Dynamical Modeling of the Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma

Dorofeenko, Victor and Shorish, Jamsheed (November 2002) Dynamical Modeling of the Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma. IHS Economics Series 124

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Abstract: Epstein (1998) demonstrates that in the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game it is possible to sustain cooperation in a repeated game played on a finite grid, where agents are spatially distributed and of fixed strategy type ('cooperate' or'defect') . We introduce a methodology to formalize the dynamical equations for a population of agents distributed in space and in wealth, which form a system similar to the reaction-diffusion type. We determine conditions for stable zones of sustained cooperation in a one-dimensional version of the model. Defectors are forced out of cooperation zones due to a congestion effect, and accumulate at the boundaries.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Prisoner's dilemma' 'Demographic' 'Active media' 'Reaction-diffusion'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C61, C73
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:37
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2017 04:28
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1459

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