Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus (2015) Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result. Economic Theory. (Published before print)

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Abstract or Table of Contents

What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Keywords: Backwards induction, Subgame perfection, Equilibrium existence, Large extensive form games, Perfect information
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C72, C62
Status: Published before print
Date Deposited: 07 Jan 2016 12:10
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2016 14:21
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/3855

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