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Affection to and Exploitation of Europe: European Identity in the EU

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Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in Austria. The **Sociological Series** presents research done at the Department of Sociology and aims to share “work in progress” in a timely way before formal publication. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the content of their contributions.

Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern – dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften in Österreich. Die **Reihe Soziologie** bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit der Abteilung für Soziologie und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne Diskussionsbeiträge einer breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen.

Abstract

Since the 1990s, we have witnessed an increase in the search for European identity. Concepts of European identity are manifold and span from historical and political to cultural criteria. Less often, scholars refer to basic concepts of identity in psychology or sociology. We derive our understanding of European identity from both and conclude in a European identity based on the self-concept. It includes emotions, opportunistic attitudes and a strong impact of the social context. Data from the Eurobarometer help us to critically analyse this identity. We argue that European identity is an outcome of positive emotions towards Europe on the one hand and/or opportunistic attitudes towards the European Union on the other. An ordered logistic regression models proves that emotions and attitudes shape people's identification with Europe in the European Union (EU15 in 2003).

We observe large differences across European societies with high identification in Italy, Spain, France and Germany. The opposite is the case in Greece, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Concerning the effects of the predictors of European identity, affection is much more important for European identity than opportunistic attitudes.

Zusammenfassung

Das Interesse an und die Suche nach europäischer Identität hat seit den 1990er Jahren rapide zugenommen. Konzeptionalisierungen von europäischer Identität gipfeln heute in der Vielfalt der Verbindungen von historischen, kulturellen und politischen Elementen. Allerdings wird dabei oft darauf verzichtet, europäische Identität im Rahmen von allgemeinen Identitätstheorien zu beleuchten. Dieser Artikel versucht letztere in die Debatte um Europäische Identität einzuflechten. Europäische Identität wird dabei vom psychologisch geprägten Selbstkonzept beleuchtet. Sie beinhaltet Gefühle und opportunistische Verhaltensweisen, welche stark im sozialen Kontext zu sehen sind. Dieser Ansatz wird mit Daten des EuroBarometers (2003) kritisch untersucht. Die zentrale These läuft daraus hinauf, dass europäische Identität zum einen das Ergebnis von positiven Gefühlen gegenüber Europe ist und zum anderen aus opportunistischen Einstellungen der EU gegenüber resultiert.

Mithilfe einer ordinal-logistischen Regression kann diese zentrale Aussage für alle Mitglieder im Jahr 2003 (EU15) bestätigt werden. Allerdings lassen sich gravierende Länderunterschiede feststellen. Italiener, Spanier, Franzosen und Deutsche identifizieren sich stark mit Europe. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall in Griechenland, Schweden, Finnland, Irland und dem Vereinten Königreich. Auf den ersten Blick zeigt sich, dass Gefühle einen wesentlich stärkeren Einfluss ausüben als die Wahrnehmung von vorteilen der EU-Mitgliedschaft.

Keywords

European identity, personal identity, affection, economic opportunism, European Union, the EuroBarometer

Schlagwörter

Europäische Identität, Persönlichkeit, Verbundheit mit Europa, ökonomischer Opportunismus, Europäische Union, EuroBarometer

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Introduction

Since the 1990s, we have witnessed an increase in the search for European identity, which has reached unprecedented high levels in social science and politics. The European Union itself has supported a “common age of European identity” (Delgado-Moreira 1997). In the mean time, a lot of empirical studies within the political and social sciences (qualitative and quantitative) have been conducted in order to define what European identity could be like and whether people do identify with Europe (and to what extent). Yet, perceptions of European identity are manifold and multidimensional (Breakwell 2004).

This article approaches European identity from a selective angle. Departing from a concept of personal identity and its effects for societies, the general aim is to explain national patterns of European (and national) identity in a European comparative perspective. We combine elements of identity theories from sociology, social psychology and psychology to refer to an embracing concept of identity. After a brief overlook of research on European identity, we consequently analyse identity in a European context. Data is taken from the EuroBarometer 60.1 from 2003 (European Commission 2003). We describe European identity and its probable determinants in a comparative view based on European national societies. There we argue that two basic attitudes towards Europe and the European Union determine European identity. Emotions and economic opportunism account for a great deal of variation in European identity both across and within member states of the EU. Unfortunately, we cannot compare EU15 countries with the new member states yet.

1 Affective Identity & Identity as Instrument

Identity is seen as a fruitful category in the social sciences' theoretical approaches to manifold problems. In psychological and sociological research, problems of different kinds are commonly regarded under the term identity. Nationalism, for instance, is often seen under the premise of national identities (e.g. Anderson 1983; Arnason 2003; Billig 1995; Bloul 1999; Bowden 2003; Castells 1997; Hobsbawn 1990; Smith 1992). Group belongings, attitudes and personality are associated kinds of identities in psychology. Nevertheless, new developments in social life (globalization, the break-down of social structures, multifaceted societies, more reasons called by Welz (2000: 3)) have recently forced sociology to rethink concepts of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; von Busekist 2004; Giddens 1990; 1991).

Generally, identity refers 'to a notion of self as an orientation in a moral space' (Taylor 1989, quoted in Golmohamad 2004). Identity is based on the knowledge and situation of oneself in this space and bears some significance for the individual. Identity is thereby often seen as a possible source of explanation and precondition for human behavior. Hence, it functions as a possible explanation of human actions. Further, identity plays a role in holding societies together (Stets and Burke 2000; Stets and Burke 2002; Stryker 1989; Stryker and Burke 2000).

Psychology marks the beginning of research on identity. Erikson (1994[1959]) relates identity to a development process beginning in early childhood and enduring more or less the whole life. In his words, identity is a feeling of self, which 'grows into a persuasion that ego learns to undertake important steps towards a tangible collective future and develops to a defined ego within a social reality' (Erikson 1994[1959]: 17). The feeling of having a personal identity backs upon two concomitant observations of the individual. First, a person observes own continuity and sameness over time and second, s/he also observes that this sameness and continuity is perceived (and appreciated) by others. His conception of a personal identity however also includes, as was shown, conditions provided by the social context. The perception that others perceive ego's sameness relates to a crucial element in psychological identity theory. It clearly states that without others, without the social background and the connection to other individuals, identity will never develop. Already Erikson makes totally clear in this respect that identity is socially determined.

In further psychological research, three elements of a manifestation of personal identity are made out. First, identity is observed as a situational experience (Haußer 1995). Subjective importance, dismay, self-perception and self-judgment are of importance. The former directs to relations concerning the person and environment. How important is an object/ a topic for the individual? The idea behind refers to the principle that only topics, which are of salient importance influence one's identity. Self-perception, the way each individual is making a picture of him/herself assumes self-awareness and self-attention (Haußer 1995). Self-

judgment is done through comparisons with (social) norms and is experienced through a comparison of own demands and wishes.

Second, identity may be seen as a kind of cross-situational and internal processing (Haußer 1995: 25). Identity processing includes working consciously on oneself, hence a continuing internal hassle about the relationship between own experiences, convictions, emotions and expectations. Identity is in constant flux, always contested, re-arranged and controlled. Crucial to this point are generalizations over time and place. Identity (self-concept) is mainly made out as a generalized self-perception, self-esteem as generalized self-judgment and conviction of control as generalized personal control (Haußer 1995: 26). But how is it manageable to combine and integrate different self-perceptions into a holistic image? What relations do occur between the fields of personal behaviour, attitudes, feelings and special personal features? Criteria are continuity and consistency of own behaviour, accordance of behaviour with internal convictions, authenticity, individuality and equality.

Third, identity is a source of motivation. Seriousness about a relationship toward an object/topic leads to an obligatory internal attitude to get deeply involved with, to get bound and to commit oneself to this relationship. It is closely linked to engagement. Identity is thus a means to control for interests and for positive selections of elements in life. Interests and perceived needs only influence identity in case of internal importance, i.e. being of critical importance or affection to the person. However, not all experiences capture relevant aspects of a personal identity.

Identity theory (Stets and Burke 2000; Stryker 1989) emphasizes the social character of identity. Identity plays two important roles there. First, identity determines the ability to adapt to new situations and changes in society. The second function of identity is to guide role selection and role performance. The concept of society enters identity theory through commitment. The latter 'refers to the degree to which persons' relationships to others in their networks depend on possessing a particular identity and role' (Stryker and Burke 2000: 286). In fact, 'commitment shapes identity salience shapes role choice behaviour' (Stryker and Burke 2000: 286).

Social identity theory (Hogg, Abrams, Otten and Hinkle 2004; Tajfel and Turner 1986) relates identity to group membership (in a wide sense). Self-categorization, as the process of classifying and categorizing oneself, and social comparison are the two major processes involved in identity formation. 'Having a particular social identity means being at one with a certain group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group's perspective' (Stets and Burke 2002: 226). Self-categorization is the process of categorization, classifying or naming oneself in ways related to other classifications. It refers to 'the process of self-stereotyping' (Haslam 2001: 44).

Processes of labelling, naming and classifying objects make out categorizations. It can be applied to the self (self-categorization) and to groups (social-categorization). Social categories do not necessarily imply particular meanings to those categorized. Self- and social categorizing seem to be common human characteristics in order to give meaning to the world. Hence, social categories help us to know about the (social) environment, to classify objects and to give them a special meaning without the need for particular information about that object. The consequences are perceived similarities with others and differences from members of the outgroups. Social identity theory argues 'that after being categorized in terms of a group membership, and having defined themselves in terms of that social categorization, individuals seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their ingroup from a comparison outgroup on some valued dimension' (Haslam 2001: 31-2). A main function of groups seems then to be the enhancement of individuals to cope with their lives, to get anchored in society and to give positive meaning to life.

Collective identities, such as a European one, necessarily combine aspects of personal, social and role identities as briefly described above. In the context of a European identity, personal identity can be conceptualized as personal feelings and values towards Europe (and/or the European Union). Identity theory defines personal identity in a quite similar way. It 'is the set of meanings that are tied to and sustain the self as an individual; these self-meanings operate across various roles and situations' (Stets and Burke 2000: 229). On the other side, we might not ignore the social aspect of a collective European identity (von Busekist 2004). Collective identities are dynamic and depend on the context. They are constructed and depend on promoters. Collective identities rest upon a tradition, most often a common history, and maintain a close relationship to values. Further, they draw borders and contain a 'central motif as in music or a pertinent common denominator that permits individuals to recognize and articulate their attachment when it is conscious' (von Busekist 2004: 82).

Further, European identity assumes a *category Europe(an)*. A social understanding of Europe, which goes beyond personal meanings of Europe, defines to a large extent what and who is European. We argue that for European identity not only the self-perception as a European is important. Much more, this social perception and acceptance by others as such is equally crucial.

Recently, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) have criticized the concept of identity in general terms. They argue for a tripartite structure of identity. Its parts are *identifications and categorizations*, *self-understandings and social location*, and *communality, connectedness and groupness*. Identification occurs as self-identification and identification of oneself by others (external identification). Identification does not result in internal sameness (as does identity), but leads to one's own categorizations, locations, situations and places in life.

Self-understanding is defined as '[...] one's sense of who one is, of one's social location, and of how (given the first two) one is prepared to act' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 17). Its advantage lies in the conception of possible variability and/or stability over time and space, lacking the semantical meaning of sameness as the term identity implies. As a subjective concept, self-understanding cannot come up with objectivity demanded by strong concepts of identity. "Communality" denotes the sharing of some common attribute, "connectedness" the relational ties that link people' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 20). Groupness is seen as 'the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary group' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 20). Communality and connectedness together may result in groupness, but still are not necessary for groupness. For large-scale collectivities for example, connectedness plays a minor role 'when a diffuse self-understanding as a member of a particular nation crystallizes into a strongly bounded sense of groupness, this is likely to depend not on relational connectedness, but rather on a powerfully imagined and strongly felt communality' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 20).

For further analysis, all these considerations imply the following. We depart from a personal and social understanding of European identity. However, we focus on personal meanings, feelings and perceptions of the European Union in order to describe patterns of identification with Europe (in Brubaker and Cooper's (2000) sense). We are aware that this approach is not the only possible one. Therefore, a brief overview is given of the main scholarly attempts to elaborate on European identity in the next section.

2 European Identity

European identity is portrayed from many perspectives. As this analysis focuses on one of such, other approaches towards European identity are described in brief in order to allow for a categorization. One idea in the European identity discourse is the link to a common European past. In the literature, European identity is set in relation to the historical development of Europe, most often as a history of a continent. Present Europe can thus rely on common experience, based in the Greek and Roman legacy, Christianity, Enlightenment, Humanism, Renaissance, and democracy. The large majority of scholars however argue against the possibility to create and foster European identity on a common history of Europe emphasizing aspects of closeness among European peoples (Burgess 2002; Delanty 1995; Harris 2003; Llobera 2003; Stráth 2002). They cannot make out the crucial aspect of unity for the existence of a European identity. 'European history is still an agglomeration of its national histories' (Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 580) and 'such [a] historical idea of Europe does not capture what the modern idea of Europe stands for' (McGee 2003: 4) are statements, which prove the difficulties one challenges by arguing for an identity based on past common experience.

European identity is also highlighted as being based on cultural elements, which are common to (all) European countries. This approach, although linked to the common history, is often target of specific policies of the European Union. According to Jacobs and Maier (1998) '[an] effort has been made to stress and discursively construct a common culturally defined European identity in a similar way as national identities [...]' (1998: 19). Cultural policies of the European Union encompass the creation and invention of shared symbols. Although often labelled as efforts to 'sell the Community' (Sassatelli 2002: 436), these symbols (the European flag, anthem, passport, driving licence, 9th May-Europe Day,...) have functioned and still function as a means of highlighting common icons across the European Union and are seen (not only by the EU) as means of strengthening European awareness and even identity (e.g. Giesen 2002).

European cultural (ethnic) identity entails further the notions of unity, diversity and *unity in diversity*. Culture is having an 'unrealized "European" and unifying potential that just needs to be cultivated and encapsulated by suitable political beliefs and institutions' Hedetoft (1999: 84) argues. Cultural identity on a European level is not self-evident but relies on promotion. European cultural identity is characterized as multifaceted or even as non-existing due to its national content and lack of generalization on a European level. Most often, the lack of a common language is mentioned, as a reason why European identity based on culture could not have evolved since 1945. The missing European language has thus 'not only hindered the practical business of the EU, it has also hindered the popular identification of Europeans with their politicians, and with each other' (Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 581). Unity in diversity assumes cultural differences across Europe to be the valued content of European

culture. It does not lead towards unification but rather highlights differences and harmony among them. It corresponds towards a postmodern conception of identity, where a 'multicultural' Europe defines a further layer of identity. Such a concept might help to arrange European cultural identities (national and regional ones) not being detrimental to a common European identity, although it remains rather difficult to image how such a European cultural identity contributes to identification at a European level (Sassatelli 2002).

The third narrative of European identity refers to its political aspects (civic identity). Here, European identity is obviously an identity of people living in the European Union. Supporters rely on the power to establish/foster new identities with methods of political integration beyond forms of nationalism/ national identity. But such an identity underlies the assumption that people share trust and confidence in the polity unless it 'tends to lose out as soon as there is a disagreement about political unity affirming policies' (Harris 2003: 25).

A major strain in European political identity is European Union citizenship. Concerning a political identity for all Europeans, *Union citizenship* comes certainly at the top of the agenda (e.g. Hansen 2000; Höjelid 2001; Jacobs and Maier 1998; Lehning 2001; Stråth 2002). Delanty (1997) argues for a European identity of such a kind. His rather institutional perspective on identity proposes a post-national concept of citizenship emphasizing citizens' rights, duties, participation and identity. A post-national notion of identity revering human rights, environment, democracy and multiculturalism shall help to challenge trends of nationalism and particularism in Europe and establish a European identity.

A further distinction among identities, which also relates to a European level, is conceptualizing instrumental and affective identities. Instrumental identities are based on a rational individual calculating own benefits of a 'differentiated belonging'. These identities mainly target economic, but also refer to political kinds of opportunism. Especially this aspect comes to the fore in our project as '[t]he perception of the potential gains or losses that might result from membership of a given social group may influence peoples' identifications with it' (Jiménez *et al.* 2004: 5). Identifications with the European Union might be due to intensive financial support of the people living in particular regions. Identification is also likely due to the hypothesis that 'the better the citizen's evaluation of the results of European policies (compared to the results of policies pursued by national governments), the more likely s/he is to feel European' (Jiménez *et al.* 2004: 5).

Affective identities grant for a strong feeling of belonging and an emotional attachment to a social group. Literature suggests that European identity might lack such affection in comparison to national identity (e.g. McGee 2003). Affection is especially important for identities to prolong in times of deteriorating living circumstances. Once the economic advantages through membership lose in salience, non affective European identities rapidly dissolve.

The latter outlines of European identity refer to the concept applied here. With us, European identity is now seen under the light of emotional attachment to Europe and in terms of economic opportunism. According to e.g. Delanty (1995), Fossum (2004), Habermas and Derrida (2003), Hedetoft (1999), Licata (2003), Shore (2004), Thomas (2002) or Weiler (1997), European identity can be seen as an effect of proverbial exploitation and opportunism towards the European Union. People tend to appreciate (aspects of) Europe and the EU respectively due to promising outcomes of those attitudes in the future (in economic or other kinds). On the other hand, European identity can also be based on affection, feelings of belonging and pride in the form of an emotional relationship towards Europe and the EU. We argue that emotions and perceived advantages positively contribute to people's identification with Europe. The main research questions focus on the extent of variation of European identity in dependence on emotions and affections to Europe and economic opportunistic attitudes. The latter aspect closely relates to an evaluation of the national membership of the European Union, whereas affection is related to pride to be European and attachment to Europe. We argue that both views contribute to people's identification with Europe as measured in the EuroBarometer 60.1 (European Commission 2003).

In this respect, the EuroBarometer 60.1 offers the opportunity to relate survey questions to each other in all member states of the European Union in 2003 (EU15). We first analyse identification with Europe in depth. Afterwards we turn to a description of the variables concerning affection and economic opportunistic attitudes and their impacts on European identity in section 3.

Traditionally, this political survey of the European Union asks for identity in relation to anticipated citizenship feelings in the near future. The wording of the central question runs "In the near future, do you see yourself as...?" (cf. Question 43 in European Commission 2003). Valid answer categories are national only, national and European, European and national or European only. The identity in question seems to be of a kind of self-understanding in the sense of Brubaker and Cooper (2000). Additionally, the answer to this question is inherently made up of speculations about the future. Defining European identity in opposition to national ones makes it more likely that people perceive European identity as based on an idea of citizenship. We therefore deal with a more or less political concept of European identity concerning its content. The exploration of the structure of such a European identity is now the primary aim of this part.

Table I European and National Identity in the EU15. Percentages of People Indicating National and European Identities

		Political Identities (Self-Perceptions) in the EU15					
		<i>National and European Identity</i>				<i>Aggregates</i>	
Country	N	National only	National and European	European and National	European only	<i>Weak European</i>	<i>Strong European</i>
Austria	987	47	44	7	3	53	10
Belgium	991	41	43	9	6	59	15
Denmark	989	37	56	6	1	63	6
EU15	15699	41	48	7	3	59	11
Finland	1015	57	40	2	1	43	3
France	982	36	52	9	4	64	12
Germany	1962	39	47	10	4	61	14
Greece	995	51	43	4	2	49	6
Ireland	980	50	45	4	1	50	5
Italy	977	26	62	8	4	74	12
Luxembourg	562	25	44	15	16	75	31
Netherlands	993	44	48	7	2	56	8
Portugal	986	52	44	3	2	48	5
Spain	971	30	60	6	4	70	9
Sweden	983	48	46	5	1	52	6
United Kingdom	1326	64	29	5	3	36	8

Source: the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003). Data weighted.

A description of the data on European identity naturally defines the starting point of the empirical study. The EuroBarometer 60.1 asks for European identity in a way that compares European and national self-perceptions in the near future. Four answer categories, ranging from national to European identity, define the spectrum of core European identity as measured in the EuroBarometer.

As is shown in table I, it is almost impossible to draw a single picture about Europeans' identities according to the EuroBarometer. The table shows univariate distributions of identity by country and also presents aggregates of European identity. The variable *weak European* refers to the percentage of people indicating any European element in their identities, whereas *strong European* identities are these when people say that 'Europe comes first or only'.

Large parts of European populations indicate that they see themselves exclusively national in the near future. However, about the half or more in each country except the United Kingdom also include some aspects of Europeanness in their near future identities. In a European perspective (EU15), 59 per cent of all respondents indicate a European identity, a fifth of them (11 per cent) even a very strong European identity. 4 out of 10 people however report that they see themselves only as nationals in the near future.

Rather large national differences occur within the EU. There are peoples appreciating the EU in terms of identity. This is especially true for Belgium (15 per cent with strong European identities, and almost 60 per cent with weak ones), France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg. In fact these are very important countries for the Union. Belgium and Luxembourg are directly involved in a way that European institutions have their headquarters in these states. Germany and France are the largest countries, and perhaps the most important ones for European integration. In Italy and Spain, European identity is also widespread among the people (not so in Greece or Portugal, the remaining southern European countries).

In other countries, however, people do not feel European to such an extent. Low European identity can be observed especially in the United Kingdom, but also in Finland, Sweden, Greece, Portugal and Austria. Some of these countries have joined the European Union rather recently in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), which could possibly explain a rather low identification with Europe. Portugal and Greece however are members for a long time. In contrast to their fellow southern European countries, people do not appreciate the idea of a future European identity. Especially low is identification with Europe in the United Kingdom. The British are grouches as far as Europe and European identity are concerned.

Very strong European identities (in terms of a comparison with national ones) are rare in the European Union. Only in countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and

Luxembourg, a considerable share of the total population (10 per cent or more) indicates an overwhelming European identity.

Corresponding to the low rates of European identity among the British, the Portuguese, the Greek and the Finish, we observe that in these countries the percentages of 'nationals' are very high. They range from 64 per cent in the UK to 51 per cent in Greece. Additionally, the Irish also report to a majority that they exclusively feel national instead of combining it with elements of European identification. Very low is the share of these people in Italy and Luxembourg (going along with strong European identifications) and in Denmark, Germany, France and especially Spain, where people tend to have 'a little bit of Europe' in their veins.

Concluding about European identity tells that people are more likely to see themselves as Europeans in Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, France and Germany. (Much) Lower are these percentage of Europeans especially in the United Kingdom, in Ireland, in the Scandinavian countries Sweden and Finland, in Portugal and Greece and finally in Austria.

3 Feelings or Opportunism?—Importance for Identification with Europe

National differences in identification with Europe probably lead towards different associations between affections and economic opportunistic attitudes and European identity. Before turning to their effects on levels of identification with Europe, I briefly refer to their basic distributions among national populations and across European societies.

Table II Concepts and Measurements of Orientations towards Europe in the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003).

Affection towards Europe

And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be European?

People may feel different degrees of attachment to their own town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe.

(1) very attached; (2) fairly attached; (3) not very attached; (4) not at all attached or (5) don't know.

(Economic) Opportunism towards Europe

Generally speaking, do you think that Our Country's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad or don't know?

Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Our country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

Source: the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003).

For the affective dimension of European identity, we refer to the indicators of pride to be European and to emotional attachment to Europe in addition to other localities (town, region and country). The assumption is that these two criteria make out (amongst other characteristics which are, unfortunately, not observed) the affective component of a European identity. Wordings are presented in table II. (Economic) Opportunism towards the EU refers to perceived (economic) gains of the nation state. These (economic) advantages through the membership might lead towards people's identification with the supranational body.

Table III shows univariate distributions of two variables related to the affective dimension of identification with Europe. We choose pride to be European and attachment to Europe as

indicators for emotional belonging to Europe and the European Union respectively. As outlined above, affection to Europe is regarded as a probable power of explanation of variation of levels of European identity. People in most countries report they are proud to be European. In a EU15 perspective, 54 per cent are fairly proud and 15 per cent are very proud to be European. Only one tenth is not proud at all in a European perspective.

Once again, national differences occur to a great extent but do not necessarily go along with different rates of European identity among the populations. The Irish are the most proud. 28 per cent say they are very and 59 per cent report they are fairly proud to be European followed by Italian, Luxembourg, Spanish and Austrian people (78 per cent are at least fairly proud to be European). In these countries, the vast majority is proud to be European; and as national pride is generally high in these countries (not shown here), European and national pride go along with each other in these countries.

Table III Pride to Be European and Attachment to Europe. Percentages of Europeans Indicating Emotions to Europe.

Country	N	Proud to be European				N	Attachment to Europe			
		not at all	not very	fairly	very		not at all	not very	fairly	very
Austria	896	6	17	55	23	986	5	28	44	24
Belgium	965	7	24	52	16	1010	7	25	47	21
Denmark	934	4	22	54	20	988	4	22	52	22
EU15	14498	11	21	54	15	15745	10	30	45	15
Finland	985	5	19	57	19	1004	4	33	52	11
France	896	13	21	54	12	987	12	30	43	15
Germany	1720	14	28	48	9	1958	6	30	49	15
Greece	979	10	24	46	19	996	12	36	35	17
Ireland	869	4	9	59	28	966	10	30	46	15
Italy	948	3	11	63	23	990	6	25	54	15
Luxembourg	563	7	17	45	31	574	4	18	45	32
Netherlands	952	9	26	55	10	974	21	49	24	6
Portugal	923	7	22	59	12	978	8	27	49	16
Spain	923	4	16	62	19	980	5	26	49	20
Sweden	939	5	20	57	18	965	4	22	52	22
United Kingdom	1192	21	26	44	9	1331	22	35	36	7

Source: the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003). Data weighted.

Among those countries with lower shares of people being proud to be European, the British take the lead. 21 per cent are not at all proud to be European, followed by 26 per cent who are not very proud to be so either. In sum, almost half of the population of the UK is not very proud to be European. Neither are Germans. 42 per cent of them say they are not very proud being European, followed by 35 per cent of the Dutch and 34 per cent of the French and the Greek.

Attachment to Europe is the second criterion of emotional identification with Europe. As for the degree of feeling of belonging to Europe, 60 per cent of all people asked indicate that they feel at least fairly attached to the European level. In this 'global' perspective people admit feelings of belonging, although to a much lower degree than being attached to their nation (91 per cent), region (87) or town/ village (89).

Especially low is the former kind of attachment in the Netherlands. Only 3 out of 10 say that they feel at least fairly attached to Europe. A large share of 21 out of 100 respondents say that they do not feel attached at all to the European level. Even in the UK, people feel more attached to Europe (42 per cent). However a rather large share of 22 per cent indicate also no feelings of attachment and 35 per cent only very weak ones, which leads to the observation that variation of feelings of belonging to Europe is large in the United Kingdom.

People feel most attached to Europe in Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Luxembourg. In other countries, about the half of the population feels attached to Europe.

For the univariate description of the remaining indicators for (economic) opportunism at a European level, we refer to the variables evaluation of the membership of the European Union at the country level and to the personal perception of benefits due to this membership. In connection with identification in Europe, these two aspects refer to the possibility that opportunism proves to be another reason (besides affection) for European identity.

The evaluation of the membership of the European Union results in far ranging positive statements of the (economic) gains. In the EU15, 51 per cent of all people say that their country's membership is a good thing. Only 16 per cent state that membership is a bad thing. In a comparative view, membership is highly evaluated in Ireland (77 per cent argue for a good thing) and Luxembourg (78). Still widely positive is this kind of assessment in Spain, the Netherlands (each 64 per cent), Greece (63) and Italy (61). Interestingly, although the Greek are grouches concerning Europe as is shown in the previous chapter, they highly appreciate the membership of their country. Rather low is this attitude in Finland, Sweden and the UK. Only 40 per cent or less (in the UK only 32 per cent) say that membership is a good thing. In the latter two countries, one third even says that membership has turned out negatively. Hence it seems that people in these countries do not see the advantages for their country as elsewhere across the continent.

The last statement is corroborated by referring to the question concerning (overall) benefits for the country due to membership. Although not asking for economic ones, the question wording lets us assume that people think of especially economic gains due to national membership. Again, in Sweden, Finland, the UK and Austria, people do not perceive benefits for the country due to the membership of the European Union. 47 per cent in Austria, 46 in Finland, only 40 of the British and 38 per cent of the Swedish people report that their country has benefited. Across the European Union however, some populations such as the Irish, the Greek, the Danish and the Spanish say that membership has brought (still brings) benefits at the country level. In Ireland, a country not overwhelmingly identifying with the European Union, 90(!) per cent say that membership is positive in terms of received benefits. In Greece this share amounts to 82, in Spain and Luxembourg to 77, in Denmark and in Portugal to three quarters each. In these countries the vast majority perceives benefits, and even in Germany, often labelled the largest net paying country, 50 per cent of the population say that Germany has benefited and still does so.

Table IV Evaluation of the EU Membership and Perceived (Economic) Advantages. In Per Cent of People by Country.

Country	N	Evaluation			N	Benefits	
		good	neither nor	bad		yes	no
Austria	973	36	44	20	861	47	53
Belgium	992	58	30	12	896	65	35
Denmark	978	59	19	22	877	76	24
EU15	15154	51	33	16	13043	58	42
Finland	994	40	38	23	887	46	54
France	986	45	37	17	822	59	41
Germany	1838	51	38	11	1486	50	50
Greece	983	63	30	7	917	82	18
Ireland	954	77	16	6	923	90	10
Italy	969	61	29	10	850	58	42
Luxembourg	577	78	15	6	526	77	23
Netherlands	978	64	24	12	885	61	39
Portugal	917	59	29	12	872	75	25
Spain	962	64	28	8	851	77	23
Sweden	985	41	27	32	813	38	62
United Kingdom	1199	32	35	33	1036	40	60

Source: the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003). Data weighted.

As has been shown so far, European identity can but needs not go along with high attachment to the European Union (Europe) and positive evaluations of the membership of the European Union. National differences exist to a large extent so to speak of a common European perspective (EU15) means to lose critical information about the relationship between identity and attachment on the one hand and positive evaluations and identity on the other.

The next step is to formulate a model, which accounts for different probabilities of identifying with Europe according to the categorical measurement. We strive for explaining variation of identification with Europe in dependence of variables taken from two dimensions. Affective orientations and (economic) opportunism have been outlined as two possible sources of different levels of European identity. As our measure of European identity is a categorical (ordinal) variable, we refer to an ordered logistic regression model. Given our four explanatory variables, which are also of categorical scale, yields the necessity to estimate 12 parameters in total (3 intercepts, 3 for pride and attachment, 2 for the evaluation and 1 for perceived benefits).

Table V shows the results of the ordered logistic regression model, which assumes that effects of the explanatory variables are equal (proportional) across different intensities of identification with Europe (Agresti 2002, R Development Core Team 2004). It assumes different intercepts (thresholds) for the categories of the ordered response variable. The effects of the explanatory variables are all the same (hence proportional) in the categories of the response. The effects of the variables X are called eta (η) and indicate the influence of the variables on the right hand side of the regression equation. Only the threshold varies according to the value of the response and indicates the probability in falling into category k or less ($P(Y \leq k | x)$) given a combination of the criterion variables X . The value of this formula is the logit (log odds) of this probability. We use the free statistical software R (R Development Core Team 2004), hence the model takes the form

$$\text{logit } P(Y \leq k | x) = \zeta_k - \eta$$

where ζ_k denotes the threshold for belonging to category k or lower and η is the linear predictor. Intercepts refer to the logits ($\log [p/(1-p)]$) of belonging to category k or lower of the dependent variable. The parameters of the criterion variables show the strength of various indicator variables.

Table V Orderer Logistic Regressions on European Identity by Affection and Evaluation Criteria concerning the European Union. Regression Coefficients (Logits) and Standard Errors in Brackets.

Country	Parameters and (Standard Errors) of the Ordered Logistic Regression Model (Proportional Logits)																				
	Intercepts			Pride			Attachment			Membership			Benefits								
	1-2	2-3	3-4	not very	fairly	very	not very	fairly	very	neither	bad	no									
Austria	.98	3.82	5.27	.55	(.49)	.96	(.48)	1.30	(.50)	.96	(.57)	1.44	(.56)	1.38	(.58)	-.34	(.22)	-.73	(.27)	-1.06	(.22)
Belgium	1.50	3.91	4.95	1.35	(.50)	2.18	(.50)	2.58	(.52)	.01	(.37)	.37	(.36)	.51	(.38)	-.17	(.19)	-1.17	(.28)	-.14	(.19)
Denmark	2.90	6.68	9.52	1.64	(.66)	2.28	(.65)	2.49	(.67)	1.30	(.73)	2.03	(.72)	2.50	(.73)	-.46	(.23)	-.75	(.27)	-.59	(.25)
EU15	.86	3.89	5.11	.44	(.09)	.91	(.09)	1.18	(.10)	.80	(.10)	1.53	(.10)	1.71	(.11)	-.55	(.05)	-1.14	(.07)	-.37	(.05)
Finland	1.58	5.25	6.58	1.76	(.76)	2.34	(.75)	2.70	(.77)	-.51	(.53)	-.11	(.54)	-.04	(.58)	-.54	(.19)	-1.19	(.26)	-.53	(.19)
France	1.22	4.54	5.96	.26	(.36)	1.08	(.36)	1.75	(.43)	1.72	(.41)	2.34	(.42)	2.19	(.46)	-.67	(.22)	-1.21	(.30)	-.39	(.20)
Germany	.32	3.02	4.24	.31	(.21)	.41	(.20)	.61	(.27)	.94	(.36)	1.49	(.37)	1.66	(.40)	-.90	(.15)	-1.11	(.22)	-.30	(.14)
Greece	2.81	5.88	6.86	1.69	(.48)	2.37	(.48)	2.83	(.50)	.32	(.32)	.77	(.33)	.86	(.36)	.70	(.18)	-.18	(.41)	-.46	(.25)
Ireland	3.10	6.20	7.92	1.75	(1.13)	2.38	(1.11)	2.77	(1.12)	.80	(.49)	1.25	(.49)	1.13	(.52)	-.31	(.27)	-1.01	(.46)	-.46	(.38)
Italy	.18	4.01	5.18	.62	(.62)	1.21	(.61)	1.80	(.63)	.05	(.42)	1.31	(.42)	1.36	(.47)	-.46	(.23)	-1.31	(.34)	-.52	(.21)
Luxembourg	.59	2.81	3.75	1.39	(.52)	1.91	(.51)	1.94	(.53)	-.59	(.65)	.46	(.63)	.40	(.65)	-.49	(.31)	.08	(.44)	-.05	(.26)
Netherlands	1.36	4.38	6.46	1.27	(.34)	1.58	(.34)	2.01	(.40)	.64	(.21)	.71	(.24)	1.10	(.35)	-.51	(.20)	-.54	(.27)	-.17	(.17)
Portugal	.94	4.34	5.41	.07	(.51)	1.21	(.50)	1.45	(.55)	-.25	(.44)	.78	(.44)	.53	(.47)	-.33	(.20)	-.61	(.35)	-.59	(.25)
Spain	.32	3.95	5.03	.74	(.60)	1.82	(.60)	1.72	(.63)	-.40	(.57)	.26	(.58)	.65	(.60)	-.06	(.24)	-.39	(.36)	-.71	(.27)
Sweden	-.37	3.17	4.77	.73	(.49)	.11	(.48)	1.40	(.52)	-.19	(.52)	-.05	(.52)	.19	(.54)	-.62	(.26)	-1.24	(.28)	-.98	(.25)
United Kingdom	1.68	4.09	5.22	.43	(.32)	.87	(.31)	.69	(.40)	1.05	(.36)	1.87	(.38)	3.00	(.45)	-.35	(.21)	-.54	(.25)	-.79	(.21)

Source: the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003). Data weighted.

The reference group is always constituted by people perceiving advantages but without affection to the European Union (Europe). This choice reflects a rather cold but reasonable and frequent perspective on the European Union. For a long time, identification in terms of emotional attachment was not a question at all. The three intercepts refer to these groups and denote the different 'starting logits' (thresholds) for the various levels of the dependent variable *European identity*. The higher these logits the more likely people define themselves as belonging to category k or lower of the variable European identity. In other words, the higher these intercepts, the more probable are identifications with the nation and weak forms of European identity.

Table V includes too much information to be presented here in every detail. Therefore we describe only a small part of the results. We start with an introductory example and then refer to three important combinations of affection and opportunistic attitudes towards the European Union.

Generally, each ordered logistic regression model accounts for approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the observed variation (Nagelkerke's R^2). Model fit is satisfactory according to the deviance statistic as well. According to the standard errors of the coefficients, most of them are statistically significant at a 5 per cent (α) level.

In a European Union perspective (valid for 2003) a threshold 1-2 logit of .86 indicates that about 70 per cent of the people do only identify with the nation in case they are not at all proud to be European, not at all attached to the European Union, but perceive advantages and benefits because of the membership (reference categories). Let me, for presentation reasons, define the probability of being national only in case such a person does not perceive advantages (benefits) at all. This person reports that membership is a bad thing and that he does not perceive any benefits in addition to the reference group. Thus, we have to add effects of the linear predictors to the baseline logit of the according level of the ordered factor *European identity*. Feeling nationally without attachment nor perceived advantages yields the equation logit $P(Y = 1|X) = .86 - (-1.14 + (-.37)) = 2.37$, which corresponds to an odd of 10.7, which itself corresponds to a probability of .91. Hence, a person who does not feel affection nor perceives any benefits is very likely to only identify with the nation (91 per cent do so according to the proportional odds logistic regression model).

The example outlined above mentions one of the three basic sub groups of all societies to which we now refer. We show rates of European identity dependent on selected combinations of attitudes concerning affection and opportunism towards Europe and the European Union respectively.

Table VI sums up the differences described above for all countries. I refer to the selected groups as the groups *Base*, *Pro* and *Idea*. The first group refers to the reference group (baseline). 'Base' people therefore are not attached to Europe but evaluate membership of

the European Union positively. The group Pro refers to people feeling emotionally attached to Europe and perceiving advantages due to the membership. Hence, this group combines affection with instrumental appreciation of Europe and the European Union. Group Idea feels close to the European Union and Europe in emotional terms but cannot make out advantages. Therefore, they are characterized as being idealistically oriented towards the idea of a common Europe. Generally, these percentages vary to a considerable degree across European countries.

Table VI shows percentages of people identifying with Europe (at least to a small extent) in dependence of four central criterion variables. Having the same attitudes and/or emotions towards the European Union yields different percentages of people with European identity. The following interpretations are based on different groups sizes. In so far, results have to be interpreted carefully and cannot be inferred to the overall level in the countries described.

In Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, people without affection but with positive attitudes towards the membership of the European Union already highly identify with their nation. More than 40 per cent of those people indicate at least a weak European identity although they are not proud to be European nor attached to Europe. Rather few people with the same orientations identify with Europe in Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the UK. Less than 10 per cent (in the UK 16 per cent) report identification with Europe in this case. In a general EU15 perspective, one third of all people with these orientations say that they feel at least a bit European.

Comparing group Base to the group Pro means that people additionally feel strongly attached to Europe in the latter. Throughout the European Union, identification with Europe is high if affection and positive evaluation (opportunism) is present in people's minds. As can be seen, percentages of 'Europeans' are very high among those people and amount to 95 per cent in Italy. This share is only significantly lower in Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Despite very positive attitudes and feelings towards Europe, many people reject European identity in these countries. In the United Kingdom and Denmark, feelings of pride and attachment have very strong effects on identification with Europe, as low percentages in group Base have been compensated in group Pro. In Greece and Ireland, these effects are also significant but not as strong as in the UK or Denmark.

Table VI People Identifying with Europe. Sub Groups of National Populations According to Selected Criteria. In Per Cent.

Country	Sub Groups		
	Base	Pro	Idea
Austria	27	84	48
Belgium	18	83	57
Denmark	5	89	68
EU15	30	88	62
Finland	17	75	34
France	23	94	75
Germany	42	88	63
Greece	6	71	56
Ireland	4	69	34
Italy	45	95	76
Luxembourg	36	85	86
Netherlands	20	85	74
Portugal	28	74	46
Spain	42	89	72
Sweden	59	88	43
United Kingdom	16	88	66

Source: the EuroBarometer 60.1 (2003). Data weighted.

Notes:

Sub groups are exactly described in the text. However, group Base refers to people with no affection towards Europe, although evaluating the EU positively. Group Pro refers to people having both affection and highly appreciate the EU in terms of advantages and perceived benefits. The third group, Idea, refers to people with emotional attachment to Europe but a critical perspective towards the benefits of the European Union.

People in group Idea are ideologically bound to Europe and the European Union. Although they do not perceive any advantages because of EU membership, they feel pride to be European and very attached to Europe. Although percentages are lower than throughout groups Pro, it can be seen that people with European identity are much more often found among these groups than among the baseline (reference) group. Hence, having feelings of pride and belonging to Europe makes it more likely to identify with Europe than opportunistic attitudes towards the European Union in a general perspective. Concerning the EU15, 62 per cent of people being proud and attached to Europe but perceiving negative

consequences of the EU membership, still identify with Europe. Only in Austria, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, this percentage drops below 50 in case people perceive no advantages but feel attached. Hence, another critical finding suggests that in these countries, it is more necessary to perceive (economic) benefits than in other parts of the European Union back in 2003. People in those five countries can be labelled more opportunistic concerning their attitudes towards Europe and the EU than other populations in Europe.

These are the major findings presented here. Alternative interpretations of the results of the applied ordered logistic regression model are manifold. Due to the fact that all coefficients are presented in table V and guidance is supplied for interpretation of the model, the reader shall be capable of making inferences of other kinds.

4 What makes Europeans?

We try to explain different levels of identification with Europe. We derive our theoretical understanding of European identity from basic identity theories. Combining elements of personal and social identity theory yields a profound understanding of European identity. Hence, we can argue that European identity is both a self-concept of people relating to an important social context in Europe. Identities reflect people's motivations towards and commitment to a particular institution (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Collective identities, such as the European one, further include elements of shared experience.

European identity is most often seen from a historical, political and cultural perspective. Scholars link European identity and its emergence to a common past departing from ancient Greece in Europe. They refer to the political identity of the European Union and/or highlight cultural aspects (shared culture) in Europe.

We combine elements of prior research but highlight a personal European identity, focusing on politico-cultural content. With data taken from the EuroBarometer 60.1 (European Commission 2003) we strive for the explanation of varying levels of identification with Europe dependent on affective and opportunistic orientations towards Europe and the EU in the fifteen member states in 2003. We show that levels of European identity are generally high. Especially the Italians, Spanish, French, Germans and Luxembourg identify strongly with Europe. Concerning the effects of emotions, we find out that feelings of pride and belonging to Europe are crucial in predicting higher levels of European identity. But opportunism also plays a significant role in most of the countries. People perceiving gains due to the EU membership of their country are more likely to identify with Europe than opponents of the EU. Nevertheless, comparing emotions and opportunistic attitudes in their predictive power, affection takes the lead. Identification with Europe is thus very likely in case one is proud to be European and feels attached to the continent.

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