ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE.
THE WEST GERMAN CASE

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Summary

Complex organizations exist and develop within their specific socio-cultural framework, and this factor should not be neglected. Not only "exotic" cultural conditions have to be acknowledged. There is still too much uncontrolled tendency to understand organizations in isolation from the specific culture on which they are founded. This paper is a preliminary attempt to explain the West German case by summarizing various data and insights related to the cultural contingencies.

The cultural factor becomes more and more recognized in the organizational field and the professional literature is fast growing. However, there is still not enough recognition that the civilizational framework is difficult to be studied. The historical background must be well known. The basic socio-cultural trends and contingencies have to be looked for. It is absolutely necessary to relate the socio-economic and political background of the investigated complex organizations to the whole national or regional culture in which they are immersed. The practice of management and organizational structuralization has to be socio-culturally interpreted. The relationship between the public sector and the private sector must be acknowledged. A comparative study of a given country with its neighbours is also necessary. Various subcultures within the national culture need to be recognized.

The West German case is particularly interesting for the variety of reasons. Both FRG and GDR are rooted in the same nation but they follow much different routes. The Americanization of West Germany is quite substantial, and the same may be said about the Sovietization of East Germany. The traditional cultural identity of Germans in both cases is under a substantial pressure but at the same time the German nation as a whole is quite successful in the economic and organizational field. It is an interesting question to what extent the German success is justified by the cultural continuity of the nation remaining more or less the same under the changing historical circumstances.

The paper here presented is only a modest attempt to deal with this problem which is much complicated and multidimensional. The shortcomings and the limitations of the author may inspire readers to do something better in the future.
Zusammenfassung


Der kulturelle Faktor erfährt in der Organisationsforschung immer mehr Anerkennung und die einschlägige Literatur wächst rasant. Allerdings wird dabei noch nicht genügend in Betracht gezogen, daß die Analyse zivilisatorischer Rahmenbedingungen ein anspruchsvolles Unterfangen ist: Historisches Hintergrundwissen ist gefordert; die grundlegenden soziokulturellen Entwicklungslinien und Wechselbeziehungen müssen identifiziert werden; der sozioökonomische und politische Kontext der untersuchten Organisation muß notwendigerweise mit kulturellen Faktoren in Bezug gebracht werden. Managementpraxis und organisatorische Strukturierung bedürfen der soziokulturellen Interpretation; der Beziehung zwischen öffentlichem und privatem Sektor ist Augenmerk zu schenken; auch eine vergleichende Studie zwischen dem jeweiligen Land und seinen Nachbarn ist erforderlich; schließlich verdienen innerhalb einer nationalen Kultur auch verschiedene Subkulturen Berücksichtigung.

Cultural Contingencies

There is a growing interest in the phenomenon of organizational culture and its impact on industrial relations. For example, E.H. Schein (1985) understands organizational culture as the basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic "taken-for-granted" fashion an organization's view of itself and its environment. They are learned responses to a group's/institution's problems of survival in its external environment and its problems of internal integration. Culture in this sense should be distinguished from 'artifacts' and 'values' that manifest themselves on the surface level (Ibid pp. 6-7). Another question is what kind of spiritual assumptions are behind a given culture (Moberg 1979).

There is in the organizational reality a subtle relationship between cultural predispositions and situational contingencies dictated by practical considerations. Value-orientation does not go well together with the expediency-orientation; there is a dialectical relationship between them. We should not ignore each one of them, and in the organizational studies there is now a great revival of the socio-anthropological perspective. "Once a group acquires a history, it also acquires a culture" (Schein 1985: 39). The shared set of assumptions characteristic for a specific culture goes together with the group identity in space and time. The sense of "we", and "I" as a vital part of "We", is needed to have a history.

The Japanese case is particularly illuminating as regards the organizational culture. This culture actually is the product of models more or consciously promoted inside the organization by influential groups and individuals, as well as of the external conditioning. Employees bring to the organization several patterns acquired outside. For example, the high consumption mentality and the regular watching of TV programs have in all big industrial democracies a major impact on working people. There is an evident change from the work orientation to the leisure orientation. These trends may be in Japan less definite than in North America or Western Europe but they do exist, especially among the young generation. The "ideal model" applied by
Alston (1986)\textsuperscript{2} does not allow to look closer into the inside/outside dialectical relationship. Things definitely are not static also in Japan; there are major contradictions between the tradition and the modernity, family/-leisure and workplace/duty, others-orientation and self-orientation. The readers of Alston are not able to find enough insight into the drama of progress in the society which still culturally reminds more in the middle ages than in the twentieth century.

So far Japan has managed to preserve peaceful industrial relations but this obvious success has much ground in the economic progress. With the growing difficulty to locate Japanese products on the foreign markets and to resist the free flow of imports, the conditioning of Japanese social culture has been changing quite substantially. The consumer economy (Japan exports actually only 10\% of its products) makes gradually the Japanese people more like citizens of the other industrial democracies. The blend of foreign/domestic becomes more and more evident. By being a vital part of the Western world, Japan is unavoidably exposed to the same (or at least similar) agencies of socialization, and the final product is being formed in the same direction. Mass advertising does its best to convince people that they should care primarily about their own happiness. Politicians in order to win elections try to please the general public. Mass media are mainly entertaining and promote a liberal/tolerant perspective on life. Of course, in Japan it is still a long way to the cult of individuality but many forces are engaged to act in this direction. Alston does not seem to appreciate how vulnerable is the current equilibrium of Japan so well described by him.\textsuperscript{3}

In the modern mass society the rejection of historical roots and of the sense of continuity leads - in my judgement - to the neglect of the cultural consciousness. This has a disastrous impact on the socialization potential of modern organizations and the cultural limbo makes impossible any socio-moral integration of people within organizations. The present day interest in "organizational culture" is actually dictated by the urgent need to acknowledge the cultural identity of human beings.
The weakness of the position taken by Schein (1985) is the lack of recognition that any microculture (e.g. the set of assumptions shared by civil servants in a given governmental agency) may be properly understood only as a part of macroculture. Values shared by a given group of people are a part of broader values; what is valuable for the coalitions of individuals is of general significance only as long as this makes some sense within the larger socio-cultural context.\(^4\)

The practical value of culture appears clearly in organizations when facing the problems of external adaptation and survival: a shared understanding of core mission, primary task, manifest and latent functions; developing consensus on goals, as derived from the core mission; developing consensus on the means to be used to obtain the goals, such as the organization structure, division of labour, reward system, and authority system; developing consensus on the criteria to be used in measuring how well the group is doing in fulfilling its goals, such as the information and control system; developing consensus on the appropriate remedial or repair strategies to be used if goals are not being met (Ibid: p.52).

When the personnel of a given organizational entity is not able and willing to achieve a cultural consensus it becomes very difficult to mobilize people behind specific decisions; organizational acculturation is an evident problem in the public sector of many multicultural developing countries; ethnic divisions and the slow progress of modernization both prevent the local civil servants to act from the position of consensus. In all multicultural countries, developed as well as underdeveloped, there is a problem of formulating a common platform allowing to promote a responsive citizenship. The mass society model is definitely not suitable in this respect.\(^5\) On the other hand, in such countries as India citizenship suffers due to the traditionally very strong family bonds given always the priority over other duties.\(^6\) In the countries much divided according the tribal divisions, as for example Zambia,\(^7\) the concern for keeping all parts together dominates quite often on the expense of democratic concerns or even administrative rationality. This is also much valid for the U.S.S.R. where the concern to keep the empire together provides a common ground between the regime and the privileged part of the population.\(^8\)
Common culture makes much easier to achieve cohesion in an organizational unit: people find common language on the basis of joint conceptual categories; they share consensus on who is in and who is out and by what criteria one determines membership; the pecking order is easier to establish; openness and intimacy are more possible; what gets rewarded and what gets punished may be agreed upon; the anxiety of dealing with the unexplainable and uncontrollable is being reduced (Schein 1985: 66). It is one of the main functions of any culture to reduce anxiety and make people comfortable. "Cultural assumptions can be thought of as a set of filters or lenses that help us to focus on and perceive the relevant portions of our environment. Without such filters and lenses, we would experience overload and uncertainty" (Ibid: p.83). I would like to add here, that in the mass society poor on culture and rich on situational constraints, the permanent stabilization and deep satisfaction are just impossible to achieve.9)

The content of any organizational culture includes a definition of inside/outside relationship, reality/truth, goodness/badness of human nature, right/wrong behaviour versus others, cooperative/competitive orientations, self-definition of people in various organizational roles, assumptions about time, "normal" distance, masculinity and femininity, etc. "Unless we have searched for the pattern among the different underlying assumptions of a group and have attempted to identify the paradigm by which the members of a group perceive, think about, feel about, and judge situations and relationships, we cannot claim that we have described or understood the group's culture (...). Superficial statements run the risk of losing the very meaning of the concept of culture or trivializing it to a point where the concept becomes no more valuable than the concept of values or norms" (Schein 1985: 111). The task to identify the organizational culture necessitates a much different search approach than in the case of other subjects. Cultural assumptions must be carefully deciphered, not glibly assumed (Ibid: 122).10

People who promote cultural change within organizations have only a limited chance to predict the results of their own actions. "Leaders create cultures, but cultures, in turn, create their next generation of leaders"
(Schein 1985: 313). The essential function of organizational leadership is to shape cultures of the units managed by them but this is a very subtle task. Culture may be easily confused with other phenomena. The human side of an organization's functioning is only a part of the problem.11)

Culture controls more the manager than the manager controls the culture. What is correct in culture or whether its strength is good or bad depends on the match between cultural assumptions and environmental realities (Schein 1985: 315). Not all aspects of the culture are necessarily relevant to the effectiveness of the organization.

Leadership and culture management are central to understanding organizations and making them effective. Organizational leaders need an adequate perception and insight, motivation and skill, emotional strength, ability to involve the organizational members in self-diagnosis, as well as the depth of vision. Intercultural interventions should be originated and implemented by the organizational leaders. "Leadership is interwined with culture formation, evolution, transformation, and destruction. Culture is created in the first instance by the actions of leaders; culture is embedded and strengthened by leaders. When culture becomes dysfunctional, leadership is needed to help the group unlearn some of its cultural assumptions and learn new assumptions" (Schein 1985: 316-317).12)

The Social Culture of the Welfare State

The welfare state carries more and more burden (Therborn 1986; Oyen 1985). For example, in western Europe during the period 1950-77 the percent of GDP spent on the public health and social welfare has grown from 9.3 % to 22.4 % (16 % in Switzerland but 30 % in Sweden)(Kaase 1986: 33). Among the electors there are more and more persons materially dependent on the state (on average 25 % in western Europe) and exercising their influence in favour of the status quo. Social strata traditionally oriented against heavy taxation have diminished in their power to influence the events.
There is now in the West not so much the crisis of the welfare state (on average in the OECD, except the U.S., the level of public expenditure has remained on the level of 45 %) but mainly the crisis of the society unable or even unwilling to reinforce its social controls, socialize its members, utilize its human resources, and to provide existential meaning to its citizens. Various occupational groups that participate in the welfare state egoistically promote their own short term interests on the expense of public good (Stockman 1986). The legal order is violated by its own holders: lawyers, politicians, teachers, policemen (Legris 1986).

The democratic process not always leads to the positive result in the sense of the general social wellbeing. The welfare state by delegating power to the external groups and agencies feeds its own potential adversaries. On the other hand, the challenges faced by the modern western state quite often grow beyond its ability: permanent unemployment among the very considerable part of the young generation, the growing gap between the "core" workers (unionized, well paid, with the chances to be promoted) and the chronically unemployed (unskilled, located in "bad" areas, women, minorities), the gap between "rich countries" that pay well and "poor" countries that pay their workers much less, the new pressure groups organizing themselves in order to squeeze out of the welfare state some privileges (for example, the old people lobby), the necessity to retrain a considerable part of the labour force in order to face the new needs on the market, the new differenciation of the labour force (several growing professional groups hesitate to join trade unions), the dangers related to the escalation of the power contest in the triangle unions-employers-state, the difficulty to integrate diversified interest groups in order to achieve some consensus. The comparison of countries with the different level of consensus definitely shows the positive relationship between the national consensus and economic wellbeing.

Democracy is not so much the matter of mathematics as of the process of integration in which the victorious party readies itself for the task of assuming responsibility for the whole (Kaase 1986: 241). It is nothing wrong to have some elites able and willing to motivate the rest by their
personal example, except when the elite remains closed, the broader interests are neglected, and the rules of power gain are disfunctional for the democratic system (Ibid. p.336).

The openness/closeness of the social system to the internal mobility is a very important factor for the functioning of democracy.

**The West German Case**

In West Germany still well over the half of the male population (56 % in the generation of sons and 52 % in the generation of fathers) are blue collar workers; specific for Germany is an evident differentiation between blue collar workers, office workers, and the administrative elite. This class differentiation is more established and reinforced by the self-selection processes than in other countries of western Europe and North America. German blue collar workers and small entreprenuers meet a considerable difficulty to locate their own children outside their own social category, and this is much related to the educational system (Kaase 1986: 342-353). Class closeness is more evident in West Germany than in other developed industrial democracies, except Ireland. The gap between the traditionally lower classes and the top administrative and business elite remains quite substantial.

There is much chance that Germany's role will grow with the obvious present day need to achieve more balance on the European scene. The relative security of the West German economy and the satisfactory condition of West German democracy may be an inspiration for the rest of Europe. Located in the centre of Europe, Germans depending on their general orientation may be a source of common peace and wellbeig or a source of great trouble for everybody, including themselves. There is no any reason to suspect the best intentions, especially of young German generation already educated in democracy and genuinely dedicated to peace. The question remains still open how much and in what fashion the present day Germans may help other nations of Europe to make their economies better and to reinforce the democratic order. The issue of
German unity remains open; there is no any good reason to keep an artificial division of the country into two separate parts. However, only the reapproachment between the West and the East may open a chance to reunite Germany and reinforce its positive European role in the whole variety of fields.

From the sociological perspective complex organizations are interesting not only as consisting of people but primarily as originating values, interdependencies, and commitments. Persons who participate in a given complex organisation bring with them their styles of life and thinking. The spiritual well-being of a given nation (Moberg 1979), the style of politics, the problem of identity, all of them have some consequences for the organizational life. For example, in the West German case it is of a major importance that Germans traditionally have difficulties with their national identity relating the spiritual content of the historical and political developments. The whole period 1871-1945 was characterised by the strong effort towards a national unity and a very considerable power on the world scale, but this has led to the disaster of two world wars, prolonged foreign occupations, and the division of the country (Weidenfeld 1986).

The state has traditionally played a major role in the German national consciousness but among the young West German generation there is a growing tendency – even among the ruling elite – to treat the care of personal freedom as one of the main duties of the state: instead of a monopoly of social wellbeing, a service role to help people to be able to help themselves (Böhr 1986, 1985). Instead of an omnipotent state bureaucracy, a mini-state delegating as many functions as possible to the autonomous bodies able and willing to accumulate the grass-roots initiative.

In 1985 around 60 prominent Germans tried to answer the following questions: Is today a definite German nation, as well as the German national culture, or actually there are several German speaking cultures/nations? What was the contribution of the German statehood 1871-
1945 to the establishment of the German nation, its life and culture? Which are the chances of the German nation, its life and culture? Which are the chances of the spiritual and cultural development in both present day German states? It is very characteristic that answers to these questions differed considerably (Häussling et al. eds., 1985). For the young generation the state/culture identification creates several problems difficult to overcome, especially when the unification of the divided country looks as impossible. There is a considerable amount of worry regarding the collective and individual future, and this makes difficult the self-identity on a national level, specially because Germany, in the west as well as in the east, has changed very considerably since the World War II (Laqueur 1985). In the case of GDR the authorities there have learned how to control the population by meeting the half-way the common need of security (Die Zeit, 1986: 26).

In West Germany people remain free to search their own identity without the pressure of the state and the necessity to subdue the individual identity to the macro-collectivity steered from outside. However, it is not easy even on the basis of a democratic freedom to identify oneself within the German framework. The cultural pluralism is the fact of life in the German-speaking territory. The burden of the past historical efforts to impose on all Germans the same nationalistic pattern and make out of the participation in oppression a pseudo-patriotic duty still is deeply rooted in the collective memory. The relationship to other nationalities is a sensitive issue due to the past dramatic confrontations. Much of the national patriotic heritage is taken as historically obsolete by young Germans, and even by a considerable part of the older generations.

People in the German speaking countries are relatively well to do. According to the 1984 OECD data, on average people had for personal consumption per capita $7,274 in West Germany, $7,757 in Switzerland, $8,540 in Luxemburg, and $6,490 in Austria in comparison with $10,214 in the U.S., but $6,535 in the U.K. and $6,744 in Japan (these data take into consideration the real buying power which differs on different markets). Is any relationship between the German "search of identity" and the
economic wellbeing? The thesis of Max Weber on the protestant ethic and
the spirit of entrepreneurship and hard work has been questioned but the
ideological identity of the German speaking countries, or at least the
search of it, may have something to do with the state of economy and
organization.

The environment influences much what actually happens in the organiza-
tion. Interdependencies existing in the organization and outside of it make
necessary for the organizational people to accomodate to the status quo at
least enough to avoid a major conflict or a failure. On the other hand, the
complex organization itself has its socio-cultural potential\(^{21}\) of a more or
less original nature which allows it to radiate influence, shape conditions
existing inside as well as outside, socialize organizational members, and
establish a regular contact with the outside world. The cultural load which
is under disposal of a given organization has to be rich enough in order to
handle the variety of the external and internal problem areas,\(^{22}\) including
the area of legitimation,\(^{23}\) behaviour of organizational members,\(^{24}\) and
the external transaction. The nature of the cultural load differs in various
organizations. For example the multipurpose organizations are potentially
vulnerable to the pressures exercised by people and agencies related to
each of the purposes (Gross & Etzioni 1985: 21-24). Therefore, they need an
organizational culture of a pluralistic nature.

Cultural contingencies\(^{25}\) differ much in various social settings. They also
change under the impact of the situational constraints. One of the
examples may be the transformation of Germany (its western part) and the
adoption of democracy.\(^{26}\) A new political culture in this case has its
roots in the long historical tradition of German democratic aspirations, as
well as in the post-war cooperation with the U.S.\(^{27}\) The organizational
difficulties experienced by several developing countries\(^{28}\) have their deep
cultural roots. The level of wellbeing is closely related to organization:
when in the well organized societies the wellbeing has been growing enough
to accomodate the stable population,\(^{29}\) in the poorly organized developing
countries there is an accelerating populational pressure on the economies
that remain in a poor shape. However, in the well organized developed
countries there are several problems, mainly in the public sector, which need much improvement. Organizational studies are well developed but there are definitely several weak spots: the too authoritarian style of leadership, inadequate work morale, low trust and cooperation at work.

Organizational culture is of a crital importance because the infrastructure of assumptions on which the organizational life is based penetrates all the rest. The declining work morale has its far reaching consequences even if the direct relationship of it to productivity may be not evident. In the long run, the climate of organization counts much (Rosenstiel et al. 1983; Florek 1986; Vries & Miller 1986), and the same is valid for the growth of the individual through the overcoming of contradictions (McGraw 1986). The preconditions of a peaceful cooperation (Rudnianski 1986) between people and their agencies have to be carefully studied. In this respect much may be learned from the sportsmen, among them for example mountain climbers (Bilczewski 1982; Piotrowski 1982), who show much inventiveness in organizing teamwork among themselves, always adapting it to the changing circumstances. On the other hand, culture of work and organization depends much on the political circumstances. For example, Poland suffers much because of the imposed authoritarian model (Checinski 1982, Spasowski 1986). Under the extremely hard circumstances the organizations break down; the classical case of the social organization collapsing under the 'black death' conditions may serve as an example (Noki 1961). The innovative forms of social organization of work may improve much the chances of cooperation (Meade 1986, Müller-Jentsch 1986).

Complex organizations, including bureaucracies, function on the basis of an external and internal bargaining between various groups who manage to articulate/promote their goals more or less effectively. Outside are investors, clients, suppliers, state authorities, trade unions, professional associations, families of employees. Inside are executives, managers, experts, administrators, workers (Ehrensparger 1985). Each of these groups represents a certain sociocultural background. Compromises done by the groups in their mutual cooperation/competition are influenced positively or negatively by the variety of background. Cultural distance may be so great
that representants of groups confronting each other are not able to find common ground. Any major change in the values characteristic for a given society has its cost in the gap between the "young" and the "old" generation.

The West German Values

In West Germany during the period 1964-74 the emphasis on personal freedom for children has grown in the public opinion from 31 % to 53 % and the emphasis on discipline has also declined. Since that time there is a growing ambiguity regarding the values, but the "authoritarian personality" is definitely the matter of the past (Klages 1985: 19-22). The destabilization of value systems has the long time consequences for the whole country, especially when a similar tendency appears also in other Western countries. The core values are more and more vulnerable to what actually happens around and people easily switch from one orientation to another making the whole socio-political system much less stable than before. Fluidity of values leads to the fluidity of commitments that become highly sensitive to the manipulative potential of people and agencies controlling mass media.

Individual freedom as a core value is much endangered by the hard realities of social life: the slowing down supply of new jobs due to the technological progress and the limited absorption power of the world markets, conflict between self-indulgence and the interests of other people, awareness that there are limits of everything and at the bottom there is much emptiness. On the other hand, the return to old subordinations and loyalties (religion, nationalism, family) remains to be perceived as oldfashioned and unattractive. Any wide-spread consensus is almost impossible because it means individual and group subordination - something in the basic disagreement with the postulate of self-growth. The concept of the society founded on the "moral majority" which has the right and privilege to expect from the rest a subordination remains unpopular among the young generation. On the other side, the naive belief in the automatic self-improvement of
"enlightened" people is no guarantee that the further development of human capacities will secure a better world.

One of the basic dilemmas does appear between the virtue orientation and the expediency orientation. The techno-organizational "rationality" makes a virtue out of expediency and this meets a substantial resistance from those people who cherish the humanistic ideals. The power of these ideals appears, among others, in the resistance against the reduction of human beings to the role of the obedient servants of organizational power. Not only people are expected to adapt to the organizational and technical realities but these realities are also postulated to be shaped in concern to human dignity. In the German society with its relatively high average life standard there is an understandable room for the "luxury" of humanization in various fields, including work. However, any humanization done on expense of the sense of duty would be self-defeating in the long run. The harmonization of the need of self-development, dedication to personal freedom, organizational loyalty and commitment to work is one of the basic contemporary problems. The inability of the state authorities to solve several vital issues, primarily to reduce the widespread unemployment, makes very difficult to deal effectively with the above mentioned problem. For example, young people are kept as long as possible at school in order to lower the unemployment rates but this is not an answer. In the society where youngsters mature early and are actually treated on equal footing with adults, the postponement of duty taking only makes the problem more acute.

The value concentration on self-development, on the expense of the duty concentration, is far characteristic for a relatively small category of people who are young, educated, and single. They differ profoundly with the management category mainly in the approach to economic growth but also in other fields: work discipline, attitude to the state, etc. Their dissatisfaction with the status quo is evident. If taking into comparison the data on people who are duty oriented and the people who are self-development oriented the latter are much more critical regarding the political institutions, more inclined to take part in public demonstrations,
more aggressive towards the bureaucracy, and even less willing to read the newspapers (Klages 1985: 54). In the ability to adapt constructively to the available working conditions, duty concentrators are definitely better than the self-development concentrators; the latter are more liberal regarding the loyalty at work and the fulfillment of obligations (Ibid., pp.60-64).

There is in present day Germany a very strong tendency towards a moral liberalism and the democratic appearance. This is still somewhat related to the Nazi past and the shame for what had happened in that time; the young seem in this respect more sincere than the older (Cooney et al. 1984: 55-144).

The decline of traditional religiosity evident among Protestants as well as among Roman Catholics has much to do with the change of values. The place emptied by the orthodox religious faith is now open to the alternative ideological perspectives; the emphasis on personal freedom is a consequence of the rejection of a doctrine. Is it actually a permanent phenomenon? People who enjoy spiritual "liberation" may in the long run feel a need to return to some kind of an orthodoxy, especially in the situation of a crisis originating the general feeling of insecurity and hopelessness. With the growing criticism of public institutions, and particularly the federal government, a new kind of orthodoxy may look like a rescue. The revival of Christianity is a chance which depends largely on the grass-root modernization of the religious institutions that would be appealing to the young generation. The chance of finding again inside the Christian institutions the possibilities of self-growth does exist but so far it has not been fulfilled on a mass scale.

Bureaucratic institutions meet much criticism dictated by the exaggerated expectations what the welfare state is actually able to do, as well as how its costs may be diminished. The personal image of leading administrators suffers because they are not able to solve many problems that are difficult - but this is not recognized by the general public. The vaguely defined interest in politics has grown in the period 1952-74 from 27 % to 47 % (Klages 1985: 98) but this does not go together with the readiness to make
sacrifice for the common sake. In the period 1973-82 in West Germany the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy has grown from 44 % to 68 %, more than in other industrial democracies (around 60 % in the U.K., Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Ireland; only 44 % in France), higher than the average for the European Community (52 %). However, the strength of commitment to the democratic values may be proved only in the case of a major trial.

Commitment to work has declined in West Germany in comparison with other developed democratic countries. In lower jobs it is the matter of the dissatisfaction with the income level, not enough something interesting, and the inadequate chances to go ahead. In the higher level jobs people would like to have more responsibility and free time for themselves (Noelle-Neumann & Piel 1983: 416; Bogun 1983: 140). Again, the danger of unemployment, that depends on the general economic situation, may in the long run change priorities. In the relative security of jobs such factors as personal development through job, participation, promotion and recognition play a major role. With the educational advancement there is more and more pressure on the employers to offer their employees at least some personal satisfaction at work. The profile of expectations traditionally typical for the "higher" (in terms of money and prestige) jobs radiates on the people located in "lower" jobs who more and more share with their bosses the similar pattern of expectations (Hetzler et al. 1982: 36).

One of the paradoxes of modern times is the contradiction between the job security enjoyed by the large number of employees located in the public sector, as well as by the unionized "core" workers of the private sector, and on the other hand the high job insecurity of young people entering the job market, working mothers and occupants of marginal jobs. German civil servants have the full job security; their income grows with the seniority; the upgrading is almost automatic (Siedentopf 1986).

Countries with the long tradition of civil service, as the U.K. and West Germany, have in the present day specific problems how to adapt this tradition to the changing conditions. In West Germany according to some
data from the surveys of public employees at least a small majority of
them (more among men than among women) perceive their duty as a
service different from other jobs (Bericht 1981: 76-77) and this looks like a
continuation of how it used to be understood historically (Haltenhauer
1980; Wolff & Bachof 1976: 467). However, other data are more pessimistic
regarding the work morale of civil servants. Democratization of the state
exposes the civil servants to political patronage (ibid., pp. 467, 469) but the
pluralistic system gives them also an autonomy not available in the
nondemocratic countries. Employees of the public sector are vulnerable to
the general trends characterised by the weakening work commitment.
Leisure orientation gains priority over the work orientation. With the
growing dominance of services in the structure of employment there is less
reason to be happy with a job that is low paid, with no perspectives to
grow, and characterised by poor working conditions. On the other hand,
people better educated than before and exposed to the liberal spirit of
mass media, mainly tv, have much higher expectations and are more
vulnerable to frustration.

The pressure of changing values becomes reinforced with the growing
wealth of societies. Comparative data show that in the better-off countries
there is much more individualism (Hofstede 1980: 232), hedonism and an
idealistic critique of society (Klages 1984: 18). In West Germany since the
early 1950s there has been a considerable change towards more secular
approach, growth of political interest, self-growth as something desirable
(Meulemann 1981). There are growing differences in the perception of
values by people from various age groups (Inglehart 1985: 512; Jugendwerk
1980: 47; Pawlowsky 1985: 142) with the young generation being more
idealistically oriented; this may change with the continuation of mass
unemployment to which the young generation is particularly vulnerable.
The differences in the freedom perception at work seem to grow (Pawlowsky
1985: 158; Noelle-Neumann & Strümpel 1984: 71). Free time fits much
better into the current life time orientation than work which does not
allow to do something pleasant and involving, express oneself, create
something permanently meaningful and earn enough to be satisfied (Opa-
schowski & Radatz 1982: 24). Dissatisfaction with work grows with the
decline of the job content, young age and the limited career chances.
The Economic Background of West Germany

The contemporary change of German values happens on the high level of wellbeing in the society which before, under much more modest conditions, did not allow the poor strata to articulate freely their preferences. Obviously, many West Germans, probably the majority of them, still experience the consequences of a mass socio-economic advancement. Their "materialism" and "obsession of having fun" at any cost, may be explained by their justified satisfaction that the country is well off.

Still not long ago Germans were defeated, their country being destroyed, divided and occupied, the victors imposing arbitrarily their own values on the arbitrarily divided nation. Foreign identification of Germans with Nazis, rejection by the new occupants - especially at the beginning - of everything that was great in the German past (for example, the social legislation introduced by Bismark, the rule of peace and order, sense of citizenship), and the claim of foreign and domestic critics that totalitarianism had in Germany the uniquely suitable conditions, all these humiliating factors have contributed to the change of values, together with the sense of collective guilt particularly evident among the young generation. The diversion of attention to the task of rebuilding what was left and creating a better life for everybody has become a priority. 36)

West Germany has done remarkably well in building the wealth, creating the welfare state, assuring good working conditions, and practicing democracy. 37) Since the late 1970s West Germany has met more and more difficulties even when the country still remains rich and effective in many respects. In the last ten years the labour force has grown but the actual employment has declined. In the period 1970-83 the West German real GDP has grown by 39% but the employment has grown by 44% (Wirtschaft und Statistik 1986, III: 161); this means that the policy to keep at work as many people as possible was relatively successful but at the same it was not adequately substantiated by the growth of productivity. The structure of employment has not much changed in the period 1971-88. 38) There has been a continuation of success in foreign trade. 39)
The structure of the German economy has changed in the past but since several years it shows a remarkable stability. In the period 1950-84 the share of services has grown up resp. from 53 % to 54 % in GNP and from 32 % to 53 % in employment. The real share of the state in GNP has remained at the level of 20 % (55 % private consumption, 21-25 % investment, 5 % balance of payments surplus). The income of the state in GNP has grown from 32 % to 46 % (in it social fund contributions have grown from 8 % to 17 %). If taking the international comparisons, the West German GNP per one inhabitant has doubled in the period 1960-83 in comparison with 54 % growth in the U.S. and the U.K., but it has quadrupled in Japan.

The Welfare State and Its Civil Servants

One of the crucial phenomena in West Germany is the growth of the welfare state, and even faster growth of the mass expectations of public services. In the period 1975-83 the public expenditure in DM per inhabitant has almost doubled but the debt service has grown 3.5 times. However, this debt service still represented in 1983 only 6 % of all public expenditure (3 % in 1975). The growth of the public service was 50 % in the period 1960-83; the share of women in this service has grown from 24 % to 32 % (in the partial employment it has remained at the level of around 90 %). Civil servants are located mostly in the provincial service (43 %), municipalities (28 %), post and railways (20 %), and relatively few of them are in the federal government (8 %) (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1985, IX: 745).

The share of the civil servants in the employed labour force has grown in the period 1960-83 from 12 % to 18 % but there is not much chance it to grow more with the growing load of public expenditure. In the period 1960-83 the public service full employment has much grown in higher education (from 56,000 to 218,000), other schools (from 272,000 to 521,000), public health and sport (from 173,000 to 338,000); it has grown particularly fast at the highest level (from 159,000 to 428,000) and on the level directly below it; it has even declined at the level of blue collar workers (from
843,000 to 795,000). This growth of employment is improbable to be continued. One of the reasons of it is the progress of some vital expenditures. For example, in the period 1970–83 the total expenditure in West Germany on health has grown 207 % when the GNP has grown only 146 % (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1985, IX: 772). In the same period of time the joint health contribution of private insurance, employers and private persons has declined from 38 % to 28 % (Ibid., p.774).

Direct and indirect payments given by the state have stimulated the middle class identity and the appropriate material demands as well as leisure aspirations. People have learned quite soon that several chances, including the educational upgrading, may be taken for granted and that they deserve things and services guaranteed by the state. Even the duty oriented people find reasons to take a critical position to the state when they face the bureaucratized institutions unable or unwilling to mobilize the goodwill of citizens. In the bargaining relationship between the politicians, civil servants, mass media, and various pressure groups quite often the final result is a higher burden put on the state to take care of people's needs. Another question whether the public sector is actually able to solve the variety of problems and how much civil servants may be actually blamed for various shortcomings.

How far actually the welfare state is able to face the demands imposed on it with the growing power enjoyed by the pressure groups that capitalize on the dissatisfaction of the population? Italy is an extreme case with the satisfaction rate regarding the state declining in the period 1973–82 from 27 % to 21 % and the average satisfaction level for that period of time 20 % in comparison with 73 % in West Germany and 54 % in the U.K. (Klages 1985: 106).

Civil service in the countries of imperial traction, including Germany, has its local roots much related to the nature of rule practiced in a given country. In Germany this is the monarchic and military tradition coexisting with the national democratic aspirations. Since the World War II the West German civil service has gained a definitely democratic basis in contradi
stinction to the civil service in GDR, fully dependent on the ruling communist party and constituting a vital part of the totalitarian status quo.

The democratic framework does not necessarily mean that the spirit of the West German civil service is actually fully democratized. The traditional elitism and autonomy of this service (violated by Nazism but afterwards revived) founded on the solid legal basis, has made out of it a definite factor of the German reality. There is a specific subculture of "Beamten-tum" playing a vital role in the history of German society, providing a motivational basis for people participating in it, visible in the daily life, as well as inspiring the German thought (the concept of bureaucracy formulated by Max Weber is the best example).

However, the German civil service as a socio-cultural entity is exposed to the broader spectrum of phenomena, and this needs to be analytically appreciated. The world of politics closely coexists with the world of the state bureaucracy. Within West German politics there are substantial socio-cultural dynamics dictated by the divergent characteristics of socio-political forces involved in the power contest. Here several trends need to be distinguished: the changing nature of the West German socialism, resistance against the Soviet communism, the declining religiosity and its political consequences, the neo-populist and neo-anarchic tendencies, etc.

The mutual penetration of the bureaucratic culture and various political cultures is of a particular interest for us. This interpenetration is much differentiated in West Germany due to the federal system and the diversity of local circumstances.

In various regions (Ländern) bureaucrats and politicians are differently dependent on each other and it is necessary to recognize these specificities. The translocation of the whole country much more to the West after the World War II went together with the destruction of the Prussian tradition which was particularly strong in the state bureaucracy. The consequences
of this also are worth to be considered. A comparison of the placement of bureaucrats in the Weimar republic and now is another important issue. For example, in that time the opposition had a relatively easy chance to remove individual ministers, and this is impossible now. Is now the position of the higher bureaucratic strata much stronger than in the Weimar republic? This and similar questions are worth to be answered.

Mass media play much role as a pressure on civil service. The liberal orientation dominating in mass media inspires criticism of state bureaucracy and the mobilization of public opinion. On the other hand, this liberal orientation has much influence on civil servants, particularly in the young generation, among experts providing sophisticated services for the state, through the participation of civil servants in public panels and various conferences. Civil service has only a limited chance to influence mass media people, and on the other hand everybody, including civil servants, is exposed to the influence coming through tv, radio, newspapers, and magazines. It is a very important question who and how much imposes here an influence on civil servants and what kind of a cultural transfer actually happens in this case.

A separate set of questions is valid for the mutual relationship between the techno-scientific personnel and civil servants. There are more and more vital public issues related to the application of modern technology and its controversial consequences. Civil servants in order not to lose their public face and act as reliable advisors to the politicians have to become quite sophisticated in technology, social sciences, economics, etc. How much they are able to preserve their own identity?

Some of them rescue their own autonomy by presenting themselves as facilitators, public advocates, social entrepreneurs, policy analysts, etc. The border zone between "science" and "public service" gains in importance and is worth to be analysed. One of the specific questions is how much civil servants become acculturated to modern science and technology (e.g. in Japan this acculturation is particularly high). The legal expertise traditionally dominates over the German civil service but it is an open question
how long will it actually last in the future with the growing importance of
the other kinds of expertise. A separate question interesting for socio-
logists is how much sociology has been able to prove its value for civil
servants.

Private sector plays in West Germany a role much beyond its modest share
in the total employment (only 10% of the labour force is self-employed)
due to its wealth, source of tax income, free enterprise ideology of the
ruling party, and the contrast to the GDR. Even socialists and neo-populists
are ideologically not against the private sector.

The relationship between the public sector and the private sector is quite
complex in West Germany. On one hand, state bureaucracy has a somewhat
negative public image (too little done for too much tax money) but the
traditional prestige of the top civil servants seems to be much higher then
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. A career in the public service still is quite
attractive for the offspring of the self-employed people not only due to the
financial security but even more due to the social prestige of the civil
servant profession.

The decline of the work ethic in West Germany, as well in the other
Western countries, has much to do with the frustrated expectations of the
young generation regarding the welfare state and the role of civil servants
in it. The change of values in the German society imposes directly and
indirectly some new pressures on civil servants as one of the core socio-
professional groups in the West German society. The question is whether
the cultural dynamics of the welfare state and its promotors is vivid
equal in order to face new challenges. The fact that civil service is
founded on lawyers at the expense of other professional backgrounds
(technologists, political scientists, system analysers, sociologists, econo-
mists, etc.) may be one of the sources why the cultural gap is growing.
Another factor is the organizational ossification not allowing for enough
innovations and much flexibility. It is worth to ask how and in what way the
culture of civil service may be enriched by the models of motivational
enrichment, organizational effectiveness, participatory management, man-
agement by results, involvement of clients, etc.
Systemic Balance and Cultural Innovativeness

The West German society is in general quite balanced economically but it remains much vulnerable to the fluctuations on the world markets, oil crisis, nuclear plant catastrophes, etc. Things may go worse easily in the case of a major world crisis, but from a comparative perspective West Germany has a stable location.

Another question is how balanced is the German society in the socio-cultural sense if taking into consideration the continuing split of the country into the democratic part and the communist part, great vulnerability to the West-East conflict, great dependence of the internal stability on the external circumstances, permanent unemployment among the young generation (at the same time the country depends in around 9% on the foreign labour ready to do the lowest jobs rejected by native Germans), as well as the major change of social values. There is a build-in factor of instability and worry about the future which has several far reaching consequences. The technological progress, including the wide utilization of the nuclear energy, reinforces the public worries and the pressure on the politicians.

In the period 1960-83 West Germany has gone closer to the pattern of a post-industrial society with its major dependence on services. However, German industry still represents more than in the U.S. in the GNP as well as in employment (each 42% in comparison with 32% in the U.S. in 1983). The private consumption has grown faster than in the U.S. as well as in the U.K. but slower than in Japan (it tripled there), France, and Italy.

The evident decline of the traditional values and the withdrawal of personnel commitment by the employees as a reaction to the frustrated expectations - on one hand, and the growing emphasis on reform and self-development - on the other hand, impose on the West German employers new problems and challenges in the field of personnel policy. It is necessary to reduce to minimum the negative effects of the declining "order and duty" orientation. Mental withdrawal of the part of the potential or actual
employees, as well as the pressure exercised by the reform-oriented people, impose the need of a new organizational culture. This is valid not only for the private sector but also for the public sector.

In the much transformed society seniority means quite often less than knowledge, satisfaction from work depends less on security than on the chances of a self-fulfillment, intellectual and technical skills gain in validity. Civil servants have to meet situations in which expertise is much needed. Candidates to civil servants are more conscious of their internal needs. In addition, the size of civil service is big enough to create much need of applying some economies: for example, the traditional image of civil service as a secure place to spend the rest of the working life is counterproductive regarding the quality of candidates. There is an obvious need to promote more ambitious and sophisticated criteria of promotion, work incentives, and other personnel procedures (Klages & Schäfer 1985).

West Germany needs badly a more courageous approach to organizational reforms, particularly in the public sector constituting one fifth of total employment but playing a leading role in several fields of German life. Already now "the civil service is increasingly avoiding the rigid forms of law-enforcement and is taking informal administrative action whereby arrangements are made with the population" (Siedentopf 1986:44). However, still "civil servants tend to behave bureaucratically, and its administrative machinery tends to be incomprehensible to the individual" (Ibid., p.41).46

The democratic style of administration may activate a better attitude to work among the subordinates. Matrix organization, based on the flexible project teams, may help to overcome the rigidity of offices and their permanent occupants. Autonomization of several organizational units and the delegation to them of the power as well as the responsibility may change the nature of bureaucratic activities. A much more careful control of policy results and an appropriate feedback to the decision-making units may limit the waste of allocating resources without actually scrutinizing the actual costs. Task-orientation characteristic for modern Western enterprises looking for challenge and excellence may be suitable also for
the public sector as long as the innovative accounting system allows to locate the profit- and waste-centres (for example in health services and in postal services).

Two-thirds of the present day civil servants are in the upper levels of training and responsibility.\textsuperscript{47} Organization of such a sophisticated labour power has to be much different from the organization focused mainly on people gaining experience and the appropriate skills inside the institution. Much may be learned from the institutions employing mainly professionals. Work motivation needs to be intensively stimulated. Rigid career lines under the new circumstances have only a limited applicability. The "efficiency model" is much more adequate than the "survival model", so far dominant in most of the state bureaucracies. There is no need of an "organizational revolution" which would bury most of the noble traditions of the German civil service. However, there is a necessity to look for new organizational perspectives, and the experiences of the most progressive Western private companies may be much inspiring in this respect.

A new organizational culture is badly needed in the public sector in order to be more in agreement with the changing dominant values of the broader society, aspirations of the young generation, and the trends in the private sector.\textsuperscript{48} In West Europe the organizational culture is badly needed to be promoted in order to improve much the economic performance so far not good enough to secure a better future for the young generation.\textsuperscript{49}

The "sociotechnical perspective" may be much appropriate in dealing with the work reform adequate to the changing people and institutions. So far too much depends on an artificial manipulation; the individual as well institutional self-growth is not enough appreciated. Instead believing that it is up to the appropriate experts to "cure" the work structures, chances of self-recovery are worth to be considered. In the workplaces there are many potential innovators; it is necessary to recognize them and to give a chance. It seems much promising to encourage all these potentially very constructive and committed people who under the suitable circumstances, advised by the sociotechnical knowledge, may do many things much better than now (Schein 1985).
There are several universal principles of an effective action (see Kotarbinski 1965). Waste may be avoided by the elimination of all unnecessary ingredients. Demonstration of the potential may be sometimes sufficient to achieve the result. By concentrating all available resources on the critical spot it is possible to achieve the momentum. The delegation of power and responsibility by the supervisors to the subordinates will extend the scope of the commitment. By making difference between what is actually important and what is not important it is possible to economize on the cost and effort. Incapacitation of the vital enemy resources makes more probable our own victory. Delaying critical decisions and actions quite often we may improve our chances.

All such universal principles of effectiveness need to be validated to the actual contingencies of time, place, resources, local organizational culture, organizational size, etc. It is the purpose of the sociotechnical diagnosis to formulate the premises of an optimal reform: the vulnerable spots (e.g. the low socialization potential of a given work structure, lack of an adequate experience among the personnel, too much superficial manipulation from the managerial side, the lack of clear goals and performance criteria, etc.), the potential agents of change (top management as the initiator, task teams, middle management, coalition of trace unionists and management people, specific occupational categories, etc.), the mode of establishing an innovative coalition and giving it a chance, various scenarios of the programme building and of its implementation (the frontal action, implementation on few spots for the simulation by the rest, self-growth instead of the imposition from outside), external and internal control of what actually happens, learning from the experience (feedback) and the introduction of adequate corrections, measurement of the success (operationalization of the performance criteria), integration of the personnel, inspiration of a moral core, and the establishment of a viable organizational culture (Matejko 1986 b).

Sociotechnical diagnosis is based on the recognition of the sociocultural, technical and other realities of the innovative action. This recognition is substantiated by the scientific input: research data, modelling scientifi
cally variefiable, social variables. The move from one mode, taken as unsatisfactory, to another mode treated as desirable, happens with the framework of specific interest groups, more or less articulated concerns, values and norms. It is up to the sociotechnicians to help to achieve by the organizational system a new state of "maturity" here understood as a harmonious cooperation of various elements for the benefit of common goals. It is up to the agents of the innovation to decide about the desirable socio-cultural model and to implement it accordingly in the most possible economy of effort.

In the sociotechnical design of the organizational innovation the commitment to specific values is unavoidable even if the value-free knowledge is taken for granted. It has to be decided which (and why) desirable alternative is given the preference over other alternatives, certain values are treated as more desirable than other values, certain means of action are excluded because of their impropriety. Such values as harmonious cooperation between people working together, recognition of human esteem and of the need to grow, moral responsibility of people versus each other, participation in the decision making, a good feeling to each other, should be treated as the integral parts of the sociotechnical design.

Conclusions

When studying the organizational culture it is necessary to consider the basic problems of a given country, its history, the specific conditioning of the present by the happenings of the past. The case of West Germany is particularly interesting in this respect. The country was devastated many times by the European wars and the danger of the same happening again is a real one. In addition, Germany actually has been in history much diversified; the efforts to unite the country were enforced by the state of a Prussian origin; conformism to a much formalized order has been of an artificial nature and it has lead to tensions. Germans are in the search of their another identity when the efforts to adapt to two much mutually opposed versions of West and East identities have proved to be unsatisfactory. A number of Germans have been leaving their country for good when
on the other hand many foreigners have been working in West Germany filling out the inferior positions. Modernity and tradition coexist in West Germany without necessarily being in agreement to each other.

Germans on the both West and East sides have good reasons to be dissatisfied with the roles given to them by their protectors: the USA on the one side and the USSR on the other. It is in the vested interest of all Germans to unite the country, promote peacefully the economy, reinforce the relationships with all parts of the world, gain a stable role in Europe, intensify the economic and cultural relationships with all neighbouring countries. The interests of both big powers engaged in the German territory are different and so far it is difficult to imagine such state of affairs in which both big powers would agree Germans to promote their own goals. Of course, West Germany has much more freedom to act than East Germany. However, in both cases the representation of the interests of a "big brother" plays a vital role. The East-West relationships have a dominant impact on the fate of Germans as the latter remain in this case much more an object than a subject.

The fear in Europe of the potential "German danger" is a vital factor. A weak Germany is understood by several European nations as the only guaranty of peace. On the other hand, being located in the heart of Europe the German potential has the decisive impact on the whole European potential. Not only West Germany but also other democratic German speaking countries play a stabilizing role in the heart of Europe. The case of Austria is particularly illustrative in this respect.

The administrative heritage of a given country has to be acknowledged. In West Germany the formal role of the state is much rooted in the legal system. Policies are quite complicated. Legal rules remain the vital unifying factor; in theory the system is rendered transparent, in practice it is opaque. It is quite difficult to make changes and innovations; there is a considerable lack of mutual trust (Jann 1983).
Administrative culture is not the only factor influencing policies. In the administrative practice the precedents play a very substantial role: decisions taken in the past establish the status quo difficult to change afterwards. Various vested interest groups exercise their pressures more or less effectively.

The nature of a given policy may influence the form of its design and execution. Contingencies of policies fluctuate and this has its impact. The personalities of civil servants designing a given policy, their skills, motives and willingness to act are also important. Therefore, it is not possible to expect from the administrative culture too much of an explanatory potential.

There is a great need of comparative research on administrative culture with much more emphasis on the implementation practices. It is not easy to check how much gap does exist between the outline of a given policy and its implementation. Bureaucratic functionaries have a vested interest in hiding their failures and errors. There is a strong tendency to cover up everything inadequate. Another factor is the actual cost of various policies compared with the utility of them. Bureaucracies in the developing countries are worth to be included as the object of studies because in this field much may be improved by learning about the actual bureaucratic functioning.

West German cultural values do not necessary differ much from such societies as Sweden and the U.K. On the other hand, they are much different from another German country, East Germany, where the Soviet-imposed nomenklatura plays a major organizational role. The weaknesses of nomenklatura are evident: the careerist orientation defeating any professionalism, lack of contact with the common man, a cynical approach to duties, involvement in intrigues, suppression of any modernization efforts, demoralization of the personnel. However, as long as the counterforces are not available in East Germany, the nomenklatura remains in full power. The multiplication of professional people contributes to the sophistication of services, or at least to a demand of it, but nomenklatura has
much chance to coopt any experts and use them in its own way. Military people and the police may have their own power aspirations but their security depends much on the continuity of nomenklatura.

There is in East Germany a complicated network of mutual interdependencies and nomenklatura is in the centre of it. People included into nomenklatura may much differ but they all have a strong vested interest to contribute to the status quo preservation.

Socio-cultural difference existing between FRG and GDR originates from the antagonistic confrontation between two civilizations opposed to each other. However, the traditional German sense of order and duty has made both countries respectively very efficient in both political camps: NATO and the Soviet block. The potential reunification of Germany may open a chance to bring together the individualistic and collectivistic cultural elements; this would lead to a major enrichment of the organizational culture. Already now both West German and East German business leaders show much mutual interest. The intensive FRG-GDR foreign exchange opens the chance for mutual organizational contacts that are looked upon with suspicion by both respective "big brothers". The fact that FRG as well as GDR have substantial economic and organizational achievements, even if the political frameworks are much different, creates a suitable ground for the mutual respect.

It is important to mention that both countries have a substantical tradition of an active role of the state, much less questioned publicly than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. East German state socialism has in this respect not only they Soviet roots but also the native basis. The officially sponsored revival of the Prussian tradition in GDR is fully understandable. On the other hand, in FRG even Christian democrats who are ideologically committed to the private sector actually when being in power preserve the welfare state in its present shape. The public sector is the dominant factor not only in GDR but also in FRG. The vital question in both cases is how to enrich its organizational culture by such factors that would envigorate work motivation, work output, elimination of waste and red tape, coopera-
tition between various organizational units, and other positive features. Within the German framework this is more probable to happen than in the countries definitely lacking the public commitment to the state. In the Anglo-Saxon countries there are deeply rooted public resentments against the state economy, and in the Soviet bloc countries the private sector has become marginalized. Both Germanies have a vested interest to learn from each other and the communication between them may be encouraging for the rest of Europe, as long as this contact will not serve only the Soviet influence to penetrate Western Europe.
Table 1: Comparative data on FRG and other developed countries

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Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1985, 7: 524 - 26
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Footnotes

1) A distinction is needed between the 'declared' culture and the 'real' culture; quite often organizations make declarations about their principles but in analytic sense what interests us much more is the organizational reality. People themselves are quite confused about their own priorities; what is valuable and honourable for some people may be objectionable for other people; basic assumptions may be quite fluid; they may be an original invention of a given group or they may be taken over from outside; various parts of a given organization may follow quite different assumptions; the continuity of assumptions may be more or less secure. Culture as "a pattern of a basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (Schein 1983: 9).

2) This is a detailed description of the Japanese managerial practices based on the lifetime employment, union-management harmony, group oriented model of human relations, cooperative approach, strong collegial bonds, indirect leadership, seniority, and deep commitment. Competition and individualism widely appearing in the West lead to much waste of the competitive power on the international markets and therefore there is a growing interest to copy from the Japanese what is possible to be absorbed from them in other environment. There are now many books on the Japanese labour relations patterns, but this by Alston (1986) provides a particularly good insight. Alston makes clear how wrong are the popular American myths about the Japanese worker. Misunderstandings arise mostly from the fact that the axioms underlying the managerial culture are so different. The Japanese way of work is based on the assumption that the worker who is able to perform any work duty is intelligent enough to improve the productivity and quality of that work; given the chance workers want to improve the quality of their work; members of a corporation form a "family"; the group is more important than the individual (Ibid, p.23). The concern for group harmony (Wa) penetrates deeply the managerial practices in Japan as well as the actual motivation of workers. Official transactions are personalized in this sense that the socio-moral concerns are always present and they influence the tactics of the encounter. The "family" approach is valid not only for the micro-groups but also for the macro-groups. For example, this approach allows major corporations to depend on the "satellite" suppliers so much that the low inventories are possible, and this diminishes considerably the costs of production. Workers are trusted and the delegation of power is the matter of fact. Trade unions cooperate with management but this does not exclude the subtle way of exercising a collective pressure for the benefit of workers.

Unequal rewards and relative deprivation both function in Japan in a much different way than in the West. "The genius of the Japanese
work style is based on the realization that long-term profits based on mutual cooperation are greater than short-term profits that result in distrust and non-cooperation" (ibid, p.52). The concern of Japanese business leaders with the limits of power encourages them to tread a very fine line between being too lax and too harsh. Leadership-by-influence is given priority over leadership-by-designation. Legitimacy offered by subordinates is looked for, and there is a tendency to avoid a direct confrontation; private talks and informal discussions are more welcomed than the public dealing.

A subtle network of mutual dependencies and influences is carefully cultivated in Japan on both sides: the superiors as well as the subordinates. Emotional dependence on the others is taken very seriously and it contributes to the tight socio-moral bonds among people. "Workers and employers are entangled in a complex web of mutually exchanged debts and favors" (ibid, p.131). Trust is very appreciated and for its sake many potential conflicts are being suppressed. Proposals are informally circulated (ringi) in order to reinforce the consensus of a future action. Contracts are treated mainly as a background of trust and cooperation and not as formal documents.

On the basis of the Japanese experience Alston has formulated the following suggestions for business leaders in running meetings: do not involve yourself in a dialogue with a specific person during the meeting, write down all solutions without evaluation, never probe, be alert when people are ready to close the meeting, be responsible for the solutions made by the group, your contribution should be more emotional (supportive) than factual, don't be impatient, set a positive tone as quickly as possible, keep meetings short (ibid, p.323).

The internal diversification of management styles in Japan does not appear in the writings of Alston. The focus is on an "ideal type" (Max Weber) of Japanese leadership and supervision without probing into the diversity of circumstances. This is a disadvantage but a well justified one because at least Alston has avoided to confuse the reader with the variety of qualifications. He mentions the fact that only minority of the labour force in Japan is employed permanently and stay in big enterprises. The rest have much less security and they are not taken so much care of.

3) Social culture of Japan, and particularly the organizational subculture, so far allows people to find the sense of their lives in the accommoda-
tion to the existing groups, particularly work groups. Manipulation coming from the top will be accepted by them as long as it provides a satisfactory answer to the existential problems experienced by people. The question is whether the present cultural status quo will be satisfactory in the case of any major crisis. Not having her own natural resources, Japan is potentially very vulnerable. Even more important is the question how much the present day organizational culture will fit into the gradual transformation of traditionalistic Japan into the modern mass society with its heavy load of artificiality,
depersonification, manipulation, and alienation. Tradition in Japan becomes more and more the matter of the past, relevant as a relict, good for ornamental purposes, but pushed into the margin by the necessities of daily modern life. With the cheapening of patriotism and religious beliefs there is a major danger that the gap will grow between the pretended Japanese identity and the real, practical expediency-orientation of the people living in a mass society. The present day Japanese practicism inclines people to pay homage to many god at the same time. Japanese for the sake of good relations want to be everything at the same time: traditionalists, patriots, democrats, cosmopolitans, friends of the U.S. as well as of the U.S.S.R., religious, agnostic, commited, uncommited. This expedient relativism in the long run confuses primarily people who are trying hard to practice it. The moral-cultural dilemmas of modern Japan almost unavoidable have to multiply. There is a great need of a more critical writing about Japan. In the West we do not know enough about the nature of contradictions carried by people who undoubtably have great virtues but maybe are in general too practical.

4) "Culture is patterned, potent, and deeply embedded in people's thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. It provides an integrated perspective and meaning to situations; it gives group members a historical perspective and a view of their identity" (Schein 1985: 44). As may be seen from this quotation, Schein recognizes the patterned nature of culture allowing to stabilize things for group members. However, his socio-psychological background prevents Schein to acquire full awareness of the socio-anthropological dimensions of culture going much beyond micro-settings. Culture actually is a value term directly related to the specific ethnic entity; however, such a meaningful relationship is easier recognizable in Europe than in North America.


10) Organizational similarities and differences may be in this respect much confusing if taken literally, without the recognition of cultural identity. One may add here that a very large number of the organizational research results need a cultural validation. Is it methodologically justified to accept generalizations which are completely ignoring the cultural diversity/unity of organizational units? The cultural paradigm by which people operate may provide a very powerful insight into the organizational reality. "Few concepts are so powerful in the degree to which they help us decipher what may be a very opaque area" (Schein 1985: 147).

11) Much attention is paid by Schein (1985) to the culture-creative role of group dynamics: shared understanding by the group members, coping styles, elimination of anxieties, building of trust relationships, dealing with conflict inside the group and outside of it, joint effort to achieve stabilization, shared consensus as the outcome of group processes, positive problem solving, pain and anxiety reduction. According to Schein, "Theories and findings about sociodynamics, leadership, and the learning process are essential to an understanding of culture formation. These theories are the basic building blocks for understanding how culture comes to be in the first place and, eventually, for understanding how culture evolves and changes" (Ibid. p.184).

Schein (1985) discusses also the unfreezing/refreezing cultural change mechanisms: evolution of a specific or a general nature, self-guided evolution through organizational therapy, managed evolution through insassers, managed evolution through outsiders, planned change and organization development, imposition of new technology, change through scandal and the exploration of myths, incrementalism, coercive persuasion, organizational turnaround, reorganization and rebirth (Ibid. pp.277-295).

12) The socio-cultural approach to organizations needs to be enriched by a much broader perception of organizational culture as actually an arena a various macro-cultural trends and influences. It is necessary to overcome the bias arising from the treatment of work and organization in isolation from the social life and society in general. The future, from my own perspective, belongs to the much more wholistic approaches.

Pity that so far social anthropology remains mainly limited to the "primitive" societies and to the matters of the past. In the North American sociological research there is so far a strong tendency to ignore culture understood as a unifying principle that provides meaning to the behaviour of people.

The book by Schein (1985) is a useful step towards the appreciation of culture in the field of organizational studies but its weakness is in the exclusion of society. The U.S. framework is taken for granted by the
author and not critically acknowledged. Mini-cultures of the North American business organizations definitely differ in several respects from the West European mini-cultures of business enterprises. The Japanese socio-cultural reality is still another story. Only by acknowledging the cross-cultural differentiation we may pay a full justice to the factor of organizational culture.

13) For example, in West Germany in the period 1980-84 the share of unemployed without jobs for more than 12 months has grown from 17% to 33% of all unemployed. Trade unions are in the great difficulty because of the conflict of interests between those members who are employed (and pay the full union dues), and those members who are unemployed and push for being helped from the public funds.

14) If taking for 100 the cost of the US industrial labour per hour in 1985, this was 28 in Greece, 41 in Spain, 47 in Ireland, 52 in the U.K. around 60 in France and Austria, 61 in Japan, between 65 and 70 in Italy, Denmark, Holland, Australia and Belgium, between 70 and 75 in Sweden, West Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Canada (Die Welt 1986, 194:11). Of course, better technical equipment allows to achieve higher productivity, but on the other hand, industrial investors look for locations where labour is cheaper and in addition where trade unions do not have much to say. The growth of labour productivity recompenses for the higher cost per worker as long as the general costs remain relatively low. This also has much to do with the market expansion: when there is a limited demand of certain products, as this happens for example with the poor population in India, there is not much chance to make the prices of goods attractive enough in order to gain profit from the large volume.

15) When comparing the western countries for the first half or the 1960s and the second half of the 1970s the countries with strong corporatism (Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Holland) appear as much better off than the rest in stable prices, employment, growth and the cost of state maintenance (Kaase 1986: 156-163). The ability of a given society to integrate various interest groups around the common welfare goals is of a critical importance. The group struggle not only costs much but in addition it makes impossible to focus the whole society on the practical chances to improve the situation.

16) In West Germany 87% of the elite are from the middle or upper class in comparison with 56% in the total population; only 3% are women. There are some considerable differences between the elites and the population but they do not have a dramatic nature (Kaase 1986: 320-334).

17) For example on how the style of the U.S. politics influences the economic policy see David A. Stockman (1986).

18) On the negative consequences of bureaucratization in the Soviet bloc countries see Hirszowicz (1986).
19) It is significant that the opposition against the bureaucratization in the Soviet bloc, and particularly in Poland, claims also the necessity to delegate much of the state power to the autonomous bodies run at the grass roots level. See Stefan Bratkowski (1984).

20) There are some major differences in the Western world. In addition to the U.S., people are well to do in Holland, West Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and France - from $7,000 to $8,000. In Ireland ($3,076), Greece ($4,388) and Spain ($5,456) the private expenditure is much lower. In Italy, Austria, U.K., and Denmark it is at the level $6,000 to $7,000.

21) Organizational culture, according to E.H. Schein, is "a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (1985: 9). Artifacts and creations give an externalized testimony to a given culture, visible but not always easily decipherable. Values testable in the physical environment or only by social consensus are another level. However, the core of culture is in the basic assumptions on the relationship to the environment, nature of reality, time and space, nature of human activity, and the nature of human relationships (Schein 1980:4).

22) Culture of an organization contains, according to J.V. Maanen and Stephen R. Barley, the ecological context mapped along physical, temporal and social coordinates, differential interaction specific for a given category of people, collective understandings that develop among members of a group, the reproductive and adaptive capacity (Frost et al. 1985: 33-35).

23) The culture perspective brings, according to Linda Smirich, different mode of understanding organizations as arenas of legitimation. "Meanings become a central question" (Frost et al. 1985:63).

24) The totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, a style of expression, and a set of common understandings - all three of them have to be acknowledged according to Meryl Louis (Frost et al. 1985:74). Exploring both integration as well as the differentiation of a socially constructed reality, it is possible to study the dialectics of the opposite cultural paradigms, as this has been done for example by J. Martin, S.B. Sitkin, and M. Boehm (Ibid., pp.99-123).

25) Difference between the U.S. and Japanese business corporations in the employment policy is a good example of the cultural contingencies. The Japanese worker is expected to be a partner and participate in the business family. He is a member of the collective and his attitude versus the employer testifies his patriotism, honour of a citizen. Duties go much beyond the working hours. Selfishness is treated as
immoral (Alston 1985: 23-30). "Corporate employment in Japan is more than a contracted agreement. The employee accept the company much as a samurai accepted employment with a feudal lord. This relationship was lifelong and unlimited. A samurai was to follow the bushido or warrior's moral code, irrespective of the dangers or personal hardships involved. The bushido code stressed self-sacrifice and total loyalty through self-effacement" (ibid., p.33).

26) The West German public opinion is strongly on the side of the Western democracy. In the period 1950-77 the majority for political pluralism has grown from 53 % to 90 % and the option to limit the freedom of the speech has declined from 35 % to 13 % (Schwarz 1985: 96). The U.S. remains to be perceived as the most important partner (around 80 %) and the trust in it is the highest from all around Europe (ibid., p.102). However, among the young generation there is a tendency for neutralization and a more equal partnership with the West as well as with the East. The unification of Germany remains a distant dream. In the period 1994-84 the percent of those claiming that the West is stronger than the East has declined from 40 % to 15 % and the opposite view has grown from 23 % to 30 % (ibid., p.128). The opinion that a new world war is close has grown from 17 % to 72 % (ibid., p.130). Of course, only a small minority so far opposes the dominant trends of the West German society but it should not be underestimated. The conformistic and opportunistic style of life loses its roots in the society rich and secure enough to dream about something more than the consumer orientation. The danger of unemployment after studying for several years activates a critical perspective among the young people who have good reasons to worry about their future. Many creative people become just tired with the monotony of living in the welfare state which does not have the ability to secure jobs. Democracy, even if looking still "perfect" in many respects, does not excite these people who take for granted basic freedoms and look for inspiration somewhere else.

27) West Germany needs the U.S. in many respects but there are also some conflicting interests between them. As Sidney L. Jones sees it, West German products are in competition with the U.S. products, the leading role of the U.S. in the world economic recovery remains inadequate, the West German trade (one fifth of the West-East trade) with the Soviet bloc is the matter of the American objections, the duties of West Germany versus the European Community are sometimes in conflict with the U.S.-German relations, there are differences between both countries regarding the relationship to the developing part of the world (Cooney et al. 1985: 176-186). The neutralization of Germany may be much in the Soviet interest and any major deterioration of the U.S.-German relations may activate this option treated as a major danger by these European nations that suffered much during the World War II.

28) In the developing countries the domination of the state bureaucracy and the low professional potential of bureaucrats both provide a basis of a new elite formation. State is a source of power and privilege. The
ruling party focuses its activities on using the state for its own interests but meets the resistance from other pressure groups: civil servants, trade unions, professionals, students, local ethnic minorities, low paid categories of the population, the army. For example, in Zambia the permanently bad economic situation, especially in the non-urban areas (56% of population in 1981 but 77% in 1960), has pushed the ruling group to the concentration of power within the ruling party on expense not only of the other groups but also on expense of the rural areas. The decentralization reform was followed in reality by the considerable reinforcement of central steering (Bodemayer 1986).

Development of the country depends much on the capacity to make decisions and implement them, control the environment for the benefits of developmental goals. Public administration needs to have a capacity to penetrate the environment. The quality of the administrative structure as well as of the personnel both are of a great importance. The "feudal" bias of many public administrations in the developing areas is based on the local strong family tradition and the actual power relationships (Arora 1985). Ability, willingness and opportunity to participate remain low among the population. Administration has a strong vested interest to keep the whole power only for itself.

29) For example in West Germany during the period 1965-85 in the mid-income four person families the share of food in the family budget has declined from 30% to 17%, and the share of savings has grown from 5% to 13% (Die Zeit, 1986, 22: 24). The population reproduction rate of West Germany remains in the 1980s at a low level (0.60 in 1985), much below even the level of other developed countries. In the period 1981-86 the number of unemployed has doubled and the percent of those without full unemployment rent has grown from 43% to 62%.

30) The institutions of the democratic government need more cooperation with other institutions, particularly with the private business. Research and planning should be reinforced. More detailed information should be given to the public about the actual functioning of the state. The policies need a critical evaluation of their actual effectiveness. Incorporation of the rank-and-file initiatives into the functioning of the state is urgent. Opening to the mass media the channels of information and mutual consultation gain in importance. A flexible and therefore more efficient employment policy oriented towards the utilization of all possible means to multiply the new jobs is a necessity. Educational policy more emphasizing the quality learning is needed. Public health policy must be more cost conscious and prevention oriented.

31) This is particularly valid for North America but at the present time there is also much development in several European countries. About the recent West German trends see Staehle (1985), Beckerath et al. (1981), Bosetzky & Heinrich (1984), Hentze (1986), Joerger & Geppert (1983), Kieser & Kubicek (1978).
32) Jürgen Meyer (1985) studied private and public companies in West Germany employing together 10% of the total labour force. He compared the guidelines on goal-setting task definition, information, communication, decisionmaking, delegation of responsibility, control, performance evaluation, delegation of power, motivation, promotion, and compensation in 20 large enterprises and 20 public authorities. He also checked the practical relevance of the above mentioned guidelines by interviewing people and collecting survey data.

Policy guidelines in the private sector focus more on people, and in the public sector more on formal rules. Focus on objectives is also more evident in the former, when the latter emphasize cooperative management. As regards the organizational reality, in both sectors the authoritarian style prevails. However, the advancement by merit is more common in the private companies; there is a tendency in these companies to reward individual accomplishment. Policy guidelines in the private sector apply mainly to management when in the public sector they apply virtually to everybody. However, "only a small minority of the organizations studied actually had acted upon their policy guidelines with the sort of commitment and persistence which promised lasting and visible results" (Ibid., p.401).

J.Meyer comes to the conclusion that "In Germany today there are serious management problems in both the public and private sector. Motivation to work is low among Germans and falling, a sharp contrast to attitudes in many of the countries with which Germany must compete. Cooperative and collaborative management is indeed propagated, raising the hopes and expectations of many. But in practice, this type of management style is in fact rarely to be found" (Ibid., p.401). On the work morale in West Germany see Wolff & Göschel (1984).

33) However, one thing is to declare liberalism and another thing is to pay for it. The employment of women is very common but this does not mean that all workplaces taking advantages of their work pay attention to the specific problems and concerns of working mothers. There is a very liberal public attitude toward young couples cohabiting without marriage but this does not mean that the society takes enough into consideration the fate of children and single mothers. There is less insistence on faithfulness in marriage but the jealous feeling is growing (Klages 1983: 72). Many married and unmarried couples prefer to enjoy a higher life standard than to have children but the society as a whole suffers for many years of a negative population growth balance (the same is in East Germany).

34) In the period 1953–79 among Germans up to 30 years old the regular or at least irregular church attendance has declined from 42% to 16% among Protestants and from 79% to 36% among Roman Catholics (Noelle–Neumann & Piel 1983: 89).

35) In 1982/83 a high commitment to work was found in 41% of West Germans (54% in 1967) but 68% Americans, 66% British, 56%
Swedish and 79% Israelis. Less Germans (29%) than Americans (44%) or Swedish (49%) feel much committed to their current place of work (Rosenstiel 1985). Among the German civil servants, according to the data from the early 1970s, a half felt that they could fully utilize at work their personal capacities (Luhmann & Mayntz 1973: 303). Now this indicator would be probably lower.

It is also significant that the optimistic evaluation of the promotion criteria grows with the higher rank level (Ibid., p.213). There is an official intention to open to civil servants the chance of achieving excellence (Studienkommission 1973: 104, 378, 380) but this is not necessarily the reality as this may be seen from the statements of the professional association of civil servants (Der Beamtenbund, Dec. 1983:4). See also Peter Schäfer.

36) The income per each working person on average has grown by 27% in the period 1980-85. Since 1950 until 1984 the real GDP per one employed person has grown from DM 13,450 to DM 51,600 (four times growth in general, but 7 times in agriculture and 2.5 times in services) and the employed labour force has grown from 20 million to 25 million; in the same period the average number of working hours per year per one employee has declined by 30% (to 1,740), and the average number of hours per week has declined from 48 to 41. The share of agriculture, forestry and fishing has declined in the total real GDP from 7% to 3% and in the employment from 25% to 5%. West Germany has considerably diminished its distance from the U.S. level (in comparison if taking West Germany as 100 the U.S. GNP level per one inhabitant was 149 in 1960 and 123 in 1983), remained above Japan (47 in 1960 and 95 in 1983) and definitely gained over the U.K. (104 in 1960 and 86 in 1983) (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1985, 6:522).

37) The wage and salary income has grown in the period 1960-81 from 60% to 74% and has later declined to 70% in 1985. This means that self-employment still represents a substantial share; 10% of employment but 30% of income. The state expenditure is around 48% of GNP and it has become closer to the state income, 46.5% of GNP, in the last few years (the state income comes mostly from the direct taxes). In the period 1970-84 the per cent of German households on welfare has grown from 1.9 to 4.1; the number of people on welfare has almost doubled from 2,5% of the population to 4.1% (8% in Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin) (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1986, 2:136). Particularly growing is the number of those people on welfare who are just poor for not any particular reason. In the period 1980-85 unemployment has grown from 4.3% to 9.3% (this does not include people who are in retraining or lost in another way the chances to have the unemployment insurance). Among the unemployed 27% are in the age group up to 24 years old.

38) The self-employment has remained at the level of around 10%. The civil servants have grown from 7% to 9%. The workers have somewhat diminished from 46% to 40%. The white collar workers (excluding civil servants) have grown from 30% to 38% (Statistisches
1985: 100). Only 5% of working people are located in agriculture, forestry and fishing; 40% work in industrial production and 55% are in various services (in Canada resp. 5%, 22% and 73%; in France resp. 7%, 30%, and 63%) (Statistisches 1985: 657).

39) In the period 1950-84 export measured in the real GNP has grown from 12% to 35% and import from 7% to 30% (Wirtschaft und Statistik 1985, 6:438). The share of ready industrial products has grown in the period 1970-84 in import from 50% to 54% and in export it has declined from 86% to 84%. In 1985 food constituted 12% of import and 5% of export, and the raw materials resp 12% and 2%. In the period 1980-85 the real growth of import was 10% and the growth of the export was 30% (in it mostly ready goods).

40) Data for 1979-85 show that services have grown from 31% to 35% and production has declined from 44% to 41% but these are rather small changes. Trade and transportation, as well as agriculture, forestry and fishing have remained at the same level (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1985, 9:742).

41) In the whole economy there are 40% women.

42) In the per cent of real GNP the health expenditure has grown in the period 1970-83 from 6,3% to 8,0%, and by 47% in the real DM per one inhabitant.

43) The leisure orientation preferred over the work orientation has been definitely growing, especially among the young. For example, in the period 1962-74 those who enjoy primary the time free of work have grown from 36% to 51% in the age group 16-29 in comparison with only from 23% to 27% among those in the age groups 45-65 (Klages 1985: 108). The job satisfaction is definitely lower among those who are leisure oriented (Ibid., p.112).

44) One of the duties of the state is to help the single mothers. In the period 1965-78 the number of children born in marriage has declined per 1.000 population from 17 to 9 and the number of the children born outside of marriage has grown from 5% to 7% of all births. In the period 1960-84 the number of divorces per 10.000 existing marriages has grown from 35 to 87 (but the marriage law changed in 1977). The number of children declines with the growing employment of women.

45) In the intensity of investments the position of West Germany has diminished but this has happened also in other Western countries. The state consumption in 1983 was in West Germany higher than in Japan (70% of the German level) but much lower than in the U.S. (170% of the West-German level) or in the U.K. (137%). Data on table 1 show that FRG has a stable and strong position in the West with the economy growing (even if somewhat slower than before), hired labour keeping its position, but the self-employment and entrepreneurship also maintaining an active role. The development of Japan is definitely faster than in West Germany but this is somewhat related to the lower entry position.
46) In order to overcome all these shortcomings, appearing all around the world and even less in West Germany than in many other countries, there is a need to be innovative. Many tasks may be farmed out to private business, universities, research centres, or to the lower levels of civil service. Management by objectives may improve efficiency by clarifying the standards of performance.

47) Of all civil servants 15 % are in lower grades, 28 % in clerical grades, 47 % in the higher or executive grades, and 10 % in the senior or administrative grades (Siedentopf 1986:29).

48) Fortunately, there is enough of the adaptational potential in the West German civil service, evident for example in the practice of appointing political civil servants, as the contact men between politicians and the politically neutral basic core of civil service (Siedentopf 1986: 33-37). Now there is the appropriate time to modify the organizational culture of the public sector bringing it closer to the developments in the private sector. The training centres of public sector have in this respect a particularly important role.

49) In the EC the industrial production has remained at the same level in the last decade; the steel utilization per capita has declined in the period 1979-84 from 485 kg to 419 kg per capita. The share of EC in the world import and export has remained at the level of one third of the world trade in both cases, and the negative balance of trade has more than doubled. Only in the case of West Germany the opposite is true: the positive trade balance has doubled. The young people under 25 years of age constitute two fifths of the unemployed (the same is valid for women). The social welfare expenses in per cent of GDP have grown in the period 1975-83: in France from 23 % to 29 %, in Belgium from 24 % to 32 %, in Denmark from 26 % to 31 %, in the U.K. from 19 % to 24 %, in the Netherlands from 28 % 34 %, in Italy from 23 % to 27 %; in West Germany they have remained on the level of around 30 % (Statistische 1985: 129). In EC according to 1984 data 18 % of the labour force were self-employed or helping a self-employed person (13 % in Germany but 30 % in Italy and 51 % in Greece); 11 % were unemployed (only 5 % in 1979).

50) The real European interest seems to be actually not Germany being weak and under control of some "big brothers" but rather Germany being a strong democratic and economic factor focusing on the unity and wellbeing of all European countries. However, this is almost impossible as long the USSR fully controls East Germany and represents an aggressive potential. Is any possibility to weaken the imperial aspirations from the East? Only a major change in Russia may create such a chance. The inner-oriented Soviet policy focused on the social and economic reconstruction would be in demand of German help as well as peaceful contacts with whole Europe. The U.S. presence in Western Europe would lose importance. These would be a major invigoration of the European economics. German unity would become possible.
West Germans can overcome their own insecurities - so well described by B. Sauzday (1986) - only by making a major contribution to the mutual trust and cooperation on the European scale, including eastern Europe. So far this has not been done with enough energy and foresight. Internal insecurities will always be much reinforced by external threats as long as Germans will hesitate to engage themselves in the large scale projects beneficial for everybody in Europe. For example, the mass campaign of sending food parcels to hungry Poles was a good case of the genuine German goodwill. It seems that the altruistic orientation still remains relatively weak in West Germany; this is particularly evident in the lukewarm or even hostile attitude to the foreign workers employed in the FRG. The free market economy has been very beneficial for West Germans but it has loaded too much emphasis on the self interest to the detriment of civil virtues. The society consisting mainly of the egotistic individuals is not able to originate enough concern and helpfulness to the others (even to the German homeless individuals). The future of Germans depends much on the revival of altruism and international engagement of an obvious universal validity. For example, the help to the developing countries remains small in scale and inconsistent; quite often it benefits not those to whom it is officially oriented.

51) In the last few years industrial production has grown in Austria faster than in Western Europe and the unemployment has remained below 5% (in the European Community it has grown in the period 1976-86 from 5% to almost 11%). Most of people gainfully employed work for others (the self employed have declined from 33% to 14% in the period 1955-85). The industrial work productivity has grown by 21% in the period 1981-85. The real GDP is growing around 3% per year. The share of taxes in GDP has grown in the period 1960-84 from 30% to 42% but this is the same as in the European Community and much below the Swedish level of 51%. Strikes per one person gainfully employed are only a few minutes per year in comparison with several hours in Italy, Canada or the U.K. Social welfare funds have been growing faster then the real GDP (Wirtschaft 1986).

The improvement of the living standard may be best illustrated by the decline of food in the family expenditure from 48% to 23% in the period 1935-85. The differences in the living standard are not of a dramatic nature. In 1985 among all persons working for others 25% earned per month from ÖS 12,000 to ÖS 17,000, another 25% earned from ÖS 9,000 to ÖS 12,000; 25% earned below ÖS 9,000, and 25% earned over ÖS 17,000. In the first half of the 1980s the real income has remained at the same level. In the period 1976-85 the nominal income has grown by 73% for the manual workers, by 68% for the white collar workers, by 69% for the civil servants, and by 66% for the transport employees. The basic socio-economic distance is between top 10% who earn one third of the whole income and the lowest 10% who earn only 0.7% of the total income. Most of people are against the far reaching income differenciation (Fischer-Kowalski & Bucek, 1985).
52) For comparison, in Sweden there is a tendency to integrate various administrative levels on the basis of policy openness, cooperation, participation, explicit objectives, delegation of power to lower levels, rejection of the incrementalist improvisation, less reliance upon agreed compromise between interested parties and more upon the analysis of alternative policy opportunities.

The U.K. policies are much different than in Sweden: based on a continuous process of mutual adjustment between a plurality of autonomous policy makers, not explicit, overriding medium or long-term objectives, incremental in their nature, peacemeal, the allocation of responsibilities is ambiguous and confused, administrative secrecy being quite common, much flexibility, a network of understandings and practices most of which are unwritten, the system changing in detail every moment and in substance at frequent intervals, conflicts are common and dealt with on the basis of mutual trust (Jann 1986). In France and Italy the civil service takes a distance to politicians in order to preserve their own identity, authority, and vested interests.

53) In the comparative study of various national cultures G. Hofstede applied four dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. West Germany, Sweden, and the U.K. are moderate in power distance (very high in Phylliphines and very low in Austria). In uncertainty avoidance (very high in Greece and very low in Singapore. West Germany is much higher than the moderate standing of both remaining countries: Sweden and U.K. In individualism (very high in U.S. and U.K., very low in some developing countries) West Germany and Sweden are located in the upper part but much below the U.K. In masculinity Sweden is very low (Japan very high) and both remaining countries are relatively high. See Geert Hofstede. Culture's Consequences. International Differences in Work-Related Values. Beverley Hills, Cal.: Sage Publ., 1980.

54) In the Soviet bloc countries nomenklatura constitutes only a small percent of the population but it controls all power. Lenin has established a relatively small group of powerful and much privileged professional revolutionaries. Stalin has substituted this group by the much larger category of appointees carefully selected and even much more privileged but at the same time blindly subservient to the bosses. All important positions are reserved to these political appointees who move from one branch to another acting always as representants of the ultimate authority.

What is the chance of nomenklatura weakening its power or even entirely losing it? The potential of desintegration is always strong, especially when the local rulers are not able to deliver substantial successes as well as integrate the whole society. Exactly the chance of desintegration keeps the ruling class together: so far any part of this class does not imagine another model of ruling. The suppressive forces are focused on the prevention of any meaningful opposition. In East Germany there is a wide spread belief among the masses that nothing
can be done against the party/state - the collective mind, just opposite to the situation in Poland (Raport 1986; Hirszowicz 1986).

There are several conflicting interests between various bodies run by apparatchiks but they are not significant enough in order to challenge the status quo. On the other hand, the strength of nomenklatura in the long run depends on the ability to penetrate the whole society. East German people are not naive and they play their own games with the authorities; they pretend to be loyal but for probably most of them it is the matter of elementary security and expediency; they pretend to work but the actual output on average remains low. The ruling class imposes its values and norms on the whole society but the effect is far from being positive. New technology is a matter of necessity but the present day social organization of industry remains definitely opposed to innovations.
Sources


Böhr, Christoph: Vater Staat oder die Freiheit, die wir meinen. Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und die Welt, 1986, 25:3


