Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius and Muir, Allan and Yannelis, Nicholas C. (February 2004) Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. IHS Economics Series 148

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Abstract: We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Differential information economy' 'Rational expectations equilibrium' 'Coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility' 'Implementation' 'Game trees' 'Private core' 'Weak fine core' 'Interim weak fine core'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C71, C72, D5, D82
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:37
Last Modified: 21 Jul 2017 05:06
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1546

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