Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus (August 2017) Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity. IHS Economics Series 332, 33 p.

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Abstract or Table of Contents

This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), arbitrary specifications of patience or impatience (geometric, hyperbolic, or otherwise), externalities, multiple selves, and other-regarding preferences.

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: bargaining, equilibrium existence, infinite-horizon games, subgame perfection
Research Units: Divisions > Former Research Groups > Financial Markets and Econometrics
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 27 Sep 2017 08:52
Last Modified: 09 Dec 2018 20:12

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