

"1958-Hooligans and 1968-Students:
One Generation and Two Rebellions"

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Abstract

It is claimed that not just the students of 1968, but also the hooligans from the late Fifties ought to be regarded as social movements: they share an international mass character during a specific period, a high degree of self-created cultural identity organized outside the institutional framework and effectively oppose major features of society - contributing thereby, so it is argued, to the fragmentation of the bourgeois subject and the basic divisions upon which it is built: the division of body and mind, of female and male, and of classes.

Secondly it is demonstrated that both movements were borne basically by the same birth cohorts (approximately 1939-1948), who, due to the Second World War, shared common generational experiences almost all over the world, one of which is a "control gap" during childhood in the immediate postwar years that gave them a relative freedom and importance for familial reproduction that children usually are deprived of. The later reconstruction of proper authority and control hit them as potentially arbitrary. These experiences were expressed by the hooligans through actions and music long before the students could express them by words and explicitly political resistance, thereby preparing the fusion of these class-specific ways that can be observed in youth nowadays.

This is discussed in the light of social science literature contemporary to the movements which may be accused of a middle class blindness failing to recognize the historical specificity and political relevance (however overtly non-political) of lower class movements.

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Introduction: the claim

1.

World War II produced special conditions (in a macro-social sense and in terms of life histories) for a shake up of very basic conditions of societal reproduction. It has among other things produced a generation of people born about 1940-1948 that incorporates the contradictions of the "old" society and the "new" society and the clash between them. This generation has, as I shall try to document, borne two world-wide youth movements, namely the "hooligans" (climax around 1958) and the students of 1968; it has laid the foundations to later movements such as the feminist, the "alternative", the "peace movement", ecologism etc. Although there certainly exist somewhat similar precedent traditions (which I certainly do not deny), this "generation" constitutes something like a turning point. I shall talk about the special conditions that produced this turn, about the specific cultural and political forms it involved, and their meaning in view of the historical process, and about the outcomes it has produced and is still producing.¹⁾

2.

I shall try to analyze the relationship of these movements to three very basic divisions (to use Negt's & Kluge's term): the division of body and mind, the division of male and female, and the division of classes. I shall briefly sketch how central these divisions are not just for the reproduction of capitalism, but for all of occidental mankind, how much they have to do with its history of conquest, destruction of other species and human cultures, and its violent and successful attempts to model the world according to its imperial needs and images - to a point of no return. Then I will argue how the political and cultural forms of these movements can be seen as a process leading to the bridging, a re-union, of these divisions.

3.

In order to preclude a misunderstanding: I am not pretending to explain a turn in world history by generation theory. If at all, the turn in world history was World War II (and there I probably differ from most of my sociologist colleagues who traditionally exclude wars from their theorising altogether). World War II, in my opinion, in effect produced a final crisis of the "bourgeois subject", as well as a generation that "acted out" this crisis, not in the ways generations before "acted out" this same crisis in the fascist bacchanal, but rather something like a prelude to a mankind that may be somewhat different, that has learned the art of surviving and letting survive, as opposed to the science of progress, conquest and destruction. Even in the contemporary youth (who are just about the children of the generation mentioned) this art is not very widespread yet²⁾ and the rules of the dominant game still are the accumulation of overkill, of nature and mankind, of progress towards World War III.

My aim is to turn the tables: not reducing rebellion against living conditions to a "generation problem", but demonstrating that this society - even through its most destructive logics, the logics of war - produces contradictions in the life history of people that enable them to fight back, and not without success.³⁾ And: No Rebel without a Cause.

Does it make sense to view the hooligans of the Fifties as "social movement" comparable to the students' revolts of the Sixties?

1.

Whereas most sociologists would agree to view the students' revolts around 1968 as "movements", this term is rarely ever attributed to the hooligans of the Fifties.⁴⁾ The latter did stimulate an upsurge of social science research on adolescents in the early Sixties. However, the interpretations offered

merely ranged from psychological reductionism (e.g. Glueck, 1959) to highly sophisticated theories of "juvenile delinquency" (e.g. Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), of a specific youth culture (e.g. Miller, 1958) and general theories of the youth phase (e.g. Coleman, 1961). Whereas during the Fifties historical and generational arguments were quite common (e.g. Riesman, 1950, Eisenstadt, 1958, Schelsky, 1959), this approach later seemingly lost its explanatory power: hooliganism was not seen as a potentially political historical "event" by contemporaries, but rather as a general more or less enduring phenomenon resulting from class and youth characteristics, that contributes a potential danger to society; it was certainly not viewed as a positive agent capable of producing social change. Now that street-corner-society belongs to the past it might be useful to look at it from this angle⁵⁾ just as the students' movement was looked upon much earlier⁶⁾, and see, what they have in common.

2.

Just like the student movements during 1965 to 1970, a considerable proportion of contemporary youth were participants of the movement of hooligans during a similarly rather short and distinct phase (1955-1960). In both cases the proportion of youth involved in the movements was but a minority (amounting to maybe one fifth of the respective cohorts⁷⁾), but a highly conspicuous minority that moulded the ideas and lives of those participating as well as those outside. As mass phenomena these movements each sprang up almost simultaneously in most industrial countries, ranging from Japan to Poland, the whole of Western Europe, and of course, the United States.⁸⁾ Their "fading out" also took place fairly quickly and internationally at about the same time, as far as mass support is concerned. The cultural forms and symbolics they created continued in a diversified and open-end fashion, through.

3.

Both movements are dominated by male offsprings from specific classes: the working class in the case of the hooligans,

the new middle class in the case of the students. However, they certainly were not as class- and sex-specific as all previous youth movements had tended to be (e.g. the scouts viz. Wandervögel, or the socialist youth in the first half of this century)^{8a)}, but did include females and members of the other classes in a whole variety of roles that were not always those of mere subordinates. I shall argue this point further below. Both the student and the hooligan movement were "youth movements" in a double sense of the word: they were neither led by adults nor functioned within the framework of adult organizations, and their participants as well as their leaders were in the life-phase just after the loosening of parental control and before entering a steady occupational life and founding their own families.⁹⁾ In terms of age this phase is located differently according to class origin and educational career: it ranges from about 12 to 18 for the lower classes, from about 17 to 27 for students.

4.

Both movements had a lot to do with the expansion of the mass media: radio/film/records for the hooligans, TV/books/journals for the students. It would nevertheless be completely wrong to view these movements as "products" of the mass media.

As is demonstrated in histories of pop music¹⁰⁾, most radio stations banned the provoking, "rough" music from their programs for many years; European adolescents had to tune into "Radio Luxemburg" to hear any of their rock music, and were prevented from seeing James Dean or Marlon Brando in the Cinema by severe age-limits or restrictive program policies. Newspapers were often deliberately assigned not to publish reports on youth riots at concerts or on street fights so that others were not inspired to follow such bad examples.¹¹⁾ In this way the media did as much to prevent this "desease" as they did to promote it. Finally the media had to sacrifice some of their educational goals to market competition - but I would tend to say that in the end the hooligans moulded the

media more than the media the hooligans.

Similarly for the students: nobody would seriously attribute for example the events in France 1968 to mass media reporting - but compared to the hooligans the students could expect much more mass media support (for marketing and political reasons).¹²⁾

But in one sense the argument has something to it: both movements used the "official" media for the creation of their identity and understanding, and they could not have done so in a world-wide fashion had they existed 50 years earlier. Had it not been for competition in capitalist markets, "educational" oppression would have been much more effective. This is the other side of the coin, often overlooked by critics of "commercialization".

5.

Both movements have drawn upon a certain historical continuity, had political and cultural predecessors. For the hooligan street gangs this was well documented by Cloward & Ohlin (1960) for criminal skills; by Warner (1937) there is an obvious continuity of "street corner societies" since after World War I, and "Schlurfs" (as predecessors of "Halbstarke") populated the streets of Germany and Austria even during the "Third Reich".

For the students, the tradition ranged from the socialist movement of the Thirties over the intellectuals' commitment in Roosevelt's "New Deal" and the "beat generation" to civil rights movements in the US (see Kleeman 1971), from socialists and existentialists (also beatniks) to the peace-movements of the Fifties for the European Countries (see e.g. Otto 1977).

But both in scale and quality these movements went far beyond their predecessors. In the second half of the Fifties juvenile gangs populated every suitable street corner (and certainly not only in the lower class parts of the cities); they had

no "organizational" goals but to maintain their free space of action, to secure their access to certain cultural assets, and to keep adult patronage to a minimum. They created their own style of appearance in an almost world-wide fashion (motor bikes, jeans or leather dress and long, greasy hair with and ant's tail for males, "sexy curves" for females, stressed by either jeans or swinging skirts worn with broad belts, their hair toupé and often dyed) which was in sharp contrast to what was considered "decent" by their parents and the adult world in general. And they had their music, a music associated with blacks, sex, and violence, and regarded as "primitive" - everything exactly contrary to the middle class standards most adults desperately were trying to meet. No "political" form of resistance was or could have been as effective in opposing so central elements of society in those times of Cold War. Of course the hooligans had to pay the price of this opposition: they were heavily criminalized. There probably never was any other young generation - before or after them - that had so large a proportion ending up in penitentiaries and jails (despite the considerable changes in judicial policies just then taking place internationally towards favouring "liberal" and "therapeutic" treatment of adolescents); and often they were killed in an escalation of violence and selfdestruction (e.g. Chambliss 1975).

For the students this point does not even have to be argued: even political opponents of the movement utter little doubt about its historical relevance.

6.

Finally the reasons why I think both "hooligans" and "student rebels" deserve the classification as "movements", are these:

- 1) Their spontaneous mass character within a distinct period of time
- 2) their high degree of self-created cultural identity and a fair degree of homogeneity

- 3) their ability to organize their actions outside the institutional framework
- 4) their effective opposition against major features of the dominant society and
- 5) their contribution to the reshaping of society.

The students did fit into a middle-class understanding of "political", and the hooligans did not. But in effect both contributed to the destruction of the bourgeois subject - which is a highly political issue indeed.

Is it true that 1958-hooligans and 1968-students belong to the same generation?

1.

For the timing of the hooligan movement we can draw upon mainly three indicators: juvenile delinquency records, the dates of major break-throughs of rock music, and the years in which major mass riots of juveniles at the occasion of concerts etc. occurred.

In the Council of Europe's report on juvenile delinquency on twelve of its member countries (1960) (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom) the difficulties of a valid comparison on the basis of statistical data are stressed. But as far as it can be judged from the records most of these countries show a very similar pattern: a rise in juvenile delinquency in the immediate postwar years, followed by a certain decline in the early Fifties. and again a rise for the years 1956-1958 (the point where unfortunately the figures for this report usually terminate). For most of these countries it is reported that delinquency in this second peak period spreads to very young age groups (e.g. 15-18 or below, which means it concerns the birth cohorts 1938-1945; see Council of Europe 1960, pp. 21-35). The report finds itself at loss to explain the similarities and certain

differences between the countries: the same patterns are shown for countries that participated in the War and for those which did not (e.g. Sweden and Turkey) and they seem to be affected neither by the different degrees of postwar juvenile unemployment nor by the respective country economic growth rates (p. 25f.). The report notes that there are "some new forms of delinquency and asocial activities" (p. 29) that are committed rather for the "thrill and excitement" associated with them than for "rational" reasons. The report criticises that although some of the national observers mention a "significant increase in gang activities among the young" and refer to Teddy boys, leather jackets, Halbstarke, blousons noirs and Raggare, for many countries, though existent, too little attention is given to these phenomenas; recorded is also a "considerable difference" (p. 31) between this rise of gang activities and the "contagious mass hysteria triggered off, for example, by the exciting rhythm of rock an'roll" (p. 31) which obviously occur during the same period of time.

The explanations offered range from "disruption of family life" (both as a consequence of the War, and of increasing employment of mothers and rising divorce rates) to the suddenly increased access to purchasing power on the part of the young¹³⁾, the impact of mass communication and the continuing existence of "social problem groups", e.g. impoverished segments of the population in urban areas. The introduction is concluded:

"On the whole, youth does well in those difficult times. When the gap between the generations is becoming so pronounced and there are so many complaints against youth and so much sharp condemnation of young people, it is as well to remember from time to time how many work hard, behave sensibly - but fail to make headlines in the newspapers." (p. 19).

This report seems to document two points of importance for my paper: that juvenile gangs associated with an increase of delinquency were an international phenomenon seen somehow

as "generational" by contemporaries, and that it was not confined to lower classes/poverty/slums¹⁴⁾ but rather associated with a general new youth culture developing around rock an'roll and highly provocative for the adult world¹⁵⁾.

This evidence can be backed by some national analyses showing that the increase of delinquency was due to particularly high incidences among certain birth cohorts. For Great Britain Wilkins (1960) demonstrated a particularly high delinquency rate for those birth cohorts who were four to five years old during the War. Since England entered the War in 1940, this means the birth cohorts 1935-1941. Schindler (1968) demonstrates for Austria that delinquency rates start to rise for the 14- and 15-year-olds in 1955 and then for the same cohort continue in each subsequent year, whereas they drop again for the younger age groups. So, for Austria, the birth cohorts 1939-1947 seem to be more prone to delinquency than those before or after this period (Schindler 1968, p. 42; similar results for Austria see Csaszar 1967).

The situation in the United States may be somewhat different. Despite the enormous body of literature on juvenile gangs and juvenile delinquency it is very difficult to judge whether there was more or less a quantitative and qualitative continuity of such activities since the Twenties or whether there occurred a major change during the Mid-Fifties. Reported juvenile delinquency seems to have grown more or less continuously since the World War II (it does show a certain stagnation for the years 1958-1962, though, but then rises much above the 1958-level; see US Department of Justice 1976). I am inclined to put forward a tentative kind of "minimal" hypothesis in the following way: that in fact an extension of juvenile rebelliousness into the (white) middle class and to girls took place, and that it also changed its quality by creating a new culture of its own, a culture centered around rock music.

So finally: there seem to be quite some indications that there was a kind of climax of juvenile rebelliousness in many countries in the second half of the Fifties borne by fairly young people that can be located in the birth cohorts around 1938-1948. One of its particular forms - namely street gangs of partly delinquent character - seems to have declined since, if one may judge by the attention paid to them by social scientists and public programs and by my - however limited - private observations: urban streets have not been crowded by groups of adolescents thereafter, or at least certainly not to the same extent.¹⁶⁾

2.

The public break-through of rock music occurs at about the same time. In 1955 Bill Haley's "Rock around the Clock" reached number one in the pop charts (the same year James Dean's "Rebel without a Cause" and "East of Eden"¹⁷⁾ came to an unforeseen success); 1956 saw Chuck Berry's "Maybelline" and Elvis Presley's "I Forgot to Remember to Forget" as Number Ones. That was the start for the probably most famous rock star of the world. Elvis was born in 1935 in a small town in the State of Mississippi, his father was a truck driver and so was he before his career begun. The religiosity of his family and his musicality brought him into contact with gospel music - he spent a lot of his boyhood singing "black music" in churches (Guralnick 1976) - but he was white. In 1960 Elvis retreated not to reappear publicly again before 1968 (!).

Another star who's career begun in 1955 ("Tutti Frutti") was Little Richard. Born in Georgia in 1935 as son of a black-market whisky dealer he was thrown out of his father's house at the age of 13 and found a new home with a white couple. He was black - and had also received his musical training by singing gospel songs. In 1957 he suddenly disappeared from the rock scene to study theology and continued in singing religious songs only; his come-back to more frivolous pop music in 1974 failed. (Winner 1976)

Very similar is the fate of another star, Jerry Lee Lewis: also born in 1935 as son of a white farmer in Louisiana he managed his first bestseller ("Whole Lot of Shakin' Going On") in 1956; by 1958 his career was severely interrupted by his marriage to a cousin, which was considered "incestuous" (Miller 1976, p. 120) and never recovered from the consequent exclusion from "respectable" media. Much less rebellious than the afore-mentioned were the Everly Brothers, born in 1937 resp. 1939 to white middle class parents, who started their success in 1957 by "Bye bye love", a career that ended about 1962 with the song "That's old fashioned". (Rachlis 1976) Buddy Holly, born 1936 in Texas, became famous by "Peggy Sue" in 1957; he died 1959 in an air crash. Among the top stars there were also a few about ten years older (e.g. Fats Domino, Bill Haley, Chuck Berry), but that was rather an exception; the later more commercial and much tamer stars, such as Paul Anka and Pat Boone, were born around 1940.

It seems to be that the following can be seen from this:

- the time span of the big success of rock an'roll was very short, form about 1955-1960, it started and terminated quite abruptly; then there was quite a gap in time until the next "wave" of comparable mass appeal, namely the Beatles, started
- the top stars are a few years older than their main audience, but mostly within a range that permitted them very much the same experiences
- by their very social origin the singers broke taboos central to those times: they almost invariably came from the lower classes and had little education, and they were both black or white but with a strong affinity to black music - a spit in the face to would-be middle class America
- the ways they behaved and sung was a personalized challenge to middle class hypocripsy: openly aggressive, sexual, with a lot of body feeling, transgressing race and sex borders by style and dressing; and they frequently allude to delinquency, jails and police.

3.

"Trust no one over thirty" - a standard saying of the student generation of 1968. That is: trust no one born before 1938. The students of the Berkely Revolt in 1964, that was kind of a start signal for "campus unrest" all over the US, were at the age of 17-27 (some members of the founding generation of the American SDS - founded in 1960 - supposedly were involved), which means they were born between 1937 and 1947 (e.g. Jerry Rubin 1941).

In 1967 Keniston (1971, p. 290) distinguishes between the "old New Left" ("approximate age, thirty") - which means born in 1937), the "New Left" ("between twenty-two and twenty-eight" - which means born 1939-1945) and the "young kids" (under twenty-two, e.g. born 1946-1950).

In Western Germany the student movement also got started in the Mid-Sixties, which means that the active figures must have (if they did not belong to the "old New Left" such as O. Negt, W. Abendroth) belonged to the birth cohorts 1939-1945, which is true for the best known student leaders (Dutschke, Teufel, Rabehl).

In France the movement started 1965 in Nanterre and reached its climax all over France in 1968 - the leading figures such as Cohn-Bendit and Geismar again are from the cohort 1939-1945.

So I would guess that the leading figures of the student movement were about 5-7 years younger than Elvis Presley, but they were not so much older than the rest of the rebellious students as Elvis was compared to his fans; they even may have been of quite the same age, since the mass basis of the revolt was probably not among the very young students.

If this timing is reconsidered it can be concluded that there is at least quite an overlap between the cohorts that were the main bearers of the hooligan movement 1955-1960 and the

bearers of the student movement, although the average date of birth of the active students may be a few years later. Since it is well known that the phase of "youth" takes place at an earlier age for the lower than for the middle classes, it is amazing that this coincidence of generations - to my knowledge - has so far been overlooked.

Because of the different character and the class difference between the movements participation in both of them will have been not too common. But it would be an interesting task to search into the life history of the active students from this perspective.¹⁸⁾


The timing of another middle class movement that started in the second half of the Sixties and that was only partly united with the student rebels is more difficult: the hippies. But since the hippy subculture seems to have developed quite during the same period as the "political" student movement, it is very likely that it recruited its members from the very same cohorts¹⁹⁾. And from a nowadays perspective the dividing line between "hippies" and "political students" (however different this might have been felt by participants) is very difficult to draw. Jerry Rubin's "Yippies" or Teufel's communes bridge the gap.

What made them rebellious? The thesis of a control-gap.

1.

Now supposed it was "one generation" in terms of five to ten birth cohorts who bore these movements: what did make them so inclined to rebellion? If one looks at the following chart, several characteristics lend themselves for a description.

A large proportion of this generation was born during the war or in the immediate postwar years. Thus their childhood must have been characterized by some degree of social desorganization.



It can be assumed that for a large proportion of those families it was impossible to maintain tight control over their children. Reasons may be various: bombing of homes, absence of fathers who were drafted or imprisoned, regional mobility (either enforced by war events or postwar poverty that dragged people into the cities)... These circumstances should be seen from two aspects: one aspect was that mothers (and fathers, as far as they were present) were highly occupied with problems of daily survival, even in the middle classes, and could not afford to invest a lot of energy on control and "education" of their small children. The other aspect is that even small children could and had to contribute to these matters of survival: look after themselves, help by semi-legitimate activities such as stealing coals or potatoes or selling things at the black market, help in the household (not for "educational" reasons but for sheer necessity), nurse their injured fathers...²⁰⁾ This of course was all the more true for the adolescents of that time (who later Schelsky 1959 labelled the sceptical generation); but I would argue that these experiences have a different impact upon small children: the very core of bourgeois pedagogics (that was promulgated with so much effort since the 18th century and maybe became prevalent throughout the classes in the first half of the Twentieth century, see Rutschky 1977) lies the idea that children should feel the dependency upon their parents (and not the dependency of their parents upon them), that they should be made believe the pretense that parents were always doing right. And whereas these beliefs may have been shaken up by war/postwar circumstances in adolescents, they were not even properly installed in many smaller children of that times.

And in contrast to the real material experiences of children the norms for bringing up children maybe were more rigid in those times than before. In all fascist countries I think there was a severe backlash in educational theory as compared to the Twenties, and I have the impression (see e.g. the introduction of Spock 1975) that this was true even for the US and several

European countries, including the Soviet Union, where the liberal ideas of the revolutionary period had given way to a much more military conception of child rearing. I guess this did not happen on the level of official propaganda only - I would suspect, for example, that the secular decline in the use of physical punishment for small children had come to a hold during the Forties²¹⁾.

My argument therefore, would run as follows: not just the factual freedom, but the contrast between this freedom and normatively and verbally held standards molded these war/post-war children in a special way. It taught them a very contradictory lesson: that they were needed and had to be taken seriously by their mothers but at the same time were regarded just as "little children" who do not understand adult affairs; that they were supposed to behave "decently" and obey strictly, but that the adults were incapable to really enforce that; that they had the freedom to do a lot of the things they were not supposed to, and if they skipped the guilt feelings could enjoy a relative liberty.²²⁾

Contrasting to this but equally important is the next phase: fathers coming back or recovering from their physical and/or psychic war injuries and trying to reinstall their authority against wives and children; postwar economic growth allowing for a stabilization of daily life; schools being "normalized" and equipped with the necessary resources not just to teach, but also to control the children; political life drifting into the Cold War and into a "common" effort of reconstruction...

This political and familial reconstruction of "proper authority" hit the children of the cohorts in question some time between entering school and puberty; it was in line with previous educational norms and verbal threats ("just wait till papa comes home, and you will see, what happens ..!") but strongly contrasting to previous actual experiences of freedom and counterpower resp. familial importance.

2.

So far the model of "control gap". However simplified - I think this was a typical sequence of experiences for a large proportion of this generation, across countries, urban/rural, class and sex divisions, much more widespread than ever before.

This explanatory paradigm has often been used by comments on "youth problems" during the Fifties and early Sixties: that contemporary youth has lost its models, family authority was no more what is used to be, institutions were failing to control the young properly, that adolescents were not respecting morals and adult authority any more ... I think that this diagnosis of conservative critics was quite right (much more so than the liberal well meant defense, that youth is strained by rapid social change and suffers from transition problems from childhood to adulthood²³), but the remedy proposed, namely tighter control on the part of the families and state institutions and the reconstruction of immaculately moral adult images, was tried anyway and failed.

To the students this interpretation was also applied, but to a much lesser degree: owing to their superior education and middle class background they themselves contributed verbal explanations for their disorderly conduct that had a certain labelling power within a middle class audience. Apart from this: postwar desorganization was already buried in the memories at those times of apparent growth and affluence and no more seen as at the roots of anything.

3.

If one looks at the typical sequence of experiences of the parents of this generation, again the Wars play a major role. The fathers were the main cohort of draftees for World War II; they often were born during World War I, had spent their childhood in a similar "control gap" afterwards and constituted the bulk of what Schelsky (1957) had called the "political

generation" of the Twenties and Thirties. They also had contributed to the climax of juvenile delinquency in the early Thirties²⁴⁾. Their entry into proper adult roles had been retarded by the World economic crisis and then by military service. It will have happened quite often that they had not started a continuous occupational life before the early Fifties, at the age of Thirty or more. The mothers, on the other hand, more often than ever before will have been the persons upon whom daily life depended: earning money, looking after children and household, and managing all hardships, very often without the help of a man or with a man who had not yet recovered from the physical and psychic strains of war, imprisonment or unemployment. All this in a context, where theories of the natural inferiority of women had a glorious comeback (an ambiguity which is particularly apparant in the fascist countries, but I don't think it was confined to them). Later the women were glad for the men to take over again and accepted an ideology that brought them some relief from overdemanding tasks - but on a material level they staid in the labor market, resisted the attempts at discriminating "employed mothers" and did lose some of their familial powers but not the memories that they alone could manage life. Their daughters, many of them in the feminist movement now, saw all this.

Another characteristic of this parents' generation is important: a large proportion of them will have had experiences with political resistance and prosecution, often not just as first, but as second generation. May it be that their parents or they themselves were involved in the intensive class struggles during the Twenties and Thirties, being persecuted as "communists", "socialists", "fascists", "jews" or "blacks", as "trotzkyists" or "mensheviks", as "spies" or "anarchists", as "revolutionaries" or "counterrevolutionaries", - there probably was no period in history where such large segments of the population, throughout countries²⁵⁾ and classes, ran the risk of being defined as political enemies by some ruling power, were killed, imprisoned or forced into emigration.

This did have consequences for their children: as "depolitization", but also as deep mistrust in power and domination that found its ways in new forms of resistance.

4.

I see the possible objections to such a sweeping approach to "generational experiences", and I admit my description may be more valid for the countries dominated by fascism than for the others, but I feel it is worth while discussing what looks to me as amazing parallels in very different parts of the world. My argument amounts to no more but that there was a culmination of very contradictory experiences for a critical proportion of the population, an important feature of which was the contradiction between norms and moral convictions on one hand and material experiences on the other.

I would not argue that this was mediated mainly on psychological level, e.g. that children with absent or weak fathers (or from, as it used to be termed so beautifully, "broken homes") became hooligans or student rebels, whereas children from "intact" families did not - although there is some empirical evidence that this may be the case, it does not seem so important to me. I would rather argue that this was mediated on a cultural level, as a latent fragmentation of parental authority, of sex role definitions, class boundaries and of institutional order that gave the leeway for new forms of freedom that was first actively fought for by the generation that experienced the clash of those contradictions most actutely and very early in life.

The final fragmentation of the bourgeois subject and the reconstruction of human beings - cause and product of youth movements?

There are many contradictions intrinsic to the development of bourgeois society from conditions of scarcity to relative abundance that contribute to a destruction of the bourgeois (or even wider: the occidental) type of human subject; two world wars engaged in that task both physically on a large scope, and mentally by teaching lessons obviously hard to learn. I can't go into this, all I shall try to demonstrate is how the two youth movements at question expressed and at the same time promoted this destruction/reconstruction process at a specific point in history.

1.

One core element of the bourgeois subject²⁶⁾ is the subjection of the body. This can be seen on several dimensions: the postulate of the intrinsic superiority of the mind over the body links into the class system, implying the superiority of those using their minds instead of their hands, the superiority of mental as opposed to physical labor. It also implies a latent hostility to one's own body, which is not seen as part of the "subject" but instrumentally: it is supposed to function properly, to produce what is programmed by the mind, to operate as a well designed and controlled machine. And finally it is feared as an object of uncontrollable pains, as an open front to nature showing its power, an open front that also always has been utilized by human authorities: inflicting pains upon bodies lies at the core of human domination.²⁷⁾ Christianity added: that not just pains, but bodily lust is evil, a break-through point not only for nature, but for the devil. This is nothing but a consequent mentaphysical formulation of the superiority principle. Profane interpretations of this principle argue by the need to control human aggression - the trouble with this interpretation is that world has not seen any other

species of primates killing each other millionwise by wars well directed by planning minds, compared to which an occasional furious manslaughter is relatively negligible. From the point of view of power the impractical point with physical domination (unless well mindedly organized by military means) is its transitional character: bodies are organized cyclically, they grow and decay. Only for the mind it may be claimed to be eternally superior upon some other mind; human bodies remain comparatively equal.

Thus not so much the "humanitarian" attack against physical violence, but the insistence upon the body, upon physical lust and aggression, is intrinsically subversive.

In the light of these considerations the hooligan movement gains a specific relevance: their behavior both expresses a class resistance against the further degradation of physical prowess by the growing size and importance of the new middle class and the insistence upon the relevance and power of physical nature for human lust and pain.^{27a)}

The ways this was articulated followed the lessons taught by lower class education of those times: to constantly prove to themselves that the child's fears of physical pains as a consequence of nonobedient behavior could be disproved, or at least stripped of their all-threatening character, that the pains ensuing could be borne, that fear was however strong but limited. Self-inflicted physical risks, against however partly technical nature (such as quick driving of motorcycles without even the protection of a helmet, see Willis 1978, or such as fighting with equals) and against human authorities (such as provoking the police or any kind of authoritative adult) therefore were very central elements of this culture. Another element was music: a rough, sensual and "physical" music.

On a verbal level things were different. The disjunction of language and physique had been a long-ranging project of bourgeois society (banning sexual words; in protestant countries even extending to expressions referring to eating, let alone digestion), and one cannot expect a lower class movement such as the hooligans to conquer something that was instituted as an upper class/middle class realm like language at one go. It was very symptomatic that in all non-Anglo-Saxon countries many contents were conveyed in English that was only very partially understood (national transcriptions of rock songs very often being a lot "tamer") - there just was no adequate language that could be made use of, too long had it been suppressed. But what was practised on the language level was the refusal of "big words" - understatement, irony were the preferred means of verbal transport. Thus the hypocrisy of the dominant language was slipped: by a-verbality, the use of a foreign language and the refusal to submit to "nice language". This also points to one of the severest limitations of this movement: the lack of verbal self-reflection, both on an individual and on a collective level. Nevertheless the control and elaboration of verbal skills, mainly as a fighting device among peers and against authorities, received high esteem in this culture - but on a reflexive level the flattest stereotypes sometimes survived.

What the hooligans had "acted out" on a largely a verbal level, the students then acted out on a verbal, theoretical level. The - however limited²⁸⁾ - sexual freedom of the hooligans was then expressed as demands for sexual liberation (by middle class adolescents who were, on the level of experience, certainly retarded compared to their lower class peers). Whereas, on a verbal level, the hooligans had in a sense cherished monogamy and family for their prospective lives (but for a period "after" the one they were just living in), the students verbally attacked these institutions and also, in part at least, practically tried out different forms. Whereas the hooligans favoured physical adventure and daring and by their own understanding willingly provoked situations that rendered such experiences, the students mainly

verbally provoked authorities for them to recur to violent means that they then could be accused of. Nevertheless the subsequent experience of physical violence molded their image of authority (see e.g. Keniston 1967) quite similarly to that of the hooligans.

Quite another path to reconnect (and in a sense also disconnect) body and mind for the students was the use of drugs; this was also expressed in a common means of the two movements, namely rock music (e.g. Springer 1980), and it contained a very contradictory message: that one could change one's mind by physical (chemical) influences that sometimes involved the risk of destroying one's body²⁹⁾ and at the same time act as nice kids who killed off all those evil bodily desires such as sex, hunger or aggression. The type of drugs becoming culturally favored in the late Sixties, namely marihuana, LSD and heroin, seem to me to have in common a very middle-class version of the mind-body conflict: everything seems to happen in the minds, negating the body.

2.

Another core element of the bourgeois subject is the subjection of women, of the female moment in mankind.

I guess my view will run counter to most analyses of hooligan gangs if I claim the existence of elements of liberation of females in this culture, but I shall try nevertheless. Most descriptions somehow mention the existence of girls in those gangs (e.g. Chambliss 1973, Sherriff 1965, Willis 1978³⁰⁾), but almost invariably they are seen as accessories not involved in the centre of what is going on. Out of individual experience and stubbornness I do not believe that this view is correct. I think that girls were both regular gang members and a lot of gang activities were centered around girls. That girls were passionate rock fans remains largely unquestioned, and that some of them even were very good rock singers also is out of debate

(e.g. Janis Joplin). Gang activities were a means of liberation from parental control and supervision for girls just as well as for boys. They also were trapped between "maintaining a good reputation" and enjoying adolescent life, even more exploited for family services, and they were in fact more endangered by sexual libertinage than boys, because it was up to them to have the illegitimate children.

There was a strong tension between normatively held standards and material reality (a tension that exactly this generation had already seen in their home families): the girl a hooligan was supposed to marry one time should be a "good girl", a nice and soft virgin for him to play the heroic part of a head of the family, a girl to be protected and to be kept as a "baby" (a favourite word in rock songs). The girl he had fun with in the meantime was supposed to be a good comrade, fearless and solitary, with a mind and a will of her own. The girl that was fancied as the primary sexual object should be beautiful, wild and with a lot of curves (e.g. Marilyn Monroe) and display those attractions generously - but be punished with moral contempt. Out of these images the girl to have fun with was the most "real" one, a common figure in many gangs. (And I do guess most of the hooligans in fact did marry these girls later.) The very fact that a female, not a-sexually defined role participating in chiefly male-dominated activities was created, meant quite something.

Another aspect of ambiguity is the combination of demonstrative masculine prowess (see Miller 1958) and feminine, if not transvestite, elements of outward appearance. Long hair, coloured clothing for males (also: extensive hip movements which previously had been confined to women), slacks and often very short hair for females. This ambiguity should not be overlooked, however; it has to be accepted that the hooligans (and the subsequent rocker gangs of the Sixties and Seventies) constituted a kind of male chauvinist revival.

In the student movement the girls also usually played a secondary part - but they were quite omnipresent. And again, like in the hooligan movement, their roles were not confined to being the girl friend of one of the activists, although often the beginning of the active involvement of girls will have been set by such a relationship. During the students' movement feminist groups came into existence to gain much more importance later on.

On a theoretical level sex relations were much discussed - quite contrary to the hooligans the equality of women was postulated as one of the central issues.

For both movements I would stress a transitional character with regard to a redefinition of sex roles: the destruction of the previous strict sex role standards and the creation of a certain cultural fluidity, that was prerequisite for the break-through that occurred later on.

3.

Another core element of the bourgeois subject is the incessant tendency to install hierarchical orders - orders of usefulness of truth, of morale and of classes. As opposed to feudal society these orders are not seen as static: by constant striving for the better, higher and more efficient, one's own position within them can be improved - and the order as a whole be preserved.

The hooligans did not challenge this order verbally - but they refused to play the game. They did not render an alternative definition of "higher, better, more efficient".

When asked they often expressed conformity to the dominant norms: that parental and police authority were legitimate, that girls should be good girls and deviance deserved punishment, that everyone who would work hard and strive for the better had a fair chance for success, that the one who pays

is to give the orders, that private property was to be protected ... And among themselves they established equally strict implicit standards of what rendered status and what did not, standards all gang members were anxious to follow. But on the level of action things were quite different: they feared but did not respect authority and therefor constantly provoked it, they did not properly submit to hard work and achievement, and they did not respect private property. May be there lies one of the reasons for the special importance of peer groups and gangs in that time: that there did not yet exist an explicit verbal model that would express the needs and the conceptions of the world that the adolescents did express in their actions.

The students challenged this order and the authorities representing it as illegitimate - in the light of alternative definitions of "higher, better, more efficient". By doing this they enacted their superior class position as supposedly future elites, and they often did so with strong moral conviction.

This appears to me as class specific variations on the same basic theme for which the model has been formed during early childhood experiences: that there existed strong norms and behavioral prescriptions on a verbal level, but contradictory material experiences (first of relative freedom and then of attempts at tightening control) had taught that they were not all-encompassing, that there was a way out, that control and authority were neither perfectly effective nor perfectly legitimate.

Within their own organization both movements had a very low degree of hierarchical structuration: there were kind of "leaders", but they were not supposed to (nor capable of) ordering people about, their leading position was always at stake to challenges and transitional in character. And both movements had very strong horizontal ties of solidarity,

reliability and mutual support,

Neither movement achieved much in terms of class struggle in the classical sense, neither on a structural nor on a personal achievement level. In the latter sense they even destroyed their changes, the hooligans by challenging and failing school standards and by acquiring criminal records; students by becoming politically suspect. But class boundaries, moral convictions and authority thereafter never were what they used to be before.

Footnotes

- 1) This contribution is a kind of interim report on research carried out at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, on "Growing up since 1945" which is based on a statistical documentation of living conditions of children and juveniles, analyses of juvenile diaries and pop-music expression (focus: relations to authority and morale to the body, sexuality and sex roles) and various studies and documents on youth movements.
- 2) I have the impression there is a widespread tendency to regard contemporary youth as "very different" from proceeding generations (e.g. R. Inglehart, 1979, Th. Ziehe, 1975, J. Zinnecker, 1981), but I would argue that there is a process of quantitative extension of new paradigms that have been generated by however small but influential minorities before. This means that these new paradigms "cut across" generations, they are no more specific of youth alone.
- 3) In her presidential address to the Society for the Study of Social Problems in August 1980 Frances Piven raises the criticism that social science all too often eliminates the human agency as a moment of social change and reduces the dialectics of this change to sociological determinism (Piven 1981). My paper is an attempt at doing otherwise
- 4) They are also usually not included in statistics of "civil strife" (e.g. Gurr 1969) or under the label of "social conflict" (e.g. Oberschall 1973), but almost invariable under the nonpolitical interpretation as "deviance" (e.g. Cohen 1964, Clinard 1961) or "social problem" (Merton & Nisbet 1966).
- 5) Such as has recently been done by a broad exhibition in Germany on the Fifties (book publication "Bikini" 1981),

or by the German rock musician Udo Lindenberg, "Rock'n' Roll und Rebellion. Ein panisches Panorama" (1981).

- 6) This certainly is related to the fact that the students, by their middle class resources, were much more capable of creating verbal labels for themselves, of producing relatively powerful self-definitions. The major cultural expression of the hooligans was rock music, and the wording of the songs very often centers around crime, police and imprisonment (e.g. Jailhouse Rock, Tom Dooley). But somehow social scientists of that time failed to connect these elements.
- 7) This is very difficult to document. The problem starts with varying definitions of "participation". In the case of hooligans I would tend to call "participation" membership, no matter how short or loose, in one of the many street gangs (out of which only a small proportion were "delinquent gangs" in any severe meaning of the word) that populated the corners of most cities at that time. In the case of the students I would refer to a very loose notion of "participation" in the sense of taking part in some of the activities (such as demonstrations, sit-ins, teach-ins, etc.).
- 8) In both movements the United States was something like a fore-runner; there they started somewhat earlier, created the major cultural symbols that then spread over the world; but I have the impression they reached their climax and faded out at about the same time as everywhere else (see Kleemann 1971 for the student's movement). I did not find any study that systematically compared these movements internationally; some interesting hints are to be found in Salisbury 1962, pp. 90 (particularly about the "stil-jagas" in Moscow, and street gangs fighting the police and listening to rock music in Poland and in Hungary, where they actively participated in the 1956 revolution).
- 8a) See Gillis (1974), Laqueur (1978)

- 9) This of course only holds for those cases, where the student movement did not extend beyond its original boundaries, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, France or China.
- 10) On the other hand did the conflict between ASCAP (Am.Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers) and BMI (Broadcast Music Inc.) in the late Forties and early Sixties about royalties help young and lower class musicians get onto the radio programs (Schmidt Joos/Graves 1973, pp. 12)
- 11) Muchow (1959, p. 125) seriously attributes a certain decline of riots of the German "Halbstarke" to the wise newspaper policy which was practised in reporting about them. For an excellent documentation of press reactions to the Austrian hooligan movement see Schindler 1968. Quantitatively the number of lines on juvenile delinquents more than tripled between 1953 and 1958 and then quickly dropped off again (p. 82ff). Qualitatively juvenile delinquency is mainly attributed to a weakening of family ties and discipline, physical prematurity and lack of ideals - more or less widespread individual pathologies, altogether; there is not a hint of attributing legitimacy to that kind of behavior.
- 12) Just one example: in summer 1968 the journalists of ORTF (the state monopolist french radio/TV) went on strike because of governmental attempts to censure their reports on the movement; this was answered by sacking 40 % of the staff (Delale & Ragache 1978, p. 195).
- 13) "Many young people prefer (to youth clubs, MFK) to buy their own entertainment in dance halls and coffee bars, where there is no supervision and where the weaker ones may come under the influence of undesirable characters". (Council of Europe 1960, p. 17).
- 14) Although most theorists of juvenile delinquency tended to put in social class as a major explanatory variable,

practically all empirical studies show a wide variation in the class and educational background of juvenile delinquents. This is especially the case with studies that use self-reported delinquency (see Nye, Short and Olson 1958), but also for studies using official records (e.g. Reiss and Rhodes 1961, Clark & Wenninger 1962). Chambliss (1973) gives an excellent description of a lower class and a middle class gang of comparable delinquency (but completely different police records). It may well have been that the influence of the Chicago school (e.g. Thrasher 1927, Shaw and McKay 1942) had caused a certain blindness to the historical novelty of forms of juvenile opposition across class and district limitations occurring in the Fifties.

- 15) Toby (1967) gives case studies of juvenile delinquents whose gang life took place in the late Fifties for so different countries such as Japan ("hooligan gang" = chimpira), Israel (chevra) and Sweden (raggare). He compares indicators of standard of living, economic growth and school attendance for some 20 countries showing the wide variation existing in the late Fifties. Although this is not his intention here thereby demonstrates that similar forms of youth gangs sprang up in countries that had school enrolment rates for the 14-17 age group between 13 % and 66 %, and that have differences in standard of living of 1 : 5. To me this is a good basis to assume that no national development, may it be the assembly of peers in schools, may it be the wide availability of cars or motor bikes, may it be a high consumption capacity for juveniles can account in itself (however it may contribute) for the more or less simultaneous upspringing of these new forms, of youth culture over so many countries in the world.
- 16) It is very difficult to tell to what degree does social science actually reflect the "world outside". It is quite obvious that after the Mid-Sixties sociologists were

hardly interested in juvenile gangs any more, and even when they were (such as; Willis 1978, 1979) they tended not to compare their results with previous ones in a historical perspective. Willis (1978) is a particularly striking example of this: he analyzed a gang of motor cyclists ("Rockers") in 1969 and describes the elements of their culture. He just mentions but takes no further notice of the fact that the leading figures of this gang (all boys are in the age group 20-25, born between 1944-1949) had previously been "Teddy Boys" and draw their experiences from those times.

This is even more true for the authors in the late Fifties/early Sixties: they were terribly interested in a "general theory" of delinquency, "peer groups" of juvenile gangs, but little in their specific historical meaning. The way they used to handle comparisons over time was by putting them into matrices organized by variables in order to find out how many studies had found an association between two variables and how many had not - the possibility of historical variations was not even considered. So it is bad luck for the hooligans that it is very difficult to detect their historical specificity even now.

- 17) An indicator of the homogeneity and interconnection of this new culture is a story told by Nicholas Ray, the director of "Rebel Without a Cause" about Elvis: "He dropped down to his knees and started to recite whole pages from the script. Elvis must have seen this film about a dozen times since he remembered every line of Jimmies' text." (Guralnick 1976).

- 18) Jerry Rubin, according to his introduction to "Do it!" (1970) seems to be one of them, and for him the connection is obvious: "The New Left sprang... From the rotating pelvis of Elvis" (17). This also constitutes an important element of my own biography: at the age of 13-16 (1959-1962) I was, although of middle class background, member of a hooligan gang then to be as a student of sociology strongly involved in the students' movement in Vienna 1967-1970. In both cases I experienced the sudden end of the movements, the young kids in the streets not forming gangs any more, trying to behave properly and avoiding police contacts, and the young students again sitting tamely in classrooms or bending to strict "cadre organizations" enforcing rather discipline than rebelliousness. Another case is an Italian girl who was in the same hooligan gang as I and then played an important role in the student movement in Naples. I also know of several Hungarian friends who as hooligans participated in the 1956-revolution and then were active in the - however quickly repressed - student's movement of 1968. These may be completely atypical private observations - but I wonder what more systematic research on this point would reveal.
- 19) Willis (1975) describes his observations of a hippy group contacted in 1969: he reports their age to be between just below twenty to just below thirty, which means born 1940-1950.
- 20) From biographical interviews conducted by a working group of German sociologists on "changes in socialization since 1945" with middle class members of this generation it is amazing how common these experiences were: almost all fathers either were absent or suffering from some kind of postwar depression or physical injuries. And almost all children were requested to fulfill some functions central for survival but otherwise were told to "get out of the way" and spend their afternoons in the street or in the

adjoining fields resp. woods with their peers whom they often were not permitted to bring back home. Playground was outside, and rarely supervised, and not in the homes. At home was a place to fulfill duties and to obey orders.

- 21) Physical punishment is of course only one indicator for the degree of "strictness" in child rearing, but nevertheless an important one. According to public opinion polls from Germany and Austria physical punishment started to become less common in the early Sixties - but a more differentiated analysis by age groups would be needed to test this hypothesis.
- 22) For the birth cohorts before (those that Schelsky 1957 called the "sceptical generation") childhood life typically was much more well ordered: a phase of economic recovery, of quasi-military discipline in schools and children/youth-organizations, a strengthening of familial authority ... The war/postwar disorganization made them prematurely adult, even if this allowed and required delinquent behavior, it was not for the fun of it but rather for plainly economic reasons. The cohorts after that, in the "reconstruction period", found fathers recovered or step fathers well installed, mothers - even if they were not only that - behaving as subservient housewives again and schools well organized. All that appeared quite self-evident - nothing different had been experienced before.
- 23) It is striking to see how widespread the interpretation model of "physical prematurity and emotional immaturity" was, not just among social scientists of those times (Riesman 1950, Muchow 1959, Fischer 1963, Undeutsch 1967) but also in the popularized versions of newspaper comments (for Austria see Schindler 1968). There was hardly any publication of youth sociology that did not mention the fact that sexual adulthood with girls (menarche) occurred a few years earlier in those days than it used to, emotio-

nal retardation being automatically presupposed in complete lack of empirical evidence. It is strange to see how our science selectively uses arguments referring to the body only for purposes of degradation of its objects (such as the more Lombrosian arguments used by the Gluecks 1956).

- 24) For Austria Schindler (1968, p. 28) has demonstrated a parallel development of juvenile delinquency in the two postwar periods that is statistically highly significant (on quite different absolute levels, though). In both cases there is a climax in the immediate postwar years, then a relative minimum in the ninth year after the end of the war, and then again a rise with a relative climax 12-14 years after the war.
- 25) If I talk about "countries" here I mean countries of the "first" and "second" world; probably the history of third world countries was just as much moulded by struggles and wars in the later years; but e.g. for China some of this also holds true.
- 26) I am from now on talking about the "bourgeois subject" although I see it in a much longer continuity of occidental conquest of the world. But it would be too far reaching to place my arguments in this wider frame of reference.
- 27) See e.g. Foucault 1975. This holds true on a societal as well as on a biographical level: physical punishment is used as a "last resort" for severe or insistent breaking of rules, and it also lies at the core of handling of children: to force the adult will upon them, be it by denying their basic needs or by intentionally inflicting pains upon them.

- 27a) This is seen by many authors. Muchow (1959, pp.94) devotes a whole chapter on "intensive body feelings" ("Intensives Leibgefühl") as a feature of contemporary youth.
- 28) There again was a severe contradiction between widely accepted norms and material experiences: pre-marital intercourse was often seen as illegitimate, even by the hooligans who practised it and then felt obliged to show their contempt for the girls who participated; the whole area of sex was still very strongly loaded by - partly religious - guilt feelings. Judged from a nowadays perspective the adult comments about the lack of sexual inhibitions in the youth of those times tells only something about the adults themselves.
- 29) Willis (1978) describes the way hippies got a "kick" out of risking their lives that way, and how important this moment of "kick" was.
- 30) Willis 1978, p.225 utters a certain amount of self-criticism on his neglect of girls in observing a rocker gang in a footnote. Previous (almost exclusively male) authors don't even find that worth while mentioning.
- 31) "The rockabilly attitude that Elvis Presley represented has generally been thought most suited to male performances. But rockabilly was more than a hard, aggressive form of music. During its heyday, it was also often viewed as a violation of masculine standards of behavior ... The eventual near-monopolization of rock music by men, and the frequently negative attitudes toward women in rock songs, should not blind us to this androgynous character of early rockabilly's male stars ... The political movement for women's rights and liberation of the 1970's attempts like these." (M.A. Bugwack, R.K. Oermann, Commentary on the cover to the record "Wild, Wild Young Women", Janis Martin, Rounder Records).

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