Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU

Levinsky, Rene and Silarszky, Peter (March 1998) Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU. Reihe Osteuropa / East European Series 56

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Abstract or Table of Contents

Abstract: In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union (EU). The goal of this paper is to evaluate the voting power of the member states after the entry of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyse the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'EU Enlargement' 'EU Decision Making' 'A Priori Unions' 'Shapley Value'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): D72
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:36
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2016 14:10
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1059

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