Powersharing and Democratic Survival

Graham, Benjamin A.T. and Miller, Michael K. and Strøm, Kaare W. (July 2016) Powersharing and Democratic Survival. IHS Political Science Series 141, 41 p.

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Democracy is often fragile, especially in states that have recently experienced civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it can limit electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing and analyze their effects on democratic survival using a new global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival in societies both with and without recent conflict. Our results suggest that institution-builders and international organizations should prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.

Item Type: IHS Series
Research Groups: European Integration
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2016 09:19
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2017 20:12
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/4011

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