Bridging Qualified Majority and Unanimity Decision-Making in the EU

Tsebelis, George (February 2013) Bridging Qualified Majority and Unanimity Decision-Making in the EU. IHS Political Science Series 132

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Abstract: The EU has tried to bridge decision making by qualified majority and unanimity over the years by expanding qualified majorities (consensus) or by making unanimities easier to achieve. I call this decision-making procedure q-"unanimity" andtrace its history from the Luxembourg compromise to the Lisbon Treaty, and to more recent agreements. I analyze the most recent and explicit mechanism of this bridging (article 31 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty) and identify one specific means by which the transformation of qualified majorities to unanimities is achieved: the reduction of precision or scope of the decision, so that different behaviors can be covered by it. I provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism by analyzing legislative decisions. Finally, I argue that this bridging is a ubiquitous feature of EU institutions, used in Treaties as well as in legislative decision-making.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Lisbon Treaty' 'Article 31' 'Qualified Majority' 'Q-Unanimity' 'Decision-Making' 'Foreign Policy' 'Social Choice Theory' 'Tatonnement Process' 'Veto-Players' 'Co-Decision' 'Consultation'
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:39
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2017 05:19
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2183

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