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Güth, Werner and Kirchsteiger, Georg and Ritzberger, Klaus (September 1996) Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games. IHS Economics Series 35
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Abstract: In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.;
| Item Type: | IHS Series |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | 'Commitments' 'Imperfect Observability' 'Subgame Perfection' |
| Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): | C72 |
| Status: | Published |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Sep 2014 10:36 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Jul 2017 06:56 |
| URI: | http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/922 |
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