The Flexibility of Constitutional Design: Enlargement and the Council of the European Union

Hosli, Madeleine O. (June 2004) The Flexibility of Constitutional Design: Enlargement and the Council of the European Union. IHS Political Science Series 97

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Abstract: The choice of a decision rule for the Council of the EU constitutes a trade-off in terms of decreased sovereignty for individual governments versus an increased 'capacity to act'. The provisions of the draft constitutional treaty would considerably increase constitutional flexibility regarding day-to-day decision-making in the EU, but without adequately protectingthe interests of the citizens of smaller and medium-sized member states. By comparison, provisions foreseen in the Treaty of Nice, which essentially amount to the implementation of a 'triple-majority rule' in Council decision-making, would lower the Council's capacity to act, but would lead to a more moderate 're-balancing' in favor of larger EU states. Finally, thepaper provides background calculations indicating that, with twenty-five member states, the EU risks being unable to reach intergovernmental agreement and hence, a challenging issue for the EU is to move towards provisions allowing for its own constitution, once adopted, to be amended.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Europäische Verfassung' 'Abstimmungsregeln' 'Europäischer Rat' 'Vertrag von Nizza' 'Qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidungen' 'European Constitution' 'Decision Rules' 'European Council' 'Nice Treaty' 'Qualified majority voting'
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:38
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2017 04:36
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1576

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