Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy

Keser, Claudia (January 1995) Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy. IHS Economics Series 3

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Abstract: We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Experimental Economics' 'Public Goods'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C92, H41
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:36
Last Modified: 26 Jul 2017 09:44
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/809

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