

IHS Political Science Series
Working Paper 109
April 2006

Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization

Klaus H. Götz



Impressum

Author(s):

Klaus H. Götz

Title:

Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization

ISSN: Unspecified

**2006 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies
(IHS)**

Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien

[E-Mail: office@ihs.ac.at](mailto:office@ihs.ac.at)

Web: www.ihs.ac.at

All IHS Working Papers are available online:

http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/view/ihs_series/

This paper is available for download without charge at:

<https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1703/>

109

Reihe Politikwissenschaft

Political Science Series

Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization

Klaus H. Goetz

109

Reihe Politikwissenschaft

Political Science Series

Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization

Klaus H. Goetz

April 2006

Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

Contact:

Klaus H. Goetz
Universität Potsdam
Lehrstuhl Innenpolitik
Postfach 900 327
D-14439 Potsdam
☎: +49 (0)331 977-3341
email: khgoetz@uni-potsdam.de

Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in Austria. The **Political Science Series** presents research done at the Department of Political Science and aims to share “work in progress” before formal publication. It includes papers by the Department’s teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the content of their contributions.

Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern – dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften in Österreich. Die **Reihe Politikwissenschaft** bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit der Abteilung für Politikwissenschaft und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne Diskussionsbeiträge einer breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. Gastbeiträge werden als solche gekennzeichnet.

Abstract

Non-convergence amongst the EU member states, despite a wide range of integration effects, has come to be accepted as conventional wisdom in the Europeanization debate. This paper takes issue with the stress on non-convergence and makes a case for 'clustered Europeanization'. Clustering is promoted by two variables that have so far received little attention in Europeanization research: territory and temporality. Territory influences Europeanization through (a) 'families of nations' and (b) center-periphery structures in an expanding European political space. Temporality matters, in particular, through the 'relative time of accession', i.e. when countries joined (c) in relation to their domestic political and economic development and (d) in relation to the phase of European integration. While (a) and (c) promote intra-regional commonalities in Europeanization-related domestic variables, (b) and (d) highlight inter-regional differences in the integration experience. This regional distinctness of both domestic and integration variables, in turn, promotes clustered Europeanization.

Zusammenfassung

Ein Großteil der Europäisierungsforschung geht davon aus, dass die europäische Integration trotz weitreichender nationaler Effekte nicht zu einer Konvergenz der Mitgliedstaaten führt. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt diese Sichtweise in Frage und weist auf die Existenz von 'Europäisierungsclustern' hin. Diese Clusterbildung lässt sich auf zwei Faktorbündel zurückführen, die in der einschlägigen Forschung bislang kaum Beachtung gefunden haben: Territorialität und Zeitlichkeit. Territorialität beeinflusst Europäisierung insbesondere durch (a) die Existenz von geographisch definierten „families of nations“ und (b) den Wandel des Verhältnisses zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie in einem sich ausdehnenden europäischen politischen Raum. Zeitlichkeit bezieht sich vor allem auf den Beitrittszeitpunkt eines Landes. Das Muster der nationalen Reaktion auf die europäische Integration wird davon geprägt, (c) welche politischen und ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen zum Zeitpunkt des Beitritts auf der nationalen Ebene vorherrschten und (d) in welcher Phase sich die europäische Integration zum diesem Zeitpunkt befand. Während (a) und (c) dafür verantwortlich sind, dass *binnenstaatliche* Bestimmungsfaktoren der Europäisierung regionenspezifisch verteilt sind, verbinden sich (b) und (d) mit einer wiederum regionenspezifischen Ausprägung *integrationsbezogener* Variablen. Zusammen begünstigten sie das Entstehen spezifischer Europäisierungscluster.

Keywords

Europeanization, convergence, clustered Europeanization

Schlagwörter

Europäisierung, Konvergenz, Europäisierungscluster

General note on content

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the IHS
Department of Political Science

Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. Beyond Non-Convergence: The Case for Clustered Europeanization..... | 1 |
| 2. Territory: Families of Nations and Center-Periphery Relations..... | 2 |
| 3. Temporality: The Relative Time of Accession..... | 6 |
| 4. Evidence of Clustering..... | 8 |
| 5. Conclusion: Territory beyond State Boundaries..... | 13 |
| References..... | 15 |

1. Beyond Non-Convergence: The Case for Clustered Europeanization

Non-convergence amongst the EU member states, despite a wide range of integration effects, has come to be accepted as conventional wisdom in the Europeanization debate. This literature follows in the footsteps of the work by Héritier et al. (2001), who highlighted 'differential responses to European policies' and tried to solve the puzzle of why 'members states' policies (...) respond so differently to identical European policy demands and similar external and internal conditions' (p. 257). One of the key findings of Wessels et al.'s (2003: xv) research on institutional reactions to integration at the national level in the EU-15 is 'that of non-convergence amongst the Member States (...). Traditional national models are resistant and apparently flexible enough to induce complacency about one's own performance'. In a similar vein, Page (2003: 163) has argued that 'domestic politico-administrative systems do adapt their systems so that Europeanization as impact can remain high while producing little by way of Europeanization as homogenization'. Kassim (2000; 2003), in summarizing research on the central national coordination of EU policy, notes 'Although not insignificant, the similarities between the coordination systems created by the member states are overshadowed by the differences that emerge from detailed inspection' (2003: 91). Finally, a major comparative study on the 'Europeanization of national environmental policy' (Jordan/Liefferink 2005), covering ten member states, concludes that evidence for convergence towards a single model is lacking and that policy styles and structures, in particular, continue to diverge.

As Héritier et al. (2001) noted in their study, this finding is puzzling. European integration is not a 'weak variable', in that most contributions associate it with major substantive effects; but it does not appear to drive public policy, and still less domestic political institutions and processes – polity and politics – in any particular direction. The basic reasons for the apparently highly variegated patterns of effects provided by the Europeanization literature can be summarized quite briefly. First, the domestic starting conditions from which the European effects make themselves felt and domestic 'intervening' or 'facilitating' variables that have a decisive influence on Europeanization trajectories vary enormously. (Relevant analyses have covered a wide array of country-specific political, institutional and policy factors and range from macro-analyses, such as Vivien Schmidt's (2006) distinction between 'simple' and 'compound' polities, to very fine-grained reconstructions of case-specific institutional, actor and policy constellations.) Second, the manner in which different member states relate to the EU, e.g., in terms of their 'uploading capacities' varies enormously. In the face of this diversity in starting conditions and domestic and integration-related variables, EU integration does not produce major convergence.

This article questions the predominant stress on non-convergence and makes a case for ‘clustered Europeanization’, i.e. the existence of multi-country groupings that are characterized by high levels of intra-regional commonality and inter-regional differences in both substance and modes of Europeanization. This clustering is promoted by two variables that have so far received little attention in Europeanization research: territory and temporality. Territory influences Europeanization primarily through (a) ‘families of nation’ and (b) center-periphery structures in an expanding European political space. Temporality matters, in particular, through the time of accession (c) in relation to domestic political and economic development and (d) in relation to the phase of European integration. While (a) and (c) are associated with, and further promote, intra-regional commonalities in Europeanization-related domestic variables, (b) and (d) highlight inter-regional differences in the integration experience (see Figure 1). Territory and temporality are not, therefore, alternatives to domestic and integration-related explanations of Europeanization. Rather, once we consider territory and temporality systematically, it becomes clear that domestic variables and integration patterns are not distributed randomly across Europe, but do, in fact, follow a fairly clear pattern, promoting clustered Europeanization.

Figure 1: Territory, Temporality and Commonality in Explanatory Variables

| | Territory | Temporality |
|---|--------------------------------|--|
| Commonality in domestic variables | (a) ‘families of nation’ | (c) time of accession in relation to domestic development |
| Commonality in integration-related variables | (b) center-periphery relations | (d) time of accession in relation to the phase of European integration |

2. Territory: Families of Nations and Center-Periphery Relations

The impact of European integration on the territorial structuring of politics and territoriality as a fundamental ordering principle of political life embodied in the modern nation-state is at the heart of a vigorous debate in International Relations and Comparative Politics (Ansell/di Palma 2004; Bartolini 2004; 2005). At first sight, this debate is only loosely connected to the

Europeanization literature. Of course, students of Europeanization have inquired into the links between integration and multi-level governance. But issues about the broader territorial restructuring of the European political space have largely been left to those who work on integration and transnationalization, whereas the empirical focus of the Europeanization literature is the individual member state. Similarly, the dominant explanations for patterns of Europeanization focus on the individual member states, with an emphasis, as already noted, on country-specific starting conditions and domestic variables and the manner in which individual countries relate to the EU. There is, however, a strong territorial dimension to these variables, which, in turn, encourages clustered Europeanization. Two types of explanations from which Europeanization research may draw inspiration are worth highlighting: the notion of ‘families of nations’ (Castles 1993) and associated debates, which draw attention to shared domestic characteristics across borders, how they might have come about and how they are maintained and strengthened over time; and arguments about center-periphery dynamics in the process of European integration, which take their principal clues from the work of Rokkan (1999).

The ‘families of nations’ notion suggests that domestic variables that may affect patterns of Europeanization – be they institutional, ideational, ideological, actor- or policy-related – are not distributed randomly amongst countries, but are likely to show cross-regional variation. As initially set out by Castles (1993), the notion has three components: first, ‘that it may be possible to identify distinct *families of nations*, defined in terms of shared geographical, linguistic, cultural and/or historical attributes’ (xiii); second, that processes of cross-national ‘transmission and diffusion’ are critical to establishing and perpetuating these commonalities; and, third, that families of nations matter for public policy profiles to the extent that ‘the commonalities of policy outcomes that characterize groupings of nations could be explained, in whole or in part, by common ideas, common customs and common institutions transmitted from the past’ (xvi).

What can be gained from these ideas for the analysis of Europeanization? The first proposition is probably the least contentious and although ‘family membership’ need not necessarily imply spatial proximity, there is often an element of a shared geographical space that underlies comparative institutional and policy analysis, as, e.g., in the debate on ‘worlds of welfare’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). Successive enlargements of the EU have, of course, followed a path that coincides quite closely, although by no means perfectly, with the most commonly employed distinction between a continental Western Europe, Anglo-Saxon Europe, Southern Europe, the Nordic region, and Central and Eastern Europe. If one accepts that these are more than purely geographical labels, then more or less distinct groups of nations have joined the integration process at particular stages of the integration project. At least the *initial* patterns of Europeanization are, accordingly, also likely to be distinct, reflecting, on the one hand, a ‘family-typical’ set of domestic circumstances and, on the other, cross-temporal variation in what integration implied at the time of joining (see below.).

The second proposition concerning the establishment and perpetuation of families resonates with a number of common themes in the study of Europeanization, notably what is now variously discussed under the labels of policy transfer, diffusion, cross-border policy learning and 'horizontal' Europeanization (for reviews see Knill 2005; Holzinger/Knill 2005). The basic argument is that such cross-border linkages and exchanges are likely to be most intense in cases where common lineage, affinity, partnerships, i.e. 'unions of deliberate coordination' (Therborn 1993: 329), and a shared space coincide. European integration is not only associated with stimulating such cross-border exchanges; rather, in doing so, it may act to maintain, enhance or even help to (re-)create family ties, and, thus, promote rather than challenge regional distinctness.

The third proposition, too, is readily compatible with the dominant approach to the definition of domestic explanatory variables in Europeanization research, with its orientation towards interests, institutions, ideas and identities. It does, however, underline that the chief explanatory variables commonly employed may themselves be the result of historical experiences of 'integration' of a different kind, and, as such, have an important conditioning effect on the degree of the cross-regional 'differential impact' one is likely to find.

Whereas the notion of 'families of nations' and related concepts help to give a regional dimension to what otherwise appear as country-specific, domestic explanations, attention to EU-wide center-periphery structures points to a decisive territorial dimension of integration and, potentially, Europeanization. Most recent discussions of 'center' (or core) and 'periphery' take their clues from the work of Rokkan (1999), who considered center-periphery relations within the context of his analysis of political system building, with a focus on state-formation and nation-building. For Rokkan, territorial centers come in three different types – military-administrative, economic and cultural – making them into 'privileged locations' within the territory (Rokkan 1999: 110ff.). The 'key characteristics of peripheries are (...) distance, difference, and dependence' (115). A periphery 'is located at some distance from the dominant center or centers', it possesses 'some minimum level and sense of separate identity'; and it depends on the center in one or more of the following: 'in political decision-making, in cultural standardization, and in economic life' (ibid.: 115). Rokkan was interested both in the role of centers and peripheries *within* states; and in center-periphery structures *across* Europe (Rokkan 1999: 191ff.).

With a focus on the latter, the issue of prime concern in the present context is the extent to which territorial differentiation within the European Union can be understood in terms of center-periphery relations. Discussions of Southern Europe and, more recently, Central and Eastern Europe are often couched in terms of dependency and distinctness (with advances in transport and communication, physical distance may lose some of its former marker status). For example, Featherstone and Kazamias's (2001: 2) comparative analysis of Europeanization in Southern and Mediterranean Europe argues that it can be identified as an EU "periphery" in terms of a number of predominant traits', which include, inter alia,

'economic inequality', 'the historically distinctive mode of the region's economic development', 'financial dependence on EU aid', and 'the lesser bargaining strength of the "south" in EU treaty negotiations' (ibid.: 2). Similarly, power asymmetries between the dominant EU member states and the new members of CEE have often been noted, as has their cultural distinctness and relative economic backwardness. Fractious or broken 'family ties' may reinforce these aspects of peripherality. Helen Wallace (2001), highlighting the relative neglect of the territorial – compared to the functional and affiliational – dimension in accounts of integration, contrasts Western and Eastern European experiences. Whilst in Western Europe the mutual reinforcement of functional, affiliational and territorial linkages have resulted in a 'distinctive pattern of integration: multi-framework, multi-layer, multi-lateral and multi-purpose' (p. 12), in Central and Eastern Europe we find 'a segmented history, followed by recent attempts to define European engagement by achieving incorporation within the west European-defined transnational system. This move 'towards' western Europe is now beginning, but only beginning, to be flanked by more local patterns of linkage. There are also tragic instances of de-linkage where (joint functions) task, territory and (affiliation) trust are all contested' (ibid.: 11).

Much also tends to be made of the fact that, with the exception of Poland, the new EU members are small or very small states. This fact may accentuate their peripherality in terms of dependence and further encourage a distinct pattern of Europeanization (Soetendorp and Hanf 1998). All of this suggests that peripherality combined with small country status may make for differentiation in patterns of Europeanization that is, again, not just country-specific, but region-specific. The same applies to territorially-based groups of countries that share center characteristics.

The notion of 'families of nation' and attention to center-periphery structures provide analytical lenses that may help to account for EU-wide regional clustering of substantive and modal patterns of Europeanization. In employing them, we need, however, to be sensitive to the malleability of family ties and center-periphery structures. As Therborn (1993: 329) has pointed out, 'families of nations' come in different forms, based on common descent or lineage; consisting of 'separated siblings' or 'kindred nations'; affinity groups; or partnerships, as 'unions of deliberate coordination'. Some of these are constituted by historical developments that cannot be undone (but may be reinterpreted); others, notably affinity groups and partnerships, may be constituted, reconstituted and dissolved by design or by default. Put differently, while 'families of nations' may have explanatory power, they are a dynamic explanans, which is itself highly susceptible to the process of European integration. Thus, it is important to pay attention to how forms of interstate cooperation and coordination change over time and how integration itself impacts on the family patterns; it is also important to recognize that individual countries may well belong to several groupings at the same time. Italy, as both a founder member and a Southern European country, is a case in point.

EU integration itself is, of course, unthinkable without intensive bilateral and multilateral territorially-based cooperation and coordination. It may be of long-standing, such as the Franco-German partnership, or of more recent origin, such as the Visegrad Group – consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – focused on ‘regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region’ (Visegrad Declaration of 2004). While in some cases, bilateral and multilateral linkages serve to facilitate cooperation and coordination across a range of arenas and policy issues, others are more narrowly defined in purpose. In short, the impact of families of nations on patterns of Europeanization can be expected to vary significantly over time, across the European space, and across policy domains.

Center-periphery structures have likewise to be understood as a dynamic variable and, again, European integration is an important motor of change (Bartolini 2005). It is, of course, an open question whether Europe-wide structures of territorial difference and dependence – two of the three key characteristics of peripheries suggested by Rokkan – are reinforced or ameliorated by integration. This question has, e.g., been discussed with reference to the rationale and effects of European regional and cohesion policy, which is often interpreted as a compensation mechanism for EU policies that tend to privilege the center (Allen 2005). Similarly, distance, the third criterion, is affected, not so much in a strictly geographical sense, although the emergence of new centers may affect this aspect, too, but rather as a result of the growing porousness of political, economic and cultural borders and improved transport and communication. What seems broadly accepted is that EU economic disparities had decreased prior to the accession of the ten new member states (Commission of the European Communities 2005) and that some countries, perhaps most notably Ireland, have, in the process, shed central defining traits of their former peripheral status. When we look at differentiation in the Europeanization experience of multi-country grouping we are, then, shooting at a moving target and key explanations for variation are, themselves, dynamic rather than static.

3. Temporality: The Relative Time of Accession

In shaping patterns of Europeanization, territory interacts with temporality. In the present context, the time of accession to the European Union in relation to, first, domestic development and, second, the phase of integration at the time of joining the EU are of special importance. The basic proposition advanced here is simple: successive enlargements have followed a fairly clear regional pattern, integrating groups of countries that already shared many important political and socio-economic characteristics. Their Europeanization experience is likely to have reinforced this distinctness for two main reasons. First, whilst Europeanization interacted strongly with democratization and socio-economic modernization in some cases, it did not do so in others; second, regionally-based, multi-country groupings joined the EU at distinct phases of European integration. Even if one

allows for the fact that early patterns of Europeanization may follow a 'logic of reversibility' (Goetz 2005), one would expect to see signs of path-dependence in later Europeanization trajectories.

The 'relative time of accession' has received special attention in the case of the Southern European enlargement of the 1980s. Accounts of the Southern Europeanization experience routinely note the interaction between integration, post-authoritarian democratization and socio-economic modernization, which has been present in the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish cases (Featherstone/Kazamias 2001; Pinto/Teixeira 2002; Royo/Manuel 2003). In Central and Eastern Europe, these processes are, likewise, closely entangled (Dimitrova 2004; Pridham 2005). This coincidence, or, conversely, its absence, has ambiguous consequences. Countries emerging from authoritarian dictatorship face a greater adaptive challenge on their path towards the EU than consolidated democracies; where democratization goes hand in hand with a transformation of the economy, as has been the case in Central and Eastern Europe, adaptive pressures will be further heightened. The likelihood of 'misfits' has increased over time, as 'democratic conditionality' has moved center stage (Grabbe 2003; 2005) and the political and economic *acquis* of the EU has expanded and deepened. The hurdles to accession have been raised considerably between the Southern enlargements of the 1980s and the CEE enlargements of the 2000s, as has been the insistence of existing member states to impose major costs of adaptation on prospective new members *prior* to accession. Countries in which Europeanization, democratization and economic liberalization closely interact are also more likely find themselves in the position of policy takers rather than policy shapers, not least because they lack the strong domestic institutional foundations of consolidated democracies. This is also one of the reasons why the participation of organized interests and civil society in the shaping of European policy is limited (Ágh 2004). Adaptive pressures and a strong orientation towards 'policy-taking' take place in the context of still malleable domestic institutions. Put differently, the European project does not encounter a set of historically validated and deeply entrenched domestic political institutions. Under these circumstances, 'Europe' can become a decisive ideational reference point both for domestic reform and in the quest for the legitimation of the newly established domestic institutions. This contribution is critical in shifting the balance between the costs and benefits of Europeanization decisively in favor of the later.

Where integration does not coincide with democratization and liberalization, the pressures for adaptation are likely to be much lower, but domestic institutional and policy inertia will be higher. Mature liberal democracies with developed market economies have no problems meeting the EU's democracy criteria and will face only moderate 'misfit' in EU regulatory policies. Joining the EU with a consolidated set of domestic institutions, countries such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden or the UK were well-placed to take on the role of policy-shapers, further reducing misfit pressures. Moreover, building on national traditions of the participation of interest and civil society groups in public policy-making, domestic EU policy-making is set

to follow a more pluralist pattern. At the same time, however, gains from EU membership in terms of democracy are absent and Europe as an ideational reference point in domestic political discourse features less prominently. In the absence of a contribution of EU membership to democracy, any cost-benefit calculation is skewed towards the regulatory dimension.

These brief remarks already underline that there is a second key aspect to the ‘relative time’ of accession, which concerns the phase of integration during which groups of countries join. That length of membership matters both in terms of substantive effects – their configuration and their depth – and in modes and processes of Europeanization – strategic adaptation versus socialization and learning (Börzel/Risse 2003) – seems uncontroversial. The point to be emphasized here is that early Europeanization effects, reflecting, in part, the nature of the EU at the time of joining, are likely to create path dependencies that influence Europeanization trajectories over time. For example, countries that joined the EU at a time when ‘integration through law’ was the predominant form of EU policy-making, might find it more difficult to reorient their domestic arrangements towards new governance instruments than those that have had to confront a more diverse policy repertoire from the beginning. Similarly, countries that joined the EU at a time when the domestic costs of integration could be cushioned by large transfer payments are likely to develop different patterns of domestic mobilization than those in which early adaptational costs remain largely uncompensated.

4. Evidence of Clustering

The preceding discussion has argued that territory and temporality help to account for intra-regional commonalities in domestic variables and inter-regional differences in integration-related variables that shape the domestic effects of European integration and, thus, promote clustered Europeanization. Yet, establishing the existence of such clusters, encompassing several countries, is less straightforward than the by-now sizeable collection of Europeanization studies might suggest. As with the bulk of work in comparative European politics, single-country studies (much of this work is reviewed and summarized in Bulmer/Lequesne 2005) or edited collections based on country-by-country chapters predominate. Systematically comparative work is rare and is typically restricted to no more than three or four countries; comparative work with a larger number of cases is very scarce (but see Anderson 2002). Much of what we know in empirical terms about *national* trajectories of Europeanization along the dimensions of polity, politics and public policy focuses on the North-Western core of the founder members of the Communities – France, Germany and the Benelux countries –, on the United Kingdom, and on the Nordic countries. This concentration is not difficult to explain. As founder members, the North-Western states do, of course, have the longest experience of an active engagement with the integration process; as such, they are also likely to have been most deeply and enduringly Europeanized. Likewise, Europeanization in both the UK and the Nordic states – including Norway as a non-member

state – has long been subject to sustained scholarly attention, not least because the integration process and its effects on domestic political systems have been fiercely contested there in the political realm.

By contrast, in the cases of the states that joined the EU during the Southern enlargements of the 1980s and, in particular, the ten new member states that acceded to the EU in 2004, the systematic opening of their political systems to the EU has begun much more recently. For the latter group of countries, including eight Central and Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus, our knowledge is, by necessity, still largely limited to the ‘anticipatory and adaptive’ Europeanization (Ágh 2003) prior to accession. However, both Southern Europe and, perhaps even more so, Central and Eastern Europe are increasingly moving from the margins to the center of Europeanization research, as a crop of recent studies shows. In the case of the Southern countries, this takes the form of a reassessment of the role of the Southern member states in the European project and of the extent to which EU membership has remolded the political systems of the European south (see, e.g., Featherstone/Kazamias 2001; Pinto/Teixeira 2002; Royo/Manuel 2003). As regards the new Central and Eastern European states, there is a wave of recent research that charts the influence of integration on institutional and policy development in the region (e.g., Ágh 2005; Andonova 2004; Dimitrova 2004; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudová 2005); further research work is under way. All of this means that the stock of studies on which cross-country comparative work can draw – including long-standing members, recent members, would-be members, and the few remaining outsiders – is growing rapidly.

There are, then, many pieces that may help to form a European-wide mosaic; but if we take a step back, does a pattern of regional differentiation in Europeanization emerge that amounts to more than a random patchwork of cross-country differences? As noted at the outset, inquiring into clustered commonalities not only runs counter to the main theme of ‘non-convergence’; it has also been argued that the search for broader regional patterns is in danger of perpetuating outmoded historical notions. This point has, for example, been put forcefully by Closa and Heywood (2004: 240) in their study of Spain’s membership in the EU, which adopts a Europeanization perspective. Thus, ‘the argument presented in this study calls into question the continued analytical utility of notions such as ‘Mediterranean Europe’, or the idea that Southern Europe should be seen as distinctive (apart from the obvious fact of geographical location)’. Instead, ‘comparative studies of the EU and its member states should be built around robust classificatory principles, rather than rely on potentially flawed categories derived from historical developments and trajectories’.

Not everybody takes such a skeptical view, of course. Work that is focused on intra-regional comparisons appears to be attractive to scholars, be it, as already mentioned, on Southern and Central and Eastern Europe, or on the Nordic region (e.g., Dosenrode/Halkier 2004; Egeberg 2005; Ingebritsen 1998; Jacobssen et al. 2003; Miles 1996). It is true that in these studies, a degree of regional commonality is typically taken as given (and provides a

reference point for the discussion of individual country experiences), but in some the aim is primarily to establish how much commonality there really is (e.g., Featherstone/Kazamias 2001).

For present purposes it is interesting to note that regionally focused comparative analyses tend to suggest a greater degree of clustered commonality in Europeanization experiences than the advocates of cross-country diversity and non-convergence would lead us to expect. This becomes clear if we look at both the substantive Europeanization profile and the modes of Europeanization in the Nordic region, Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. As regards the Nordic states, with the partial exception of Finland, there is intense political contestation over Europe and evidence of a major European effect on electoral behavior and party system dynamics (Jenssen et al. 1998; Sitter 2001). At the same time, in policy terms, the Nordic states are set apart from the rest of Europe as model implementers (Sverdrup 2004). The 'world of law observance', identified by Falkner et al. (2005) in their research on 'complying with Europe', is exclusively populated by Nordic member states. But with both Denmark and Sweden outside the Euro zone, they show a pattern of differential membership. On the institutional side, observers have noted how integration has further promoted cooperation within the region (Egeberg 2005) and the transnationalization of national governments (Jacobssen et al. 2003).

The arguments about the effects of territory and temporality developed above help to account for these patterns. Thus, the Nordic states have a long history of intensive cooperation and common policy legacies preceding their intensive engagement with European integration (as is, e.g., shown in Esping-Andersen's (1993) work on 'worlds of welfare capitalism'); it is in line with the 'families of nations' argument that integration should have strengthened rather than weakened these ties. The 'relative time' of accession has been especially important in the Nordic context as the Nordic states have engaged with the EU as mature democracies with developed market economies. This has meant that they have had the institutional capacities to implement European law; that they were able to upload their preferences effectively; and that the 'misfit' between the EU's market making and regulating legislation and domestic economic governance was, on the whole, limited. At the same time, however, there was no 'democratic' payoff for the Nordic states from joining the EU, as linkages between integration and democratization were non-existent.

The Southern region offers almost a mirror image of the Nordic scenario: it now stands out in Europe for the virtual absence of popular-based or party-based Euroscepticism (Taggart 1998), but the lack of substantial contestation over integration in Portugal, Spain and Greece has not translated into a correspondent capacity to comply with the requirements of membership. Thus, both Portugal and Greece belong to what Falkner et al. (2005) call the 'world of neglect' in compliance with EU law, although it should be noted that Spain's record is better in this respect and that implementation records are not uncontroversial (Börzel 2003; Falkner et al. 2005: 317ff). On the institutional side, Featherstone and Kazamias's

(2001: 13) comparative exploration has highlighted 'dynamism, asymmetry and fragmentation' as key substantive attributes of the Southern Europeanization experience; these effects, are, e.g., visible in the organization of their core executives. Evidence of markedly increased co-operation amongst the Mediterranean countries in the wake of accession is lacking.

Territory and temporality do, again, help to account for these patterns. In the Southern European case, the explanatory power of 'families of nations' is more limited than in the Nordic case, for whilst there is evidence of commonalities in aspects of state organization (Sotiropoulos 2004) or public policy profiles, the intensity of co-operative ties is lower. By contrast, the second dimension of territoriality highlighted above – center-periphery relations – is of special relevance and its importance has been reinforced by the Southern countries' relative time of accession. Briefly, at least at the time of joining, Greece, Portugal and Spain were in a position of economic backwardness in relation to the Western European founder members; 'dependency', one of the key criteria of peripherality as set out by Rokkan, was not only acknowledged in the form of transfer payments from the center – EU regional, structural and cohesion funding – but, arguably, reinforced. But the countries joined at a stage in EU development when the 'core' was both able and willing to shoulder much of the costs of domestic adaptation. Early Europeanization was further aided by the temporal coincidence between integration and domestic democratic consolidation, with EU membership widely seen as an aid to, if not a guarantee of, the consolidation of democratic regime change; early opposition to EU membership, thus, quickly gave way to unconditional support. At the same time, however, all three countries joined at a time when domestic core executives capable of the effective 'uploading' of domestic preferences to the EU level were only beginning to take shape (thus increasing the likelihood of 'policy misfits'); when institutional capacities for the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* were underdeveloped; and when organized civil society was weak. As already briefly indicated, recent research on Europeanization in Southern Europe suggests that these conditions at the time of joining the EU have had a long-term impact not only in terms of persistent compliance problems, but also in fostering elite-centered Europeanization. For example, an investigation into the 'mobilizing' effects of the EU Convention in Southern Europe has noted that 'the potential in terms of discourse and more generally mobilization around issues raised by the Convention was higher than in other areas of the EU' (ibid.), mainly because 'Europe has always been a fundamental actor in domestic processes of democratization, modernization, and policy change in Southern Europe'. Yet, the project found that 'social mobilization was limited and often 'absorbed' by party politics (...) there was far less social participation than expected' (ibid.: 21).

Turning to the new Central and Eastern EU member states, Euroscepticism appears rife – it is by no means restricted to Poland (Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004) – and, not surprisingly, there are many question marks over their implementation capacity. Full EMU membership, at first eagerly desired by the new members, has, by now, become at best a long-term aspiration for

most. In terms of institutional effects, Europeanization has been associated with centralization and the creation of 'islands of excellence' in public administration (Lippert/Umbach 2005), a development aided by the preference of both the Commission and the old member states for dealing with a small number of privileged interlocutors during the accession negotiations.

At first sight, evidence of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe seems to run counter to the argument developed above, namely that where integration and democratization coincide, persistent Eurosceptic politics are unlikely to take root. Yet, there are at least three factors that distinguish the Central and Eastern Europe case from the Southern cluster. First, the time lag between initial regime change and eventual accession has been much longer in the case of the most recent enlargement; put simply, accession came too late to be ideationally closely associated with successful democratic consolidation. Second, the costs of domestic adaptation were higher in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, partly because the *acquis* had, of course, grown enormously since the 1980s, and partly because the EU insisted on the full implementation of the *acquis* (with the exception of some temporary derogations) prior to accession. Third, the old member states were less willing to compensate the new CEE members for their domestic adaptational costs through transfer payments both prior to accession and in the post-accession phase. As a consequence, in percentage terms, the EU contribution to the GDP of the new CEE members remains much lower than has been the case in Southern Europe.

The impression of CEE distinctness is further reinforced if we look at the second central dimension of differentiation, i.e. modes of Europeanization. In fact, it is in this respect that evidence of interregional differentiation is most compelling. In this regard, two issues, in particular, have been broadly debated in recent years: the extent to which Europeanization involves societal mobilization, i.e. 'usage of Europe' (Jacquot/Woll 2003; 2004) beyond the confines of state institutions; and the importance of conditionalities in shaping domestic responses to EU accession. The Central and Eastern European experience stands out when it comes to the role played by conditionalities. The impact of conditionalities on shaping post-Communist institutional and policy development and pre-accession Europeanization has been extensively debated (see, e.g., Grabbe 2003; 2006; Hughes et al. 2004a; 2004b; Smith 2003; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004; 2005), although, predictably, the outcome of this debate has been inconclusive. Some contributions stress the importance of conditionalities as a key component of the 'external governance' to which the countries of CEE have been subjected (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004; 2005); others note the obstacles to the external direction of domestic change, be it in territorial organization and regional policy (Brusis 2002; Hughes et al. 2004a; 2004b) or budgetary policy (Dimitrov/Goetz/Wollmann 2006). What can scarcely be doubted is that the EU approach to accession has been more coercive than in previous enlargement rounds.

Modes of Europeanization do not just matter in their own right, but because they influence the substantive institutional, policy and political effects of accession. In Central and Eastern Europe, Europeanization could have been expected to have been more immediate than in other parts of the EU (Grabbe 2001; Goetz 2005). Oft-cited reasons include, *inter alia*, the weakness of institutional ‘cores’ in the post-Communist states – notably those that only came into being after the fall of Communism – which are less likely to offer resistance to ‘adaptive pressures’ than the deeply embedded state institutions of Western Europe; evident crises of performance and legitimacy of domestic institutions, which encourage policy transfer and learning from foreign experiences; and the existence of institutional and policy ‘voids’, so that Europeanization involves not so much adaptation, but rather the *ab ovo* creation of new actors, institutions and policies. On the other hand, there are equally good arguments to suggest that Europeanization effects, whilst more immediate, may also be less profound and that patterns of ‘institutionalization for reversibility’ prevail. Thus, the new members had little incentive to invest in ‘deep’ Europeanization that would ‘lock in’ specific institutional and policy arrangements prior to full membership precisely because of their weak uploading capacity as *demandeurs*. They could hope that, as full members, they would be able to challenge, or escape altogether, some of the constrictions that a negotiation process that was structured to favor the existing members had imposed on them. Moreover, processes of socialization and learning that would lend depth and durability to Europeanization and could support and complement consequentialist institutional and policy adaptation will take time.

In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, too, then, territory and temporality have mattered. The relative time of accession meant that EU membership imposed major adaptive costs on the new Central and Eastern European member states – not least because of an extended official and unofficial *acquis*, without the cushion provided by extensive transfer payments, as in the case of the Southern enlargement. ‘Families of nations’ have mattered here in the form of the common inheritance of Communism and commonalities in the challenges of democratic regime change that these countries have encountered. Peripherality, combined with small country status (with the exception of Poland), has further encouraged a top-down mode of Europeanization.

5. Conclusion: Territory beyond State Boundaries

This paper has sought to make a case for clustered convergence in patterns of Europeanization, i.e. the existence of regionally-based multi-country groupings that share a common Europeanization experience and has illustrated the importance of territory and temporality in explaining this clustering with reference to the Nordic countries, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, this argument is open to challenges both on empirical and theoretical grounds. For example, should Italy be considered part of the Southern cluster? It is often included in analyses of the Southern European experience of integration and Europeanization, but it is, of course, a founder member state, and, thus,

differs on at least one important variable, the time of accession relative to the stage of European integration. Perhaps more importantly, do the founder members, as our discussion would imply, in themselves constitute a distinct cluster in terms of both substantive polity, politics and policy effects and modes of Europeanization? Theoretically, even if one acknowledges the importance of territory and temporality in principle, it is clear that much more detailed analysis is required to trace the chain of causation from these factors through their impact on domestic and integration-related variables to patterns of Europeanization. The argument presented here is, thus, primarily intended to stimulate research and reflection.

But are country groupings the appropriate unit of analysis? Considering this question leads us to broader issues about the study of Europeanization and its limitations. Challenges to territoriality as an ordering principle of the modern polity, in which the four key dimensions of control over resources, the rule of law and sovereignty, legitimation, and welfare provision coincided and reinforced each other within the framework of the modern nation-state (Zürn/Leibfried 2005), are now widely regarded as undermining the classical nation-state model. Di Palma (2004: 259) argues with reference to Ruggie's argument (1993) about the 'unbundling of territoriality' in the context of the European project,

'to unbundle territoriality means to recompose and rebundle it. It means to recognize the presence, in the political space below and beyond the state, of a variety of territorially relevant collective actors: some private, some public and legal (or indeed illegal), some constitutionalized (...) in some ways, the multiplicity of actors subtracts from the centrality of the national state. In other ways, it involves a repositioning of the state and the emergence of new state tasks'.

Based on central tenets of Rokkan's work, Bartolini (2005) has recently analyzed European integration as 'the formation of an enlarged territorial system', revolving around center formation, system building and political structuring. Yet, with its focus on changes *within* the 'container' (Taylor 1994) of the nation-state, the analytical lens of Europeanization is, arguably, not especially well placed to capture and explain the transformation of governance between and amongst member states. We find references to 'horizontal' Europeanization, but that tends to be associated with non-hierarchical mechanisms of domestic Europeanization such as cross-border policy transfer, learning and diffusion (Radaelli 2003: 4), and not the constitution of a transnational policy space. It follows from this that the search for clusters of Europeanization, and especially their historical evolution, may well need to take country borders as its starting point; but as the European integration process progresses, the relevance of these borders in producing distinct Europeanization profiles becomes more doubtful. This is not to argue that we should focus on sectoral patterns of Europeanization at the expense of examining broader territorial patterns; but these distinct territorial patterns are increasingly less likely to coincide more or less neatly with state boundaries.

References

- Ágh, A. (2003) *Anticipatory and Adaptive Europeanization in Hungary* (Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies).
- Allen, D. (2005) 'Cohesion and Structural Funds: Competing Pressures for Reform?', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack (eds.) *Policy-making in the European Union*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 213-241.
- Andonova, L. (2004) *Transnational Politics of the Environment: The European Union and Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
- Ansell, C. K. and di Palma, G. (eds.) (2004) *Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Anderson, J. J. (2002) 'Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (5), pp. 793-822.
- Bartolini, S. (2004) 'Old and New Peripheries in the Processes of European Territorial Integration', in C. K. Ansell and G. di Palma (eds.) *Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 19-44.
- Bartolini, S. (2005) *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Börzel, T. A. (2003) *Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why there is (Not) a Southern Problem* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2003) 'Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.) *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 57- 80.
- Brusis, M. (2002) 'Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', *Governance* 15 (4), pp. 531-559.
- Bulmer, S. and Lequesne, C. (eds.) (2005) *The Member States of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Castles, Francis G. (1993) 'Introduction', in idem (ed.) *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies* (Aldershot: Dartmouth), pp. xiii-xxiii.
- Closa, C. and Heywood, P. M. (2004) *Spain and the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Commission of the European Communities (2005) *Third Progress Report on Cohesion*, COM(2005) 192 final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities).

- Dimitrov, V., Goetz, K. H., and Wollmann, H. (2006) *Governing after Communism: Institutions and Policy-Making* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).
- Dimitrova, A. L. (ed.) (2004) *Driven to Change. The European Union's Enlargement Viewed from the East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Di Palma, G. (2004) 'Postscript: What Inefficient History and Malleable Practices Say about Nation-States and Supranational Democracy When Territoriality Is No Longer Exclusive', in C. K. Ansell and G. di Palma (eds.) *Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 246-269.
- Dosenrode, S. and Halkier, H. (eds.) (2004) *The Nordic Regions and the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Egeberg, M. (2005) 'The EU and the Nordic Countries: Organizing Domestic Diversity', in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.) *The Member States of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 185-208.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Falkner, G., Treib., O., Hartlapp, M., and Leiber, S. (2005) *Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (2001) 'Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of "Europeanization"', in K Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds.), *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 1-22.
- Goetz, K. H. (2005) 'The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe', in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.) *The Member States of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 254-280.
- Grabbe, H. (2001) 'How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8 (6), pp. 1013-1031.
- Grabbe, H. (2003) 'Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 303-327.
- Grabbe, H. (2005) *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Héritier, A. et al. (2001) *Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).
- Holzinger, K. and Knill, C. (2005) 'Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12 (5), pp. 775-796.

- Hughes, J. Sasse, G. and Gordon, C. (2004a) 'Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42 (3), pp. 523-551.
- Hughes, J. Sasse, G. and Gordon, C. (2004b) *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Ingebritsen, C. (1998) *The Nordic States and European Unity* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- Jacobsson, B., Lagreid, P. and Pedersen, O. V. (2003) *Europeanization and Transnational States: Comparing Nordic Central Government* (London: Routledge).
- Jacoby, W. (2004) *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Jacquot, S. and Woll, C. (2004) *Les usages de l'Europe: Acteurs et transformations européenne* (Paris: L'Harmattan).
- Jenssen, A. T. Pesonen, P. and Gilljam, M. (eds.) (1998) *To Join or No to Join: Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press).
- Jordan, A. and Liefferink, D. (eds.) (2004) *Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of National Environmental Policy* (London: Routledge).
- Kassim, H. (2003) 'Conclusion: The National Co-ordination of EU Policy', in H. Kassim et al. (eds.) *The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 235-264.
- Kassim, H. (2003) 'Meeting the Demands of EU Membership: The Europeanization of National Administrative Systems, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 83-111.
- Knill, C. (2005) 'Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches, and Explanatory Factors', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12 (5), pp. 764-774.
- Lippert, B. and Umbach, G. (2005) *The Pressure of Europeanization: From Post-Communist State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).
- Lucarelli, S. and Radaelli, C. (2005) 'The European Convention: A Process of Mobilization?', in S. Lucarelli and C. M. Radaelli (eds) *Mobilizing Politics and Society? The EU Convention's Impact on Southern Europe* (London: Routledge), pp. 1-23.
- Miles, L. (ed) (1996) *The European Union and the Nordic Countries* (London: Routledge).
- Page, E. C. (2003) 'Europeanization and the Persistence of Administrative Systems', in: J. Hayward and A. Menon (eds.) *Governing Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Pinto, A. and Teixeira, N. S. (eds.) (2002) *Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, 1945 – 1980s* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs).
- Radaelli, C. (2003) 'The Europeanization of Public Policy', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.) *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 27-56.
- Rokkan, S. (1999) *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan*, edited by P. Flora with S. Kuhnle and D. Urwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Royo, S. and Manuel, P. C. (eds) (2003) *Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years* (London: Frank Cass).
- Ruggie, J. (1993) 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 47 (1), pp. 139-174.
- Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) Governance by Conditionality: EU Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4), pp. 661-679.
- Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2005) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- Schmidt, V. A. (2006) 'Democracy in Europe: The Impact of European Integration', *Perspectives on Politics*, 3 (4), pp. 761-779.
- Sitter, N. (2001) 'The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euroscepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?', *West European Politics*, 24 (4), pp. 22-39.
- Smith, K. (2003) 'The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality', in M. Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 105-139.
- Soetendorp, B. and Hanf, K. (1998) 'Conclusion: The Nature of National Adaptation to European Integration', in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp. (eds.) *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London: Longman), pp. 186-194.
- Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2004) 'Southern European Public Bureaucracies in Comparative Perspective', *West European Politics*, 27 (3), pp. 405-422.
- Sverdrup, U. (2004) 'Compliance and Conflict Management in the European Union: Nordic Exceptionalism', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 27 (1), pp. 23-43.
- Taggart, P. (1998) 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems', *European Journal of Political Research*, 33 (3), pp. 363-388.

- Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2004) 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 43 (1), pp. 1-27.
- Taylor, P. J. (1994) 'The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System', *Progress in Human Geography*, 19, pp. 151-162.
- Therborn, G. (1993) 'Beyond the Lonely Nation-State', in F. G. Castles (ed.) *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies* (Aldershot: Dartmouth), pp. 329-340.
- Vachudová, M. A. (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Wallace, H. (2001) 'Introduction: Rethinking European Integration', in H. Wallace (ed.), *Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 1-22.
- Wessels, W., Maurer, A. and Mittag, J. (eds.) (2003) *Fifteen Into One? The European Union and its Member States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Zürn, M. and Leibfried, S. (2005) 'Reconfiguring the National Constellation', in S. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds.) *Transformations of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-36.

Author: Klaus H. Goetz

Title: Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization

Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series 109

Editor: Oliver Treib

Associate Editor: Inge Korneck

ISSN: 1605-8003

© 2006 by the Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS),
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna • ☎ +43 1 59991-0 • Fax +43 1 59991-555 • <http://www.ihs.ac.at>
