The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games

Demichelis, Stefano and Ritzberger, Klaus and Swinkels, Jeroen M. (June 2002) The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games. IHS Economics Series 115

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Abstract: Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensiveform games.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Perfect information' 'Subgame perfection' 'Equilibrium correspondence'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C72
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:37
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2017 12:45
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1425

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