On the Evolution of Altruism

Stark, Oded (June 1997) On the Evolution of Altruism. IHS Economics Series 46

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can flourish in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling and that the probability than an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Altruism' 'Evolution' 'Imitation' 'Equilibrium'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): A13, D00
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:36
Last Modified: 26 Jul 2017 17:48
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/993

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