Large extensive form games

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus (2013) Large extensive form games. Economic Theory, 52 (1), pp. 75-102.

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Abstract or Table of Contents

This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Article in Academic Journal
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Jan 2015 11:54
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2016 14:16
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2635

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