Powersharing and Democratic Survival

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Abstract

Democracy is often fragile, especially in states that have recently experienced civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it can limit electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing and analyze their effects on democratic survival using a new global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival in societies both with and without recent conflict. Our results suggest that institution-builders and international organizations should prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.

Introduction

How can we best sustain democracy under challenging conditions? An influential response to this question promotes political *powersharing* institutions that allocate stakes in power to specific groups or otherwise divide power among opposed interests (Lijphart 1977, 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Norris 2008). This approach has most commonly been applied to states recovering from violent conflict, aiming to coax warring parties to lay down their arms for guarantees of political representation. For instance, several political observers currently propose powersharing to resolve conflicts and build democratic consensus in Iraq and Ukraine.[1] Powersharing has also been promoted as a way to prevent civil conflict in the first place and to build more successful democracies (Lijphart 1977).

Yet there is an inherent tension between powersharing and democracy. Specifically, by mandating how power is allocated, powersharing limits electoral responsiveness and thus risks violating the spirit of democracy as "institutionalized uncertainty" (Przeworski 1991). This may protect vulnerable minority groups, but only by compromising democratic ideals such as meaningful elections and popular sovereignty. This dilemma poses an intriguing puzzle: Does powersharing help build democracy or is it a hindrance? And does the answer depend on the form that powersharing takes and the political context?

Unfortunately, we have little systematic evidence on whether powersharing institutions promote democratic consolidation. After Lijphart's pioneering work on democracy in divided societies, empirical studies of powersharing have mainly focused on the risk of conflict renewal. The surprisingly few cross-national studies that relate powersharing to democracy mostly examine cross-sectional correlations, making them susceptible to reverse causation.[2]

In this paper, we return to Lijphart's concerns about democratic survival, but greatly expand the scope of the analysis. We identify three types of political powersharing – inclusive, dispersive, and constraining – and compare their effects. We focus on three critical conditions for democratic survival: (1) electoral winners must not have incentives (and opportunities) to abuse their power, (2) electoral

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[1] On Ukraine, see Lieven (2014) and Roger Myerson and Tymofiy Mylovanov's public advocacy of federalization.

[2] Prominent examples include Linder and Bächtiger (2005) and Norris (2008). Both estimate regressions showing that powersharing institutions correlate positively with democracy. Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) predict transitions, but limit their analysis to post-conflict autocracies.

losers must not have incentives to renege on their democratic commitments, and (3) third parties must not suffer exclusion, denial of basic rights, or other deprivations that undermine their regime support. These conditions are all critical, but we expect their relative importance to vary by political context.

Based on our expectations stemming from these conditions, we examine the effects of political powersharing on democratic survival across different forms of powersharing, as well as between societies with and without a recent history of civil conflict. We take advantage of a new global dataset covering 180 countries from 1975-2010, which uses factor analysis to combine 19 institutions into three distinct powersharing dimensions (citation omitted). Employing these index measures of powersharing avoids the severe multicollinearity that comes with testing a large number of mutually correlated institutions. To ensure that powersharing and democracy are defined in mutually distinctive terms, we use a non-overlapping definition of (electoral) democracy from Boix et al. (2013).

We find that institutions that constrain political leaders consistently enhance democratic stability, regardless of political context. Other types of powersharing have more contingent effects. In societies that have recently undergone violent civil conflict, mutual security is of pre-eminent concern, and hence those forms of powersharing that best undergird that security are most critical. In such states, inclusive arrangements that guarantee group representation in central government thus support democratic survival, as do constraining institutions. In contrast, dispersive institutions that divide power territorially destabilize democracy. Under all other circumstances, constraining powersharing generally has a more beneficial effect than either inclusion or dispersion. Absent recent armed conflict, neither inclusive nor dispersive powersharing has any systematic effect on democratic survival.

We also investigate powersharing's effects restricted to other "hard cases," such as poor or fractionalized countries and those that have suffered ethnic strife. In all these tests, constraining powersharing consistently sustains democracy, while the effects of inclusive and dispersive powersharing vary by context. Our results thus highlight the merits of restrained government, civil rights, and effective checks on those with access to arms. Our findings are robust to a large number of controls and instrumental variables analysis, bolstering our confidence in the causal effects of powersharing.

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To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to relate powersharing to democratic survival in a dynamic framework, or to compare the effects of powersharing in post-conflict versus other states. Our findings have implications for both theory and policy. First, this study contributes to a more discriminating understanding of powersharing and its effects on democratic governance, underscoring the importance of disaggregating powersharing and considering a range of political environments. In the process, our results speak to several centuries-old debates on the proper institutional structure of democracy, including federalism vs. centralization, electoral responsiveness vs. group guarantees, and restraints on power vs. state capacity. Moreover, our results have policy implications for democracy promoters and international peacekeepers, whose standard post-conflict reform package emphasizes inclusive and dispersive powersharing (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). We call for shifting focus from dispersive to constraining powersharing. Our analysis also suggests that while inclusive powersharing may protect nascent democracies in conflictual environments, it may not be the best prescription for the long haul. Lastly, our findings remind us that institutional designers must consider the incentives they generate for ordinary citizens as well as for political elites.

Powersharing: From Concepts to Measures

A political powersharing agreement mandates or facilitates the participation of a broad set of decision makers in government. The parties to such agreements are usually ethnic groups, political parties, armed forces, or other organizations representing social groups with opposed interests (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007). Powersharing aims to ensure that no groups, and ideally no citizens, suffer policies that are seriously detrimental to their interests.

The study of powersharing is greatly beholden to Arend Lijphart's research on democracy in divided societies. Lijphart (1977) originally conceptualized "consociational democracy" as characterized by grand coalitions, a mutual veto, segmental autonomy, and proportional representation.[3] However,

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[3] Lijphart's classic cases of European consociationalism include the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland. Consociationalism has also scored notable successes in India, Benin, and South Africa, although these are balanced by less successful experiences in Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and Fiji.

these institutions do not necessarily coexist or exhaust the set of political practices fostering cooperation. Lijphart's (1999, 2012) later concept of "consensus democracy" thus expanded to an executive-parties dimension (representing the ease of party dominance) and a federal-constitutional dimension (representing the ease of national policy change). In an influential contribution, Barbara Walter (2002) further differentiates between political, territorial, and military powersharing.[4]

Powersharing has been promoted by international actors and peacekeepers (including the United Nations), particularly in post-conflict settings and in concert with immediate elections (Sisk 1996; Downes 2004; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). This pattern is exemplified by the peace agreements in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Nepal, and Sierra Leone. Of the 38 civil wars with negotiated settlements between 1945 and 1998, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) find that all but one contained some form of powersharing.

We see powersharing as a bundle of related institutions and practices, of which virtually all modern polities contain some components. For instance, the American founders adopted a range of powersharing features for their new republic, including federalism and separation of powers. Even many autocracies adopt powersharing provisions, such as the grand coalition government in Zimbabwe and the federal systems in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. However, the extent of powersharing clearly varies. At a low extreme is what O'Donnell (1994) refers to as "delegative democracy," in which power is highly concentrated in an elected president, with minimal constraints from the legislature or judiciary. At a high extreme is a decentralized system with multiple countervailing powers and an inclusive central government. Specific institutional forms vary considerably, however, which motivates the need for an account of powersharing that reflects its diversity.

Inclusive, Dispersive, and Constraining Powersharing

We identify three distinct forms of powersharing. To understand the differences between them, consider how we think about sharing in ordinary life. In some contexts, sharing something treasured means enjoying or consuming it jointly, as when families or lovers share special occasions. Jointness is

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[4] For other categorizations of powersharing, see Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) and Binningsbø (2013).

inherent and critical to this form of sharing. In contrast, when family members share an inheritance, sharing is understood as a dispersion of goods to be consumed separately by their respective recipients. Finally, when activists demand that elites "share the wealth" or that motorists "share the road," their typical concern is to prevent someone from excluding others from the enjoyment of some good and the emphasis is on coexistence rather than togetherness. Sharing can thus refer to joint and inclusive consumption, dispersion, or simply constraints on anyone's exclusive control of a valuable good.

The same ambiguity is present in political powersharing, which we thus divide into (1) **inclusive** agreements that mandate the participation of several parties or groups in particular offices or decision-making processes, (2) **dispersive** agreements that divide authority among actors in a well-defined pattern (e.g., territorial decentralization), and (3) **constraining** agreements that limit the power of any actor and thus protect ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse.

Inclusive powersharing places power broadly and jointly in the hands of multiple recognized groups. This includes grand (cabinet) coalitions representing all significant parties; constitutional or statutory provisions that reserve specific political offices for particular parties or social groups; rules that mandate inclusiveness in the armed forces, civil service, or other government appointments; and rules that give minority groups veto power over policy changes in sensitive areas, such as language policy. Inclusive powersharing thus aligns closely with several features of Lijphart's consociationalism and with Norris's "positive action strategies" (2008: 107). Its purpose is to guarantee each group a share of political power and a floor level of political expectations, reducing the threat that they might withdraw or rebel from fear of being shut out of the political process.

Dispersive powersharing limits the power of one faction over others through partitioning or devolution of political authority. Dispersive powersharing is often territorial and includes federalism and other measures that increase the autonomy of subnational governments and render them accountable to local constituents rather than to the central government.[5] Territorially dispersing power has long been touted as a promising way to promote democracy, with the connection between federalism and

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[5] As Lijphart (1977) points out, segmental group autonomy need not be strictly territorial but can also involve non-territorial segments such as religious or ethnic communities.

democracy going back to Rousseau, Montesquieu, and the American Federalists.[6] Such dispersion protects geographically concentrated minorities and ideally maximizes the efficiency of local popular representation (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972; Norris 2008).

Finally, constraining powersharing limits the scope of political authority to maximize citizens' autonomy and protect them from encroachments by the powerful. The struggle to impose constraints on rulers was a critical event in Western political development, as liberals fought for checks on executive power, parliamentary autonomy, individual rights, and the rule of law. The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 famously erected substantial constraints against the Crown, providing a foundation for England's democratic evolution and economic ascendancy in the 18th and 19th centuries (North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Some modern thinkers see such constraints as the most fundamental component of democracy, which ideally should be secured prior to competitive elections (Zakaria 2003; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Constraints include institutional checks and balances; independent and non-partisan judicial institutions, central banks, electoral commissions, and other regulatory agencies; rules subjecting the armed forces to civilian control; and protections of religious freedom and separation of church and state. Constraining powersharing often removes issues from the political arena through non-partisan institutions and the protection of civil society. These institutions have been empirically under-investigated, although Gibler and Randazzo (2011) and Reenock et al. (2013) find that independent judiciaries promote democratic survival.[7]

We next look to identify these forms of powersharing empirically in the world's states. We draw on data covering 19 different political powersharing institutions that spans all 180 countries with a population of at least 250,000 from 1975 to 2010 (citation omitted). This data breaks new ground in several ways. It is more extensive than previous datasets, both in terms of the political systems covered and the variables included. It gives us information on both democracies and autocracies and states with

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[6] Empirically, Norris (2008) finds that federalized countries are more democratic, although Linder and Bächtiger (2005) find no relationship.
[7] Also see Kapstein and Converse (2008). Roeder's (2005) concept of "power-dividing" institutions shares elements of dispersive and constraining powersharing. In contrast to (inclusive) powersharing, power-dividing institutions favor multiple, shifting majorities in separate political arenas, but where no faction can dominate government as a whole. Roeder (2005) argues that power-dividing prevents the escalation of conflict more effectively than powersharing, especially in ethnically divided countries.

and without recent civil conflict. Previously available data have been limited to post-conflict cases (e.g., Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007, 2015) or focused on a narrower range of institutions (e.g., Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Norris 2008). A larger number of indicators facilitates more precise estimates for each type of powersharing. Moreover, by including different forms of powersharing in the same analysis, we can distinguish their effects and account for the degree to which they co-vary.

While powersharing includes both *de jure* rules and *de facto* practices, this dataset focuses heavily on *de jure* rules and constitutional rules in particular.[8] To the extent that rules on the books are not thoroughly enforced, this approach reduces the probability that we will observe strong effects of powersharing. At the same time, this measurement approach has pragmatic value in that *de jure* rules are more amenable to objective coding and can also more easily be manipulated by democracy promoters. If we want to change the world, formal rules are the easiest levers to pull. We want to know whether these levers are likely to work.

Empirically, we treat each form of powersharing as a latent variable that cannot be directly observed. Therefore, to create our measures, we begin by identifying a range of observable institutions that we a priori associate with each type of powersharing. We expect that institutions with similar purposes will be correlated and load on a common latent factor. For example, we expect that states with high levels of constraining powersharing will have a range of institutions restricting the dominant group from oppressing the weak.

Table 1: Indicators of Powersharing		
Type of Powersharing	**Indicators**	**Country Examples**
Inclusive	Mandated Grand Coalition or Unity Government Mutual Veto Reserved Executive Positions Reserved Seats Mandated Military Inclusiveness	Bosnia (1996-2010) Cyprus (1975-2010) Lebanon (1975-2010)
Dispersive	Subnational Tax Authority Subnational Education Authority	United States (1975-2010)

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[8] We complement this by controlling for civil liberties provision and the Polity democracy score, which more explicitly capture *de facto* institutional practices.

	Subnational Police Authority	
	State/Provincial Executive Elections	Mexico (1975-2010)
	State/Provincial Legislative Elections	
	Constituency Alignment (state/provincial representation in the upper house)	India (1975-2010)
Constraining	Religion Protected (freedom from discrimination)	
	Religion Protected (freedom of practice)	Finland (1975-2010)
	Military Legislator Ban	
	Ethnic Party Ban	Spain (1979-2010)
	Judicial Review	
	Judicial Tenure (two binary variables)	Taiwan (1975-2010)
	Judicial Constitution (role of judiciary described in the constitution)	Singapore (1975-2010)

To put these expectations to the test, we factor analyze the 19 powersharing indicators presented in Table 1, which reveals that they do indeed cluster around three latent variables that correspond to our three conceptual types. Further, the patterns of correlation between indicators match our theoretical expectations. We use the resulting factor loadings to construct index measures of each type of powersharing, which we use in our analysis below. Table 1 reports the relevant indicators and factors, along with examples of countries with high values on each powersharing dimension.

Powersharing and Democratic Survival

Several studies find that powersharing promotes civil peace, although differences emerge regarding the types of powersharing that best forestall conflict and the conditions under which they are most effective (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Mukherjee 2006; Jarstad 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Binningsbø 2013; Wucherpfenning 2013). However, powersharing has also attracted a growing chorus of critics (Downes 2004; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; LeBas 2014), who argue that such practices have negative long-term effects on political stability and peace (Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Jarstad 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2009; Jung 2012).

The empirical literature relating powersharing to democracy is much less extensive. Although the theoretical literature is rich, cross-national quantitative studies are surprisingly rare, with three

important exceptions. Linder and Bächtiger (2005) conduct a cross-sectional study relating powersharing to average democracy levels in 62 African and Asian cases from 1965-95. They identify two dimensions of powersharing: horizontal (similar to our inclusive dimension) and vertical (similar to dispersive). They find that only horizontal powersharing is positively correlated with democracy. Analyzing a global panel from 1970 to 2004, Norris (2008) instead relates several powersharing institutions (e.g., parliamentarism, PR, and federalism) individually to different measures of democracy. She finds nearly all powersharing indicators to be positively associated with democracy. Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) also employ panel data, but their study focuses on democratization rather than democratic survival, is limited to a post-civil war sample, and does not differentiate among types of powersharing.

Both Norris and Linder and Bächtiger correlate powersharing with democracy contemporaneously, making their studies prone to reverse causation. A positive relationship could simply indicate that more democratic countries are more likely to implement powersharing arrangements, rather than that powersharing sustains democracy. As critics of the conflict literature point out, powersharing may simply *reflect* peaceful cooperation rather than causing it (Andeweg 2000). To address this, we model democratic development dynamically by estimating the effects of powersharing on subsequent democratic survival or breakdown. Like Lijphart (1977, 1999), we focus on initially democratic states, as we expect powersharing to work differently within autocracies.[9] Our work also builds on Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) by showing that not all forms of powersharing operate identically. In what follows, we therefore discuss how powersharing relates to democratic survival and develop distinct predictions for each type of powersharing.

Democratic Survival

To understand how powersharing influences democratic survival, we focus on mechanisms that maintain key actors' support for democracy. We understand democracy as a self-enforcing equilibrium

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[9] We limit our study to democracies for two reasons. First, democratic survival means retaining the status quo, whereas democratization implies active regime change. Thus, arrangements that spread power and promote stability may impede transitions from autocracy. Second, autocratic elites can more easily undermine powersharing institutions in non-transparent ways.

in which all elite players must have incentives to commit to a mutually accepted order of political contestation (Przeworski 1991). Our focus on elites is empirically warranted, as democratic failures are almost always initiated by elite actors (Houle 2009). According to Maeda (2010), half of all democratic breakdowns between 1950 and 2004 resulted from military coups, with another 38 percent "self-coups" initiated by civilian leaders to consolidate power (e.g., Fujimori in Peru). There is therefore a long tradition of studying how institutions—such as presidentialism, the electoral system, and political pacts—affect democratic survival by structuring elite interaction (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996).

Democracy also means that ordinary citizens decide which politicians to empower. While elites may make the critical decisions, they must be constantly mindful of their electoral accountability to the masses. Democratic stability requires that election losers choose to contest the next election rather than challenge the winners via force and that election winners choose to conduct future elections fairly rather than abuse their power (Walter 2002; Mattes and Savun 2009).[10] It also requires that other powerful actors, particularly in the armed forces and the mass public, regard the democratic order as worth preserving. Compared to a Hobbesian "state of nature," a stable democratic order has many advantages. Yet consistently maintaining the support of electoral winners, losers, the mass public, and other actors with coercive capabilities is no easy task.

All compacts of this kind require a few key conditions for their adoption. In the first place, each participant must expect a higher payoff from cooperation than they could obtain through defection. Each player must also believe that other critical players will see the agreement as beneficial and that they will continue to follow the rules of the commitment. Lastly, the compact itself must be regarded as reasonably efficient and legitimate, as otherwise the players will expect constant pressures to renegotiate. These are the *ex ante* conditions that determine whether the leaders of major social groups are likely to submit themselves to a democratic process in the first place.

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[10] This is conceptually related to the payoffs from winning, losing, and subverting democracy discussed by Pzeworski (1991: 29).

In many ways, this is the easy part. The greater challenge is securing compliance with the *results* of the democratic process. Once electoral outcomes are realized (*ex post*), the players must still be willing to comply.[11] Specifically, a stable democracy must satisfy the following three conditions: (1) Electoral winners must not have incentives (and opportunities) to abuse their power and manipulate the rules to their advantage, (2) Electoral losers must not have incentives to renege on the constitutional game (such as by resorting to armed violence), and (3) Third parties must not withdraw their support because the system imposes large costs on them or because of elite behaviors that "drastically reduce the confidence of other actors in democratic institutions" (Przeworski 1991: 28). Ultimately, robust stability arrives when elites collectively regard democracy as the "only game in town" (Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996) and do not fear the repercussions of others taking office.

Democracy can be undermined by various forms of opportunistic non-compliance. It is often in the self-interest of politicians to engineer biased political institutions, to violate the security of their competitors, to tolerate ineffective governance if it works to their own advantage (Geddes 1994), or to resort to non-democratic means if they fail in civilian contestation. To capture how powersharing influences democratic stability, we therefore need to understand how the features of such agreements can incentivize democratic behavior. We next discuss the three conditions in greater detail, focusing on how different forms of powersharing can help to secure compliance.

Compliance Among Winners

A fundamental compliance problem is that strong players can be tempted to renege on their democratic commitments to a "level playing field" by using their power to undermine competition. This can result in the steady erosion of civil liberties and electoral standards witnessed in Putin's Russia and Chavez's Venezuela, where strong executives gradually magnified their power, persecuted opposition politicians, and harassed the media and civil society. Limiting such power consolidation is necessary to reassure other elites and maintain an effective electoral opposition. In particular, electoral losers must

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[11] Coups and anti-regime protests are common after decisive elections (e.g., Burundi in 1993, Egypt in 2013). In fact, the mere prospect of an election can be enough to topple democracy. The 1967 military coup in Greece, for instance, was triggered by the conservative ruling party's fears of a leftist victory in upcoming elections.

expect a fair chance of securing power in the future (Przeworski 1991).

Political institutions can help limit opportunities for leaders to consolidate and abuse their power. Inclusive powersharing does so by increasing the number of democratic "stakeholders" and giving the leaders of all relevant groups a share in decision-making, thus raising their incentives to support the regime as well as their ability to prevent competing factions from abusing their control of political office. The more effectively the "losers" are represented in various political institutions, the more difficult it is for the "winners" to use these same offices for sectarian purposes or to undermine the political compact. Dispersive powersharing instead gives multiple groups a stake in power at the sub-national level and thus a measure of localized security and autonomy, which can protect them against an abusive central government. Thus, dispersing power regionally can help prevent a tyranny of the majority, a virtue much emphasized by James Madison. Minority groups with a regional base can also expect their constituents to support their opposition to winners bent on abuse of power. What they may less reliably possess, however, is good information about politics in central institutions.

Constraining powersharing can also help restrain winners from abusing their power. The most effective such institutions provide for multiple, countervailing sources of power, such as strong, independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and intra-governmental checks and balances. Institutions that circumscribe the political role of the armed forces and submit it to civilian control may help contain military coups, the most frequent threat to democratic stability (Maeda 2010). Judicial constraints may similarly limit opportunities for the expansion of power by individual leaders by safeguarding civil liberties and electoral laws (Moraski 2009; Gibler and Randazzo 2011). There is strong evidence that such institutions can be effective, especially in regimes that seek democratic legitimacy. Facing intense political pressure, judges have enforced constitutional term limits for a number of sub-Saharan African presidents, sharply increasing the likelihood of party turnover (Posner and Young 2007; Cheeseman 2010). Independent judiciaries also overturned fraudulent elections in Ukraine in 2004 and the Philippines in 2007, helping to prevent autocratic consolidation.

Nigeria's rocky road to democracy illustrates these concerns and a variety of institutional remedies. During the country's first two decades of independence, abuses of power were rampant, and

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the country suffered a devastating civil war. Even in the 1990s, Nigeria's military autocrats imprisoned leading opposition politicians and annulled elections that produced the "wrong" results. After the return to civilian rule in 1999, however, trust among politicians has increased (although civil violence persists) to the point that in 2015, President Goodluck Jonathan peacefully conceded defeat after a closely contested, high-stakes presidential election. Informed observers characterized this as a watershed in Nigeria's political history (e.g., *The Economist*, April 4, 2015). A key component of this decision was the mutual expectation that Jonathan's People's Democratic Party will freely contest future elections.

This trust was undergirded by a complex set of formal and informal rules designed to promote mutual security and limit abuses of power. Nigeria has gradually increased the number of states from 3 to 36 and allowed a number of ethnic minorities a "homeland." In addition, there are explicit rules about "zoning" or division of the spoils and rotation of political offices (including the presidency) between regions, a form of inclusive powersharing. Moreover, executive power has been reined in by the 1999 Constitution's elaborate judicial system, including a Supreme Court with powers of judicial review. The courts have increasingly constrained the abuse of power by election winners, as shown by their rulings against the government in several election-related disputes (Campbell 2013: 36). Campbell (2013: 31) further identifies several informal powersharing rules, such as (1) no president for life, (2) patrons at the pinnacle are never killed by their rivals, and (3) money accumulated by a political figure in office is sacrosanct. The first of these norms is clearly designed to prevent non-compliance among winners, with the second aimed at preventing particularly destabilizing behavior by election losers.

Compliance Among Losers

Democratic stability also depends on electoral losers deciding that sticking with the electoral game is better than withdrawing support or resorting to armed violence. This decision depends in part on whether they believe that winners will comply with democratic rules. Yet even if electoral losers believe that they can compete fairly in the future, they must also be satisfied with the current distribution of power and its implications for their core rights and interests. To secure compliance with democracy, all groups must have *sufficient stakes in political power*, ideally commensurate with their

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shares of coercive power. If not, the urge to resort to civil conflict or a coup may be irresistible. For instance, a major destabilizing force in Iraq since 2006 has been the marginalization of the Sunni minority under the Nuri al-Maliki government, leading many Sunnis to support violent opposition. Further, ensuring a minimum share of power for potential spoilers gives these groups and their leaders a stake in the democratic system. Over time, this can improve opposition elites' loyalty to the regime as they become more invested in the status quo (Stedman 1997).

Most importantly, groups must feel that their most *critical rights and interests*, including sensitive issues like language policy, religion, and personal autonomy, are not in jeopardy. This can be achieved either by guaranteeing groups sufficient political power to protect these rights or by removing these issues from the political arena entirely. Thus, winner-take-all elections may incentivize undemocratic behavior both to win the election and by losers in its aftermath.

Opposition compliance can be fostered through various forms of powersharing. Inclusive arrangements, such as pacts and group quotas, are classic strategies for securing mutual security and trust through centralized bargaining. Especially when they contain proportionality norms for minorities, inclusive measures can guarantee groups access to political power even if they end up electoral losers. By predetermining power relations, inclusiveness lowers the stakes of elections, lessening the incentives for parties and candidates to defect after losing (Lijphart 2002). Inclusive arrangements can also build mutual trust and respect through recognition and bargaining (Lijphart 1999, 2002). Ideally, as Norris (2008: 108) writes, "[E]ach distinct religious, linguistic, or nationalistic community will feel that their voice counts and that the rules of the game are fair and legitimate." This parallels the popular claim in the democratization literature that elite pacts stabilize democracy (Przeworski 1991; Bunce 2000). In this way, mutual security can be forged by a *culture of political accommodation* among national elites, which is partly a product of institutions and the path taken to democracy (Rustow 1970; Dahl 1971; Higley and Burton 1989).

In contrast, dispersive powersharing can protect minority autonomy by decentralizing critical decisions about matters related to faith or ethnicity. Dispersive powersharing thus gives multiple groups a stake in power regionally and a concomitant measure of security. Territorial divisions also tend to be

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stable, so groups that feel secure within a particular sub-national area also face low uncertainty over the future. However, dispersion can also mean that ethnic appeals become increasingly likely at the regional level, potentially worsening ethnic tensions nationally, as occurred in Nigeria in the 1960s and Sudan in the 2000s (Downes 2004; Hale 2004). In direct contrast to inclusive powersharing's centripetal pressure that necessitates compromise and centralizes bargaining, dispersive powersharing enables groups to retreat to their separate corners, with secession and civil war as potential consequences. Thus, Roeder (2009: 206) notes that of 11 ethnically defined federations in modern history, only 4 reached 2005 as unified countries.[12]

Constraining powersharing aids loser compliance by removing sensitive issues from the political arena entirely and by inserting third-party barriers to government manipulation. If these checks work effectively, they increase the mutual security among elites (Dahl 1971). While constraints do not allocate fixed shares of power to specific groups, they do reassure minority groups that their interests will be protected when rivals take power. For instance, South Africa's 1996 constitution introduced strong property rights and a Supreme Court with the power of judicial review, which Sisk and Stefes (2005) argue were critical for stabilizing the divided country. Most importantly, the constitution reassured business interests and the white minority that they would be protected under ANC rule. Constraints such as a strong judiciary also help to stabilize democracies by sharply reducing the stakes of elections. By ensuring that electoral losers will have later opportunities to regain power, electoral losses become less threatening and less likely to encourage coups.

Compliance Among Third Parties

Most analyses of compliance problems in emerging democracies focus on the government and other elites, such as the leaders of former insurgent groups. Yet democracy depends on the compliance of "third parties" as well, including the military, civil society organizations, and groups not granted formal political representation. Because many mechanisms of powersharing mainly benefit opposition elites, they may not credibly constrain politicians from repressing or exploiting the broader public.

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[12] Data from Lake and Rothchild (2005: 110-12).

Ordinary citizens also play an important role in sustaining democracy. When insurgents initiate armed conflict against the government, they depend critically on masses for recruits (Gates 2002) and for moral and material support (Mukherjee 2006). A rich research tradition has therefore explored mass participation in civil conflicts (e.g., Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). If the supporters that opposition elites seek to recruit view armed violence as too risky or illegitimate, they may withhold their support, in turn making insurgency too costly (Mattes and Savun 2009: 739). Therefore, if the government can credibly commit to providing for ordinary citizens, opposition elites may find it unprofitable to renege on their democratic commitments.

Democratic stability is thus enhanced when government is seen as *well-functioning and accountable to popular demands*, especially through the provision of economic opportunities and public goods (Przeworski 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The democratic breakdown in Ecuador in 2000, for instance, was partly triggered by a large-scale protest by indigenous groups who felt politically and economically excluded. Effective governance is most critical in weak democracies, as the inability to resolve policy crises is one of the most common causes of military intervention (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Bernhard et al. 2001). Coups are also more likely if citizens are polarized and only weakly support democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996). Thus, democratic stability is enhanced when ordinary citizens view their government as capable and conducive to economic inclusiveness and growth. Especially important to popular legitimacy is the protection of political and economic liberties, which in turn safeguard civil society and generate economic prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

Inclusive powersharing fosters minority representation and may in turn protect the rights of ordinary citizens (Mukherjee 2006; Norris 2008). Yet particularly when ethnically based, inclusive powersharing can also jeopardize democratic functioning (Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Lake and Rothchild 2005; LeVan 2011; Selway and Templeman 2012). Inclusiveness limits electoral responsiveness and accountability. Although a virtue in reducing threats to elites, the predetermination of power is inherently undemocratic: "Without the possibility of political turnover, leadership selection yields neither uncertainty about outcomes nor institutional credibility for the process" (LeVan 2011: 12). By freezing power relations in place, inclusive powersharing can also hamper the development of a vibrant

opposition and civil society (Jung et al. 2005; Mehler 2009). In particular, it often blocks new entrants from electoral competition, potentially alienating underrepresented or emerging populations (Reilly 2005).[13] Inclusive powersharing can also impede effective governance and distance factional leaders from their respective constituents. The inclusion of so many opposed interests in government often produces rigidity and inefficiency, as in Cyprus and Lebanon. Moreover, the pacts that promote mutual security among political elites often do so at the expense of ordinary citizens. For example, the third powersharing rule that Campbell attributes to contemporary Nigeria ("money accumulated by a political figure in office is sacrosanct") testifies to the blatant rent-seeking accords that sweetened the deal between the country's various factional leaders. Needless to say, such practices do little to enhance economic performance or regime legitimacy.

Dispersive powersharing is in many ways conducive to responsive and legitimate governance. Norris (2008) emphasizes that federalized countries provide more access points to government. The result is political decision-making that is closer to the people, leading to improved policy responsiveness, greater public goods provision, more tailored policies, and potentially a more engaged and supportive civil society (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). But a federal structure also has its liabilities, especially when it coincides with ethnic divisions (Monteux 2006; Roeder 2009). As politics becomes defined within distinct regions, national identity suffers and nationally representative parties are less likely to develop (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Constraints, in contrast, overwhelmingly contribute positively to accountability and governance. A strong independent judiciary and limits on the armed forces help to secure civil liberties, room for opposition parties, a credible election process, and a robust civil society, furthering the participatory "civic culture" that supports democratic consolidation and effective governance (Almond and Verba 1963; Muller and Seligson 1994). Secure civil liberties can also help citizens coordinate against anti-democratic leaders. Finally, independent judicial institutions protect property rights and the rule of law, fostering economic growth.

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[13] Moreover, inclusivity often empowers existing ethnic groups instead of cross-cutting political alignments, thus deepening ethnic divisions rather than building national identity (Horowitz 2003; Jarstad 2008).

Expected Effects of Different Types of Powersharing

Powersharing can help sustain democracy by lessening the opportunities and incentives for winners to abuse their power, for losers to renege, or for citizens or third parties to withhold or withdraw their support. However, these effects likely differ across forms of powersharing.

Inclusive powersharing is likely to constrain winners, safeguard minority interests, and enhance mutual elite security. However, it may adversely influence popular accountability and governance. For democratic survival, inclusive powersharing thus presents a difficult tradeoff, and the net effect is unclear. However, inclusive powersharing is most likely to bolster democracy when the mutual security of elites is most urgent, such as in deeply divided or war-torn societies. We incorporate this expectation into Hypothesis 3 below.

While dispersive powersharing may protect regionally concentrated minorities and improve the responsiveness of local politicians, it typically does not foster mutual security among elites nationally. Moreover, unless complemented by a strong rule of law, it does little to guarantee the rights of minorities within each region. As with inclusive institutions, dispersive powersharing thus provides countervailing incentives for the maintenance of democracy.

We believe constraining institutions positively affect the compliance of winners, losers, and third parties. Constraints provide mutual security to elites and protect groups' core interests by lowering the stakes of elections and limiting opportunities for abuse. Furthermore, unlike inclusive powersharing, we do not expect constraining powersharing to impede democratic legitimacy and accountability.

Predictions

Based on these expectations, we next present predictions for the average effect of each type of powersharing across all countries, then turn to predictions specific to post-conflict societies. In a typical democracy, we expect our compliance conditions to carry roughly equal weight. As argued above, we expect inclusive and dispersive powersharing to have mixed effects on these compliance conditions, whereas we expect that constraining powersharing strongly and positively reinforces compliance by winners, losers, and third parties alike. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *In the full sample of democracies, constraining powersharing positively promotes democratic survival.*

Hypothesis 2: *In the full sample of democracies, constraining powersharing more strongly promotes democratic survival than inclusive or dispersive powersharing.*

Are post-conflict contexts different? Societies that have recently undergone civil conflict often have special and more severe institutional needs. Intense hostility and insecurity, coupled with high uncertainty over the future, encourage the resumption of violent tactics, and political leaders often have easy access to arms and experienced combatants. Therefore, the first two compliance conditions rise in importance compared to societies without recent political violence. In contrast, popular accountability falls in relative importance in the short term.

Because inclusive powersharing particularly favors mutual security, we expect it to have more positive effects in post-conflict settings than elsewhere. This is because inclusive powersharing protects the leaders of minority groups and lessens uncertainty. Further, it centralizes political bargaining, which produces national-level recognition and interaction among opposing groups and facilitates mutual monitoring.[14]

Dispersive powersharing, in contrast, shifts the focus away from national-level politics and tends to isolate contending groups from one another. Mutual isolation may remove ethnic flashpoints but at the same time foster incendiary ethnical appeals. Mutual isolation also means that the leaders of contending groups will have less information about one another and fewer opportunities to build mutual trust. Furthermore, dispersive powersharing fails to guarantee local-level minority rights as it often empowers hostile regional ethnic majorities prone to human rights abuses like ethnic sorting and secession (Sriram and Zahar 2009). Thus, dispersive powersharing may be even riskier in a post-conflict context than otherwise.

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[14] There are also reasons to be wary of post-conflict inclusive powersharing, as it freezes war-time divisions (Horowitz 2003; Jung 2012) and empowers violent actors (Sriram and Zahar 2009). Inclusivity may even encourage violence by excluded groups seeking access to powersharing (Tull and Mehler 2005).

Lastly, the critical role of constraining powersharing in limiting government abuses, improving mutual security, and protecting civil liberties is only magnified in post-conflict situations. This leads us to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *In post-conflict countries, constrained and inclusive powersharing promote democratic survival, whereas dispersive powersharing does not.*

Main Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Data for Main Variables

We begin by describing our measure of democracy, our dependent variable, followed by our main explanatory variables. After discussing some key descriptive statistics, we proceed in the following section to our empirical strategy and control variables.

Democracy. To examine the relationship between powersharing and democracy, we must begin with measures that are mutually distinct. This is non-trivial because broad measures of democracy often include aspects of powersharing, such as executive constraints. We therefore adopt the Boix et al. (2013) definition of electoral democracy, which in turn builds on Dahl's (1971) twin dimensions of participation and contestation, and has no component that taps into powersharing. *Democracy* is coded 1 when the following conditions are met: (1) The executive is directly or indirectly elected, (2) The legislature is freely and fairly elected, and (3) A majority of adult men have the right to vote. It is coded 0 otherwise. This measure, which has been updated to 2010, is conceptually distinct from our powersharing dimensions as it hinges only on free and fair elections.

Powersharing. This paper draws on a new global dataset covering 180 countries from 1975-2010 (citation omitted). A factor analysis of 19 institutional indicators shows that they cluster around the three latent dimensions of *inclusive, dispersive,* and *constraining* powersharing. We use the three indices from this analysis.

Civil War. We capture post-conflict status through the civil war measure from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). *Post-Civil War* equals 1 if a state is currently at

peace but a civil war (with at least 1,000 battle deaths) has occurred within the past 10 years. This characterizes 5.9% of democratic country-years in our sample, including 22 separate democratic spells. To distinguish the effects of powersharing in the post-war context, we interact each type of powersharing with *Post-Civil War.* For robustness, we vary the window from 5 to 15 years. We also employ two alternative measures: One includes smaller civil conflicts that do not reach 1,000 battle deaths, and the other includes states currently experiencing civil war. As discussed below, in some models we also control for characteristics of civil wars.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations between democracy and each type of powersharing. Note that our three powersharing indices are clearly mutually distinct, with the highest pairwise correlation at 0.36. This allows us to include all three in the same model without high multicollinearity. Democracy is positively correlated with dispersive and constraining powersharing. In contrast, inclusive institutions are equally common in democracies and autocracies and only marginally co-vary with other types of powersharing.

Table 2: Cross-Correlations

Variable	Inclusive	Dispersive	Constraining	Democracy
Inclusive Powersharing	1.00			
Dispersive Powersharing	0.07	1.00		
Constraining Powersharing	0.04	0.36	1.00	
Democracy	0.03	0.35	0.48	1.00

Figure 1: Powersharing Over Time

Democracy and powersharing steadily increased in prevalence between 1975 and 2010. To examine the trend specific to each powersharing measure, Figure 1 shows the prevalence of each type of powersharing over time, net of the global annual average of democracy.[15] The full sample (left panel) exhibits a strong upward trend in constraining institutions, especially after the Cold War, with inclusive and dispersive powersharing relatively flat. In post-civil war countries (right panel), inclusive institutions have steadily spread over the past 15 years, whereas constraining and dispersive institutions trend upward throughout the entire period. This is consistent with the adoption of a standardized post-conflict approach by international actors, especially post-Cold War.

Empirical Strategy

To estimate how powersharing affects democratic survival, we run dynamic probit regressions (sometimes called "Markov transition models") on a sample of democracies and test whether current

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[15] Specifically, the figure shows the average residuals from a regression of each powersharing measure on the global average of democracy.

levels of powersharing predict whether a state remains democratic in year $t + 5$. Since we control for *Regime Age* (consecutive years of democracy), these models are a type of duration model.[16]

We use a five-year lag of all independent variables for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the lag reduces the risk that our results are driven by reverse causation. Many regimes institute political reforms in reaction to political crises. Although these reforms may precede breakdown, they are not its causes, but reflections of an existing transition process. We want to avoid including misleading transitional institutions of this type. Second, the five-year lag increases the incidence of democratic breakdown. If we use a one-year lag, breakdown occurs in only 1.5% of our democratic country-years. Using probits for such small likelihoods can cause statistical problems (see King and Zeng 2001) that we avoid by analyzing five-year transition probabilities. Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Boix (2011) adopt a similar five-year panel setup. Because this five-year threshold is somewhat arbitrary, we vary the lags from 3 to 10 years in robustness checks (Figure 4 in the online appendix).

Control Variables

Our primary specifications include standard predictors of democratic development. We control for *GDP/Capita* (logged, in real 2000 dollars, from Haber and Menaldo 2011; World Bank 2011), *GDP Growth* (annual % change in *GDP/Capita*), *Population* (logged, from Heston et al. 2011), and *Fuel Dependence* (% of GDP, from Ross 2013). We expect faster-growing and higher-income countries to be more stable. Although the literature is not unanimous, many suggest that resource wealth has negative effects on democracy. We further control for *Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization* (from Roeder 2001), which is an important potential confounder as it often inspires powersharing arrangements (Roeder 2005; Cederman et al. 2015).

Democratic trajectories may be affected by conditions in surrounding countries, so we control for the *Regional Polity* average (not including the country itself; see below on *Polity*). We also control for *Past Democratic Breakdowns* (total since 1800) and *Regime Age*. We expect newer regimes and those

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[16] Results are also substantively identical controlling for a cubic polynomial of *Regime Age* or adopting a parametric duration model, such as a lognormal or Weibull.

with past breakdowns to be more prone to transition. Lastly, to control for the time period, we include a cubic polynomial of the year.

In further models, we control for *Recent Irregular Turnover* and *Recent Regular Turnover,* which refer to executive turnovers in the previous five years. Regular turnovers are those that follow constitutional procedures, whereas irregular turnovers are extra-legal and generally violent. Data are taken from the Archigos dataset, which we extended from 2004 to 2010 using news sources (Goemans et al. 2009).

In the additional models, we also control for alternative freedom and democracy measures. *Freedom House* is the civil liberties score from the Freedom in the World dataset, which captures the protection of basic rights, such as speech, press, and assembly (Freedom House 2010). This is rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 (with 1 the freest). Although constraining powersharing does not directly include these rights, we expect that it makes their legal provisions more effective. *Horizontal Constraints* measures legislative constraints on the executive (Henisz 2010) and does not overlap with our measure of constraining powersharing. *Polity*, which runs from -10 to 10, is a widely used democracy measure that encompasses political competition and executive constraints (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). When including *Polity*, we add the binary variable *Disruption,* which is drawn from the same dataset and takes the value 1 in cases of foreign intervention or state collapse.[17]

Horizontal Constraints and *Freedom House* are particularly useful controls because democracy is multi-faceted and these variables capture components that fall outside of our dependent variable, which measures only participation and contestation. Controlling for these additional elements increases our confidence that it is powersharing itself, and not some other aspect of the institutional environment, that accounts for the effects we observe. *Polity* does overlap somewhat with our powersharing measures, which should increase standard errors and tilt our findings away from significance. Thus, its inclusion presents a very demanding test of our predictions. Nevertheless, our results are robust to including *Polity*, *Freedom House*, and *Horizontal Constraints*.

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[17] These cases are assigned a 0 on *Polity* but are less stable than other regimes of approximately the same score.

Causal Claims

Great care is needed in the causal interpretation of our empirical findings. Powersharing institutions are not randomly assigned, making tests of their effects prone to omitted variable bias. However, several features of our analysis increase our confidence in the causal nature of our findings, especially relative to prior work. We control for several variables that should be predicted by similar omitted factors, such as *Polity*, *Freedom House*, and *Horizontal Constraints*, and find little variation based on their inclusion. The five-year lag also prevents bias from characteristics of the transition process itself. A sensitivity analysis, using the technique recommended by Oster (2014), also indicates that our results are unlikely to be explained by omitted variables (see fn.20).

Finally, the online appendix includes an instrumental variables analysis. In brief, we use legal origin and British colonial history to instrument for constraining powersharing, as inheritance of an English common law system is widely argued to increase executive constraints. We add geographic size, mountainous terrain, and population density as instruments for dispersive powersharing, as territorial fragmentation is often implemented in response to geographically divided populations. We retain colonial history for predicting dispersive powersharing; this parallels the strategy in Cederman et al. (2015), which uses British colonial history to instrument for decentralization. We do not believe there exists a valid instrument for inclusive powersharing. For both constraining and dispersive powersharing, the instruments are strong predictors of the corresponding powersharing measures and our results regarding their effects on democratic survival are robust to this approach.

Empirical Results

General Results for Democratic Survival

Table 3 displays the general results for democratic survival, with the three models successively adding controls. Our most striking result is the consistently positive effect of constraining powersharing, which is strongly positive for democratic survival both substantively and statistically ($p<0.0001$). For Model 1, with all variables at their means, the five-year likelihood of democratic survival is 93.3%. If we

increase constraining powersharing by one standard deviation, that probability rises to 96.6%—the risk of democratic failure is cut in half. Remarkably, the effect remains significant controlling for *Freedom House*, *Polity*, and *Horizontal Constraints*. In contrast, we estimate a negative effect for dispersive powersharing in each model, which we later show is specific to post-conflict countries. Inclusive powersharing does not have a significant effect. These results strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2.

To further validate our theoretical mechanisms, we estimated separate models for three mutually exhaustive types of democratic breakdown: (1) military coups, (2) self-coups or incumbent abuse, and (3) civil wars or violent protests. Predictions for each breakdown type (separately or with a multinomial logit) confirmed our expectations. Dispersive powersharing strongly predicts breakdown through renewed civil war. Inclusive powersharing protects against self-coups, but not against other breakdowns. Constraining powersharing protects against all breakdown types, especially military coups and civil war, indicating reduced fear among electoral losers and third parties. See the online appendix for more details.

Democratic survival may not be one's only concern, especially in conflictual societies. Specifically, one might also worry about powersharing's consequences for conflict renewal or democratization. If powersharing has countervailing effects on these outcomes, we would have to balance our competing concerns. However, other research shows that the three powersharing dimensions are related to democratization and conflict renewal in a manner highly consistent with their general effects on democratic survival (citations omitted). Specifically, constraining powersharing strongly predicts both continued peace after civil war and democratization (either post-conflict or not), whereas the other two forms are generally non-predictive. There is thus no tradeoff with the effects we find for democratic survival—what is good for peace is also good for democracy.

Looking to the control variables in Table 3, greater fuel dependence and a history of democratic breakdowns jeopardize democratic survival, while more democracy in the region, higher income, and recent regular turnover all support survival. All of these effects are in the expected direction, increasing our confidence that our model is correctly specified. States with greater civil liberties (*Freedom House*) are more likely to remain democratic, but *Horizontal Constraints* has only a modest effect. Surprisingly,

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Polity does not have an independent effect on survival after accounting for *Freedom House, Horizontal Constraints,* and powersharing.

Table 3: Powersharing and Democratic Survival

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusive Powersharing	0.005	0.042	0.061
	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.110)
Dispersive Powersharing	-0.158$^\tau$	-0.206*	-0.167$^\tau$
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.096)
Constraining Powersharing	0.452***	0.371***	0.451***
	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.084)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	-0.274	-0.465$^\tau$	-0.034
	(0.237)	(0.265)	(0.266)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	-0.159*	-0.137*	-0.218***
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.066)
Regional Polity	1.894***	1.803***	1.601***
	(0.347)	(0.360)	(0.400)
Population (logged)	-0.004	0.074	-0.022
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.048)
GDP Per Capita	0.563***	0.416***	0.483***
	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.105)
GDP Growth	0.010	0.008	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Fuel Dependence	-0.019**	-0.016**	-0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.004	-0.006$^\tau$
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Freedom House		2.031***	2.327***
		(0.418)	(0.471)
Horizontal Constraints		0.681$^\tau$	0.323
		(0.412)	(0.442)
Recent Regular Turnover			0.550***
			(0.138)
Recent Irregular Turnover			-0.052
			(0.184)
Polity IV			-0.006
			(0.025)
Disruption			-0.400
			(0.280)
Constant	-4.208***	-5.553***	-4.806***
	(1.135)	(1.252)	(1.339)
Observations	1856	1806	1778
Pseudo R^2	0.309	0.331	0.370

Standard errors in parentheses

Probit models with heteroskedacity-robust standard errors.

All models include controls for non-linear time trends.

$^\tau$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Post-Civil War Settings

We now consider the small, but politically significant, set of democracies recovering from civil war. Table 4 applies the same models as above and adds a dummy for *Post-Civil War* states and interaction terms between this dummy and each type of powersharing. To interpret the coefficients, the base term for each powersharing measure indicates the effect in states without recent conflict. The interaction term indicates the *difference* in effects between post-conflict and other states.

Recall that across our full sample only constraining powersharing has a significantly positive effect on democratic survival. This also holds true in each model for countries without recent conflict. In contrast, the findings for post-conflict countries show significant effects for all three powersharing types.[18] Constraining institutions have an even stronger positive effect on democracy following conflict. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, inclusive powersharing now also has a significantly positive effect. Indeed, within our sample, only two post-civil war democracies with an above-average value of inclusive powersharing have broken down (Lebanon 1976, Pakistan 1999). Holding other variables at their means, shifting constraining powersharing up one standard deviation in a post-civil war democracy raises the five-year likelihood of survival by 12.5%; the equivalent effect for inclusive powersharing is a 14.5% increase (Model 1). We also see a *negative* effect of dispersive powersharing (p<0.00001), for which the equivalent effect is a decrease of 39%. This is a remarkably strong effect that calls into question the common advocacy of ethnic federalism in post-war settlements.

Because the coefficients on interaction terms are cumbersome to interpret, we also present these results graphically. Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities of democratic survival in both post-civil war and other states. The predicted probabilities of survival are on the y-axis and the values of powersharing are on the x-axis.[19] Of special note are the substantively large, and opposite, effects of constraining and dispersive powersharing in post-conflict countries, as well as the contrasting effects of inclusive powersharing in peaceful and post-conflict states.

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[18] The net effects in post-conflict countries (calculated by summing the base and interaction terms) are significant for all three powersharing measures.

[19] These plots are based on Model 1 from Table 4. Other variables are held at their means.

The online appendix displays several robustness checks for these results. As discussed, we vary the window defining post-civil war and also test two alternative post-conflict measures, one lowering the threshold of conflict intensity and one that adds ongoing civil wars. Results are highly consistent across these models. One notable difference is that inclusive powersharing is significantly *negative* for democratic survival in states that are neither post-civil war nor currently experiencing a civil war. This bolsters our view that inclusive powersharing is primarily advisable only in societies plagued by violent conflict. We also control for several civil war characteristics, specifically whether the war was a separatist conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012), whether it resulted in a peace settlement, as opposed to military victory (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), and whether international peacekeepers were involved (Fortna 2008). None of these controls change our main results.[20]

Democratic Survival in Other Challenging Environments

We now investigate the effects of powersharing specific to other sets of "hard cases." We do this for three reasons. First, we want to make sure that our results (especially for constraining powersharing) do not simply reflect the stability of consolidated liberal democracies. This concern is already mitigated by our controls for *Freedom House*, *Polity*, and *Regime Age*, but it deserves further validation. Second, we further support our argument that powersharing's effects vary strongly by context. Third, these relatively fragile states are precisely those in which institutional design decisions are most pressing and where new knowledge can do the most good.

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[20] We also follow Oster (2014) in evaluating the likelihood that omitted variable bias is driving our results through a sensitivity analysis that compares the strength of association that omitted variables would need to explain our results with the strength of association with *observed* controls (implemented via psacalc in Stata). Since the inclusion of our controls actually strengthens the estimated effect of constraining powersharing on democratic survival (*i.e.*, the estimated delta in these tests is negative), the test indicates it is unlikely that omitted variables are driving the effects we estimate.

Table 4: Powersharing, Democracy, and Post-Civil War States

|	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusive Powersharing	-0.075	-0.062	-0.040
	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.112)
Dispersive Powersharing	-0.124	-0.181*	-0.129
	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.111)
Constraining Powersharing	0.422***	0.342***	0.442***
	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.090)
Post-Civil War	-0.010	0.016	0.098
	(0.219)	(0.221)	(0.225)
Inclusive * Post-War	1.199***	1.029**	0.994**
	(0.394)	(0.440)	(0.407)
Dispersive * Post-War	-0.736***	-0.659***	-0.695***
	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.200)
Constraining * Post-War	0.780***	0.883***	0.783***
	(0.277)	(0.285)	(0.292)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	-0.367	-0.514*	-0.093
	(0.260)	(0.284)	(0.287)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	-0.147*	-0.129*	-0.210***
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.071)
Regional Polity	1.880***	1.839***	1.593***
	(0.358)	(0.376)	(0.414)
Population (logged)	0.014	0.088*	-0.018
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.052)
GDP Per Capita	0.560***	0.417***	0.482***
	(0.087)	(0.101)	(0.111)
GDP Growth	0.018	0.018	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Fuel Dependence	-0.017**	-0.016**	-0.020***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Regime Age	-0.001	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Freedom House		2.087***	2.384***
		(0.441)	(0.498)
Horizontal Constraints		0.616	0.332
		(0.442)	(0.476)
Recent Regular Turnover			0.563***
			(0.146)
Recent Irregular Turnover			-0.042
			(0.186)
Polity IV			-0.007
			(0.025)
Disruption			-0.300
			(0.252)
Constant	-4.439***	-5.846***	-4.932***
	(1.196)	(1.338)	(1.427)
Observations	1750	1708	1690
Pseudo R^2	0.338	0.357	0.395

Standard errors in parentheses
Probit models with heteroskedacity-robust standard errors.
All models include controls for non-linear time trends.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

**Figure 2: Effects of Powersharing by Context**

To investigate these hard cases, we run Model 1 from Table 3 on ten different samples, all subsets of the full sample used in Tables 3 and 4. Each sample was chosen to represent a challenging environment for democratic survival. The sample restrictions are as follows: (1) countries within 10 years of a civil war (including ongoing civil wars), (2) countries within 10 years of any internal conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012), (3) countries that have ever experienced an ethnic war (Marshall 2012), (4) country-years in the top 25% of our sample on the State Fragility Index, a measure of state weakness (Marshall and Cole 2014), (5) democracies less than 10 years old, (6) country-years in the bottom 25% of our sample on per-capita income, (7) countries within five years of an economic or financial crisis,[21] (8) countries for which ethnicity is politically relevant (Wimmer et al. 2009), (9) countries in the top 25% of our sample on *Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization*, and (10) country-years in the bottom 25% on the estimated likelihood of democratic survival.[22] The results for each powersharing dimension are pictured in Figure 3 (alongside the full-sample results for comparison), with the full regressions shown in Table 8 in the online appendix.[23]

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[21] We construct this measure using Laeven and Valencia (2008) and the World Financial Development Indicators (Čihák et al. 2012). Data from Graham (2015).

[22] These estimates come from running Model 1 of Table 3 on our democracy sample *without the powersharing measures*, then predicting expected chances of democratic survival for each country-year.

[23] Regression results when adding *Polity*, *Freedom House*, or *Horizontal Constraints* to these models are highly consistent.

Figure 3: Effects of Powersharing in Challenging Environments

Constraining powersharing's positive effects on survival are remarkably robust, predicting survival at the .05 significance level in all 10 "hard case" samples and at the .001 level in 8. The effects are particularly strong for the civil and ethnic war samples (Models 1 and 3). The estimated effects of dispersive powersharing on democratic survival are generally negative, especially in the three conflict samples and after economic crises (Models 1-3 and 7). In countries that have experienced ethnic war, for example, shifting dispersive powersharing up one standard deviation lowers the five-year likelihood of survival from 90.2% (the sample average) to 46.2%. This supports the view that territorial divisions

can foster renewed ethnic polarization and conflict (Downes 2004; Hale 2004). Inclusive powersharing is positive for survival in most samples, but its effect size and significance vary. The estimated effect of inclusive institutions is strongly positive after lower-level internal conflicts and economic crises (Models 2 and 7), as well as in fragile and poor states (Models 4 and 6). However, the effects are negative for young democracies (Model 5) and null for the hard cases estimated in Model 10. In sum, the results demonstrate the consistently positive effect of institutional constraints, whereas the effects of other dimensions of powersharing differ sharply by context.

Conclusion

In this project, we develop a theory on the connection between powersharing and democratic survival, distinguishing three types of powersharing and several political contexts. We exploit new global data: a broad definition of powersharing that captures its institutional diversity, non-overlapping measures of democracy and powersharing, and extensive temporal and geographic coverage. Moreover, because our measures focus heavily on *de jure* institutions, our findings easily lend themselves to recommendations regarding the institutions that best sustain democracy.

We show that constraining powersharing strongly supports democratic survival in all political contexts. Inclusive powersharing may promote democratic survival, but primarily post-civil war. We find no evidence that dispersive powersharing is advantageous for democracy; in fact, it harms democratic survival in post-conflict states. Future research is needed to ascertain whether this effect is due to ethnic federalism, or reflects the inheritance of formal federalism from autocracies without real dispersion of power (such as Nigeria under military rule or the Soviet Union).

Our findings suggest that constraining political institutions should receive greater scholarly attention. A credibly restrained government appears to be the best guarantee of democratic survival. This is further bolstered by the positive effect we find for civil liberties (*Freedom House*). Such constraints are particularly critical for preventing electoral victors from abusing their authority and for persuading electoral losers to accept temporary defeat.

The sharply contrasting findings regarding the effects of inclusive and dispersive powersharing on post-conflict democratic survival highlight the importance of national reconciliation and bargaining in these contexts. In polarized societies, decentralized structures can undermine democratic consolidation by working against national consensus and encouraging ethnic appeals. We should therefore rethink the standard post-conflict reform package promoted by international actors, which emphasizes inclusive and dispersive powersharing (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Our results suggest shifting emphasis toward constraining institutions and away from dispersive powersharing, especially territorial divisions along ethnic lines. Inclusive powersharing can play a positive role, but a highly contingent one and primarily when mutual elite security is an especially pressing concern.

Powersharing and democracy are uneasy allies. Each reflects the ideals of equalizing power and restraining leaders, but they diverge on the priority and scope of electoral responsiveness. The connection from powersharing to democracy is therefore complex and context-dependent. Future work should continue to explore how powersharing can be tailored to specific political circumstances. Although we find strong and robust evidence that constraining powersharing is beneficial, the effects of inclusive and dispersive powersharing are much more conditional. Determining what other political contexts matter is vital for both democratic theory and practice.

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