Wage Bargaining and Management Opposition in the Presence of Productivity Gains and Organization Costs

Riedl, Arno (October 1997) Wage Bargaining and Management Opposition in the Presence of Productivity Gains and Organization Costs. IHS Economics Series 49

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Abstract: Empirical studies have emphasized three important factors in firm-labor relationships: (a) organization costs of workers, (b) management opposition against workers' organizing drives, (c) the possibility of productivity enhancing effects due to "voice/response" reasons. In this paper the interplay of all three issues is simultaneously analyzed. The possibility of forgone productivity gains puts an upper bound on management opposition against organizing drives of the workers, even if management opposition is cost-less. Strategic gift exchange - less opposition for higher productivity - plays a crucial role. Decreasing productivity gains and increasing the firm's bargaining power lowers management opposition. The equilibrium wage is above the workers' reservation wage.;

Item Type: IHS Series
Keywords: 'Wage Bargaining' 'Management Opposition' 'Productivity Gains' 'Organization Costs'
Classification Codes (e.g. JEL): C78, J50, J51
Status: Published
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2014 10:36
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2016 17:13
URI: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1021

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