Trees and extensive forms

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus (2008) Trees and extensive forms. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 216-250.

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Abstract or Table of Contents

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers “exotic” cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Jan 2015 13:11
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2016 14:16
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2641

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