighouse, H., Ladd, H.F., Loeb, S & Swift, A. (2016). Educational goods and values: A framework for decision makers. *Theory and Research in Education 14*(1), 3–25.

[38] IPSP (2018, v1, 70); see also Gutmann, A. (1987). Democratic Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[39] Fleurbaey et al (2018, 3).

wellbeing and freedom, security and solidarity, as well as pluralism and toleration, distributive justice and equity, environmental preservation, transparency, and democracy. Any project that would severely crush one of these values and principles is considered objectionable here'. Interestingly, they use the modest expression of equity. In contrast, the compass chapter only refers (several times) to equality or inequality with the key distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes – these issues are, of course, essential for education (but cannot be discussed in more depth here).[40]In terms of values and principles, the IPSP manifesto sees three main challenges towards progress: equity (as an expression of justice and equality), freedom and environmental sustainability. Throughout the work and publications of the IPSP, socio-economic and environmental topics are addressed as two main challenging areas for social progress.

Environmental Care and Social Progress– Impossible Connection?

In this section, a more concrete linkage between the work of the IPSP and the main question of the workshop is established by looking more specifically at some of the summarising chapters that tackle critical aspects of this question: first, the chapter 'Economic Growth, Human Development, and Welfare'[41] that gives an elaborate analysis of the relationship between environmental care and social progress, trying to integrate this topic with the contradictions implied in economic growth; second, the chapter 'Governing Capital, Labor, and Nature in a Changing World'[42] that goes deeper in the questions of governance, even daring to speak about governing of nature (what some might consider being haughty).

   The impossibility of linking environmental care and social progress originates in a limited understanding of the progress that sees the core of progress in the submission of nature under the imperatives of

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[40] A basic point in the selection of values constituting social progress is the distinction between basic non-derivative and derivative values, whereby the compass deliberately builds on non-derivative values; equality is problematised in this sense. "Derivative values include not only items that are valuable instrumentally. For example, we might value equality neither for its own sake (that is, non-derivatively) nor because it is a means of promoting a different value such as well- being (i.e. for its instrumental value), but because it is a constitutive feature of a larger ideal, such as the ideal of a political community that displays fraternity or solidarity." (IPSP 2018, v1, 46).

[41] IPSP (2018, v1, 141–186).

[42] IPSP (2018, v2, 491–522).

technological development and economic growth. Thus, the connection depends on a wider definition of progress, including social and environmental dimensions. This is what the chapter does in an elaborate, differentiated, inclusive and sophisticated way. The main elements of the argument are first the conceptual analysis of the relation between economic growth and welfare/well-being, second the inclusion of environmental care in the definition of progress by extending the economic perspective with the social and environmental dimensions (using the expressions of physical, social and environmental capital or wealth). 'Economic activity clearly is not a complete measure of social welfare. For this reason, economic growth cannot be characterised as "only good" or "only bad," […] Rather, social welfare includes a number of social and environmental dimensions in addition to material consumption. Similarly, the wealth of a given society cannot exclusively be measured in terms of physical capital, but also includes social and environmental capital'.[43] Basically, economic growth is classified as a double-edged sword, supporting on one side 'liberation, lifting people out of poverty' and on the other side leading to 'alienation, increasing inequality, and […] environmental degradation'. The solution to contradictions is sought not through the simple rejection of economic growth but by giving it a reasonable place in a wider understanding of progress.

A basic requirement is to reject the view that economic growth (measured by the GDP) – via several channels – automatically leads to welfare/well-being to understand the normative implications of the multidimensional goals involved in welfare/well-being as well as the various contradictory impacts of economic growth that are worked out in the chapter. Besides some overall positive implications of growing material wealth (e.g. extended education provision, potential poverty reduction), fundamental transitions in society are influenced (concerning fertility, industrialisation, commercial service provision, urbanisation, energy consumption, etc.), and important negative consequences are correlated to growth as widening inequalities in control of global income/wealth and in the distribution of gains of growth, as well as several aspects of environmental damage (climate change, water scarcity and air pollution, species extinction, etc.).

The chapter contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between economic growth and welfare/well-being by discussing alternative measures of sustainability (that extend the established measure

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[43] IPSP (2018, v1, 175).

of GDP) and disaggregating the various aspects of the (ambiguous) relationship between economic growth/development and social and natural wealth. First, the dimensions of 'what matters' in progress (preference satisfaction, happiness, capabilities, meaning of life, status consumption, nature and animal welfare, and political stability/legitimacy) as dimensions (or metrics) of evaluating the contribution of economic growth are disentangled. Second, five potential distributive criteria of these metrics (maximising good, equality, meeting core needs, the priority of least advantaged, environmental justice) are discussed.

The extended dimensions of the progress of social wealth and natural wealth are analysed in relation to the contribution of economic growth from a longer-term perspective (Figure 3). Education has a double position in these considerations: first, it is discussed as an important component of economic growth in terms of human capital[44]; second, it is also classified as a key component of welfare/well-being. Thus, education is considered an input (necessary but not sufficient, with many complexities) as well as an outcome of economic growth (by contributing by itself to welfare).

Table 1: Dimensions of social and natural wealth analysed by the IPSP.[45]

Social Wealth	Natural Wealth
Health and poverty reduction	Depletion of exhaustible resources
Inequality	Planetary boundaries
Urbanisation as social transition	Climate change
Political change and democracy	Air pollution
*Education**	Water
	Food security
	Biodiversity
	Socio-economic metabolism

*Education is excluded from this discussion, even though it is mentioned several times in the text.

Based on these multiple dimensions, indicators can be defined and measured as the basis of welfare diagnostics.

An overarching concept to integrate these dimensions has been proposed by the United Nations through the expression of the 'global commons'

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[44] IPSP (2018, v1. 151–152).

[45] Source: IPSP (2018, v1, 161–169).

already from the early 2010s,[46] which are further analysed by the IPSP in terms of political perspectives to achieve progress in the extended meaning. Things get complicated to understand when the approaches and experiences of governing the commons are analysed in detail.[47] Environmental care is closely related to commons problems that 'usually relate to common-pool resources (CPRs), or underprovided and impure public goods'.[48] Resolving these problems requires solutions for problems of collective action at the various levels of social and political life, from the local to the global, with the environmental challenges being situated at the global level where (so far) no authoritative actors exist. Governing the commons basically requires solutions for the involved problem of overuse of resources, expressed by the formulas of the 'tragedy of the commons' or the 'tragedy of open-access' (Elinor Ostrom). In theory, two big classes of solutions – that always imply some kind of exclusion – are proposed and analysed: property rights and regulations/institutions. Such solutions always have to fight to overcome existing vested interests and find feasible social norms and institutions. 'Ostrom finds empirically that humans routinely devise complex governance arrangements to transform open-access situations into regulated commons regimes'.[49] The challenge is generally two-fold: first, how to find ways to devise such arrangements, and second, how to construct them. Challenges in the global environmental commons are aggravated by the lack of responsible actors' 'global perspective without world government'.

In the search for solutions, choices between fundamental political issues (taxing, property rights, regulation) and rent-seeking and multi-level

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[46] UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN development agenda (2013 January). Global governance and governance of the global commons in the global partnership for development beyond 2015. Thematic think piece. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/24_thinkpiece_global_governance.pdf; McInerney, T. F. (2017 March). UNEP, International Environmental Governance, and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Report. UNEP UN environment programme. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/21247/UNEP_IEG_2030SDA.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Vogler, J. (2000). The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance. Chichester: Wiley; Allan, J., Tsioumani, E., Jones, N. & Soubry, B. (Eds.) (2022). State of Global Environmental Governance 2021. IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development. Earth Negotiations Bulletin. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-02/state-global-environmental-governance-2021-en.pdf.

[47] IPSP (2018, v1, 171–175).

[48] IPSP (2018, v1, 171).

[49] IPSP (2018, v1, 171).

problems are involved. The analysis of effective solutions involves the assessment of experience with the alternatives of taxing, pricing and regulating, and methods to overcome normative problems and ideological convictions (e.g. between neoliberal perspectives on the 'homo economicus' vs. more comprehensive 'third-way' alternatives). The complexities are shown by analysing the technical problems and competing normative solutions (transcendental Rawlsian goal-oriented vs. relational iterative incremental regimes), leading to an overall verdict. 'Successful commons governance in these cases works through establishing a private good or club good, often including decisions on distribution or exclusion. Commons management also … involves the provision of public goods … It is important to clarify that there is no single "right" governance or property regime for goods or resource systems with CPR or public good characteristics.'[50] This verdict makes things not easier, and the conflicts between economic growth and environmental care must be processed in a reasonable way. In their expression of key recommendations, the authors still emphasise the difference between economic growth and social objectives as the main ingredient of social progress; however, they leave out an explicit reference to the detrimental effects of growth on the environment. Reading this IPSP chapter, the difficulties and possible paths to resolve the conflicts and contradictions between economic growth and environmental care become more transparent; moreover, the stupidity of the promise to resolve all these problems through education also becomes clear.

The chapter about governance, 'Governing Capital, Labor, and Nature in a Changing World', does not elaborate much on conceptual definitions of governance/governing – a task that the bulk of the literature has undertaken for some time. Instead, it provides a functional analysis of the 'shift from government to governance' in five fundamental societal fields, three concerning capital (finance, investment and trade), and work and the environment. However, this analysis does not cover the fundamental social service fields of health and education. The approach towards governance uses broad definitions and is strongly driven by political considerations about 'governance as the action or fact of governing', which involves some kind of interplay between government and governance. Actors, institutions and instruments governing our world are the key elements of the analysis. New modes of exercising power and an enhanced focus on ordering a rapidly changing world are seen as key drivers behind the emergence of the new concept. The new phenomenon

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[50] IPSP (2018, v1, 171-172).

of governance is commonly seen in contrast to the structures and actions of government by sovereign nation-states, implying a much more diverse landscape of new actors, institutions and instruments involved in governing. These ongoing changes involve the following:

> The inclusion of *new (private)actors* (transnational organisations, business corporations, industry consortia, international financial institutions, law firms, arbitrators, experts, interest organisations/associations, civil society stakeholders, NGOs)

> The creation of *new institutions* (regulatory rules, treaties, agreements, conventions, recommendations, corporatist regimes, arbitration tribunals, rating firms, technical commissions, interstate organisations, market self-regulation, dispute settlement courts)

> The use of *new instruments* (market self-regulation in the governance of labour; governance by experts through monitoring, surveillance, risk calculation techniques, arbitration, etc., in the economic domains of finance, investment, and trade)

Governance is broadly and encompassingly defined 'as a generalised description of all forms of rule', or more specifically 'as the exercise of power organised around multiple dispersed sites operating through transnational networks of actors, public as well as private, and national, regional as well as local'.[51] More concretely, the analysis of the development of the government/governance relation uses a conceptual framework that distinguishes basic dimensions of the meanings and practices of governance: *actors* (who governs?), *instruments* (how do actors govern?) and *objects/subjects* (what/who is governed and how are objects framed?) Important basic elements analysed are *effects/consequences*, *knowledge*, *norms*, *subjectivities* and the loci and relationships of *power*. This provides a differentiated and complex space for analysis.

The authors of the IPSP chapter take a political approach, situating themselves between the advocates of governance and the critics, who draw a strong demarcation and opposition between government and governance. On the one hand, the advocates hold a low opinion of the government and praise incentives/penalties, markets and (external) regulators instead of strong legal provisions in command-and-control regimes. On the other hand, critics see governance as a neoliberal concept that 'describes or prescribes shifts in the distribution of power to the

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[51] IPSP (2018, v2, 515, 493).

detriment of states and citizens, and in favour of markets, large corporations, and international financial institutions (IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)'.[52]This critique is somewhat supported by evidence; however, the analysis also provides some support of positive possibilities related to the rise of governance. The IPSP authors, in contrast, do not see government and governance as separate competing regimes but rather as interrelated forms of rule, with a key role of government by driving governance practices towards social progress. They also see dangers in the possibility that powerful private actors might leverage the rise of governance practices to fragment vertical power hierarchies of government, and alternatively concentrate power at the sites of accumulation of (private) capital and wealth. Overall, they assess governance as being 'not reducible simply to the transmission and implementation of preformed "neoliberal" templates and prescriptions', and they conclude from their analysis that while the shifts towards governance 'partially transformed the role of nation-states, the resulting social impact depends on the accountability of governments as well as their ability to regulate and hold institutions of governance to account … . Government, governance, and any combinations thereof involve and reflect trade-offs between accountability, equity/justice and efficiency, among other considerations. Such choices are fundamentally political rather than technical'.[53]

The analysis of the emergence of governance in the five areas reveals the key role of knowledge, experts and the application of expertise in several instruments. The paradigmatic example is monetary policy, where experts are conceived to hold a monopoly position and immunity from democratic politics. This can be interpreted as the logic of technocracy, reflected in strong proposals of 'evidence-based' policymaking, where 'evidence' can or should rule out the democratic process – the problem is that experts themselves might be and are often entrenched in powerful interests, and that expert knowledge is fragmentary and limited; these issues are elaborated in the overarching chapter about the uses of social sciences for social progress.[54] To secure governments' political decisions towards social progress, public accountability and broadened inclusive deliberative processes of consultation are necessary. Social progress agendas and their diagnoses and prognoses must be 'subjected to public

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[52] IPSP (2018, v2, 493).

[53] IPSP (2018, v2, 494, 515).

[54] IPSP (2018, v3, 847–886).

debate and scrutiny, and their legitimacy established through democratic mandate'.[55]

In addition to the role of knowledge and experts, the emergence of the global scale of governance is a second key issue in the conclusions. At this level, the rise of governance is necessary as long as no global government exists. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that governments play a key role at this level in the mixture of inter-governmental, trans-governmental, transnational and non-governmental ordering and rule-making by the creation of agreements, treaties, etc. In the field of financialisation, the impact of global governance has limited the role of national states. In the field of transnational investment treaties, issues with 'private' juridical and arbitration instruments have resulted in asymmetries favouring powerful investors at the expense of states. New policies by EU and UN institutions propose the establishment of international courts and appellate bodies to address these challenges. In the field of trade, issues of market regulation beyond nation-states have led to contestations about regulatory bodies and the development of standards and certification schemes by expert bodies or commissions (e.g. International Organization for Standardization [ISO] or International Electrotechnical Commission [IEC]), in which stakeholders must fight for public welfare and social progress. The analysis in the field of labour provides quite catastrophic results for governments and governance. Indicators such as real wages, the share of wages to GDP, and wage/income inequality have worsened for employees. The response of governments to ILO conventions of minimum standards declined because of the lack of sanctioning instruments. 'The last three decades have seen the failure of the model of private governance of labour, centring on the initiatives of multinational companies'.[56] Nevertheless, international negotiations and coordination are perceived as essential for social progress in this field to prevent a race to the bottom.

Finally, the analysis of the emergence of governance in the field of the environment and climate change gives a mixed picture. On the one hand, attention has grown, and governance initiatives have proliferated in various ways; on the other hand, implementation and effects pose various conflicts among stakeholders and make it difficult to provide evidence about concrete causing environmental damage. On the positive side, three developments are found: first, the extension of certification, labelling and auditing and inclusion of additional actors and sites into activities; second, a shift from abstract overall levels to sub-national or regional ecosystems;

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[55] IPSP (2018, v2, 515).

[56] IPSP (2018, v2, 514).

and third, the push of popular mobilisation to bring environmental concerns into the mainstream. On the negative side, increased attention to environmental damage has not led to much action, implying resistance and evasion by key actors. In terms of the effects of governance, differences between statutory laws and disciplinary/procedural regulations are discussed. The enforcement of statutory laws is confronted with the problem of proof of damage, whereas examples show that the mandatory repair costs might induce authorities to act in advance to prevent damage.

Governance of education is not included in the in-depth analysis by the governance chapter but is tackled as an important aspect in the analysis of 'The Contribution of Education to Social Progress'.[57] A specific section about governance and public policy[58] selects similar topics as above for analysis, public support, decentralisation, privatisation, the role of research, and the global scope. Governance is not conceptually defined, a systematic distinction between government and governance is not applied, and governance is rather used more or less synonymous with government as part of public policy. The argument takes an advocating rather than a critical position towards governance and sees governance shaped by politics, recommending that 'governance structures should be flexible, participatory, accountable, and aware of their social and cultural context'.[59] Concerning the important role of teachers, a main final recommendation states that 'it is important to design governance arrangements in such a way as to ensure that stakeholders engage in collective problem-solving rather than zerosum bargaining for particularistic benefits'.[60]

Education is perceived as a complex and contradictory political field with high priority among actors, strong conflicts of interest and opposing ideologies about realisation. Long-term historical trajectories have led to pronounced path-dependency in structures and practices, making it difficult to realise change. Concerning governance, opposing positions between political actors (e.g. political parties across the left–right spectrum) about the respective roles of the state vs. various private stakeholders in the provision of education lead to many conflicts about political decisions to take. At the same time, the potential objects and subjects of governance (the 'what' in the language of the governance

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[57] IPSP (2018, v3, 753–778).

[58] IPSP (2018, v3, 767–770).

[59] IPSP (2018, v3, 754).

[60] IPSP (2018, v3, 772).

chapter) are quite rich, differentiated and contingent. 'Public policies seek to steer the educational processes happening in the classroom by, for example, regulating the training and employment conditions of teachers, establishing standards and external evaluation procedures, and providing money to finance buildings and salaries, as well as many other things. Policy-makers shape the governance and institutional set-up of education by defining the variety of educational pathways, the conditions of access and the involvement in governance of stakeholders such as teacher unions and parents'.[61] Of course, in all these aspects, a wide range of possible specifications exists, among which the policymakers and involved participants can decide.

Decentralisation and privatisation are contested instruments (the 'hows' in the language of the governance chapter) of governance. Both are introduced quite sympathetically as powerful international trends, using de facto common arguments of advocates to explain them seemingly neutrally, however, in a somewhat biased way. Decentralisation is framed in the well-known 'subsidiarity' argument of the opposition of central government bureaucrats vs. local stakeholder involvement, with the latter knowing more about the circumstances of decisions and practices. 'Decentralization of education governance means that decisions over management, financing, curriculum design, and personnel are delegated to regional and local governments as well as to schools and school districts'.[62] Privatisation is presented as sometimes occurring in parallel to decentralisation, mainly as a solution for the failure of the public sector. Private provision supplies attractive alternatives to the public system or fills niches left open by public institutions. Despite pointing to evidence about occurrences or dangers of increasing inequalities through privatisation, the overall verdict is a cautious plea towards complementarities of public and private provisions with the government having to secure 'good' outcomes of privatisation. 'Education is not an exclusive task of public institutions and cannot be considered a service business like any other: it is the role of public governance to seek a proper balance for each context, looking for the best mix that enhances the goals of relevant content, equity, the enhancement of civic values, and economic productivity'.[63]

A much more critical analysis of privatisation in education points to 'white-washing' as a main strategy for promoting privatisation, as 'IOs

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[61] IPSP (2018, v3, 767).

[62] IPSP (2018, v3, 768).

[63] IPSP (2018, v3, 768).

[International Organisations], governments, and other actors … attach their pro–private education programs to noble aims, such as the achievement of global development goals or the promotion of education opportunities for the disadvantaged'.[64] This literature that is not mentioned in the IPSP chapter conceives a substantive linkage between privatisation and decentralisation, with decentralisation including processes of 'endoprivatisation', meaning privatisation processes within education systems without a formal transformation into private institutions (called exoprivatisation; see also the classic text by Ball and Youdell[65] not mentioned in the IPSP chapter).

This historical and conceptual analysis of global experiences with privatisation, which also analyses the emergence of the Global Education Industry, draws a much more marked demarcation between public and private provision. The authors observe that governments, in fact, do not take an independent and influential position expected by the IPSP authors but are rather complicit with actors promoting privatisation or under pressure by them. 'Increasingly, governments, international organisations (IOs), donors, and philanthropic entities are converging around the idea that the involvement of the private sector in education systems is inevitable and, to some extent, desirable. … privatisation also occurs because governments promote it proactively by adopting and implementing specific public policies' and 'many governments are embracing measures that promote privatisation in and of education' whereby 'corporate interests that aim at opening new education markets and, accordingly, put significant pressure on governments to adopt private sector-friendly policies in education'.[66] Here, we find replicated the common phenomena observed by the IPSP governance chapter in the relationship between powerful private interests and government.

In their analysis of privatisation policies, Verger et al. (2016, 158–176) specifically look at the role and reaction of the teachers' unions in resisting privatisation. They show that decentralisation is not only a neutral process of including stakeholders in policymaking; partly, it is even the contrary.

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[64]Verger et al. (2016, 192); Verger, A.; Fontdevila, C.; Zancajo, A. (2016). The Privatization of Education. A Political Economy of Global Education Reform. New York: Teachers College Press.

[65] Ball, S. J., Youdell, D. (2008). Hidden privatisation in public education. Brussels, Belgium: Education International. https://pages.ei-ie.org/quadrennialreport/2007/upload/content_trsl_images/630/Hidden_privatisation-EN.pdf.

[66]Verger et al. (2016, 177, 7, 14).

'Many governments have promoted education decentralization as a way to fragment and reduce the influence of TUs. However, some TUs have conceived decentralization reforms as an opportunity for renewal and revitalization. …Teachers' unions (TUs) are the most persistent opponents to privatization reforms in most of the cases analysed'.[67] Research shows that, in privatisation policies, teachers' unions were often deliberately excluded from interest representation and participation in decisions.[68]

Finally, Verger et al. (2016, 193) conclude that 'education privatization is a process that is contributing to a paradigmatic change in education policy … Education privatization, in its many facets, represents a drastic change in the main goals of education policy. Education privatization and the introduction of market mechanisms in education systems contribute to the individual and positional goals of education overshadowing the social and collective goals (such as the acquisition of a common culture and the promotion of social cohesion and equity) … Privatization also challenges the traditional ethos of key educational actors'. In the view of the authors, further research should look not only at the trend towards privatisation but should also pay attention to the experience of de-privatisation in several countries as well as to resistance against privatisation.

Concerning the key topic of *knowledge and expertise* in governance, the situation in education differs from the economic fields of finance, investment and trade, where experts have an outright role in how global governance is performed: in education governance, the role of knowledge and expertise is much more indirect, and the analysis in the IPSP education chapter gives an open discussion of a range of approaches towards research-informed policymaking. Proponents of a strong version of evidence-based policy hope that the solution of the various value-loaden ideological and partisan conflicts in education can be delegated to 'hard evidence' and experts as its producers and representatives (in fact a similar solution as in the economic fields). However, such a solution is hampered by at least two problems: first, no sufficient consensus exists about what evidence means (e.g. the debate about the methodological 'gold standard' that alone would produce evidence), and second, the rule of experts would

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[67] Verger et al. (2016, 163, 192).

[68] Bascia, N. (2014, March). Privatisation and teacher union-governmental relations. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Comparative & International Education Society (CIES), Toronto, Ontario, Canada;

Bascia, N., & Osmond, P. (2013). Teacher union governmental relations in the context of educational reform. Brussels, Belgium: Education International. Retrieved from download.ei-ie.org/Docs/WebDepot/Teacher_Union_Study.pdf.

technocratically overrule democratic decision-making (a similar argument as in the other fields of governance). A more indirect mechanism of the influence of knowledge and expertise in education has been established by the various international large-scale assessments (e.g. PISA and the like run by the OECD and IEA). This was named 'governance by numbers' and was followed by various rankings of educational institutions at the higher education level. When international political institutions took patronage over such instruments, complex interrelations between transnational and national levels of governance and governments emerged; however, the impact and use of these instruments depended on the adoption by national governments and on processes of diffusion among them at the transnational and global levels. Finally, the role of knowledge and expertise in educational governance culminates in the polarity between technocracy and democracy.

International assessments and the use of their results at various levels[69] also point to the question of how educational governance has reached a global scope. Besides the assessments and rankings, the IPSP education chapter mentions various elements of international and transnational education governance by a transnational advocacy framework, including intergovernmental organisations and inter-state treaties (e.g. the Global Campaign for Education, the Education for All agenda, the Millennium Development and Sustainable Development Goals). In this framework, different emphases have successively emerged, ranging from mass education and higher education to innovation. More recently, there has been a shift towards lifelong learning as a response to increased longevity and uncertainty resulting from rapid changes. The more recent developments imply more emphasis on content and 'a paradigm shift in pedagogy – toward flexible and non-formal education, toward digital literacy, and toward agentic learners'.[70] As important international policy initiatives, the 2010 Belém Framework for Action (UNESCO) and the 2015 Lifelong Learning Platform (European Civil Society) are mentioned. At the higher education stage, economic purposes have gained attention and accordingly have 'led many governments to reform the governance of their higher education systems to increase their universities' links to the economy and contribution to the global competitiveness of their countries'. The expansion of university objectives to include the 'third

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[69] see Schleicher (2018); Schleicher, A (2018). World Class: How to build a 21st-century school system, Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/4789264300002-en.

[70] IPSP (2018, v3, 770).

mission' of economic and social engagement, along with the emphasis on international rankings and initiatives promoting 'world-class' excellence, is highlighted as a significant common movement in higher education, and 'this movement has stimulated many institutions to improve their standards of teaching and research and to introduce new governance practices'.[71]

In the analysis of privatisation by Verger et al. (2016, 177), the increasing emergence of the global scope of action is mainly focused on the advent of the Global Education Industry, stemming from 'the fact that education is becoming in itself an increasingly profitable global industry'. This industry formed by the growth and concentration of multinational corporations, e.g. in the sectors of publishing, digitalisation, or testing services, and often supported by governments and international organisations, is briefly described by the following elements. 'This emerging education industry benefits from governments outsourcing an increasing number of activities that have been conventionally delivered by the public sector directly (including the provision of education services, the drafting of education policy texts, or the evaluation of policies and programs). This emerging industry also promotes governments and schools buying into their ICT and certification products, testing preparation services and other types of so-called school improvement services'.[72] This industry might be seen as an analogue to the positions of the pharmaceutical industry in health services or the armaments industry in defence services.

The analysis of resistance against this shift from public to private actors in education strongly emphasises gaps between the local/national and transnational/global levels, as the main actors are situated differently. The teachers' trade unions, as a main opponent against industrialisation, are still much confined in their actions to the national and local levels, whereas the education industry is situated at the transnational and global levels. Here, the issues of global governance in the economic sphere, specifically in finance, investment and trade as analysed above, come into play, as the education industry is a component of this domain.

Challenges and Potentials for Adult, Vocational and Higher Education and Governance in Seeking Social Progress

To the question of how education can contribute to social progress, the IPSP education chapter gives quite simple answers. The provision of

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[71] IPSP (2018, v3, 758–759, 759).

[72] Verger et al (2016, 157).

education is per se contributing to progress, and the analysis confines itself to formal education, and it speaks to policymakers about how they could improve education. Overall, reforms should consider the four selected goals of education – humanistic, political-civic, economic and equity – in a balanced way with some priority to civic and humanistic purposes. Main recommendations are given to implement sustainable development goals, to improve access and quality in all sectors, to develop educators and to use digital technologies properly. Research should be used, and governance should be considered; however, it is not specified. Looking more specifically at the recommendations, we find an eclectic compilation of mainstream ideas, and some reference to established research results. The agenda aimed to communicate with policymakers using the simplest terms possible and to avoid topics that might require complex or elaborate discussions. Consequently, the recommendations are quite commonplace and could have already been heard by anyone interested (including policymakers), so one may wonder why these recommendations have not been implemented thus far.

Thus, the education chapter does not contribute substantially to the meaning of social progress and does not provide answers to the main questions raised in our workshop. Progress is not considered systematically, and, therefore, the connection/contradiction of progress and the environment is not reflected. Environmental degradation and climate change are not emphasised as a specific priority in education (rather, they are subsumed in general terms under the humanistic goal). The argument leans more towards economic issues than environmental concerns. The problems of collaboration/fragmentation/competition between disciplines, academics, or researchers in addressing environmental degradation, economic injustice, forced migration and refugees, and gender inequalities are not noticed explicitly. Research is discussed with respect to methodological variety and as the provision of evidence that should inform policymaking, with the main focus on educational research (and contributions from political science, sociology and psychology).

A clear focus is given to school and higher education. Vocational education is only tackled by a small paragraph, expressively 'besides higher education' with noble contributions (social inclusion, labour market participation) 'for young people who do not make it to college or university'.[73] Only two conditions for vocational education to flourish are emphasised: commitment by stakeholders, particularly employers, and

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[73] IPSP (2018, v3, 772).

being well connected to higher education. Adult education is only mentioned as an outdated endeavour with mostly negative life cycle results (according to the 'Heckman Curve')[74] and substituted by fluid and market-oriented lifelong education.[75] Teacher unions are presented under a negative label, commonly opposing quality and fighting for particularistic benefits.

Lessons from the IPSP About Social Progress and Environmental Care

The following 'lessons' are preliminary generalisations by the author from the studies and reflections presented in this chapter about the work and results of the IPSP. The leading contributors to the panel present their work as a collective effort to comprehend and propose potential solutions to the challenges faced by the 21st-century society. These findings should serve as a foundation for further in-depth study and the development of more concrete political initiatives. Therefore, more established lessons can only be expected from continuous further work on this basis. Currently, the produced results are accessible. However, the concept of establishing a more permanent structure for the social sciences, akin to the IPCC for the natural sciences, has not gained momentum thus far. Several hints point to the UN Sustainable Development Goals as a widely agreed upon political structure that can be informed in several ways by the work of the IPSP.

As a first lesson, the effort of the IPSP to construct a new framework for social progress, drawing on the best knowledge offered by the social sciences, in an attempt to identify reasonable perspectives and orientations towards potential/possible ways out of the numerous pressing challenges facing our planet and the associated multiple crises, deserves commendation. A key message is the call for collaboration among social

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[74] "Heckman Curve": The European Commission (EU-Com 2006, Fig.1, 4) has included a figure based on research by the group around James Heckman in a key policy document that shows only very small returns from adult education compared to previous education sectors; the original research even shows that returns from adult education are negative (Cunha et al. 2005, Fig.1A, 110). EU-Com (2006 September 8). Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems. Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, COM(2006) 481 final, 8.9.2006, Brussels. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0481; Cunha, F., Heckman, J.J., Lochner, L., Masterov, D.V. (2005 July). Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation. Discussion paper series, IZA DP No. 1675. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit. Online: https://docs.iza.org/dp1675.pdf.

[75] IPSP (2018, v3, 758).

scientists to forge a positive alternative to the notion of the end of history and the sole critical and de(con)structive reasoning prevalent in postmodernity. This effort aims to move beyond simplistic linear models of progress tied to Western capitalist 'modernisation' and also surpass the reworked 'third-way' modernisation. The underlying concept behind this new alternative path of social progress involves a comprehensive philosophical undertaking to establish the framework of progress on a flexible set of values and principles capable of serving as a compass for progress assessment.

As a second lesson, the framing of social progress needs to be complex and multifaceted and must at least consider diverse conditions and the three dimensions of (1) values and principles that establish human rights, justice, and the rule of law comprehensively, (2) the renewal of democracy, and (3) a thorough examination of the future of capitalism. Encouraging the broadest possible participation in societal processes is essential, involving the mobilisation of civil society and challenging privileged and powerful forces. In the economic sphere, regulations must secure a progressive use of the market mechanism, and the sphere of production must also be exposed to societal and political influences (without thinking of a command economy).

As a third lesson, the in-depth socio-economic analyses conclude that economic growth and environmental care can be reconciled. Growth is considered a double-edged sword, with positive outcomes in alleviating poverty and negative consequences in environmental degradation. Therefore, social progress can no longer be equated solely with economic (GDP) growth; instead, it must be defined and politically and socially staged in the broader way elaborated in the philosophical analysis of values and principles mentioned above. In line with this, the IPSP analysis does not align with the concepts of degrowth as a societal solution. In short, the IPSP analysis suggests that economic growth and environmental care can be reconciled through the development and implementation of appropriate actions and policies.

As a fourth lesson, we can see that education is interconnected with social progress in many ways. Several chapters in the IPSP report mention the supportive role of education in providing competencies and 'human capital' for economic purposes, as well as potential contributions to engagement and democratic citizenship. On balance, references to education in the various chapters of the IPSP report amount to more narrative space than the specific chapter about education. An overall systematic account of the relationship of education and social progress is not provided. The overall narrative in the big report deserves analysis to

work out the several facets of how education is related to social progress in this discourse. A prominent and simplistic view suggests that the mere provision of education would automatically contribute to social progress and requires only some specific policy implementations for proper execution. While this perspective is broadly adopted in the education chapter, it overlooks some crucial aspects.

The deliberate confinement to formal education institutions and processes negates, in fact, the essential interplay between formal and informal education and learning that fundamentally influences the potential and limits of formal institutions. While there is a brief mention of the essential role of informal processes and structures in citizenship education,[76] this dimension is not accorded its proper place in the overall argument. Similarly, recommendations about the teaching profession are very limited in their selection and positioning. Despite attributing teachers 'an important role in the cultural and political discourse',[77] this role is not elaborated in a productive manner to advance and support social progress. This would need a systematic framework and understanding of the role of education in society as being worked out in parallel to the IPSP work by a group of philosophers and social scientists. Brighouse et al. (2018, 2016) and Lindblom (2018) have proposed such an encompassing framework about the (potential) contribution of education to 'human flourishing', which considers the main elements of education and gives a rationale for political decision-making. In this framework, the 'educational goods' are systematised and brought in a systematic relationship to the essential elements of wider, non-educational goods, choice processes, just distribution criteria and the main elements of the political process. This framework could be used for more elaborate contributions of education to social progress. The focus on formal institutions also results in an overemphasis on schools and higher education, neglecting the importance of vocational and adult education.

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[76] IPSP (2018, v3, 761).

[77] IPSP (2018, v3, 772).

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