involuntary unemployment in a bargaining model when capacity choice is a binding precommitment

Pesendorfer, Wolfgang and Ritzberger, Klaus (October 1988) involuntary unemployment in a bargaining model when capacity choice is a binding precommitment. Forschungsberichte / Research Memoranda 250

[img]
Preview
Text
fo250.pdf

Download (2MB) | Preview

Abstract or Table of Contents

abstract: a market is studied where prices are formed through a bilateral bargaining process. players on one side of the market have in an initial stage the option to incur at a cost a binding precommitment which may limit the possible number of trades. it is shown that such a set-up does not necessarily lead to market clearing. to solve the game a refinement of subgame perfection is used and under this extra requirement the sensitivity of bargaining behavior with respect to the specification of outside options is analysed.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'bargaining' 'nash-refinements' 'oligopoly' 'wages and unemployment'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): 026, 824
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:34
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2016 14:07
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/250

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item