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# Expected Stability: Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation

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Defining and Measuring Democratic  
Consolidation

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# **Expected Stability**

## Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation

**Andreas Schedler**

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**November 1997**

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## Editorial

This is the first editorial I write as a Managing Editor of the IAS Political Science Series (PSS) and it is at the same time the last one. I am about to leave the Institute for Advanced Studies and move to CIDE, the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, in Mexico-City. A big move, and certainly a good motive to drop a note of good-bye (even if I probably should leave the field to our migration specialists).

It is fair to say that the Political Science Series has proved to be a very successful product innovation. At its beginning, in 1992, some colleagues were deeply skeptical. “This has been done before,” they said, “and it has failed.” Well, this time it was different. The PSS triggered a thorough reorganization of the entire Institute’s publication policies and established itself as the best-selling series. Overall, it has developed into a multi-faceted, lively, and renowned platform of the IAS Political Science.

I wish to thank here all our contributors as well as our readers. And I want to extend a special thank you to the Series’ strong woman in the background, Mrs. Gertrud Hafner, who with great patience and dedication has done all the copy-editing of the past 50 numbers.

From 1 October, my friend and colleague Josef Melchior will take over as the PSS Managing Editor. I am sure he will do a wonderful job in keeping up the high quality and the high spirits of the Series. I wish him and the Department of Political Science all the best and I very much am looking forward to reading the next 50 issues.

Andreas Schedler, September 1997





## Abstract

The paper starts with a probabilistic definition of democratic consolidation. A democratic regime is consolidated, it claims, when it has acquired a high probability of survival. The article discusses some implications and complications of this definition: its probabilistic foundations and its continuous, cognitive, and subjective nature. This descriptive concept of democratic consolidation, the text argues in continuation, helps avoiding two common methodological pitfalls: etiological definitions (that fail to distinguish between defining features and causal variables) and operational definitions (that fail to distinguish between concepts and operational indicators). The essay concludes with some reflections on the observation and measurement of democratic consolidation.

**Notes**

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Democratic consolidation (DC) is an elusive concept that bears many faces and wears many clothes. Students of new democracies use it to describe a wide range of tasks and realities. In a previous paper, I proposed that we should distinguish five concepts of DC which carry different teleological implications: preventing democratic breakdown, preventing democratic erosion, institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy, and deepening democracy (see Schedler 1997). The present essay will ignore this plurality of competing meanings that surrounds the term. It will content itself with analyzing only one specific meaning of DC, the first one in our list of five, the central, the most widespread, the “classical” one, namely, the prevention of authoritarian regressions.

At first sight, this notion of DC appears to be simple and straightforward. Yet conceptualizing as well as measuring it in appropriate ways presents quite some methodological complexities most authors tend to overlook. The problems go well beyond the semantic disorder that reigns the field. In positive terms, students of DC (in this narrow sense) speak about democratic stability, continuity, maintenance, survival, endurance, persistence, resilience, viability, sustainability, and irreversibility. In negative terms, they talk about democratic fragility, uncertainty, contingency, fluidity, risk-proneness, vulnerability, or about the avoidance of democratic destabilization, death, reversal, breakdown, collapse, overthrow. I have no problem with accepting many of these terms as close synonyms. The problem is not with semantics but with methodology, with concept formation and operationalization.

In the present article, the term “democratic consolidation” shall carry a specific and precise meaning: expected regime stability. In this sense, we can take a democracy to be consolidated as soon as we reach the conclusion that its probability of breakdown is very low, or the other way round, that its probability of survival is very high. In other words, democratic consolidation “reaches closure” when all relevant observers – including “major political actors,” “the public at large,” and also us, the academic experts – “expect the democratic regime to last well into the foreseeable future” (Valenzuela 1992, 70).

In essence, I claim, this definition does not do more than making explicit, in a clear and concise way, what most other concepts of DC struggle with in more obscure and implicit ways: the pivotal importance of probability estimates. In the following, I will discuss some direct implications that follow from my conceptual decision to anchor the notion of democratic consolidation in the soft grounds of expectations and probability calculations: its probabilistic, continuous, subjective, and cognitive structure. In continuation, I will sketch two widespread methods of defining (and operationalizing) DC which I think both distort and impoverish the descriptive concept of DC: “etiological” approaches, that collapse definition and explanation, and “operational” concepts, that collapse definition and measurement. The essay concludes with some remarks about pending challenges of forming and studying perceptions of democratic consolidation.

## 1. A Probabilistic Concept

Defining DC in probabilistic terms is less eccentric or even original than it may seem at first sight. Indeed, it is fully concordant with much of the literature on democratic consolidation.

Probabilistic conceptions of DC are most transparent with authors who explicitly use the language of probability estimates, of risks, dangers, chances, and uncertainties. They associate DC, for example, with diminishing “risks of an authoritarian regression” (O’Donnell 1992, 17), subsiding “threats of destabilization” (Mainwaring et al. 1992a, 3), decreasing “success chances of authoritarian involutions” (Kasapoviç and Nohlen 1996, 219), a rising “likelihood” of military acquiescence (Weiner 1987, 864), a reduced “probability of breakdown” (Waldrauch 1996, 65), and dissolving “uncertainties” about the continuity of the democratic game (Przeworski 1986; Schmitter 1988, 6; Whitehead 1989, 79).<sup>1</sup>

However, clear probabilistic connotations are visible as well in terms such as “resilience” (Gunther et al. 1995, 21), “viability” (Sunkele 1995), “crisis-resistance” (see Merkel 1996, 35), or “sustainability” (Przeworski 1996) that suggest that a “consolidated” democracy should be able (in all probability) to manage pending challenges, survive irrupting crises, and adapt to changing circumstances.<sup>2</sup> The same applies to many negative terms that describe the absence of democratic consolidation, such as “fragility” (Whitehead 1989), “vulnerability” (Tulchin 1995, ix), or “risk-proneness” (Linz and Stepan 1996a) that suggest that a “non-consolidated” democracy lives under the shadow of its eventual (or even quite probable) disintegration under stress. Too, the general rejection of determinism in studies of DC, points to the probabilistic foundations of the subdiscipline.<sup>3</sup>

In sum, much of the language of consolidation studies is a probabilistic language. Many of its terms rest on probabilistic foundations. But more often than not, scholars seem to feel somehow uncomfortable with the probabilistic assumptions they make. They tend to leave them implicit and to shy away from their implications. For instance, the often-noted apparent paradox that consolidated democracies are not immune to breakdown (Diamandouros et al. 1995, 413; Linz and Stepan 1996a, 6; Waldrauch 1996, 87) loses all its mystery if one only accepts the probabilistic bases of DC and thus, the trivial point that high probabilities of surviving do exclude remaining possibilities of dying.

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<sup>1</sup> For similar probabilistic formulations, see also Collier and Norden (1991), Di Palma (1990, 43), Huntington (1996, 7), O’Donnell (1996a, 166), Paramio (1992, 22), Pridham (1990a, 19; 1995, 168).

<sup>2</sup> For similar notions, see also Gunther et al. (1995, 8, 13, 16; Diamandouros et al. (1995, 389, 396), Merkel et al. (1996a, 12), Remmer (1995, 114).

<sup>3</sup> For anti-deterministic statements, see e.g. Baloyra (1987a, 14), Diamandouros et al. (1995, 392), Gunther et al. (1995, 7f., 20f.; 1996, 155); Linz and Stepan (1996a, 6), Munck (1996, 13), Pridham (1995, 202), Schmitter (1988, 4), Sorensen (1993, 46).

The main reason for the (at least implicit) probabilism of consolidation studies lies, I think, in the temporal perspective students of DC tend to assume. Most of us are studying today's "third wave" democracies. We are not looking back at historical cases, successful or not, whose outcomes are known and definitive. We are looking at contemporary cases, hopeful or not, whose outcomes are still in the making. We are not contemplating monuments of the past but future contingencies. We are not talking about given results but about uncertain scenarios. We are not dealing with finished stories but with improvised open-ended scripts. Instead of reaping the benefits of hindsight we have to bear the burden of foresight. As a result, we are condemned to do what social scientists are least equipped to do: not to explain but to predict. In this aspect, we are no different from political practitioners. Looking into the future we have to accept its basic uncertainty (in our post-metaphysical age) and thus, the probabilistic nature of our business.

Probabilistic conceptualizations of DC may be widespread. They are not universal, however. The notion of "democratic consolidation" occupies the center of a wide semantic field that accommodates many neighboring quasi-synonymous terms that speak of DC in nonprobabilistic ways. Terms such as democratic stability, stabilization, survival, guarantee, continuity, maintenance, permanence, endurance, or persistence suggest that empirical certainties exist, objective, observable facts.<sup>4</sup> Authors who employ such non-probabilistic terms either look into the future with false certainties. Or they change their perspective, shifting their analytical focus from present futures to present histories, from unfolding dramas to past events. Unfortunately, those changes in time perspectives go mostly unnoticed and misunderstood, which leads to considerable conceptual confusion.

For instance, I hold it to be erroneous and misleading to think, as many authors do, that democratic "persistence" represents a "phase" following democratic consolidation (see e.g. Diamandouros et al. 1995, 412; Gunther et al. 1995, 3; Morlino 1995, 577; Schmitter 1988). Which could be the theoretical criterion for distinguishing between the two in sequential terms? It is difficult to imagine any plausible one (and none has been offered to date). Indeed, it seems much more convincing to adopt an alternative interpretation: If we talk about democratic "persistence" it is not a different stage we are looking at but a different perspective we are looking from: Instead of looking into an uncertain future we are watching either past or present empirical realities. And it is this change of perspective, and the empirical certainties it delivers, that allows us to drop all prospective cautions and replace our probabilistic language of "consolidation" with the non-probabilistic notion of "persistence."

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<sup>4</sup> For references to democratic "stability," see e.g. Flisfish (1989, 115), Geddes (1995, 270), Gillespie (1989, 93), Kaase (1994, 73), Nolte 1996, 301), to "stabilization," Merkel (1996, 38), to "survival," Di Palma (1993, 1) and Gillespie (1989, 92), to "endurance," Di Palma (1993, 1), and "guarantee," Morlino (1995, 577).

## 2. A Continuous Concept

Conceptualizing democratic consolidation in probabilistic terms implies that we think of it as a continuous variable. It implies that we dissolve the dichotomy of consolidation versus non-consolidation (yes or no) and instead conceive of DC in terms of degrees (more or less). Or more precisely, embracing probabilism does not preclude that we continue to speak of DC in binary terms. Assessing their life expectancies we will find that empirical political regimes will rarely attain probability values of one or zero. Most of them will most of the time fall somewhere in between these ideal-typical extremes of expected stability.<sup>5</sup> But explicit probabilistic reasoning will make us recognize that any discrete distinction we choose to draw between consolidated and non-consolidated democracies must rest on some prior, more or less arbitrary act of boundary drawing.

Students of democratic consolidation have come to express (and discuss) the continuous nature of DC in different ways. Many authors have reflected on the difficulty, or even impossibility, of identifying precise endpoints to the process of consolidation (e.g. Morlino 1995, 577). Some have introduced gradualistic qualifications into their consolidological vocabulary (e.g. Gunther et al. 1995). Others have disaggregated DC into various subdimensions (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996a; Pridham 1995, 169). And still others have switched the level of analysis from national regimes to political subsystems (e.g. Schmitter 1988).

However, I find most of the prevalent graded treatments of DC wanting on different accounts. As a rule, definitions of thresholds between consolidated and non-consolidated democracies remain either too precise or too vague.<sup>6</sup> Quantitative qualifiers often proliferate in uncontrolled and intransparent ways, betraying their promise of delivering greater clarity and precision.<sup>7</sup> And efforts to disaggregate DC usually leave the question unanswered of how the various subdimensions or subsystemic processes relate both to each other and to the composite concept of DC.

I do not share Gerardo Munck's conviction that measuring DC constitutes a "conceptually uncomplicated task" (1996, 12). But I agree with his assertion that "it is possible to move beyond the very broad and sometimes vague assessments" (*ibid.*, 12) that that have been put

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<sup>5</sup> For reflections on the "utopical" character of any certainties (probability values of 1) with respect to future regime continuity even in the case of old, consolidated democracies, see Schmitter (1988, 4f.) and Valenzuela (1992, 59). For a non-deterministic perspective on democratic breakdown, see Linz (1978).

<sup>6</sup> For a critical view on some indicators of DC, see also below, section on "operational concepts."

<sup>7</sup> See Guillermo O'Donnell (1996, 161), in reference to the multiple "casually drawn" graded categories in Gunther et al. (1995): "The authors view consolidation as a several-stage process. [...] The democracy resulting from the transition may be simply unconsolidated, but it may also be 'partially consolidated,' or 'substantially consolidated'; or it may be consolidated at the national but not the regional level – all this before eventually reaching 'sufficient consolidation.' [...] I find all this confusing. [...] Beyond their own assertions, the authors give no indication that would allow us to recognise when most of their 'stages' have been reached." (O'Donnell 1996, 161).



forward with respect to different degrees of democratic consolidation. And I think a probabilistic conceptualization of DC helps us to formulate the right questions we need to answer if we want to establish how far a given democracy has traveled towards the longed-for goal of consolidation.

Let us recall here that we take “a low probability of breakdown” or conversely “a high probability of survival” to be the hallmark of democratic consolidation. Or to reiterate Samuel Valenzuela’s definition, we consider a democracy to be consolidated as soon as “major political actors as well as the public at large expect the democratic regime to last well into the foreseeable future” (1992, 70). Conceptualizing DC in this manner, and equating it with expected regime stability, immediately gives rise to four sets of issues which up to now most efforts to define and measure DC have failed to deal with in explicit and systematic ways.

First, qualifying probability values: How do we classify countries along the continuum of probability estimates? Where do we draw the boundaries between “high” and “low” chances of survival? What counts as “good” and “bad” prospects of regime continuity?

Second, selecting relevant actors: Whose probabilistic calculus should we take into account? Who are the relevant actors whose expectations should enter our consolidological equations? Whom should we include? Only top officials and the military? What about party representatives, political journalists, judges, interest groups, civic associations, private entrepreneurs, or academics? And should we ask elite actors only? Or do we have to take the general public into account? Or only parts of it?

Third, establishing majority rules: In most cases, people will not coincide in their judgments about the prospects of democratic rule. The variance of likelihood estimates will be significant both between and within societal groups. But how should we handle different degrees of societal dissensus? How many pessimists suffice to make us diagnose non-consolidation? How many optimists do we need, in society or in a given group, to speak of democratic consolidation? Are pluralities sufficient? Or should we establish a threshold of fifty percent? Or must we even demand virtual consensus in certain key groups before we dare extending certificates of consolidation? And how should we treat the undecided and indifferent?

Fourth, defining future conditions: Whenever we look into the future trying to assess the life expectancy of a democratic regime we have to rely on certain assumptions about future conditions, enabling and constraining ones. And the final conclusions we reach will critically depend on these prior assumptions. Should we support hypotheses we take as realistic or those we accept as cautious? How risk-averse should we be? How optimistic can we be and how pessimistic must we be? Should we normally rely on *rebus sic stantibus* assumptions? Or should we better follow the consolidological mainstream that tends to draw worst-case scenarios and to extend the quality label of consolidation only to “crisis-resistant” regimes

(Merkel 1996a, 12) that promise to survive “even in the face of severe political and economic crises” (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 15).

### 3. A Cognitive Subjective Concept

Some events in life carry objective probability values. They may be won deductively, as in the case of winning chances at lotteries, or inductively, as in the case of rainfall statistics. Yet, in any case, their probability distribution represents an objective datum. It may be a matter of mathematics or measurement. But it does not depend on subjective judgment. Not so in the case of democratic consolidation.

As one can see from the questions listed in the previous section, assessing degrees of democratic consolidation is a matter of subjective perceptions. High chances of regime survival (consolidation) as well as high chances of regime breakdown (non-consolidation) cannot be taken as objective measures. It is subjective data they represent. It is always the perceived probability of regime continuity or discontinuity we are talking about.

In this sense, the notion of consolidation resembles the concept of legitimacy. The same way as legitimacy, it is not an objective attribute of a given system but a matter of subjective attribution. No political regime is intrinsically legitimate (or consolidated), but perceived to be so (or not). And the same way Max Weber spoke of a “belief in legitimacy” (Legitimitätsglaube) we may speak of DC as a “belief in stability” (Stabilitätsglaube). Both variables are causally related to empirical regime stability, but do not coincide with it.

In the literature on democratic consolidation, the key role of subjective perceptions has not gone unnoticed. But only few authors have placed explicit emphasis on this elusive variable (see Merkel et al. 1996a, 12; Power and Powers 1988, 5; Valenzuela 1992, 70–3, Whitehead 1989).<sup>8</sup> Objectivist approaches still dominate the scene. As it seems, even concepts that were subjective in origin become gradually transformed into objective ones. We can cite, for example, the well-known metaphor of democracy as “the only game in town. In its first versions it was still formulated with an open eye to actors’ perceptions. As Giuseppe Di Palma asserted, democracy is consolidated, when “the democratic game looks more and more like the only game in town” (1990, 43), or in Adam Przeworski’s words, when “a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the

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<sup>8</sup> Guillermo O’Donnell, in an early paper on democratic consolidation (“Notes for the Study of Democratic Consolidation in Contemporary Latin America,” Notre Dame: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1985), has seemingly developed an “admittedly subjective” (Mainwaring 1986, 3) notion of DC quite akin to ours. He conceived DC as a game between coup players and democrats that ends as soon as the possibility of a coup does not dominate the political agenda any more. Unfortunately, the text does not exist any more, as its author credibly assures, and I have therefore only been able to get hold of indirect references to it (in Collier and Norden 1991 and Mainwaring 1996).

democratic institutions (1991, 26). Contrast these versions with Linz and Stepan's later synthesis according to which, in a consolidated regime, "democracy has become 'the only game in town' (1996a, 5) (all emphases added). This version does not contain any reference to actors and perceptions any more. The democratic game developing into a winning monopoly game and driving all its competitors out of town, appears as an objective datum observable without regard to its players' viewpoints.

However, most students of democratic consolidation do take subjective variables into account. Yet, when speaking about subjective attitudes relevant for DC, most of them tend to exclude precisely the perceptual dimension we are emphasizing here. They tend to privilege normative over cognitive aspects, values over beliefs, evaluations over expectations. They tend to speak about (perceived) legitimacy and remain silent about (expected) stability.

Take, for example, Linz and Stepan's definition of "attitudinal consolidation" which they see accomplished "when, even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures" (1996b, 15; emphasis added). Though this normative definition is at odds with our stress on empirical perceptions, it would be easy to give it a "cognitive turn." Changing a single word would suffice. Democracy is consolidated, a cognitive version would claim, when actors "believe that any further political change will emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures." In other words, democracy is consolidated when actors think it actually will last well into the future, not when they think it ideally should.

It is important to emphasize here that the essentially subjective nature of DC is the same for all and everybody. We academic researchers cannot claim any special status. We do not possess any epistemological privilege vis-à-vis other actors and observers. As external observers we look at political regimes from a different perspective than directly involved participants. And we may (hopefully) dispose of more systematic information, more elaborate theories, more explicit criteria, more reliable instruments of data collection, or whatever. But in the end we can do no more than delivering subjective probability estimates.<sup>9</sup> Our conclusions about the chances of democratic continuity may diverge or not from those of other people. And they may be less prejudiced and more accurate or not.<sup>10</sup> But in any case, we are not doing anything that would differ substantially from what others do: observing others, and observing

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<sup>9</sup> Or else, we may refrain from calculating probabilities on the grounds that more research and more evidence is needed. For example, Guillermo O'Donnell declares himself "agnostic pending better research" with respect to the "relative likelihood of breakdown" of different types of democracies (O'Donnell 1996a, 166).

<sup>10</sup> For a brief discussion of converging and diverging "observer-defined" versus "actor-defined" coup probabilities, including the possibility of misperceptions on both sides, see Collier and Norden (1991, 12–14). For some hints at the possible impact of prejudice ("entrenched expectations") on academic analyses, see Remmer (1995, 115). For a general discussion of external observer versus internal participant perspectives, see Habermas (1981, I, 152–96).

others observing others, and drawing our conclusions on the basis of certain rules of inference. Or in the words of Laurence Whitehead, “analyzing concrete instances of consolidation is not a matter of developing the right objective indicators. Rather, all that is involved is developing the well-grounded political judgment” (quoted in Mainwaring 1986, 6).

## 4. Etiological Definitions

Now, the features of democratic consolidation outlined above – its probabilistic, continuous, subjective, and cognitive nature – do not promise easy operationalization and measurement. In addition to the intrinsic complexities of the concept, however, current practices of defining, operationalizing, and measuring DC have even created some additional methodological obstacles, which we have to get out of our way before we can take up the task, in some appropriate manner, of describing empirical levels of DC.

Some students of democratic consolidation have warned against the teleological connotations the concept tends to carry. They are right. In a way.<sup>11</sup> Yet, in my view, we should be much more concerned about the etiological implications definitions of DC often bear. In methodological terms, the “etiological fallacies” students of DC tend to commit (frequently and systematically) are much more harmful than their eventual “teleological fallacies.” Their definitions often contain some hidden telos, some hidden goal. But more often than not, they also contain some hidden aitia, some hidden cause. In the literature on democratic consolidation, we can observe a strange tendency to conflate definitions and explanations, to mix up defining features and causal variables.

The usual way into the etiological mess passes through the trap of DC’s double meaning of process and outcome. The term denotes both movement and arrival, both progress and achievement. And many authors tend to include both aspects into their concepts of DC. They tend to define DC as the process that leads to the outcome of DC, however defined. To quote just two examples: Leonardo Morlino comprehends democratic consolidation as “the process by which the democratic regime is strengthened so as to ensure its persistence” (1995, 573), while Geoffrey Pridham defines it as “a process that diminishes the probability of reversal of democratization” (1995, 168).<sup>12</sup> Such conceptualizations, that obliterate the distinction between process and outcome, define DC essentially in causal terms. They contaminate it with etiological imports. They create the strong temptation to dissolve the conceptual boundaries of DC and to include just anything into its very definition that may contribute to its eventual

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<sup>11</sup> For critical remarks on the “teleological flavor” of DC, see O’Donnell (1996a and 1996b) and Schneider (1995). For an effort “to redraw the map of DC by unearthing its basic teleological co-ordinates” in order to distinguish different types of DC, see Schedler (1997).

<sup>12</sup> For similar definitions that contain simultaneous references to DC as both a process and an outcome, see also Diamond (1996, 54), Schmitter (1993, 1), Waldrach (1996, 65), Whitehead (1989, 79).

achievement. Any variable of hypothetical causal relevance appears as an integral part of democratic consolidation, understood as “the process that leads to” democratic consolidation. Any factor perceived as “indispensable” or just “supportive” condition of DC appears as something “the process of democratic consolidation” “includes”, “involves,” or “implies” by definition.<sup>13</sup>

The list of explanatory variables authors integrate into their “etiological” conceptualizations of DC is long. We can distinguish two approaches. One relies on actor-centered variables, the other on systemic ones.

The first approach deals, in its negative version, with antidemocratic actors, attitudes, discourses, and behavior, and in its positive version, with democratic actors, attitudes, discourses, and behavior. In this perspective, consolidating democracy equals to domesticating the former and fomenting the latter. I find this conceptual route problematic on four accounts.

First, the dividing line between democratic and antidemocratic actors is often fuzzy, fluid, and controversial. Therefore, in many new democracies, the very act of boundary drawing represents an openly political act, which in itself bears tangible implications for democratic consolidation.<sup>14</sup>

Second, the causal relation of these actor-centered variables to democratic stability is uncertain and controversial, too. In any case, they do not appear to constitute either necessary or sufficient conditions for regime continuity. For example, democracies may survive even in the face of precarious mass legitimacy and organized violence. And conversely, they may collapse despite of high levels of popular support and low levels of systematic violence.<sup>15</sup>

Third, democratic consolidation unfolds as an interactive game. The causal weight and even the causal direction of certain behavioral variables (such as the presence of guerilla groups or antidemocratic parties) depend on how prodemocratic actors react to them. Antidemocratic actions and discourses do not have any intrinsic significance of their own. We cannot know how they affect the prospects for democratic stability if we look at them in isolation. And as

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<sup>13</sup> These fragmentary references are taken from Linz and Stepan's “Five Arenas of Democratic Consolidation” (1996a, 7–15) and Pridham's definition of “negative” consolidation (1995, 168–9).

<sup>14</sup> For instance, Laurence Whitehead (1989) pleads, out of political considerations, for a generous attitude towards the integration of former authoritarian players. He condemns the “sectarian” “tendency to deny or undermine the democratic credentials of political rivals in a context where very few political actors have impeccably pure records” (ibid., 77). In academic debate, middle categories such as Juan Linz' “semi-loyalty” testify to the ambiguous “gray areas” between the two poles (Linz 1978, 32).

<sup>15</sup> For affirmative statements about the importance of legitimacy for democracy's long-term survival, see Diamond (1996, 54), Ethier (1990a), Linz and Stepan (1996a), Mainwaring (1992, 305), Munck (1996, 7), or Pridham (1990b, 112; 1995, 169). For skeptical accounts, see Agüero (1995, 125, 151), Nolte (1996, 301), Remmer (1995, 113: “Democracies are overthrown by elite conspiracies, not popular revolt”), Schmitter (1995, 37: “democracy is compatible with a wide range of cultural dispositions”), or Valenzuela (1997).

soon as we begin comprehending them as elements of “an interactive sequence of moves” (Whitehead 1989, 79) we can see that their actual impact on DC may be ambivalent, paradoxical, counterintentional. Failed coups may help to prevent future coups attempts. Threats of violence may reinforce norms of peaceful conflict resolution. The presence of disloyal actors may deepen the unity of the democratic coalition. Et cetera.<sup>16</sup>

Fourth, if democratic consolidation is a matter of perceptions, as I argued above, it is not enough if we assess the quasi-objective impact our variables have shown historically on democratic stability. If we want to learn how they contribute to ongoing processes of DC, we have to study how they enter actors’ present estimates of expected regime stability. After all, their probability calculus may differ substantially from ours.

The second variety of “etiological” definitions forms its concepts of DC on the basis of systemic explanatory variables. Since each part of national political systems bears arguable potential implications for regime stability, the term “democratic consolidation” here comes to describe processes of institution building in all political subsystems. It covers a in principle limitless number of highly demanding tasks such as the construction of constitutional regimes, electoral rules, party systems, systems of interest mediation, civil society, the rule of law, legislative bodies, rational state bureaucracies, and economic society (see, for example, Morlino 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996a, 7–15; Schmitter 1988).

Whatever the explanatory merit we may grant to either set of causal variables, welding causal assessments into descriptive concepts the way “etiological” definitions of DC do does not make any sense in the first place. Imagine, for example, somebody defining the psychological notion of a “consolidated personality” by including into that definition whatever favorable conditions he or she considers to be supportive or even necessary for somebody to become really “crisis-resistant”: economic security, prospects of upward mobility, high self-esteem, the consensual unification of different personality aspects, high levels of patience and low levels of aggression, a general disposition to bargaining and compromise, a supportive social environment, intact family structures, high human capital, supportive life experiences, favorable paths of transition from adolescence to adulthood, prior experiences with modern identity management, and access to psychotherapy and medication in case of critical contingencies. Et cetera. The result of such an “etiological” exercise is quite obvious. By collapsing descriptive and explanatory statements, it leads to a unbounded concept which carries no

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<sup>16</sup> For analyses of the “functional ambivalence” (Nohlen 1996) of (failed) coup attempts as well as of other challenges, see e.g. McClintock (1989) on Peru, Linz and Stepan (1996a, 217) on Chile, Valenzuela (1996) on Paraguay, and Burton et al. (1992, 15–16) with respect to “elite settlements” (taking place in the wake or in anticipation of violent crises).

meaning anymore independent of its presumptive facilitating conditions, a concept which we can neither properly describe nor properly explain anymore.<sup>17</sup>

## 5. Operational Definitions

While etiological concepts collapse the acts of explanation and definition, operational concepts collapse the acts of operationalization and definition. While etiological approaches define some abstract empirical phenomenon by its causes, operational approaches define it by its indicators.<sup>18</sup> The two methods of concept formation sometimes overlap. Often etiological definitions treat explanatory variables as indicators, and operational definitions rely on variables of causal relevance. Yet since analytically the two concept families are clearly distinct it makes sense keeping and discussing them apart.

In the literature on democratic consolidation, at least three kinds of operational definitions (or defining indicators) are widely circulating: the peaceful transfer of power, the absence of “serious challenges” to democracy, and the passage of time. All three variables do make some sense if we use them not as embodiments but as mere indicators of DC. Though their operational value is only relative.

The well-known “one-turnover test” as well as the more demanding “two-turnover test” rely on a meaningful criterion, namely, on actors actually accepting democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections” (Przeworski 1991, 10). Yet both quasi-objective tests of DC are notoriously too specific and context-insensitive. They do not provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator for establishing DC. Above all, they tend to misclassify dominant party systems, where alternation in power may not occur in decades, as well as presidential systems (with non-reelections rules), where alternation in power may occur at each subsequent election (see Beyme 1995, 228; Gunther et al. 1995, 12; Huntington 1991, 266; Schneider 1995, 220).

The absence of antidemocratic “challenges” (however defined) represents an empirical indicator of DC as problematic as any objective one. Here, similar arguments apply as with respect to the relevance of attitudinal and behavioral variables (see above). Antiregime “challenges” do not possess any unequivocal a priori meaning. The information they convey as well as the consequences they bear depend on their contexts and their perceptions. Antidemocratic challenges, such as coup attempts, often lead to “precedent setting confrontations”

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<sup>17</sup> Indeed etiological definitions systematically run the “risk of tautologies” (Guillermo O’Donnell, quoted in Mainwaring 1986, 16; see also O’Donnell 1990b, 161; and Schneider 1995, 219).

<sup>18</sup> Thus, the concept loses any meaning independent of its measurement. A classical example is the definition of intelligence (in its ironic, constructivist reading): What is intelligence? What intelligence tests measure!

(Valenzuela 1992, 71) that in the end – provided the democrats defeat their enemies – can make positive and even decisive contributions to democratic consolidation.

Furthermore, the very notion itself of an antidemocratic “challenge” represents an infelicitous choice of language. For the term “challenge” is a relational one. It does not describe some empirical variable in isolation but already implies that this variable represents a problem for some other empirical phenomenon. And it is the researcher who decides whether this is the case or not, for example, whether some military coup attempt represents a “serious challenge” or not. Thus, judgments about empirical degrees of democratic consolidation tend to become tautological. They maintain, in essence, that “democracy is likely to survive because I cannot see any factors (‘challenges’) which threaten its survival,” or inversely, “democracy is likely to break down because I can make out some elements (‘challenges’) that threaten to bring it down.”

Scholars tend to reflect these methodological problems through imprecise language choices. Geoffrey Pridham, for example, states that DC includes “the containment or reduction, if not removal, of any serious challenges to democratization” (1995, 169). When do we demand containment, when reduction, when removal? And what is “seriousness” else than an implicit answer to the context-dependence of antiregime “challenges,” a nebulous license to take these contexts into account.

Finally, many authors maintain, with more or less polemical undertones, that the mere passage of time is insufficient for democracies to consolidate. But many perceive it as a at least necessary ingredient of DC and define certain, though widely and wildly varying time requirements for DC. That is, many take time seriously as a causal variable – though not all would go as far as Arturo Valenzuela affirming that “what really consolidates a democracy is [...] simply the continuity of democratic practices” (1997, 4). But it seems to me that virtually nobody supports operational definitions that take democratic consolidation to be “just a matter of time” (Przeworski et al. 1996, 50). Such simple equations apparently just serve the role of straw concepts people construct in order to deconstruct them subsequently.<sup>19</sup>

## 6. Observing Observations

Etiological definitions measure causes. Operational definitions measure symptoms. Both do violence to the descriptive concept of DC. Both fail to get at the empirical heart of DC. Both fail to measure perceptions. Yet if we take democratic consolidation to be a matter of perceived

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<sup>19</sup> For skeptical accounts on DC as a function of time, see Chull Shin (1995, 144), Przeworski et al. (1996), and Valenzuela (1992, 59). For estimates of DC’s time requirements, see Dahrendorf (1990, 92–3), Gunther et al. (1995, 19), Morlino (1995, 574), Schmitter (1995, 31–3), Whitehead (1989, 79). For some general reflections on time as a causal variable, see Schedler and Santiso (1998).



probabilities of regime survival it is clear by definition that it is subjective expectations and perceptions we have to look at if we want to know whether a democracy is consolidated or not. But how do actors assess prospects of regime stability? How do they form their expectations about democratic persistence? How do they reach summary judgments on democracy's life chances? The answer is, I believe, straightforward: They do so by observing other actors.

For instance, in Latin America, the traditional prime suspects of antidemocratic action are the military, and everybody watches them, their ideological outfit, their coherence, their personnel policies, their formal power, their incentives to stay in the democratic game, and so forth, in order to make out the likelihood of a military coup. But the military themselves watch everybody else. Potential coup mongers observe the democratic grievances and commitments of all other players, including public officials, party representatives, entrepreneurs, and citizens, in order to identify eventual allies and assess eventual chances of success.

In this sense, democratic consolidation is a game of mutual observation. Indeed, it is a circular game of cross-cutting n-order observations. I observe you observing him observing me observing you. Et cetera. As I have maintained above, academic observers are not outside this game but just add another layer of observations to it. Furthermore, their observations do not pass unobserved: They enter the consolidological game and become part of it in similar ways to other observations (though wrapped up in an aura of objectivity, as they often are, they carry more weight than the unlicensed perceptions of presumptive non-experts).

Of course, we can produce our own probability estimates of future democratic persistence on the basis of purely structural variables, such as economic growth, economic affluence, historical traditions, forms of government, and party-systemic fragmentation (see e.g. Przeworski et al. 1996). But if we wish to learn whether the involved actors themselves, too, expect a democratic regime to last or to perish in the long run, we have little methodological choice other than asking and listening to them.

In principle, all we have to do is to follow certain routine procedures in social sciences: setting up content analyses, interviewing others, reconstructing discourses, interpreting interpretations. Our standard exercises in "double hermeneutics" (Habermas 1981). There is nothing inherently problematic or even special in it.

In practice, however, we academic observers of democratic consolidation tend to refrain from asking political participants directly for their observations. Or if we do, we tend to ask them the wrong questions. For instance, with few exceptions, the mass surveys we students of DC rely on focus on normative attitudes (regime legitimacy), to the almost complete neglect of cognitive perceptions (expected stability). In accordance with ingrained conventions of public opinion polling, we tend to ask citizens whether they like democracy or not. And from the answers we get we draw their own inferences about prospects of democratic stability. But

much more often than not, we forget asking people how they themselves evaluate the chances that democracy will endure well into the future.<sup>20</sup> We usually do not ask them questions such as: What do you think, how stable is democracy today? How likely is it to survive if economic conditions deteriorate? If public order breaks down? If an alternation in government takes place? How much of a threat are actors such as the military, guerilla groups, entrepreneurs, or labor unions? And what about your own democratic commitment? How would you act in the face of democratic crises? Et cetera.

Admittedly, analyzing public discourse and interviewing citizens as well as elite actors represents a practical challenge as much as a methodological challenge. It is highly demanding in terms of time, money, personnel, and energy. Yet fortunately we do have some examples that show that it can be done and how. As an example, I would quote Cynthia McClintock's 1989 essay about the prospects of DC in the "least likely" case of Peru. This article tried to assess the chances of democratic persistence in Peru in the late eighties, combining structural data with interview data. The latter showed, above all, that military elites did not perceive the multiple structural challenges they faced (from guerilla movements to economic decay) as calls for antidemocratic action. Instead, skepticism about the payoffs of an eventual military coup as well as fears about its potential costs made them utterly cautious and hesitant to embrace this antidemocratic option. Thus, despite Peru's unfavorable structural background, McClintock's interview data suggested that at this point in time the country's "prospects of democratic consolidation in Peru" were not "bleak" at all (see McClintock 1989). The sad fact that the country's political elite did not grasp the "fair chance" of DC it was granted, does not invalidate the author's past optimism. It only testifies to future's irrepressible uncertainty we try to domesticate (but never quite succeed so) with our tentative estimates of "democratic consolidation."

## 7. Conclusion

The preceding essay has defined democratic consolidation as "expected regime stability." It has embraced the probabilistic, gradualistic, and subjective implications of this future-oriented definition. It has dropped some polemical notes against "etiological" concepts, that blur the boundaries between the descriptive and causal inferences, and against "operational" concepts,

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<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Linz and Stepan's Addendum "How Citizens View Democracy" in *Latin America* (1996a, 221–30). However, those few surveys that do people ask for stability estimates often produce quite surprising results. For instance, I find it startling that in 1996, 61 per cent of Poles (n=1057) thought it to be "possible" or even "highly probable" that parliament would be dissolved and the number of parties reduced in the next future ) (see Rose and Haerpfer 1996, 425). I admit that the two-dimensional question asked here looks fuzzy and overloaded, and that summing up low and high probability estimates cuts out valuable information. However, Poland, after all, is a country where experts such as Linz and Stepan have come to the conclusion that "after the 1993 election" most political actors "seem to have accepted democracy as 'the only game in town'" (1996a, 291).

that suppress the distinction between definition and measurement. And finally, it has issued a general call for understanding DC as a n-level game of mutual observations, which we should try to reconstruct on the basis of (a plurality of) interpretive approaches. Future discussions will reveal to what extent the paper will indeed be able to keep up to its double ambition of describing as well as prescribing common conceptual and methodological ground for the studies of democratic consolidation.

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